


U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies & Concepts (1970 - 2009)

With Context & Insights for the U.S. Navy of 2009 & Beyond

Peter M. Swartz
with Karin Duggan



MISC D0019819.A1/Final
February 2009

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Approved for distribution:

February 2009



Dr. Thomas Bowditch
Director
Strategic Initiatives Group

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
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Overview

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Dedication

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- ◆ Five OPNAV Strategy & Concepts Branch (N513) staff officers died or were severely wounded in the line of duty in the attack on the Pentagon, September 11, 2001
 - ◆ CAPT Bob Dolan USN
 - ◆ Branch head
 - ◆ LCDR Bill Donovan
 - ◆ LCDR Pat Dunn
 - ◆ LCDR Dave Williams USN
 - ◆ LT Kevin Shaeffer USN
- ◆ This study is respectfully dedicated in their honor

Outline

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- I. Intro: What this is all about
- II. How each document was written
- III. Comparisons, constants & changes
- IV. Analyzing capstone documents
- V. How to write the next one



What this is



- ◆ A baseline study
 - ◆ In briefing slide format
 - ◆ In one volume, for ease of use in follow-on studies
- ◆ The foundation for a future set of more advanced study documents
 - ◆ Will be divided into several volumes, for ease of reading
 - ◆ With written text added to explain each slide

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Why this study? And why now?



- ◆ USN developed a “New Maritime Strategy” (2005-07)
- ◆ As part of development process, USN wanted:
 - ◆ Record of previous such endeavors
 - ◆ Useful insights drawn from that record
- ◆ Subsequently, USN wanted:
 - ◆ Record of development of “new maritime strategy” itself
 - ◆ Record of development of four 2009 documents derived from new maritime strategy

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The utility of looking at the record



The past is our best guide to the future.

Actually, the past is our only guide to the future; it is the sole source of evidence. Since the future, by definition and the laws of physics, has yet to happen, any and every claim about the future is guesswork; it is theory, speculation.

If history, by your choice, is a closed book to you, and the future -- the focus of your interest -- has yet to happen, what remains? The answer is the present and the lessons you derive from your personal life experience. These aids to wisdom are unlikely to be impressive.

Colin Gray, "Coping with Uncertainty: Dilemmas of Defense Planning" *Comparative Strategy* (2008)

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Premise



"I believe in the power of our past to inspire and instruct."

ADM Michael Mullen, USN
Chief of Naval Operations
22 July 2005
U.S. Naval Academy
Annapolis, Maryland

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Purpose of this study & follow-on studies

- ◆ To identify, organize & present data on development & influence of USN capstone documents, 1970-2009
- ◆ To analyze the data and make comparisons, judgments & recommendations to inform current and future USN capstone document efforts

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What this study can do

- ◆ Help USN better understand why it is what it is today
- ◆ Help foster thinking about appropriate USN roles in the future
- ◆ Help inform USN decisions on formulation and dissemination of new capstone documents
 - ◆ Identify stages in document development, dissemination
 - ◆ Give range of USN options & choices; “best practices”
- ◆ Provide context, perspective to USN staff officers
- ◆ Provide a basis for more sophisticated analyses

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Limits of this study (I)

- ◆ Study cannot definitively ensure or predict future “success;” What will “work” & what won’t
- ◆ It also cannot definitively explain what “worked” in the past
 - ◆ Valid measures of effectiveness (MOEs) difficult to identify, calculate & compare
 - ◆ Every situation has important unique characteristics
 - ◆ Few past efforts to measure “success” beyond anecdotes
 - ◆ Past data on “success” missing, uneven &/or uncertain

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Limits of this study (II)

- ◆ Study does not focus on:
 - ◆ Allied, coalition, national security, defense, joint or other service or agency strategies and documents
 - ◆ Except as they relate to US Navy capstone strategy & concept documents
- ◆ Study does not provide full texts of each document
 - ◆ Available in related Naval War College “Newport Paper” series

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Study analyzes documents

- ◆ There is a range of options to choose from in organizing an analysis of the evolution of strategic-level thinking
 - ◆ Ideas
 - ◆ Events
 - ◆ Personalities
 - ◆ Documents
- ◆ This study focuses on & is organized by *documents*
- ◆ Why? Designed principally to help future Navy strategic-level document-writers

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Caveat

- ◆ Essence of post-WW II US Navy is *operations*
 - ◆ Specifically: Global forward operations in peacetime, crises & war
- ◆ Most post-WW II US Navy officers most of the time have been at-sea operators, or direct enablers of operations, not desk-bound “scribes”
- ◆ Focus of study, however, is on *documents*, not operations
 - ◆ Necessarily focuses on USN officers as “scribes”
 - ◆ No intent to slight importance of activities of operators, or of scribes when on operational tours, in contributing to US Navy & to the Nation

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Strategy, operations, & tactics

- ◆ Levels of war
 - ◆ Strategy
 - ◆ Operations
 - ◆ Tactics
- ◆ Inter-related
 - ◆ Strategy *requires* tactics (“top-down” construct)
 - ◆ Tactics *can enable* strategy (“bottom-up” construct)
- ◆ USN operators mostly focus on tactical level at sea
- ◆ Study focus, however, is on *strategic* level of war

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Study origins: 14 April 2005

- ◆ “3/1 Strategy Workshop” at Lockheed–Martin offices
 - ◆ POC: CAPT Robby Harris USN (Ret)
 - ◆ Director, Advanced Concepts
 - ◆ To inform “3/1 Strategy” construct
- ◆ Original request
 - ◆ Look at
 - ◆ *The Maritime Strategy* (1982-9)
 - ◆ . . . *From the Sea* (1992)
 - ◆ *Forward . . . From the Sea* (1994)
 - ◆ Answer questions
 - ◆ What were they?
 - ◆ What prompted these initiatives?
 - ◆ What was the Effect?
 - ◆ Keys to Success?
- ◆ But . . . we found that there were many more

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Analytic approach

- ◆ Understand the question
- ◆ Gather data: Documents and interviews
- ◆ Find patterns in the data
- ◆ Analyze the patterns & make comparisons
- ◆ Make judgments & recommendations

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Methodology

- ◆ Empower an experienced analyst/ SME
- ◆ Conduct extensive naval, academic literature review
- ◆ Conduct interviews & personal correspondence
- ◆ Conduct conference, workshops. Surface data, issues
- ◆ Draft, present strawman briefs, as “murder boards”
- ◆ Provide updated briefs & circulate successive drafts within wide network, for review & criticism
 - ◆ Include sponsors, USN, retired USN, outside USN
- ◆ Develop typologies from data & analyses
- ◆ Improve data and analysis; develop recommendations
- ◆ Socialize approach, findings prior to final publication

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Methodological difficulties

- ◆ Proof is impossible
- ◆ Too many interacting military, political, bureaucratic, economic & human factors to track
- ◆ Impossibility of untangling all relationships
- ◆ Difficulty in finding data
 - ◆ Very sparse and unbalanced literature
- ◆ Difficulty in finding *accurate* data
 - ◆ Memories can be thin reeds
- ◆ Precise parallels between past & present & *future* are speculative

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Terminology & definitions: difficult issues

- ◆ This study
 - ◆ Identifies, acknowledges, & discusses the issues
 - ◆ Does not address these issues definitively
- ◆ Worthy of further study & analysis

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What are “capstone documents?”

- ◆ Criteria
 - ◆ General, over-arching “Washington-level” documents
 - ◆ Convey fundamental beliefs about the application of US naval power
 - ◆ Intended to inform USN subordinate commands & documents
 - ◆ “Ref A”
 - ◆ CNO involvement, visibility, signature
 - ◆ A couple of exceptions
- ◆ Self-descriptions are of little help
 - ◆ “Strategies,” “concepts,” “visions,” “strategic plans,” etc.
 - ◆ Few formal definitions
 - ◆ Even formal definitions change over time

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Terminology: USN capstone documents

- ◆ At least 25+ “capstone” strategy & concepts documents since 1970
 - ◆ Some explicitly said they were “strategy” or “strategic”
 - ◆ E.g.: *The Maritime Strategy, Navy Strategic Plan*
 - ◆ Some explicitly said they were “visions” or “concepts”
 - ◆ Others said they were something else, but contained important elements of *strategy* or *vision*
 - ◆ E.g.: “Navy Policy Book, Fleet Response Plan”
- ◆ Most—even those labeled “strategy”—have occasioned debates as to whether or not they really were “strategies”

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25+ Capstone Documents: 1970-2009

◆ <i>Project SIXTY & Missions of the U.S. Navy</i>	1970, 1974, 1998
◆ <i>Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (5)</i>	1975-78, 1985
◆ <i>See Plan 2000</i>	1978
◆ <i>CNO Strategic Concepts & Future of U.S. Sea Power</i>	1979
◆ <i>The Maritime Strategy (8)</i>	1982-1990
◆ <i>The Way Ahead</i>	1991
◆ <i>The Navy Policy Book</i>	1992
◆ <i>... From the Sea</i>	1992
◆ <i>NDP 1: Naval Warfare</i>	1994
◆ <i>Forward...From the Sea</i>	1994
◆ <i>Navy Operational Concept (NOC)</i>	1997
◆ <i>Anytime, Anywhere</i>	1997
◆ <i>Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) (2)</i>	1999 & 2000
◆ <i>See Power 21 & Global CONOPS</i>	2002
◆ <i>Naval Power 21 . . . A Naval Vision</i>	2002
◆ <i>Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO)</i>	2003
◆ <i>Fleet Response Plan (FRP)</i>	2003
◆ <i>Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 08</i>	2006
◆ <i>Naval Operations Concept (NOC)</i>	2006
◆ <i>Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10</i>	2007
◆ <i>A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seepower</i>	2007
◆ <i>Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 (Change 1)</i>	2007
◆ <i>Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11</i>	2009
◆ <i>Naval Operations Concept (NOC)</i>	2009
◆ <i>NDP 1: Naval Warfare</i>	2009
◆ <i>Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 12</i>	2009

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No in-depth analysis here of: (I)

- ◆ Unsigned & aborted draft efforts
 - ◆ *Won if by Sea (1990)*
 - ◆ *The Strategic Concept of the Naval Service (1992)*
 - ◆ *NDP 3: Naval Operations (1995-6)*
 - ◆ *Power and Influence . . . From the Sea*
 - ◆ *2020 Vision (1996)*
 - ◆ *Naval Operational Concept (1997)*
 - ◆ *4X4 Strategy (1998)*
 - ◆ *Beyond the Sea . . . (1998-9)*
 - ◆ *Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century (1999-2001)*
 - ◆ *Navy Strategic Planning Guidance 2001 (2000)*
 - ◆ *21st Century Navy (2000)*
 - ◆ *3/1 Strategy (2005)*
 - ◆ *Navy Operating Concept (2006)*

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No in-depth analysis here of: (II)

- ◆ 2 USN “Transformation Roadmaps” (2002, 2003)
- ◆ 3 USN-USCG “National Fleet” policy statements (1998, 2002, 2006)
- ◆ CNO Guidance (CNOGs) & Navy Objectives
- ◆ ONI products (e.g., *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*)
- ◆ Influential in-house USN studies & analyses
- ◆ Unofficial efforts

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No in-depth analysis here of: (III)

- ◆ USN annual “Capstone” communications to the Congress
 - ◆ Annual Navy “Posture Statements” (through FY 2000, & resumed)
 - ◆ Navy testimony before Congress
 - ◆ Annual Navy “Vision/Presence/Power” brochures (since 1993)
 - ◆ Annual Navy “Budget Highlights” documents

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Posture Statements, Program Guides, Budget Highlights



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Posture Statements & Program Guides (I)

- ◆ Annual general pubs justifying Navy overall budget requests to Congress
- ◆ First chapter normally presents Navy policy & strategy
 - ◆ Not always comprehensive (e.g.: *FY 07 Program Guide*)
- ◆ Reflect current CNO & OPNAV thinking
- ◆ Short-term influence: one year; but opportunity for continuity

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Posture Statements & Program Guides (II)

- ◆ Last glossy Navy Posture Statement: for FY 2000
 - ◆ SECDEF Rumsfeld cancelled all glossy service posture statements for FY 2001 & later
 - ◆ But still published as initial CNO FY budget testimony
- ◆ 1st annual Navy Program Guide (*Force 2001*) published for FY 93
 - ◆ Became *Vision...Presence...Power* in FY 1998
 - ◆ Became *Sea Power for a New Era* in 2006
 - ◆ No program guide published in 2008 for FY 09

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Were capstone documents “strategies”?

- ◆ Or were they
 - ◆ Doctrines?
 - ◆ Concepts?
 - ◆ Strategic concepts?
 - ◆ Concepts of operations?
 - ◆ Visions?
 - ◆ Philosophies or styles of warfare?
 - ◆ Policies?
 - ◆ Guidance?
 - ◆ Analysis?
 - ◆ Public relations?
 - ◆ Ethos? Creeds?
- ◆ Definitions differ – & change over time – for each

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Terminology: Authorities & reality

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- ◆ Agreed DOD joint definitions
 - ◆ Joint Pub 1-02 *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (2007)
 - ◆ Evolves over time. Continuously updated
- ◆ Navy definitions
 - ◆ NTRP 1-02 *Naval Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (2006)
 - ◆ Superseded NWP 1-02 (1995) & NWP-3 (pre-1995)
- ◆ Navy usage
 - ◆ Often at variance with formal joint & Navy definitions



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Terminology: Scattered among sources (I)

CNA

- ◆ Example #1: “Missions & capabilities” (in 2009)

◆ Sea control operations	Joint
◆ Power projection	Navy
◆ Maritime power projection	Joint
◆ Forward presence	Navy
◆ Strategic deterrence	Joint
◆ Humanitarian assistance/DR	----- -----
◆ Humanitarian & civil assistance	Joint
◆ Foreign HA, Foreign DA	Joint
◆ Maritime security operations (MSO)	----- -----
◆ Maritime interception operations (MIO)	Navy



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Terminology: Scattered among sources (II)

◆ Example #2: "Warfare tasks" (in 2009)

◆ Strike warfare	Navy
◆ Amphibious operations	Joint
◆ Anti-air warfare	Navy
◆ Anti-submarine warfare	Joint
◆ Anti-surface warfare	-----
◆ Surface warfare	Joint
◆ Mine warfare	Joint
◆ Naval special warfare	Navy
◆ Electronic warfare	Joint
◆ Information operations	Joint



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What is “strategy”? (I)



The concept of “strategy” has proven notoriously difficult to define. Many theorists have attempted it, only to see their efforts wither beneath the blasts of critics

. . . Straightforward definitions go fundamentally astray, for strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate.

Williamson Murray & Mark Grimsby
“Introduction: On Strategy”
The Making of Strategy (1994)

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What is “strategy”? (II)



- ◆ Enormous literature. Numerous definitions

- ◆ Definitions evolve & diverge

- ◆ Joint Pub 1-02 (1994): “The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat”

- ◆ Joint Pub 1-02 (2008): “A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives”

“This definition is bureaucratically appealing, politically correct, and relatively useless”

Gabriel Marcella & Steven Fought,
“Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century,”
JFQ 1st qtr 2009

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What is “strategy”? (III)



- ◆ *Strategy = plan of action*

- ◆ Choosing & using certain *Means* → in chosen *Ways*
→ to achieve certain specific *Ends*

- ◆ In a given *Context*

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What is a “Navy strategy”?



- ◆ The US Navy's theory about how its forces contribute to US national security
 - ◆ A set of concepts & arguments
- ◆ It should coherently enumerate, think through, lay out, & ideally *prioritize*:
 - ◆ Maritime components of threats to the nation
 - ◆ Strategies those threats are likely to employ
 - ◆ Reasons why these threats & strategies are salient
 - ◆ Optimal potential Navy operations to counter those threats & strategies
 - ◆ Reasons how & why these operations will work

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Navy, naval & maritime strategy



- ◆ All include “how the U.S. Navy is/should be used”
- ◆ *Naval* strategy sometimes also means “include USMC”
- ◆ *Maritime* strategy sometimes means “include USCG”
 - ◆ Maritime industries believe it should include them too
- ◆ *Maritime strategy* has also meant “a type of total national strategy”
 - ◆ As opposed to a *continental strategy*

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"Naval Strategy:" The Navy's formal definition

The use of naval forces (including naval aviation and Marine forces) to achieve naval objectives determined by national strategy, with the overall objective of controlling the seas and denying to an enemy the use of those sea areas important to enemy operations

- ◆ Virtually unchanged in 20+ years
 - ◆ NTRP 1-02 *Navy Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Aug 2006)
 - ◆ NWP 1-02 *Navy Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Jun 1995)
 - ◆ NWP 3 (Rev. D) *Naval Terminology* (Feb 1985)
- ◆ Exclusive focus on sea control

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"Strategy" & "doctrine"

- ◆ Most of the documents examined are closer to "doctrine" than to "strategy"
 - ◆ "Doctrine" is abstract, conceptual & general
 - ◆ "Strategy" has a particular context
 - ◆ The Navy formally says "doctrine" is an essential bridge between "strategy" & "Tactics, Techniques & Procedures" (TTP) (NDP 1)
 - ◆ "Strategy" is a more positive term in USN than "doctrine"
 - ◆ "USN is wary of doctrine"
 - ◆ "What little doctrine the Navy has it ignores in favor of operational flexibility"
 - ◆ Few USN mechanisms to ensure knowledge of doctrine
 - ◆ Strong contrast with joint system & other services, esp/ US Army

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“Strategy” & “concepts”



- ◆ Dictionary definition of *concepts*: “General ideas”
- ◆ Joint forces definition of *concepts*: “Future-oriented; “beyond the FYDP”
- ◆ Navy usage: Closer to dictionary than joint usage
 - ◆ Sister service usage tracks with Joint definition
- ◆ “Operational”, “operating” & “operations” concepts
 - ◆ Have specific, future-oriented meanings in joint usage
 - ◆ Navy view is they are closer to “capstone doctrines”

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“Strategy” & “strategic concepts”



- ◆ “Strategic concept”
 - ◆ Popularized by Samuel Huntington in 1954
 - ◆ Periodically used by Navy and naval commentators
 - ◆ No official joint definition
- ◆ Some Navy “strategy” documents may really be “strategic concepts”
 - ◆ *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (2007)

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“Strategy” & “concepts of operations”



- ◆ Concept of operations (CONOPS)
 - ◆ A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. (JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary* (2008))
- ◆ Fleet Warfighting CONOPS
 - ◆ “A written document specifying how the Fleet will employ . . . capabilities . . . to effectively and efficiently perform the missions assigned by the COCOM to naval forces”
(COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 5401.1, *Fleet Concept of Operations Development* (2007))

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“Strategy” & “vision”



- ◆ Visions, like concepts, are future-oriented

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“Strategy” & warfare philosophies, styles, types (I)

- ◆ Usually discussed in pairs, as polar opposites
- ◆ One pole often used as a “straw man”
 - ◆ Annihilation vs. attrition
 - ◆ Attrition vs. maneuver
 - ◆ Attrition vs. effects-based operations (EBO)
 - ◆ Conventional vs. nuclear (or strategic)
 - ◆ Conventional vs. unconventional (or guerrilla)
 - ◆ Irregular vs. regular (or conventional)
 - ◆ Asymmetric vs. symmetric
 - ◆ “3-block war,” hybrid war vs. single-type

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“Strategy” & “warfare philosophies” or “styles” (II)

- ◆ “Attrition warfare” vs. “maneuver warfare”
- ◆ Characterized USMC writings: Late 1980s onward
- ◆ Adopted in several subsequent Navy & naval capstone documents
- ◆ Large literature analyzing “maneuver vs. attrition”
- ◆ Terms defined as “philosophies” in *Navy Supplement to Joint Pub 1-02 (NTRP 1-02)*
 - ◆ Not part of US joint lexicon (*Joint Pub 1-02*)

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“Strategy” & “policy”

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Expanded post-World War II use of term “strategy” to encompass “policy”

I know of no way to make a sharp, easy distinction between policy & strategy. They blend & overlap. Both provide guidance for plans & operations.

Policy . . . provides guidance under which officials work to attain an effect desired.

Policy must dominate strategy; strategy influences policy

RADM (Ret) Henry Eccles

“Strategy – The Theory & Application”

Naval War College Review (1979)

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“Strategy” & “guidance”

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- ◆ “Guidance” normally refers specifically to direction given to develop the Navy Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and the Navy budget
- ◆ Can contain elements of strategy
- ◆ Audience is chiefly DON Washington-area military & civilian staff charged with POM & budget development

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"Strategy" & "analysis"

- ◆ SECNAV Claytor, USN Woolsey, later SECNAV Lehman saw them as antithetical in late 1970s/80s
 - ◆ "Strategy" often equated w/ "professional military judgment"
 - ◆ Believed OSD emphasis on quantitative policy analysis de-valued, eviscerated strategy & "intellectual audacity"
 - ◆ Saw aspects of campaign analysis as pernicious
 - ◆ "How much is enough?" = "the wrong question" for navies
 - ◆ Analytic focus on scenarios & marginal changes downplayed
 - ◆ Lessons from historical experience
 - ◆ Need for flexibility in face of uncertainty
 - ◆ Role of naval forces in seamless transitions from peace to crises to war
 - ◆ Also saw "analysis" as cover for OSD subjective judgment
- ◆ "Peaceful coexistence" in 1990s & 2000s
 - ◆ Campaign analyses central to USN programming in 2000s

"Strategy" & "The Navy Story"

- ◆ Drafters often conflated "strategy" with "public relations"
- ◆ Some documents were designed to increase public and congressional support for the Navy
- ◆ Terming them "strategies" and "strategic concepts" was seen as giving them a respectability that furthered this aim

“Strategy, “Ethos,” & “Creed”



- ◆ “Navy Ethos” (Nov 2008)
 - ◆ To define USN’s “distinguishing character, culture, guiding beliefs”
 - ◆ Short statement of values
 - ◆ CNO ADM Roughead directed development in CNOG 2007-8
 - ◆ Product of Navy-wide solicitation for inputs
 - ◆ Criticized for being too long, not focused enough on combat
 - ◆ Not announced as part of 2007-9 capstone document “trifecta”
 - ◆ *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Navy Strategic Plan, Naval Operations Concept*
- ◆ “Sailor’s Creed” (1993; 1994 rev, 1997 rev)

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Our approach



- ◆ Does not further analyze debates on nature of strategy, concepts, vision, doctrine, etc.
- ◆ Lines between policy & strategy, strategy & operations, and strategy & doctrine can be fuzzy
- ◆ This study eschews definitional rigor to more clearly show context and sweep of Navy thinking

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Can/should the USN have a strategy?


CNA

- ◆ Yes. It's the service's responsibility to:
 - ◆ Describe & amplify on global maritime aspects of national military strategy
 - ◆ Recommend changes and professional judgments
 - ◆ Organize, train & equip coherently, now and in future
- ◆ Others often don't agree
 - ◆ Joint Staff, combatant commander staffs
 - ◆ Civilian & military defense specialists
 - ◆ Believe services can have "visions," "policies," "doctrines," etc., but not "strategies"
 - ◆ "Strategy" = domain of joint staffs

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Why strategies, concepts & visions? (I)

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Samuel P. Huntington
"National Policy and the
Transoceanic Navy"
Naval Institute *Proceedings*
(May 1954)

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Why strategies, concepts & visions? (II)

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- ◆ “The fundamental element of a military service is its purpose or role in implementing national policy. The statement of this role may be called the *strategic concept* of the service.”

- ◆ “If a military service does not possess such a concept, it becomes purposeless, it wallows about amid a variety of conflicting and confusing goals, and ultimately it suffers both physical and moral degradation.”

Huntington (1954)

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Why strategies, concepts & visions? (III)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ “If a service does not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and the political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence, and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resource of society.”

- ◆ “A military service capable of meeting one threat to the national security loses its reason for existence when that threat weakens or disappears. If the service is to continue to exist, it must develop a new strategic concept related to some other security threat.”

Huntington (1954)

Why strategies, concepts & visions? (IV)



- ◆ Two audiences:
 - ◆ “The public and the political leaders”
 - ◆ The “military service” itself

Huntington (1954)

The four functions of (grand) strategies



- ◆ A guide for the allocation of scarce resources
- ◆ Helps complex organizations coordinate their activities
- ◆ Communicate interests to others (potential adversaries, allies & friends)
- ◆ Permit criticism & correction; organize public discourse; allow for policy evaluation

—Barry R. Posen

“A Grand Strategy of Restraint” (June 2008)

Kinds of strategies

- ◆ Declaratory strategy (our topic)
- ◆ Deployment strategy
- ◆ Planned employment strategy
- ◆ Actual employment strategy
- ◆ Force architecture strategy
- ◆ Personnel and training strategy

Issues:

- ◆ Which, if any, leads others?
- ◆ Alignment


59

Parallel tracks vice sequencing

It's less like this...



...And more like this



...with limited feedback

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Why start with 1970?

CNA

- ◆ Familiar. Spans living USN memory.
- ◆ An obvious, traceable trail of successive CNO involvement, commitment, & visibility begins
- ◆ US naval power vocabulary transformed in 1970
- ◆ Not to say that there were no USN strategies/concepts/visions/ strategic plans etc. before 1970

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200 years of USN strategic thought (I)

CNA

- ◆ 1775-6 Continental Congress Naval Committee & Naval Commissioners orders: interdiction
- ◆ 1777-83 Capt John Paul Jones correspondence
- ◆ 1798+ SECNAV *Reports to the Congress*
- ◆ 1800s: Adams, Hamilton, Jefferson & USN supporters writings
- ◆ 1812: Navy captains letters to SECNAV
- ◆ 1830s *Naval Magazine* articles
- ◆ 1821 Capt Elliot et al. in Fortifications (Bernard) Board report on coast defense

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200 years of USN strategic thought (II)



- ◆ 1851: USN officer reports to SECNAV on coast defense strategy
 - ◆ Esp. Dupont *Report on National Defences*
- ◆ 1861: CAPT Dupont & Blockade Board
- ◆ 1861-5: SECNAV Mallory (CSA): commerce-raiding & homeland defense
- ◆ 1870s: Adm Porter: Commerce-raiding & homeland defense
- ◆ 1874+ Naval Institute *Proceedings* articles
- ◆ 1881-2 Adm Rodgers et al., Naval Advisory Board reports

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200 years of USN strategic thought (III)



- ◆ 1885+: Naval War College lectures, papers, games
- ◆ 1889: SECNAV Tracy *Report to the Congress*
- ◆ 1890 Navy Dept. *Report of the Policy Board*
- ◆ 1890s+ CAPT A.T. Mahan writings
 - ◆ Sea power through decisive battle fleet action
- ◆ 1900-50: General Board of the Navy
 - ◆ Strategy & policy studies & memoranda
 - ◆ *U.S. Naval Policy* (1922)

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200 years of USN strategic thought (IV)

- ◆ 1900s: *War Plan Black* (vs Germany)
- ◆ 1916: RADM Bradley A. Fiske, *The Navy as a Fighting Machine*
 - ◆ Forward fleet ops
- ◆ 1920s & 30s:
 - ◆ *War Plan Orange* (vs Japan)
 - ◆ Rainbow Plans
- ◆ 1940s: World War II
 - ◆ ADM Harold Stark & "Plan Dog"
 - ◆ Germany first
 - ◆ FADM Ernest J. King & global offensive
 - ◆ Membership in new Joint Chiefs of Staff

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200 years of USN strategic thought (V)

- ◆ Mid-late 1940s: Cold War & containment
 - ◆ Emergence of a coherent global, offensive "transoceanic" strategy,
 - ◆ Quick response, protracted war, nuclear strikes, persistent combat-credible forward presence
 - ◆ Focus on Mediterranean theater, NATO naval ally support (1949)
 - ◆ Fleet balance: Shift from PAC to LANT
 - ◆ JCS PINCHER war plan vs. USSR (1946)
 - ◆ DCNO (OPS) VADM Sherman, "Presentation to the President" (1947)
 - ◆ CNO FADM Nimitz, "*The Future Employment of Naval Forces*" (1947)
 - ◆ General Board of the Navy (CAPT A. Burke), *National Security and Navy Contributions Thereto Over the Next Ten Years* (1948)

66

200 years of USN strategic thought (VI)

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- ◆ 1950s: Continued Cold War
 - ◆ Naval strategy diffused
 - ◆ Limited wars, finite nuclear deterrence, naval alliances, regional presence, East Asia focus, ASW, homeland defense
 - ◆ CNO ADM Burke (1955-1961)
 - ◆ No public statements on national or naval strategy or policy
 - ◆ No CNO-signed "capstone documents"
 - ◆ NWP 10 *Naval Warfare*

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Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (I)

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Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Evolving document series (1954-1970)
 - ◆ May 1954 *NWP 10*
 - ◆ Same date as Huntington *Proceedings* article
 - ◆ 1956-60 *NWP 10 (Changes 1-4)*
 - ◆ Nov 1961 *NWP 10(A)*
 - ◆ April 1970 *NWP 10(B)*



Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (II)

CNA
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- ◆ Signed by RADM
 - ◆ ADCNO, Fleet Ops & Readiness
 - ◆ Roughly equivalent (in 2009) to N31
 - ◆ (Contrast w/ later CNO signatures on NWP 1 & NDP 1)



Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (III)

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- ◆ Contents
 - ◆ Concepts of national power, national security, sea power
 - ◆ Control of the seas
 - ◆ Organization for US national security
 - ◆ DON organization
 - ◆ Types of naval operations
 - ◆ An ever-evolving list
 - ◆ 1970 edition included riverine warfare, domestic HA/DR
 - ◆ Regional security arrangements
 - ◆ Principles of War (through 1960)

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Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (IV)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ “The basic publication of the NWP series”
- ◆ “Presents the basic principles of sea power and naval warfare and the broad aspects of the naval operations which are generally necessary to conduct naval warfare”
- ◆ “An authoritative reference for experienced officers and a suitable text for . . . junior officers and midshipmen”

NWP 10 May 1954

- ◆ “A source for general information on the Navy as part of the national security establishment & on naval warfare”

NWP 10(B) April 1970

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Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (V)

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◆ Types/aspects of naval operations

<ul style="list-style-type: none">◆ NWP 10 w/ changes (1960)<ul style="list-style-type: none">◆ Striking force operations◆ Naval air operations◆ Amphibious operations◆ Submarine operations◆ Mining operations◆ Air defense operations◆ Anti-submarine operations◆ Mine countermeasures operations◆ Control & protection of shipping◆ Scouting operations◆ Base defense operations◆ Logistics operations◆ Support operations◆ Blockading operations◆ Search and rescue operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◆ NWP 10(B) (1970)<ul style="list-style-type: none">◆ Strike force operations◆ Amphibious operations◆ Anti-air warfare◆ Anti-submarine warfare◆ Mining and mine countermeasures◆ Riverine operations◆ Support operations◆ Surveillance and blockading◆ Search and rescue◆ Domestic emergency operations
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Naval Warfare: NWP 10 series (VI)

- ◆ **NWP 10(B):**
 - ◆ Emphasis on “control of the seas”
 - ◆ “Projection of power,” “deterrence” & “presence” mentioned only occasionally, in passing
 - ◆ Provided “domestic emergency operations” policy
 - ◆ No mention of foreign disasters or humanitarian assistance ops
 - ◆ “Blockade” discussed as a discreet & important naval operation

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1960s interlude (I)

- ◆ Focus more on PPBS than on drafting strategy
 - ◆ SECDEF McNamara management initiatives
 - ◆ OPNAV focus on **campaign analysis**
 - ◆ E.g.: CYCLOPS ASW I, II, III; *War at Sea* I & II, ASWFLS
- ◆ Focus more on current combat ops, regional contingencies, nuclear strategy, than on planning future global war vs. Soviets
 - ◆ Vietnam War ongoing: Strike & in-country COIN ops
 - ◆ Crises: East Europe, Middle East, Caribbean, Far East
 - ◆ Soviets achieving strategic nuclear parity with US
 - ◆ US global naval preponderance; limited Soviet navy threat

1960s interlude (II)



- ◆ Bifurcation of USN strategic thinking vs. Soviets
 - ◆ Other aspects of anti-Soviet naval warfare decoupled from anti-SSBN warfare
 - ◆ Anti-Soviet SSBN warfare discussed only at highest levels of classification, & within only a few USN communities (submarines, NAVFACs, intel, etc.)
 - ◆ Reinforced USN fragmentation by “union” community
- ◆ CNO personalities: Anderson, McDonald, Moorer
- ◆ Few flag officer strategy books, articles

1960s interlude (III)



- ◆ But . . .
 - ◆ RADM Eccles's *Military Concepts and Philosophy* (1965)
 - ◆ RADM Wylie's *Military Strategy* (1967)
 - ◆ OP-06 *Navy Strategic Studies (TS)* (from mid-1960s)
 - ◆ Occasional CNO signed *Proceedings* articles
 - ◆ NWP 10 *Naval Warfare* updates
- ◆ Strike, AAW, ASW, inshore warfare improvements
- ◆ Further reading
 - ◆ Enthoven & Smith, *How Much is Enough?* (1971)
 - ◆ CDR Brooks, “An Examination of Professional Concerns of Naval Officers” *NWCR* (Jan-Feb 1980)
 - ◆ Hegmann, “In Search of Strategy” (Ph.D. diss. 1991)

1960s: Naval policy literature of the period

CNA

- ◆ Focus on bureaucratic politics, civil-military relations
 - ◆ Huntington, *The Common Defense* (1961)
 - ◆ Hammond, *Organizing for Defense* (1961)
 - ◆ Caraley, *Politics of Military Unification* (1966)
 - ◆ Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy & the U.S. Navy* (1966) & *The Admirals' Lobby* (1967)
 - ◆ Albion & Pope, *Forrestal & the Navy* (1962)
- ◆ Analyses of World War II experience
 - ◆ Potter & Nimitz, *Sea Power* (1960)
 - ◆ Brodie, *Guide to Naval Strategy* (5th ed.) (1965)
 - ◆ Morison, *History of U.S. Navy in World War II* (1947– 62)
- ◆ Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy* (1968) (resisted)


Outline

CNA

- I. Introduction
- II. How each document was written** ←
- III. Comparisons, constants & changes
- IV. Analyzing capstone documents
- V. How to write the next one

Complete text of each document

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Hattendorf
2000s
Newport
Paper
(forth-
coming)

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Context & trends: 1970-2009

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- ◆ This study shows context & trends
 - ◆ World events & threats
 - ◆ Presidential administrations
 - ◆ SECDEFs & CJCSs
 - ◆ SECNAVs & CNOs
 - ◆ Higher authority documents
 - ◆ Budget & personnel trends
 - ◆ New capabilities

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USN capstone documents in context

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WORLD EVENTS	Year	ADMINISTRATION	SECNAV	CNO	CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
Soviet Oklaan 70 Indo-Pak War Nixon to China	1970 1971 1972	Nixon Laird	Chafee Richardson	Zumwalt	Project SIXTY (S)
Vietnam Pullout USN-SN Med Confrontation India Nuclear Test South Vietnam Falls	1973 1974 1975		Warren Schlesinger	Holloway	Missions of the U.S. Navy Strategic Concept for the U.S. Navy (S)
Soviet-Egypt Treaty canceled Panama Canal Treaty Deng leads PRC Shah of Iran Falls	1976 1977 1978	Rumsfeld	Clayton		NWP 1 Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy NWP 1 Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (Rev. A) Sea Plan 2000 (S)
Taiwan Relations Act Soviets invade Afghanistan	1979	Brown		Hayward	CNO Strategic Concepts (TS) Future of U.S. Sea Power
Bekaa Valley Bentu/Grenada	1982	Weinberger	Lehman		
Iran-Iraq War	1983			Watkins	Maritime Strategy (Brief) (S)
Gorbachev GICFBU	1985				Maritime Strategy (Pub) (S)
Gedhener-Nichols	1986				Ambitious Warriors Strategy (S), Maritime Strategy (Rev) (S)
Loya Strike Praying Mantis	1987		Carlucci	Trotz	Maritime Strategy (U)
Cold War Ends	1988	Bush	Cheney		Maritime Strategy (Rev) (U)
Iraq Invades	1990				Maritime Strategy (Rev) (S)
Gulf War	1991			Krause	Maritime Strategy (Rev) (U)
Yugoslav Split	1992				The Way Ahead
Southern Watch	1993				Navy Policy Book ... From the Sea
Hell Creek Adriatic Ops	1994	Clinton	Aspin		NOP 1 Naval Warfare
Somalia Ops	1995				Forward... From the Sea
Taiwan Strait Crisis	1996		Perry		
Desert Fox	1998			Johnson	Navy Operational Concept (NOC); Anytime, Anywhere
Kosovo Occupied	1999		Cohen		Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) I (S)
USS Cole Attacked	2000	GWBush	Rumsfeld	Clegg	Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) II (U)
Amrano Attacked	2001				Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS, Naval Power 21
OIF Begins	2002				Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO), Fleet Response Plan (FRP)
OIF Begins	2003				
IO Tensions	2004			Mullen	Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 08, Naval Operations Concept (NOC),
Hurricane Katrina	2005				Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10
DPRIK Nuclear Test	2006				
Lebanon Escalation	2007		Gates	Roughhead	A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 (Change 1)
Somalia, Nigeria piracy	2008				
	2009	Obama			NSG ISO PR 11, Naval Operations Concept (NOC), NOP 1 Naval Warfare, NSP ISO POM 12

USN capstone documents & higher authorities

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Year	President	National Document	SECDEF	CJCS	Defense Document	CHO	USN CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
1969	Nixon	Nixon Doctrine NSMs & NSDMs	Laird	Moorer USN	JSPs • PPs documents	Zumwalt	Project SIXTY (S)
1970							Missions of the U.S. Navy
1971							Strategic Concept for the U.S. Navy (S)
1972		Shangri Communique	Richardson				NWP 1 Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy
1973		ADM Treaty					NWP 1 Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (Rev. A)
1974	Ford	NSDM 344	Rumsfeld	Brown USAF			Sea Plan 2000 (S)
1975							CNO Strategic Concepts (TS)
1976							Future of U.S. Sea Power
1977	Carter	PRM 10, PD 18	Brown				
1978		PRMs & PDs					
1979		PD 50		Jones USAF	Contingency Planning Guidance		
1980		Carter Doctrine					
1981	Reagan	NSNs & NSDDs NSD 32 NSD 75 SDI	Worner				
1982		Reagan Doctrine					
1983		INF Treaty		Vessey USA			
1984		Reagan Doctrine					
1985		INF Treaty		Crowe USN			
1986		Reagan Doctrine					
1987		Reagan Doctrine					
1988	Bush	NSRs & NSDs NSR Security Strategy NSR Security Strategy	Cheney				
1989		NSR Security Strategy					
1990		NSR Security Strategy					
1991		NSR Security Strategy					
1992		NSR Security Strategy					
1993	Clinton	NSR Security Strategy NSR Security Strategy NSR Security Strategy	Aspin	Shel USA	Bottom-Up Review Nuclear Posture Review		
1994		NSR Security Strategy NSR Security Strategy NSR Security Strategy					
1995		NSR Security Strategy		Perry			
1996		NSR Security Strategy					
1997		NSR Security Strategy					
1998		NSR Security Strategy					
1999		NSR Security Strategy					
2000		NSR Security Strategy NSR Security Strategy NSR Security Strategy	Cohen	Shaftron USA	JV 3819 GDN, National Military Strategy		
2001	GWBush	NSPDs HSPDs	Rumsfeld		JV 3820, JT PPs 1 Nuclear Posture Review, ODR BPO, TPL, CPO, SCL JOSEC, CJCS JOCS GPPR, NRP Military Strategy		
2002		NSR Security Strategy NSR Security Strategy NSR Security Strategy		Myers USAF			
2003		NSR Security Strategy NSR Security Strategy					
2004		NSR Security Strategy					
2005		NSR Security Strategy					
2006		NSR Security Strategy					
2007		NSR Security Strategy NSC/T MOTR NSR	Gates	Pace USMC	CDIO, MARINPROT NSC/T Defense Strategy, RGA JT PPs 1, 2, 3 NSR Defense Strategy GCD, CPO		
2008		NSR Security Strategy					
2009	Obama			Mullen, USN			

Higher authorities (I)

- ◆ U.S. Constitution
- ◆ Title 10 of U.S. Code, as amended
 - ◆ Other public law
 - ◆ Congressional record on authorization & appropriation language
 - ◆ Congressional intent & committee reports
- ◆ Presidential documents
 - ◆ Classified NSC system documents
 - ◆ NSSMs, NSDDs, PRMs, PDs, NSPDs, HSPDs, etc.
 - ◆ *Unified Command Plan (UCP) (began in 1946)*
 - ◆ *UNCLAS National Security Strategy (began in 1987)*

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Higher authorities (II)

- ◆ Successive SECDEF documents
 - ◆ “Functions directives”
 - ◆ *DOD Dir 5100.1, Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff*
 - ◆ *UNCLAS National Defense Strategy (began 2005)*
 - ◆ *UNCLAS Posture Statement*
 - ◆ *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Reports*
 - ◆ *Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) (began 2008)*
 - ◆ *And predecessor documents*
 - ◆ *Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF) (began 2008)*
 - ◆ *And predecessor documents*

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Higher authorities (III)


- ◆ Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) documents
 - ◆ *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)*
 - ◆ JSOP, JSPD, etc.
- ◆ CJCS documents
 - ◆ *National Military Strategy* (began 1992)
 - ◆ CJCS Posture Statement
 - ◆ *Joint Pubs (doctrine)*
 - ◆ *Capstone Concepts for Joint Operations (CCJO)* (began 2005)

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
US economy & defense spending (1970-2009)



YEAR	PRESIDENT	ECONOMY	DOD % of GDP	DOD TOA (Constant FY 09 \$)	CNO	CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
1970	Nixon		7.6	461B	Zumwalt	Project SIXTY (S)
1971		Nixon Shock	6.9	418B		
1972			8.4	404B		
1973		Oil Crisis	5.8	384B		
1974		Recession	5.4	365B		
1975	Ford		5.4	354B	Holloway	Strategic Concept for the U.S.N (S)
1976			5.1	358B		
1977	Carter		4.8	360B		NWP 1 Strategic Concepts (U) Sea Plan 2000 (S)
1978			4.6	378B		
1979		Oil Crisis	4.6	377B	Hayward	CNO Strategic Concepts (TS) Future of U.S. Sea Power (U)
1980		Recession	4.9	363B		
1981	Reagan		5.1	422B		
1982		Recession	5.7	465B	Watkins	Maritime Strategy (Brief) (S) Maritime Strategy (Pub) (S) Amphibious Warfare Strategy (S) Maritime Strategy (Rev) (S) Maritime Strategy (U)
1983			6.0	495B		
1984			5.7	517B	Trotz	Maritime Strategy (Rev) (U) Maritime Strategy (Rev) (S) Maritime Strategy (Rev) (U)
1985		Gramm-Rudman Act	5.9	530B		
1986			6.0	530B	Kelso	The Way Ahead Navy Policy Book... From the Sea NDP 1 Naval Warfare
1987		Stock Market Crash	5.9	524B	Boorda	Forward... From the Sea
1988		Savings & Loan Crisis	5.6	514B		
1989	Bush		5.5	503B	Johnson	NOC, Anytime, Anywhere NSPG I (S) NSPG II (U)
1990			5.1	489B	Clark	SP 21 & Global CONOPS, Naval Power 21 NOCAO, Fleet Response Plan
1991			4.4	495B		
1992		Recession	4.6	448B	Mullen	NSP ISO POM 08, Naval Operations Concept (NOC), NSP ISO POM 10
1993	Clinton		4.2	419B	Roughhead	A Cooperative Strategy, NSP ISO POM 10 (Change 1) NSG ISO PR 11, NOC, NDP 1, NSP ISO POM 12
1994			3.9	363B		
1995			3.6	379B		
1996			3.1	371B		
1997		Stock Market Crash	3.7	361B		
1998			3.0	358B		
1999			2.9	368B		
2000			2.8	377B		
2001	GW Bush	Recession	2.9	391B		
2002		Stock Market Crash	3.2	440B		
2003			3.6	520B		
2004		Oil Prices Rise	3.8	531B		
2005			3.9	561B		
2006			3.8	560B		
2007		Subprime Mortgage Crisis	3.9	639B		
2008	Obama	Recession/Financial Crisis	3.8			
2009		Global Economic Crisis	3.9			



Dollars, numbers, capabilities (1970-2009) CNA



Capstone documents & force goals (1970-2009) CNA







Chronology

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- ◆ This study discusses
 - ◆ Four decades
 - ◆ 1970s
 - ◆ 1980s
 - ◆ 1990s
 - ◆ 2000s
 - ◆ Through early 2009
 - ◆ Context of each decade
 - ◆ Context, content & analysis of each document

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Context for each decade

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- ◆ This study shows context of each decade
 - ◆ The global system and world events
 - ◆ The nation: US political, economic, opinion trends
 - ◆ US defense spending trends
 - ◆ US national security; planned & actual adversaries
 - ◆ Defense & Navy budgets & manpower trends
 - ◆ Allied, joint & USN command structures
 - ◆ US national security documents
 - ◆ USN force level & capability trends
 - ◆ USN deployment strategy, ops, exercises, forces
 - ◆ ONI public documents
 - ◆ USN relations with USMC, USCG, USAF, USA, foreign navies

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Analysis of each document

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- ◆ What was it?
- ◆ Why was it written?
- ◆ What was going on at the time?
- ◆ What documents did it cite?
- ◆ What other documents had influence at the time?
- ◆ How was it written?
- ◆ What were its key ideas?
- ◆ What did it say that was new?
- ◆ What did it leave out?
- ◆ What has been written about it?
- ◆ For what was it criticized?
- ◆ What was its influence & why?

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US Navy capstone documents of the 1970s CNA


- ◆ 1970 *Project SIXTY*
- ◆ 1974 *Missions of the U.S. Navy*
- ◆ 1975 *Strategic Concept for the U.S. Navy*
- ◆ 1977 *NWP 1: Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy*
- ◆ 1978 *NWP 1: Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (Rev. A)*
- ◆ 1978 *Sea Plan 2000*
- ◆ 1979 *CNO Strategic Concepts & The Future of U.S. Sea Power*



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Context: The world of 1970

- ◆ Cold war ongoing for over two decades; 5 nuclear powers 🚨
- ◆ Hot war in Vietnam since 1964-5 🚨
- ◆ De-colonization almost complete
- ◆ U.S. & Soviet alliance systems
 - ◆ Sino-Soviet split
- ◆ Real & potential wars, crises, & tensions 🚨



1970s: The world, the nation & the Navy

World Events	Year	Administration	SECNAV	CNO	Capstone Document
Soviet Okean 70 NPT Treaty Seabed Treaty Indo-Pak War Nixon to China ABM Treaty	1970	Nixon	Laird	Chafee	<i>Project SIXTY</i>
Vietnam Pullout USN-SN Med Confrontation	1971				
	1972				
	1973		Richardson	Warner	
	1974	Ford	Schlesinger	Middendorf	<i>Missions of the U.S. Navy</i>
South Vietnam Falls USSR-Egypt Treaty Canaxed	1975		Rumsfeld	Holloway	<i>Strategic Concept for the U.S. Navy (S)</i>
	1976				<i>NWP 1</i>
Panama Canal Treaty	1977	Carter	Brown	Claytor	<i>NWP 1 Strategic Concepts (Rev. A)</i>
Deng leads PRC Camp David Accords	1978				<i>Sea Plan 2000 (S)</i>
Shah of Iran Falls Taiwan Relations Act	1979			Hayward	<i>CNO Strategic Concepts & Future of U.S. Sea Power</i>
Soviets Invade Afghanistan Desert One debacle	1980				

1970s: The world (I)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Increasingly violent world
- ◆ Bi-polar international system: US & USSR
 - ◆ Global alliance and treaty systems
 - ◆ Leonid Brezhnev led USSR (since 1964)
- ◆ Cold War continuing; detente in early-mid 70s
- ◆ Significant growth in world seaborne trade volume
- ◆ Insignificant # of reported piracy incidents
- ◆ Soaring oil prices throughout the decade
 - ◆ Oil price spikes: 1973-4 & 1979-80
- ◆ Vietnam war raged, then ended (1975)
- ◆ Tensions & war: India-Pak, Middle East

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1970s: The world (II)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Suez Canal closed by Egypt (1967-1975)
- ◆ Many coastal states claimed vast territorial seas
- ◆ UN *Law of the Sea* negotiations (1973-1981)
- ◆ IMO *Safety of Life at Sea* (SOLAS) Convention (1974)
- ◆ Number of reported climatic & other natural disasters in the world triples
- ◆ US tanker *Manhattan* NW Passage cruise sparked Canadian Arctic sovereignty concerns (1969)
- ◆ Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1970)
 - ◆ But 1st Indian test of nuclear weapons (1974), 1st S. African test (1979), Pakistani nuc weps development

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1970s: The world (III)

- ◆ USN the world's dominant seapower; but increasing global Soviet Navy threat
 - ◆ Rise of Soviet Navy under ADM Gorshkov (CinC since 1956)
 - ◆ Coherent Soviet peacetime naval diplomacy & wartime sea denial/ strategic nuclear force strategies developed
 - ◆ SOVINDRON (since 1968)
 - ◆ TU-22 Backfire w/ AS-4 ASUW missiles (from 1970)
 - ◆ Delta II SSBNs w/long-range nuclear ballistic missiles (1972)
 - ◆ Kiev-class carriers (1975)
 - ◆ 1st quiet SSN (Victor II) (1978)
 - ◆ Soviet Navy access to Cam Ranh Bay (1979)

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1970s: The world (IV)

- ◆ NATO strategy of “flexible response” (since 1968)
- ◆ Decolonization & “Wars of National Liberation” ending
 - ◆ Portuguese revolution (1974) & freeing of colonies
 - ◆ Indonesia invaded, annexed Port. East Timor (1975)
 - ◆ Rhodesia free as Zimbabwe (1980)
- ◆ British withdrawal from East of Suez
 - ◆ Leave Bahrain, Qatar, UAE (1971)
 - ◆ UK patronage of Shah of Iran diminished
 - ◆ Last fleet carrier decommissioned (1978)
- ◆ US-USSR “Proxy Wars” in Africa
 - ◆ Angolan factions (1975-6)
 - ◆ Ethiopia vs. Somalia (1977-8)

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1970s: The world (V)

- ◆ Non-aligned multi-ethnic Communist federation in Yugoslavia, under Marshal Tito
- ◆ Stalinist dictatorship in North Korea under Kim Il-Sung, with Soviet support
- ◆ Muslim armed rebellions in Mindanao, southern Philippines
- ◆ France deployed 1st SSBN (1971)
- ◆ NATO allies denied US base access to resupply Israel during Yom Kippur War (1973)
- ◆ Cyprus War & fall of Greek military regime (1974)

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1970s: The world (VI)

- ◆ Violent Sino-Soviet border clashes (1969)
- ◆ PRC, PLA, PLAN postured vs. Soviet invasion
- ◆ PRC Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) raged, then ended (1966-1976)
- ◆ Death of Mao Ze-Dong (1976)
- ◆ Emergence of Deng Xiaoping (from 1978)
- ◆ PRC self-sufficient in energy
- ◆ Deterioration of PRC-Vietnamese relations
 - ◆ PRC invades Vietnam (1979)
- ◆ PRC deployed 1st SSN (1974)
- ◆ Taiwan industrializing under KMT dictatorship of Chiang Kai-Shek & son Chiang Ching Kuo

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1970s: The world (VII)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Middle East transformed by Arab-Israeli wars (1967, 1973)
- ◆ Baath Party control in Iraq, supported by USSR (from 1968)
 - ◆ Saddam Hussein President (1979)
- ◆ Anti-US Qadhafi coup vs. Libya king (1969)
 - ◆ Wheelus AFB closed (1970)
- ◆ Jordan-PLO-Syria war, crisis (1970)

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1970s: The world (VIII)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Oil shock: Saudis, others refused to sell oil (1973)
- ◆ Egypt changed patrons (US vice USSR)
- ◆ Lebanon civil war (from 1975)
- ◆ Egypt-Israel Camp David Accords (1978)
- ◆ Shah in power in Iran, w/ strong US support, until ousted (1979)

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1970s: The world (IX)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Close Soviet-Indian relations
 - ◆ Treaty of Peace, Friendship & Cooperation (1971)
 - ◆ Soviets began massive arms transfers to India
 - ◆ Indians developed, tested nuclear device
- ◆ Pakistan reeling from 1971 war w/ India, loss of Bangladesh. Began to develop nuclear weapons
- ◆ Political turmoil throughout the decade in Afghanistan, leading to Soviet invasion (1979)
- ◆ Military control in Somalia under pro-US Gen. Siad Barre (since 1969)
 - ◆ Tensions and Ogaden War w/ Soviet-backed Ethiopia (1977-78)

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1970s: The world (X)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Communist Cuban government continued in power (since 1958)
 - ◆ 125K fled Cuba in “Mariel Boatlift” to Florida (1980)
- ◆ “Baby Doc” dictatorship in Haiti (from 1971)
- ◆ Leftist Chilean President Allende overthrown, replaced by military dictatorship (1973)
- ◆ Marxist Sandinistas seized power from Somoza family in Nicaragua (1979)
- ◆ Leftists insurgency began in El Salvador (1980)

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1970s: The world (XI)

- ◆ Sporadic terrorist acts

- ◆ Palestinians attacked Israelis at Munich Airport (1970)
- ◆ Palestinians hijacked 3 airliners to Jordan (1970)
- ◆ Japanese Red Army attacked Lod Israel airport (1972)
- ◆ Palestinians seized Israelis at Munich Olympics (1972)
- ◆ Terrorists attacked, hijacked airplane in Rome (1973)
- ◆ Puerto Ricans bombed Fraunces Tavern NYC (1975)
- ◆ German radicals, Palestinians forced airplane to fly to Entebbe. Israeli commandos freed passengers (1976)
- ◆ Iranian students seized US Tehran embassy, hostages (1979)
- ◆ Islamic terrorists seized Mecca Grand Mosque (1979)
- ◆ Palestinian terrorist Israeli beach landings (1970s)

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1970s: The Nation (I)

- ◆ Nixon (Republican) administration (1968-74)
 - ◆ Re-elected for 2nd term
 - ◆ Watergate scandal (1972) & Nixon resignation
- ◆ Ford (Republican) administration (1974-77)
 - ◆ Fails to be elected to 2nd term
- ◆ Carter (Democrat) administration (1977-81)
 - ◆ Fails to be elected to 2nd term
- ◆ Democrats controlled both houses of Congress
 - ◆ Congressional Budget Office (CBO) created (1975)
- ◆ US domestic consensus on foreign & national security policy, especially interventions, frayed
- ◆ Domestic popular support for US military waning

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1970s: The Nation (II)

CNA
INSTITUTE FOR SEA POWER STUDIES

- ◆ US the world's largest economy
- ◆ Low federal budget deficits
- ◆ Slowing US economic growth
- ◆ Soaring US inflation & unemployment rates
- ◆ Trade and currency crises
- ◆ US domestic oil production peaks
- ◆ US dependence on imported oil rose sharply, then fell somewhat

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1970s: US economy & defense spending

CNA
INSTITUTE FOR SEA POWER STUDIES


YEAR	President	ECONOMY	DOD % of GDP	DOD TOA (Constant FY 09 \$)	CNO	CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
1970	Nixon		7.6	461B	Zumwalt	Project SIXTY (S)
1971		Nixon Shock	6.9	418B		
1972			6.4	404B		
1973		Oil Crisis	5.6	384B		
1974	Ford	Recession	5.4	365B		Missions of the U.S. Navy (U)
1975			5.4	354B	Holloway	Strategic Concept for the U.S.N. (S)
1976			5.1	358B		NWP 1 Strategic Concepts (U)
1977	Carter		4.8	380B		Sea Plan 2000 (S)
1978			4.6	378B		CNO Strategic Concepts (TS)
1979		Oil Crisis	4.6	377B		Future of U.S. Sea Power (U)
1980		Recession	4.9	383B		

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1970s: US planned & actual adversaries

CNA

- ◆ Viet Nam combat (until 1973); Cambodia (*Mayaguez*) incident (1975)
- ◆ Hostage raid into Iran (1980) ("Desert One")
- ◆ Deter/ plan vs. USSR, W. Pact, forward Soviet naval forces, Cuba
 - ◆ USN-Soviet Navy standoffs, incidents at sea (e.g.: Med (1973))
- ◆ Deter/plan vs. N. Korea. Incidents. Deter PRC/plan Taiwan defense
- ◆ Increased planning vs. state- & non-state sponsored terrorists



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1970s: US national security policies (I)

CNA

- ◆ Focus on one over-arching global threat
 - ◆ Main goal: **Contain** & balance Soviet Union & allies
 - ◆ Initial means: New parallel, coordinated rapprochement policy with Soviet Union & China
 - ◆ New détente w/ Soviets (ended w/ Afghan invasion)
 - ◆ Cienfuegos Soviet sub base crisis defused (1970)
 - ◆ US-USSR agreement on Berlin access arrangements (1971)
 - ◆ Arms control & confidence-building: Talks and agreements
 - ◆ BMD policy: Arms control and R&D
 - ◆ ABM Treaty; INCSEA Agreement; TTBT & PNET signed
 - ◆ Treaty barring nuclear weapons on ocean floor
 - ◆ US resisted including USN systems in conventional arms control talks
 - ◆ Soviets deployed SS-20 missiles in Europe (1977)

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1970s: US national security policies (II)



- ◆ Other important US national security goals
 - ◆ Deter & plan against N. Korean attack on South
 - ◆ Maintain Arab-Israeli Middle East peace
 - ◆ Balanced support for Israel, key Arab states
 - ◆ Ensure western access to Gulf oil, stability in Gulf
 - ◆ Vietnamize, end Vietnam War; accept less than victory
 - ◆ Avoid “another Vietnam”
 - ◆ Constrain Soviet influence in Middle East & Africa
 - ◆ Prevent another Communist regime in LATAM
 - ◆ Especially in Chile
 - ◆ Build up and rely more on allied/proxy capabilities
 - ◆ “Nixon Doctrine” (Guam, 1969)

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1970s: US national security policies (III)



- ◆ Continued centrality of nuclear deterrence
 - ◆ US capable of overwhelming, devastating nuclear retaliation vs. Soviets
 - ◆ Required “triad” of ICBMs, SSBNs, bombers
 - ◆ US nuclear systems survivable, esp. SSBNs
 - ◆ US nuclear weapons targeted what Soviets held dear: Leadership, military, industry targets
 - ◆ US nuclear forces deterred conventional & nuclear attacks on US allies as well as US (“extended deterrence”)

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1970s: US national security policies (IV)

CNA
Center for National Defense

- ◆ Successive evolving nuclear strategies
 - ◆ US-Soviet nuclear parity by mid-1970s
 - ◆ New Nixon-Kissinger strategy of “nuclear sufficiency” vice “nuclear supremacy”
 - ◆ Flexible response;” NSDM 242 “Schlesinger Doctrine: Limited Nuclear Options;” PD-59 SECDEF Brown: “Countervailing Strategy”
 - ◆ US goal: Nuclear sufficiency vice supremacy
 - ◆ Limited & focused counterforce strikes (as well as massive countervalue (counter-city) strikes)
 - ◆ Search for range of options
 - ◆ MIRVing of US strategic nuclear forces, including Poseidon SLBMs (since 1971); Trident C-4 devel
 - ◆ # of US strategic nuclear warheads increased over the decade

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1970s: US national security policies (V)

CNA
Center for National Defense

- ◆ U.S. rapprochement with PRC (from 1971-2)
 - ◆ New Nixon-Kissinger opening to PRC (1971-2)
 - ◆ Cessation of much US military planning vs. PRC
 - ◆ Continued treaty commitment to defend Taiwan (till 1979)
 - ◆ Carter Administration pursued cooperation with PRC
 - ◆ Diplomatic relations announced (1978)
 - ◆ Taiwan Relations Act (1979)

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1970s: US national security policies (VI)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Ending the Vietnam War

- ◆ US forces in combat in Vietnam (since 1964)
- ◆ Nixon “Vietnamization” policy (1969-74)
- ◆ Steady withdrawal of US troops (incl/ USN) (1969-73)
- ◆ US-NVN negotiations leading to 1973 Paris Agreement
- ◆ US “secret bombing” of VC Cambodian sanctuaries (1969-70)
- ◆ US & RVNAF forces invasion of Cambodia (1970)
- ◆ N. Vietnamese “Easter Offensive” taking northern provinces of South Vietnam (1972)
 - ◆ US, RVNAF forces prevented more serious losses
- ◆ US “Christmas bombing” of Hanoi & Haiphong (1972)
- ◆ Treaty w/ N. Vietnam, accepting less than victory (1973)
- ◆ Withdrawal of all US forces from South Vietnam (1973)
- ◆ N. Vietnam final offensives, victory over South (1975)

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1970s: US national security policies (VII)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ NATO, Spain, Japan, Korea, Philippines, ANZUS alliances held
- ◆ Some Asian alliances unraveled
 - ◆ SEATO alliance dissolved (1977)
 - ◆ CENTO alliance dissolved (1979)
 - ◆ Taiwan alliance abrogated (1979)
- ◆ India viewed as Soviet surrogate
- ◆ Treaty (1977) gave Canal & Zone to Panama (1979)

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1970s: US national security policies (VIII)



- ◆ Post-Vietnam War US force level & defense budget “peace dividend” decline, then modest post-détente military buildup
- ◆ “1 ½ war” force sizing construct
- ◆ US reconsidered role of conventional forces in war with Soviets
- ◆ Ascendancy of “NATO Contingency” as DOD force sizing basis; primacy of Central Europe theater
- ◆ Less US direct 3rd world intervention & counter-insurgency (“Vietnam syndrome”)
- ◆ Shift of security concerns from the Pacific

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1970s: US national security policies (IX)



- ◆ Emergence of SWA & Gulf as important operational theater
 - ◆ US “Twin Pillars” policy (1969-1979)
 - ◆ Ensure western access to Gulf oil, Gulf stability
 - ◆ Build up Shah of Iran & Saudi Arabia to defend Gulf
 - ◆ “Carter Doctrine” (from 1980)
 - ◆ Gulf oil a US vital interest
 - ◆ US will tolerate no outside control of Gulf region
- ◆ Increased concerns re: terrorism
 - ◆ State Dept. designated Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, Syria as state sponsors of terrorism

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1970s: US national security policies (X)

- ◆ DOD roles, missions & functions governed by:
 - ◆ National Security Reorganization Act of 1958
 - ◆ Took SECNAV & CNO out of formal operational chain of command to CINCs & Naval Component Commanders
 - ◆ Continued CNO role as member of JCS, chief NCA naval advisor
 - ◆ Continued CNO influence over Naval Component Commanders through admin chain
 - ◆ DOD Dir 5100.1 *Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Dec 1958; revised Jan 1980)

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1970s: US national security policies (XI)

- ◆ SECDEF McNamara-instituted Planning, Programming & Budgeting System (PPBS) in place since 1961-2 as central process of DOD headquarters
 - ◆ Tried to focus on generating outputs vice merely counting inputs
- ◆ Increased centralized DOD civilian & joint C2 capabilities
- ◆ US societal stresses reflected in military
 - ◆ Racial tensions, drug abuse, working women
- ◆ All Volunteer Force (1973)

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1970s: US national security policies (XII)

CNA
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
- ◆ Non-governmental policy critics
 - ◆ Military reform movements blossomed
 - ◆ Bill Lind, etc.
 - ◆ Retired RADM Gene Laroque formed Center for Defense Information (CDI) (1972)
 - ◆ Joined by retired RADM Eugene Carroll (1980); retired VADM John J. Shanahan
 - ◆ "Team B" assessment of Soviet threat (1976)
 - ◆ Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) revitalized (1976)
 - ◆ Incl. former SECNAV Nitze, future SECNAV Lehman, etc.

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1970s: Combatant & component commands

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Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ PACOM
 - ◆ PACFLT
- ◆ SOUTHCOM
 - ◆ USNAVSO (to 1975)
- ◆ LANTCOM
 - ◆ LANTFLT
- ◆ EUCOM
 - ◆ NAVEUR
- ◆ STRICOM/MEAFSA (to 1971)
- ◆ REDCOM (from 1972)
- ◆ CONAD (to 1975)
- ◆ ALCOM (to 1975)
- ◆ ADCOM (from 1975)
- ◆ SAC
- ◆ MAC (from 1977)



1970s: Higher authorities & USN capstone documents



Year	President	National Document	SECDEF	CJCS	Defense Document	CNO	USN CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
1969	Nixon	Nixon Doctrine	Laird	Moorar USN	JSPS & PPBS documents	Moorer	
1970		NPT					
1971		NSSMs & NSDMs				Zumwalt	<i>Project SIXTY (S)</i>
1972		Shanghai Communiqué					
1973		INCSEA, SALT I ABM Treaty NSDM 242	Richardson		SECDEF Posture Statements		<i>Missions of the U.S. Navy</i>
1974	Ford		Schlesinger	Brown USAF	NUWEP 74	Holloway	
1975		CSCE					<i>Strategic Concept for the U.S. Navy (S)</i>
1976		NSDM 344	Rumsfeld				
1977	Carter	PRM 10, PD 18	Brown				<i>NWP 1 Strategic Concepts</i> <i>NWP 1 Strategic Concepts (Rev. A)</i> <i>Sea Plan 2000 (S)</i>
1978		PRMs & PDs SALT II		Jones USAF		Hayward	
1979		PD 59 Carter Doctrine			NUWEP 80 DOD 5100.1 CPG		<i>CNO Strategic Concepts & Future of U.S. Sea Power</i>
1980							

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1970s: Dollars, numbers, capabilities



YEAR	CNO	CAPSTONE DOCUMENT	DON TOA FY09\$	NEW SHIPS	BATTLE FORCE SHIPS	ACTIVE PERSONNEL	NEW CAPABILITIES INTRODUCED
1970	Zumwalt	<i>Project SIXTY</i>	\$138B	10	750	692K	LCC, DSRV, P-3C KA-6D, ITASS, NOSIC, FOSIF
1971			\$124B	15	682	623K	AMCM, A-6E, EA-6B, Poseidon SLBM
1972			\$127B	15	645	588K	MK 48 Torpedo, OSIS, SOSUS upgrade
1973		<i>Missions of the U.S. Navy</i>	\$123B	9	576	564K	E-2C AEW a/c, RH-53D AMCM helo
1974	Holloway	<i>Strategic Concept for the U.S. Navy</i>	\$120B	14	506	546K	F-14 AAW a/c, S-3 ASW a/c, TACAMO a/c
1975			\$115B	21	496	535K	CWC, Nimitz-class CVN, Spruance-class DD
1976			\$116B	15	484	524K	Los Angeles-class SSN, Tarawa-class LHA, Harpoon
1977		<i>NWP 1</i> <i>NWP 1 Strategic Concepts (Rev. A)</i> <i>Sea Plan 2000</i>	\$126B	15	477	530K	Perry-class FFG, CVBG, TENCAP, Pegasus-class PHM
1978			\$126B	18	468	530K	FLTSATCOM, GPS satellite
1979	Hayward	<i>CNO Strategic Concepts & Future of U.S. Sea Power</i>	\$123B	16	473	522K	Trident I C-4 SLBM, CAPTOR mine
1980			\$124B	11	479	527K	Near-Term Prepositioned Ships

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1970s: Capstone documents & force goals

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

YEAR	CNO	FORCE GOAL DOCUMENT	FORCE LEVEL GOAL	BATTLE FORCE SHIPS	CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
1970	Zumwalt	Hi-Lo goal	770	> 750	Project SIXTY (S)
1971			770	> 682	
1972			770	> 645	
1973			770	> 576	
1974	Holloway	CNO testimony	600	> 506	Missions of the U.S. Navy
1975			600	> 496	Strategic Concept for the U.S.N. (S)
1976			600	> 484	
1977		NSDM 344 Sea Plan 2000	600	> 477	
1978	Hayward		585	> 439	NWP 1 Strategic Concepts, Sea Plan 2000 (S)
1979		CNO testimony	600	> 473	Future of U.S. Sea Power
1980		Reagan platform	600	> 479	

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1970s: USN force structure goals

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis


- ◆ Emergence of a “600-ship Navy” force goal
 - ◆ 1970-75: Fleet drops from >700 to <500 ships
 - ◆ 1975-1980: Fleet stays at <500 ships
 - ◆ Zumwalt initial “high-low mix” goal: 770 ships
 - ◆ 1974: Zumwalt HASC recommendation: 600 ships
 - ◆ 1974: Holloway HASC recommendation: 600 ships
 - ◆ 1974: DEPSECDEF HASC statement: 575-600 ships
 - ◆ 1977: NSDM 344: About 600 ships in mid-1990s
 - ◆ 1977: Outgoing SECDEF Rumsfeld: “closer to 600 than to the present 485 ships” by mid-1990s
 - ◆ 1978: Seaplan 2000: 3 options: 439; 535; 585 ships
 - ◆ 1979: Hayward HASC testimony: 600 ships
 - ◆ 1980: Republican Party platform: 600 ships

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1970s: USN deployment strategy


CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ 2 combat-credible forward deployed fleets (6th & 7th)
 - ◆ 7th Flt forward-based (from 1972)
- ◆ 2 home fleets (2nd & 3rd) (from 1973)
 - ◆ Routine intermittent Indian Ocean carrier presence
 - ◆ Small Persian Gulf squadron (MIDEASTFOR)
 - ◆ Aggressive SSN ops; SSBNs within target range



1970s: USN operations & exercises

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis



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1970s: State of the Navy (I)



- ◆ USN the world's dominant seapower; strong challenge from Soviet Navy
 - ◆ Walker Family espionage ongoing (1967-1985)
- ◆ USN force levels plummeted; then rose a bit
 - ◆ Block obsolescence of WWII/Korea/VN-era warships
- ◆ LANTFLT increasingly larger than PACFLT
 - ◆ 1970: 51/49 split (4% larger)
 - ◆ 1980: 55/45 split (22% larger)
- ◆ Declining, then fluctuating, DON budgets

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1970s: State of the Navy (II)



- ◆ Major new systems, tactics introduced into fleet
 - ◆ Fleet slowly gaining confidence in using them
- ◆ Steadily improved USN strategic deterrence, ASW, ASUW, AAW, ISR capabilities
- ◆ USN strike capability concentrated in carrier air wings
- ◆ Global USN ocean surveillance information system (OSIS) deployed vs. Soviet Navy

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1970s: State of the Navy (III)

CNA
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

- ◆ Fleet developed, implemented CWC concept
- ◆ SS & SSN roles primarily ASW & ISR for I&W
- ◆ Long-standing SS/SSN, SOSUS, P-3
“barrier” strategy vs. Soviet submarines in place, esp. G-I-UK Gap
- ◆ Debates re: sea control vs. power projection priorities

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1970s: State of the Navy (IV)

CNA

- ◆ USN contribution to US strategic deterrent ramped up sharply
 - ◆ Greatly increased number of SLBM nuclear warheads, both absolutely & relative to USAF ICBM & bomber warheads
- ◆ Global SSBN deployments, including Med (for NATO)
- ◆ SSBN/SLBN force optimized for counter-value, not counter-force, ops
- ◆ USN carrier-based nuclear strike aircraft phased out of SIOP; retain other nuclear roles

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1970s: State of the Navy (V)

- ◆ “Top Gun” advanced USN fighter training at NAS Miramar (since 1969)
- ◆ Specialized USN ASW carriers disappeared
 - ◆ CVA/CVAN/CVS → CV/CVN
 - ◆ CVWs transformed from 2 specialized air wing types to one general multi-mission model
- ◆ New fleet battle organization (1977)
 - ◆ CVTF/CTVG → CVBF/CVBG
- ◆ Internal & external carrier & aircraft design & force structure debates
 - ◆ Culmination: 1978-9 Executive-Legislative Branch battles over CV-71 funding

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1970s: State of the Navy (VI)

- ◆ USN surface ship reclassifications (1975)
 - ◆ Brought USN “frigate” nomenclature in line with international practice
 - ◆ Eliminated perceived USN-Sov Nav “cruiser gap”
 - ◆ Eliminated USN surface combatant “escort” terminology
 - ◆ CG/CLG → CG
 - ◆ DL/DLG → CG or DDG
 - ◆ DD/DDG → DD/DDG
 - ◆ DE/DEG → FF/FFG
 - ◆ PF → FFG
- ◆ CNO ADM Holloway decided to halt CGN procurement

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1970s: State of the Navy (VII)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Combat/advisory ops/ turnovers to VN Navy continue in Vietnam (till 1973)
- ◆ Drawdown then atrophy of USN riverine, coastal forces (post-1973)
 - ◆ Remaining riverine forces reoriented to Naval Special Warfare support missions
- ◆ Collaboration with NGOs in Vietnam
 - ◆ World Vision, Operation Helping Hand Foundation, etc.
- ◆ Serious personnel problems
 - ◆ Low re-enlistment rates (1970<10%)
 - ◆ Racial unrest, riots throughout the fleet (1972-5)
 - ◆ Zumwalt, Holloway personnel programs address

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1970s: State of the Navy (VIII)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Growing concern for Soviet North Atlantic, North Pacific, Arctic buildups
 - ◆ New Delta-class SSBNs (1972)
 - ◆ Soviet SSBNs no longer needed to deploy far forward & transit GIUK & other barriers to reach CONUS targets
 - ◆ Backfire-B bomber with ASMs (1972)
 - ◆ To keep US carrier aviation beyond striking range of Soviet targets
 - ◆ Growing concern at increased Soviet “out of area” deployments: E.g.: Indian Ocean
 - ◆ Soviet global naval exercises: Okean 70 & 75
 - ◆ SACLANT/CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT ADM Train plans to shift convoy routes south, to free up USN & other NATO escort forces for forward northern ops

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1970s: State of the Navy (IX)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Growing concerns re: the Med in crises & war
 - ◆ 2 USN CVBGs, ARG, etc. routinely deployed in Med
 - ◆ Soviet Med, Crimea naval buildup, esp. Backfire
 - ◆ Concerns over “battle of the 1st salvo”
 - ◆ Egypt 6-Day War Styx ASM use shock (1967)
 - ◆ Periodic crises, wars, NEOs drove fleet movements
 - ◆ E.g.: Jordan-Syria-PLO (1970), Cyprus (1974), Lebanon civil war (1976)
 - ◆ Middle East war Med crisis (Oct 1973)
 - ◆ At sea confrontations with Soviet Navy
 - ◆ Worldwide DEFCON III alert
 - ◆ Operation Nickel Grass support
 - ◆ Little SACEUR/USCINCEUR interest in naval issues
 - ◆ USN CNE/C6F plans to stand & fight in C., E. Med
 - ◆ NATO CINCSOUTH ADM Turner plans to move CVBGs west during times of tension & war (1975-7)

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1970s: State of the Navy (X)

CNA

- ◆ Concern for US Pacific Fleet roles after Vietnam
 - ◆ Communist regimes accepted in VN, Cambodia, Laos
 - ◆ “No more Vietnams” sentiment in US
 - ◆ Rapprochement with PRC & need to reassure, support
 - ◆ Gradual distancing from Taiwan commitments
 - ◆ NATO desires for PACFLT forces to “swing” to LANT
 - ◆ Unthreatened, pro-US governments in most of SE Asia
 - ◆ South Korean commitment
 - ◆ Modest requirements in Indian Ocean (till 1979)
 - ◆ Growth of Soviet Pacific Fleet & Far East air force
 - ◆ Remaining post-VN USN PACFLT forces less numerous, less capable than LANT
 - ◆ New 7th Flt/PACFLT plans to take offensive vs. Soviets

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1970s: State of the Navy (XI)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Continued bifurcation of USN strategic thinking vs. Soviets
 - ◆ Other aspects of anti-Soviet naval warfare still decoupled from anti-SSBN warfare
 - ◆ Anti-Soviet SSBN warfare still discussed only at highest levels of classification, & within only a few USN communities (submarines, NAVFACs, intel, etc.)
- ◆ Deployment of Soviet Delta II SSBNs to bastions, however, starting to force a blurring of the lines
 - ◆ 1st Global War Game played anti-SSBN ops (1979)

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1970s: State of the Navy (XII)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Intermittent USN CV/CVN presence in IO (1971-9)
 - ◆ *Enterprise* in IO during India-Pak War (1971)
 - ◆ *Constellation* enters Gulf (1974)
 - ◆ Permanent presence after Iran hostage crisis (1979)
- ◆ Continued extensive, varied, global ops, exercises
 - ◆ Forward SS/SSN ISR ops for I&W
 - ◆ Vietnam War ops (to 1973)
 - ◆ BALTOPs begin (1973)
 - ◆ Vietnam/Cambodia War end-game operations (1975)
 - ◆ Mayaguez incident (1975)
 - ◆ Korean waters surge after tree-cutting incident (1976)

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1970s: State of the Navy: (XIII)

CNA

- ◆ OPNAV developed campaign analysis techniques & Net Assessment
- ◆ Waning internal OPNAV influence of OP-06 (DCNO for Strategy, Plans and Policy)
- ◆ NAS NRC Naval Studies Board created (1974)
- ◆ VADM Crowe & RADM Hilton created OPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) (1978)
- ◆ Unofficial “Commanders Cabal” DC-area officer discussion group (late 1970s)
 - ◆ Convener: CDR Norm Mosher)

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1970s: State of the Navy: (XIV)

CNA

- ◆ ADM Rickover headed Naval Reactors
 - ◆ Since 1948
 - ◆ VADM since 1958; ADM in 1973
 - ◆ Held USN & AEC (since 1977 DOE) positions
- ◆ Significant growth in NAVWARCOL capabilities & reputation
 - ◆ Transformed curriculum, esp. strategy (1972-4)
 - ◆ Build-up of top-notch civilian faculty, esp. strategy
 - ◆ 1st Naval War College Press monographs (1975)
 - ◆ Center for Advanced Research (CAR) created (1975)
 - ◆ ONI “Newport Detachment” created (1977)
 - ◆ Global War Games instituted (1979)

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1970s: State of the Navy: (XV)

CNA

- ◆ Robust USN program to educate thoughtful operationally-adept officers in Poli Sci, IR
 - ◆ Civilian universities: Masters & doctorate levels
 - ◆ Especially Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy
 - ◆ Also University of Washington, others.
 - ◆ Later assigned/re-assigned to key OPNAV billets
- ◆ Strong community management of Navy pol-mil/ strategic planning sub-specialists by successive OP-60 flag officers
 - ◆ Esp. RADM Bob Hilton (1976-78) & RADM Art Moreau (1978-1980)
 - ◆ Strong cadre of educated, experienced Navy strategy action officers built in OP-603

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1970s: Naval policy literature of the period

CNA

- ◆ Focus on bureaucratic politics, civil-military relations, naval presence & diplomacy
 - ◆ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy* (1971)
 - ◆ Allison, *Essence of Decision* (1971)
 - ◆ Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing* (1973)
 - ◆ Luttwak, *Political Uses of Sea Power* (1974)
 - ◆ Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign Policy* (1974)
 - ◆ ADM E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., *On Watch* (1976)
 - ◆ Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* (1977)
 - ◆ Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen & Cold War Crises* (1977)
 - ◆ Blechman & Kaplan, *Force without War* (1978)
 - ◆ Lehman, *Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices* (1978)
 - ◆ Allen, *The Uses of Navies in Peacetime* (1980)

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1970s: State of the Navy (XVI)

CNA

◆ Systems in development &/or construction

◆ Ships

- ◆ Nimitz-class CVN
- ◆ Kidd-class DDG
- ◆ CG-47 Aegis cruiser
- ◆ FFG-7
- ◆ Los Angeles-class SSN
- ◆ Ohio-class SSBN
 - ◆ (Had been ULMS)
- ◆ Patrol hydrofoil (PHM)
- ◆ NTPF & MPF ships
- ◆ T-AGOS
- ◆ LCAC
- ◆ SCS (never built)
- ◆ DDH (never built)
- ◆ CVV (never built)
- ◆ CSGN (never built)

◆ Aircraft

- ◆ F-14A
- ◆ S-3A
- ◆ F/A-18A
- ◆ SH-60 LAMPS III

◆ Weapons & systems

- ◆ Harpoon Anti-ship missile
- ◆ Phalanx CIWS
- ◆ Trident I SLBM
- ◆ TACTAS
- ◆ Tomahawk SLCM
- ◆ VLS
- ◆ CAPTOR mine
- ◆ TENCAP

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
1970s: Public ONI threat documents

CNA

Understanding Soviet Naval Developments
(1974) (Norman Polmar drafted)

Understanding Soviet Naval Developments
(2nd ed.) (1975)

Understanding Soviet Naval Developments
(3rd ed.) (1978)



150

1970s: State of the Navy: Sealift (I)

- ◆ Decline of US gov't owned, private sealift fleets
- ◆ Plans for & creation of prepositioning fleet
- ◆ Containerization & rail-truck-water intermodalism revolutionized world shipping
 - ◆ New Roll-on/Roll-off "Ro-Ros" ideal for surge sealift
 - ◆ Containerships useful for sustainment shipping
- ◆ Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) now Military Sealift Command (MSC) (1970)
 - ◆ Remained USN (not "specified") command
 - ◆ COMSC downgraded: VADM to RADM (1971-1981)
- ◆ Aborted attempt to merge MSC & US Army military traffic management command (1971)

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1970s: State of the Navy: Sealift (II)

- ◆ MSC nucleus fleet declines
 - ◆ 1967: 175 1975: 86 1976: 6
 - ◆ Last troopships retire (1973). Troops deploy by air.
- ◆ Increased MSC use of long-term US civilian commercial charters
- ◆ Plans relied on MSC, National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), US commercial fleet, Effective U.S.-Control (EUSC) ships, allied merchant fleets
 - ◆ Much of NDRF obsolete
 - ◆ Poor Yom Kippur War EUSC experience (1973)
 - ◆ Several ships would not deliver to war zone
 - ◆ Allies not always allied

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1970s: State of the Navy: Sealift (III)



- ◆ US Maritime Administration (MARAD) NDRF ship #s drop precipitously
 - ◆ 1970: 1027 1975: 419 1980: 303
 - ◆ 172 NDRF ships activated during Vietnam War
- ◆ Creation of MARAD NDRF Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) of modern ships (1976)
 - ◆ USN funded new purchase of civilian ships
 - ◆ Old NDRF ships aging, hard to activate
 - ◆ Planned for 10-day deployability by MSC
 - ◆ Numbers grew: 1977: 6 1980: 24
 - ◆ Activation contingent on availability of US civilian merchant mariners

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1970s: State of the Navy: Sealift (IV)



- ◆ 7-ship Indian Ocean Near-Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) deployed (1980)
 - ◆ USMC (5), USAF (1), USA(1) SWA contingency gear
- ◆ *Mayaguez* Incident (1975) triggered by Khmer Rouge capture of civilian mariners from US civilian container ship *SS Mayaguez*
- ◆ Germany, Korea reinforcement exercises
 - ◆ “REFORGER” (from 1967); “Team Spirit” (from 1976)
- ◆ Civilian crewing of Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF) ships (created in 1972)
 - ◆ Freed up USN Combat Logistics Force (CLF) crews to serve on combatants
 - ◆ Increased effectiveness at lower cost
 - ◆ MSC took on new, additional fleet support role)

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1970s: State of the Navy: Basing (I)

- ◆ “Seafloat” afloat river base in Cua Lon River, South Vietnam (from 1969)
- ◆ NSA Danang & Saigon bases & detachments turned over to VN (by 1973)
- ◆ “Overseas homeporting” of major Fleet units
 - ◆ Greece: DESRON (unsuccessful) (1972-5)
 - ◆ Japan: CVBG & ARG (long-term success) (1973)
 - ◆ Sardinia: Med sub tender (long-term success) (1973)
 - ◆ Naples: PGs & AGP (short-term success) (1972-77)
- ◆ Last USN facilities in Morocco close (1978)
- ◆ AS, SSBNs withdrew from Rota, Spain (1979)

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
1970s: State of the Navy: Basing (II)

- ◆ CONUS base closures (Boston, Newport)
- ◆ USN took over USAF Kindley Field in Bermuda (Renamed NAS Bermuda) (1970)
- ◆ USN takeover of RN facility in Bahrain (1971)
 - ◆ Leases, negotiations, status changes with Bahrain
- ◆ Build-up of new forward base on BIOT island of Diego Garcia (from 1971)
- ◆ New CONUS SSBN base development (1970s)
 - ◆ Kings Bay GA & Bangor WA

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1970s: US Merchant Marine (I)

CNA
Center for Naval Analyses



1970s: US Merchant Marine (II)

CNA
Center for Naval Analyses

- ◆ US-flag commercial Merchant Marine
 - ◆ In continuing decline
 - ◆ Ocean-going ships (1000 gross tons & over)
 - ◆ 1970: 1579 1975: 870 1980: 849
 - ◆ Dropped from 8% to 4% of world tonnage
 - ◆ Carried only 4-5% of US international trade
 - ◆ Remaining ships less suitable for military cargo
 - ◆ World shipping depression (1973-late 80s)
 - ◆ # of non-gov't US civilian commercial merchant mariners also dropped
 - ◆ Pre-VN War: 48,000 1975: 20,500 1980: 19,600

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1970s: US Merchant Marine (III)



- ◆ Jones Act had reserved shipping between US ports to US flagged & built vessels (since 1920)
- ◆ New highways, pipelines led to inter-coastal fleet decline

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1970s: US Merchant Marine (IV)




- ◆ US ship owners continued to “flag out” ships
 - ◆ Lower regulation, oversight, costs, taxes
- ◆ Symptom of larger world, US trends
 - ◆ US industry overseas movement
 - ◆ Global shipping movement to “flags of convenience”
- ◆ Effective US Control (EUSC) fleet increased
 - ◆ 1970: 300 1974: 432 1978: 451
 - ◆ But 1975 tax law dis-incentivized US investment in foreign-flagged US-owned shipping
- ◆ Increased foreign competition
 - ◆ E.g.: Japan, West Germany, South Korea

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1970s: US shipbuilding (I)

CNA



161

1970s: US shipbuilding (II)

CNA

- ◆ USN shipbuilding down, then up
 - ◆ 1971: 33 1975: 3 1979: 16
- ◆ MM shipbuilding modest, fluctuating
 - ◆ 1971: 14 1973: 34 1978: 19
- ◆ Increased international competition
 - ◆ E.g.: Japan, West Germany, South Korea
- ◆ USN ceased building warships in US naval (gov't) shipyards
- ◆ # of US naval shipyards cut from 10 to 8

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1970s: US shipbuilding (III)


CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ New US Merchant Marine Act (1970)
 - ◆ New version of traditional US subsidy policies
 - ◆ Update of Merchant Marine Act of 1936
 - ◆ Sought to stimulate building of 300 US-flag ships over 10 years
 - ◆ Subsidized bulk carriers, tankers as well as liners
 - ◆ But failed to stem decline of US commercial shipbuilding & merchant marine
 - ◆ World shipping depression
 - ◆ Shipyards focused on naval shipbuilding technology

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1970s: TOA by US military department


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1970s: US Service active duty personnel

CNA



1970s: USN-USMC relations (I)

CNA

- ◆ CMCs Robert Cushman & Lou Wilson (1972-79)
- ◆ “Amphibious”/ “expeditionary”
 - ◆ USMC task organizations styled “amphibious” vice “expeditionary” (from late 1960s)
 - ◆ Vietnamese sensitivities to negative French concept
 - ◆ But USMC VN ops more expeditionary than amphibious
 - ◆ USMC lost much amphib expertise during VN War
 - ◆ Post-VN USN-USMC amphibious focus
- ◆ Continued routine & crisis-response USMC forward deployments on USN ships
 - ◆ MAUs on amphibious ships
 - ◆ MARDETs on non-amphibious ships (MARDET)

1970s: USN-USMC relations (II)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Continued USN support of remaining USMC operations in Vietnam (I Corps) (to 1973)
 - ◆ But overall, USN, USMC fought separate wars in VN
 - ◆ In South VN, USN worked more w/ US Army
 - ◆ Vs. North VN, USN coordinated with more w/ USAF
- ◆ USN & USMC refocus away from Vietnam air & ground ops (from 1973)
- ◆ Increased USMC focus on NATO flank roles
 - ◆ Result of USMC assessment of directions to move
 - ◆ Decision & planning for NALMEB
 - ◆ Soviet Motorized Rifle Divisions seen as threat
 - ◆ USMC began to “heavy up” its formations

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1970s: USN-USMC relations (III)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ CNO Zumwalt initiative to deploy USMC air squadrons in USN carrier air wings (1970+)
- ◆ USMC AV-8s help USN validate “sea control ship concept on USS *Guam* (LPH as ISCS) (1972-74)
- ◆ USMC helos replace air wing, deploy on USN CV USS *Hancock* for Saigon evacuation (1975)
- ◆ USMC pilots fly USN helos into Iran in ill-fated Operation *Eagle Claw* (1980)
- ◆ New 20-kt amphib ships enhance relations
 - ◆ LCCs, LPHs, LKAs, LPDs, LSDs, LSTs (1960s-70s)
 - ◆ 5 LHAs commissioned (1976-1980)

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1970s: USN-USMC relations (IV)

- ◆ CMC became full member of JCS (1978)
- ◆ No USMC CINCs, components, or war college
- ◆ Gen P.X Kelley is 1st COMRDJTF (1980-1)
 - ◆ Under USCINCRED in peace; under SECDEF in war
- ◆ USN-USMC aviation divergences
 - ◆ USN needs F-14s for outer air battle; USMC declines
 - ◆ USMC needs AV-8s for CAS; USN declines
- ◆ USMC interest in emerging SWA roles (1979-)
 - ◆ USMC enthusiasm for NTPF at Diego Garcia (1979-80)
 - ◆ USMC gear on 5 of 7 NTPF ships deployed (1980)
 - ◆ Less USN enthusiasm

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1970s: USN-USMC relations (V)

- ◆ Agreed multi-service *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*
- ◆ Published separately by Departments of the Navy, Army, Air Force (2 Aug 1967)
 - ◆ US Navy NWP 22(a)
 - ◆ US Marine Corps LFM 01
 - ◆ US Army FM 31-11
 - ◆ US Air Force AFM 2-53
- ◆ Resolved decades of inter-service disagreements
- ◆ USN-USMC amphibious CATF/CLF doctrine divided sea service C2 at the water's edge

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1970s: USN-USMC relations (VI)

CNA
INSURANCE & FINANCIAL

- ◆ **USN saw USMC amphibious role as only one component of a single naval warfare task**
 - ◆ Little USN interest in USMC non-amphib expeditionary roles
- ◆ **USMC saw itself increasingly as a co-equal service within DON**
- ◆ **No co-signed USN-USMC capstone documents**
- ◆ **Slight decline in amphib % of active fleet**
 - ◆ 1960s: 15% 1970s: 13%

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1970s: USN-USCG relations (I)

CNA
INSURANCE & FINANCIAL

- ◆ **USCG in new Department of Transportation (created 1967)**
- ◆ **Commandant of Coast Guard is both service chief & senior operational commander**
- ◆ **USCG cutters & PSUs integrated into USN component commanders war plans**
- ◆ **USN funded USCG defense hardware for:**
 - ◆ WHECs, WPBs, & PSUs
- ◆ **USCG shifted from USN-style uniforms (1972)**
- ◆ **USCG began Deck Watch Officer (DWO) exchanges with USN**

172

1970s: USN-USCG relations (II)



- ◆ **USCG well-integrated into USN in-country Vietnam War effort (1965-1973)**
 - ◆ Cutters, WPBs, LORAN, port security, etc.
 - ◆ USCG LORAN stations remained (1973-5)
- ◆ **USCG ramps up counter-drug ops**
 - ◆ President Nixon declares "War on Drugs" (1971)
- ◆ **USCG deploys all US icebreakers**
 - ◆ 5 USN icebreakers transferred (1965-6)
- ◆ **US 200-mile fishery zones created (1976)**
 - ◆ Increased USCG enforcement responsibilities

173

1970s: USN-USAF relations (I)



- ◆ **USAF deployment strategy:**
 - ◆ TACAIR in ready forward Europe/WESTPAC garrisons
 - ◆ Strategic forces in ready CONUS garrisons
 - ◆ Frequent alert, surge & other exercises
- ◆ **Heavy & increasing USAF purchases of new F-15s, F-16s, A-10s**
- ◆ **DON Navy-Marine Corps TOA > USAF TOA**
 - ◆ From 1973 on
- ◆ **USAF active duty end strength > USN**

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1970s: USN-USAFAF relations (II)



- ◆ **Limited USN-USAFAF MOAs**
 - ◆ 1971, 1974, 1975, 1979
 - ◆ Mostly re: B-52 minelaying, aerial refueling support
- ◆ **CNO ADM Zumwalt initiative to qualify USAFAF units on USN carriers (aborted)**
- ◆ **US strategic nuclear triad included both USAFAF & USN**
 - ◆ Centralized targeting (JSTPS)
 - ◆ No unity of command (SAC a specified command)

175

1970s: USN-USAFAF relations (III)



- ◆ **US naval aviation continued to refine its capabilities & TTP for autonomous strike, AAW campaigns**
 - ◆ De-confliction as necessary with USAFAF
 - ◆ Vietnam War "route packages" policy
- ◆ **USN kept land-based intra-theater airlift role**
 - ◆ SECDEF Schlesinger sought to consolidate Operational Support Aircraft (OSA) under USAFAF (1974)
 - ◆ Congress overruled the administration
 - ◆ CNO designated CHNAVRES as Navy Executive Agent for navy airlift (1977)

176

1970s: USN-USAF relations (IV)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ **USN 6th Fleet supported USAF Operation Nickel Grass resupply of Israel during Yom Kippur War (1973)**
- ◆ **USAF helos replaced air wing, operated from USN carrier USS *Midway* during evacuation of Saigon (1975)**
- ◆ **USAF B-52G-H & FB-111 “Busy Observer” maritime surveillance exercises**
- ◆ **Limited B-52 Indian Ocean maritime surveillance ops (1979)**
- ◆ **NTPF USAF TFS support in SWA contingencies**
 - ◆ 1 ship of 7 deployed to Diego Garcia (1980)

177

1970s: USN-USAF relations (V)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ **High USN use of USAF space systems**
 - ◆ Modest USN funding of space systems
- ◆ **Change in DOD space policy (1970)**
 - ◆ All services allowed to develop new space systems
 - ◆ USAF had had sole responsibility (since 1961)
- ◆ **USN pushed forward immediately to develop tactical FLTSATCOM & TIMATION systems**
 - ◆ Joint USAF-USN FLTSATCOM program (1971)
 - ◆ Inter-service relationships sometimes stormy
 - ◆ 1st FLTSAT launched (1978); all launched by 1980
 - ◆ TIMATION placed under USAF-led GPS effort (1973)

178

1970s: USN-US Army relations (I)

CNA
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

- ◆ **US Army became doctrine-based**
 - ◆ TRADOC established (1973)
- ◆ **US Army's National Training Center (Ft. Irwin CA) opened (1980)**
- ◆ **Clash of USA/USN post-VN strategic visions**
 - ◆ US Army main focus on NATO-WP war in Germany
 - ◆ Army FM 100-5 *Operations* ("active defense") (1976)
 - ◆ Emphasis on defensive operations & the first battle
 - ◆ **USN more offensive & global view of war with USSR, & encompassing spectrum of war**

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1970s: USN-US Army relations (II)

CNA
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

- ◆ **US Army plans for infantry, air defense reinforcement of forward islands**
 - ◆ Iceland, Azores, Aleutians
- ◆ **Similar US Army & USN internal debates**
 - ◆ Hi-lo mix; Army on cusp of new family of systems
 - ◆ Defensive vs. offensive operational concepts
 - ◆ "Battle of the 1st Salvo" vs. campaign analyses

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1970s: USN-US Army relations (III)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ **US Army requirement for USN sealift & prepo**
 - ◆ Desire to focus USN solely on convoy escort ops
 - ◆ NTPF support for Army in SWA contingencies
 - ◆ 1 ship of 7 deployed to Diego Garcia (1980)
- ◆ **US Army bought 7 USN Navy-designed LCUs**
- ◆ **Army-Navy Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) exercises**

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1970s: USN-foreign navy relations (I)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ **USN focus: Increasing capabilities of US allies & friends to counter Soviets & allies**
- ◆ **Coordination, not integration, with allied forces**
- ◆ **Division of labor: Allied expertise encouraged in:**
 - ◆ NCAPS, convoy escort, mine & coastal warfare, forward basing support, port security
- ◆ **Security fears limited classified info exchanges**
- ◆ **Interoperability through LIMDIS NATO pubs**
- ◆ **Exercises, education & training, tech transfer**
 - ◆ A few international meeting & staff talks
 - ◆ NATO, Korea wartime integrated command structures
 - ◆ Few real-world multilateral ops (E.g.: Suez MCM)
- ◆ **OPNAV, fleet commanders drove USN policy**

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1970s: USN-foreign navy relations (II)



- ◆ International Seapower Symposia (ISS) ongoing biennially at NavWarCol Newport RI (from 1969)
- ◆ NAVWARCOL curricula for foreign officers
- ◆ New international NAVWARCOL junior Naval Staff Course (1972)
- ◆ International Surface Warfare Officers School program (from 1972)

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1970s: USN-foreign navy relations (III)



- ◆ Other foreign navy education & training in US
- ◆ Expanding bi-lateral Navy staff talks programs
- ◆ Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) created
- ◆ Arms & technology transfers (both ways)
- ◆ Intel & communications collaboration
 - ◆ AUSCANZUKUS

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1970s: USN-foreign navy relations (IV)

CNA
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- ◆ Zumwalt initiative to encourage more allied contributions to wartime anti-Soviet sea control (1970+)
- ◆ Multilateral Suez Canal mine clearance ops (1974)
 - ◆ Facilitated by prior NATO interoperability programs
- ◆ Worldwide Naval Control & Protection of Shipping (NCAPS) network
 - ◆ USNR participates for USN
- ◆ International oceanographic cooperation

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1970s: USN-foreign navy relations (V)

CNA
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- ◆ NATO relationships
 - ◆ Command structures, staffs, plans & exercises
 - ◆ NATO LANT, Med commands headed by USN admirals
 - ◆ USN SSBNs assigned to NATO MNCs
 - ◆ “Swing” of USN Pacific forces a contentious issue
 - ◆ STANAVFORLANT routinely deploys (since 1968)
 - ◆ Conceptual differences: Strike fleets, convoy escort, “swing” of USN Pacific forces
 - ◆ Rationalization, standardization, interoperability
 - ◆ STANAGs, ATPs
 - ◆ Carter-era NATO initiatives included some naval
- ◆ Royal Navy relationships
 - ◆ RN deploys US Polaris missiles as UK strategic deterrent, with USN assist
 - ◆ RN pays off last fleet carrier (1978)

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1970s: USN-foreign navy relations (VI)

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- ◆ Bilateral JMSDF, ROKN, ROCN, RTN, RAN, RNZN relationships continue
 - ◆ US 7th Fleet forward basing in Japan facilitates close operational ties with JMSDF
- ◆ RIMPAC exercises (from 1971)
 - ◆ Initially AUSCANUKUS
- ◆ Quadripartite US-UK-AUS-NZ Navy staff talks
- ◆ S. Vietnamese Navy relationships (till 1973)
 - ◆ Advisors, assistance, combined ops, trng
 - ◆ Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese (ACTOV)
 - ◆ “Pigs & chickens” programs
 - ◆ Personal Response (PR) Program

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1970s: USN-foreign navy relations (VII)

CNA
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- ◆ CENTO MIDLINK annual exercises (till 1979)
 - ◆ US, UK, Iran, Pakistan
- ◆ US-fostered buildup of Imperial Iranian, Royal Saudi navies in Gulf
 - ◆ 79 F-14As to IIAF (1976-8); 4 DDGs to IIN (planned)
 - ◆ P-3F Orions & SH-3D Sea King helos to IIN

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1970s: USN-foreign navy relations (VIII)


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- ◆ **LATAM navy relationships**
 - ◆ UNITAS exercises
 - ◆ Inter-American Naval Conf (IANC) (since 1960)
 - ◆ Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network
- ◆ **USN WATC exercises with West African navies**
- ◆ **INCSEA Agreement with Soviet Navy (1972)**
 - ◆ Annual USN-Soviet Navy INCSEA meetings
- ◆ **1st USN-SovNav reciprocal port visits (1975)**

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1970s: Text & context of each document

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ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. (CNO Jul 1970-Jun 1974)

- ◆ Sept 1970 *Project SIXTY*
 - ◆ An assessment; direction to move
- ◆ Mar-Apr 1974 "Missions of the Navy"
 - ◆ Missions



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ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. (CNO Jul 1970-Jun 1974)

- ◆ Surface warfare officer
 - ◆ Followed 3 naval aviator CNOs
- ◆ Drew on previous Washington experience
 - ◆ Nat War Col, OSD/ISA (Arms Control), SECNAV EA, 1st OP-96 (systems analysis)
- ◆ Signature programs: FFGs, PHMs, sea control ships, equal opportunity programs
- ◆ Opposed to Nixon-Kissinger arms control efforts (SALT I)
- ◆ Personnel reforms; Z-Grams
- ◆ Conflicts with ADM Rickover

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ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. (CNO July 1970-June 1974)


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- ◆ Immediately created a capstone document
- ◆ Sought to implement it throughout his term
- ◆ Had NAVWARCOL President VADM Turner promulgate its overarching themes at end of his term
- ◆ Publicly fearful of Soviet Navy
- ◆ Sought to avoid SSBN prosecution; focus on SLOC sea control

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Project SIXTY (Sept 1970)

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Project SIXTY (1970)

◆ Overview

- ◆ Signed by CNO ADM Zumwalt
- ◆ “Assessment” & “Direction to Move”
- ◆ SECRET brief & memo
- ◆ Principal targets: SECDEF, OSD, DON, OPNAV
- ◆ Comprehensive plan for Zumwalt term
- ◆ To re-optimize USN vs. Soviets
- ◆ 4 USN capability categories; hi-low mix
 - ◆ Sea control priority over power projection programs
- ◆ Listed 22 specific actions taken or proposed
- ◆ Presented 3 force structure alternatives
- ◆ Concepts proved more influential than programs

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Project SIXTY (1970)

◆ Signed by:

- ◆ CNO ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
- ◆ 2 months after taking office



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Project SIXTY (1970)

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- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as “an assessment”, “direction to move,” “concepts”
 - ◆ Secret briefing for SECDEF Laird & DEPSECDEF (Sept 1970)
 - ◆ Secret memorandum to all Flag Officers (and Marine general officers)
 - ◆ 30 pages plus slides

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Project SIXTY (1970)

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- ◆ Why it was written
 - ◆ Show USN relevance to conflict with Soviets, primarily through SLOC defense
 - ◆ Re-optimize USN vs. growing Soviet at-sea combat & SLOC-cutting capabilities in a NATO-Pact war
 - ◆ Gain OSD & OPNAV support for CNO ADM Zumwalt vision to reconfigure fleet capabilities
 - ◆ Focus more on sea control, less on power projection
 - ◆ Add “low-mix” ships to established “high-mix” programs
 - ◆ Focus on “capability categories”, to reduce “union” parochialism
 - ◆ Show that the Navy was conforming to new national “Nixon Doctrine” policy, focus on USSR
 - ◆ Leave the 1960s and the Vietnam War behind
 - ◆ Principal targets: SECDEF, OSD, DON, OPNAV
 - ◆ To guide USN, USMC flag/general officer actions

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Project SIXTY (1970)

◆ Context (I)

- ◆ 2nd year of Nixon administration (1969-74)
- ◆ SECDEF Laird (1969-73)
- ◆ US-Soviet nuclear parity
- ◆ Détente, deterrence & disarmament policies vis-a-vis Soviets
- ◆ Nixon Doctrine: allies do more
- ◆ “1 ½ War” national defense planning construct (reduced from “2 ½ wars”)
- ◆ Vietnam War winding down
- ◆ Improving relations with China
- ◆ US economy in recession
 - ◆ GDP growth slowing; inflation rate rising

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Project SIXTY (1970)

◆ Context (II)

- ◆ SECNAV Chaffee (1969-72) (Made Zumwalt CNO)
- ◆ New CNO ADM Zumwalt (1970-74)
- ◆ Soviet naval buildup
 - ◆ 1st Soviet global naval exercise: Okean 70
 - ◆ Imminent deployment of Delta SSBNs & Backfire bombers
- ◆ N. Korean USN EC-121 SOJ shoot-down (April 1969)
- ◆ AVF impending
 - ◆ USN downsizing; declining budgets
 - ◆ But, DoN TOA now >DoA or DoAF

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Project SIXTY (1970)

CNA

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ USN in 1970: 750 ships; 10 new ships authorized
- ◆ CEP, OPNAV OP-00K, NADEC created (1970)
- ◆ Demise of OPNAV Long Range Planning Group (1970)
- ◆ Carriers changing to CV/CVN concept
 - ◆ From CVAs & CVSs
- ◆ Six-Day War Egypt Styx anti-ship missile use shock (1967)

201

Project SIXTY (1970)

CNA

◆ Cited references

- ◆ Nixon Doctrine (1969)
- ◆ JCS Plans
- ◆ DoD FY 72 *Fiscal Guidance*
- ◆ *FY 72 POM Annex Navy budget*

202

Project SIXTY (1970)

- ◆ Context: Other important publications
 - ◆ CAPT E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., "A Course for Destroyers," USNI *Proceedings* (Nov 1962)
 - ◆ NATO MC 14/3 *Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area* (1968)
 - ◆ NATO MC 48/3 *Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area* (1969)
 - ◆ Flexible response
 - ◆ DOD Dir 5100.1 *Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (31 Dec 1958)
 - ◆ Herman Kahn works
 - ◆ Robert Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy* (1968) (resisted)
 - ◆ Paul Nitze thinking
 - ◆ *Naval Warfare NWP 10B* (1970)

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Project SIXTY (1970)

- ◆ How it was written
 - ◆ Drafted by RADM-SEL Stansfield Turner
 - ◆ New OPNAV special office
 - ◆ Finished by RADM Worth Bagley
 - ◆ "60-day effort"
 - ◆ CNO & SECNAV Chaffee briefed SECDEF Laird & DEPSECDEF Packard (Sep 1970)
 - ◆ Then distributed to USN and USMC flag & general officers
 - ◆ Tracking goal accomplishment (measuring effectiveness) by new Coordinator of Decisions (OP-09C) (RADM Emmett Tidd)

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Project SIXTY (1970)

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Key Ideas (I):

- ◆ Soviets & their navy are the priority threat
 - ◆ Taken very seriously
- ◆ Soviet threat is global
- ◆ Alarming view of USN capabilities to defeat Soviets at sea
 - ◆ 55% w/ present forces
 - ◆ 30% w/ POM 72 forces
- ◆ Vital importance of NATO flanks & NE Pacific
- ◆ Joint & allied coordination & cooperation
- ◆ Reprioritized naval missions

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Project SIXTY (1970)

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Key Ideas (II):

- ◆ 22 specific actions taken or proposed
 - ◆ Included topics for further study & analysis
- ◆ 3 force structure alternatives
- ◆ Theater tradeoffs necessary. Gave details.
- ◆ Retire obsolescing forces early (for \$)
- ◆ Modernize ("hi-low mix")
- ◆ New R&D initiatives
- ◆ Reduce support costs
- ◆ Pursue people programs
- ◆ Reduce forward deployments to ensure optimum rotation policies for personnel retention & motivation
- ◆ Testing new force packages: Add SSNs to surface task forces

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Project SIXTY (1970)

What was new?

- ◆ Comprehensive USN statement of strategy & policy
- ◆ 4 prioritized disaggregated capabilities
 - ◆ Assured second strike
 - ◆ Control of sea lines and areas
 - ◆ Projection of power ashore
 - ◆ Overseas presence in peacetime
- ◆ “Strategic deterrence must come first”
- ◆ Focus on sea control vs. Soviet threat
- ◆ Shift \$ from VN-era USN power projection CV strike to defensive sea control
- ◆ Many new programs
 - ◆ Sea control ships to replace CVSs (aborted)
 - ◆ Perry-class FFGs
- ◆ Tracking goal accomplishment; measuring effectiveness

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Project SIXTY (1970)

Not addressed

- ◆ Naval Warfare NWP 10B (1970)
- ◆ Non-Soviet threats
- ◆ World trade issues
- ◆ On-going war in Vietnam
- ◆ Counterinsurgency; terrorist threats
- ◆ Coastal & riverine operations & programs
- ◆ Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response
- ◆ Maritime Security Operations
- ◆ US Coast Guard
- ◆ US government inter-agency partners
- ◆ US industrial base & shipbuilding
- ◆ Little on USMC
 - ◆ Just distribution list & USMC CV TACAIR bid

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Project SIXTY (1970)

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses
 - ◆ ADM E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., *On Watch* (1976)
 - ◆ David A. Rosenberg, "Project 60: Twelve Years Later" (1982)
 - ◆ Jeffrey Sands, *On His Watch* (CNA 1993)
 - ◆ Norman Friedman, *Seapower and Space* (Ch X) (2000)
 - ◆ CAPT Terry Pierce, *Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies* (2004)
 - ◆ Edgar Puryear, *American Admiralship* (Ch IX) (2005)
 - ◆ Harlan Ullman, "A New Maritime Strategy," US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Mar 2007)

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Project SIXTY (1970)

- ◆ Criticisms (I)
 - ◆ "A non-Mahanian aberration" (Norman Friedman)
 - ◆ Too defensive
 - ◆ Too much focus on sea control vs. Soviets
 - ◆ Too little focus on power projection vs. Soviets
 - ◆ Sea control & power projection were intertwined, not bifurcated
 - ◆ Wrongly assumed Soviet priority to cut SLOCs
 - ◆ To abandon naval offensive would lose the fleet & the war

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Project SIXTY (1970)



- ◆ Criticisms (II):
 - ◆ A step backwards from focus on forward USN influence on events ashore
 - ◆ Wrong solutions to problems
 - ◆ Unaffordable
 - ◆ Led to tactical caution
 - ◆ Not well connected to national policy of détente
 - ◆ Not joint or allied enough
 - ◆ Too parochial (surface-warfare advocacy)

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Project SIXTY (1970)



- ◆ Influence:
 - ◆ Wide within Navy & DOD at the time
 - ◆ Concepts more influential than programs
 - ◆ Mostly repudiated by successors
- ◆ Why?
 - ◆ Personality: Strong backing by forceful & thoughtful, but unorthodox & controversial, CNO
 - ◆ Effective CNO management techniques (special assistants, NADEC, Z-Grams). But limited buy-in.
 - ◆ Crystallized poles in USN thinking
 - ◆ 1982 ENS Rosenberg OP-965 retrospective study showed utility of comprehensive USN policy statement

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Project SIXTY (1970)


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- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Set the example for all
 - ◆ Conceptual roots of *Missions of the U.S. Navy*
 - ◆ Triggered contrary views in *Strategic Concepts of the US Navy*
 - ◆ Studied for lessons leading to *The Maritime Strategy*

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

CNA



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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

CNA

◆ Overview

- ◆ Signed by NAVWARCOL President VADM Turner
- ◆ Described 4 Navy missions (from *Project SIXTY*)
- ◆ Showed relationship of missions to tactics
- ◆ Deliberate creation of a new vocabulary
- ◆ Principle target: US Navy officer corps
- ◆ USN officers should think deeply about their service
- ◆ Missions construct lends itself to analyzing naval issues
- ◆ Soviets the main threat
- ◆ UNCLAS articles
- ◆ Lasting influence


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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

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◆ Signed by:

- ◆ VADM Stansfield Turner, President, Naval War College (1972-4) (surface warfare officer)
- ◆ Later, Carter Administration CIA Director (1977-81)
- ◆ Continued to write extensively on naval policy & strategy



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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)



- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as “Missions”
 - ◆ UNCLAS *Naval War College Review* article (Mar-Apr 1974)
 - ◆ 16 pages
 - ◆ Reprinted in *Naval War College Review* (Winter 1998)
 - ◆ UNCLAS *Proceedings* article (Dec 1974)
 - ◆ Derived from *Project SIXTY*

217

Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)



- ◆ Why it was written
 - ◆ To get USN officers to think deeply about their service
 - ◆ To transform Navy internal thinking about what it does
 - ◆ To help naval officers understand what is best for the whole organization, not just their own platforms or programs
 - ◆ To focus the Navy on cross-cutting *outputs* (missions), vice parochial *inputs* (platforms, unions)
 - ◆ To inform future naval force structure decisions
 - ◆ To form a basis to establishing priorities for allocating resources
 - ◆ To assist in selecting the best among competing systems
 - ◆ Institutionalize *Project SIXTY* framework
 - ◆ Principle target: US Navy officer corps

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

◆ Context (I)

- ◆ Last year of Nixon administration (1969-74)
 - ◆ Watergate scandal 1972-4
- ◆ US forces withdrawn from South Vietnam (1973)
- ◆ SECDEF Schlesinger (1973-75)
- ◆ All-Volunteer Force (1973)
- ◆ US economy in recession again; inflation rate rising
- ◆ SECDEF nuclear strategy changes (1974)
- ◆ Palestinians attack at Munich airport (1970). Beginning of major terrorist campaign
 - ◆ Munich Olympics (1972); Rome airport (1973)
- ◆ Improving US relations with PRC

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

◆ Context (II)

- ◆ Nixon-Brezhnev Moscow summit meeting (May 1972)
 - ◆ High point of detente
- ◆ INCSEA agreement with Soviets (1972)
- ◆ ABM & SALT Treaties (1972)
- ◆ Soviet naval buildup
 - ◆ Delta II-class SSBN (1972)
- ◆ USN-Soviet Navy Mediterranean confrontation (1973)
- ◆ Post-Vietnam operations
- ◆ Indo-Pakistani War & *Enterprise* cruise (1971-2)
- ◆ Close Soviet-Indian military ties

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ Outgoing CNO Zumwalt (1970-74)
- ◆ OPNAV reorganization: Creation of "3 platform barons" as Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations (DCNOs) (1971)
 - ◆ OP-02 (Submarines); OP-03 (Surface); OP-05 (Air)
 - ◆ Formalized increased post-World War II officer specialization
- ◆ OPNAV Net Assessment Office created
- ◆ USN downsizing; declining budgets
- ◆ USN in 1974: 506 ships; 14 new ships authorized
- ◆ But, DON TOA now >DA or DAF

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

◆ Context (IV)

- ◆ Sea Control Ship experiment on USS *Guam* with AV-8s & SH-3s (1972)
- ◆ Racial incidents on USN ships (1972)
- ◆ "Turner Revolution" at Naval War College (1972-4)
 - ◆ Curriculum transformation, esp. Strategy & Policy Course (1972)
 - ◆ New top-notch faculty, esp. Strategy Department
 - ◆ Current Strategy Forum instituted (1973)
- ◆ Increasing USAF minelaying & surveillance support at sea
- ◆ Army at TRADOC developing defensive operational doctrine focused on Europe

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Cited references
 - ◆ Mahan

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other important publications
 - ◆ *Project SIXTY* (1970)
 - ◆ Robert Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy* (1968) (resisted)
 - ◆ Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy* (1970)
 - ◆ USN-USAF MOAs on B-52 minelaying at sea (1971, 1974)
 - ◆ *Future Maritime Strategy Study (FUMAR)* (1973)
 - ◆ “U.S. Strategy for the Pacific/Indian Ocean Area in the 1970s”
 - ◆ “Project 2000” long-range planning Study (1974)
 - ◆ ADM Gorshkov, “Navies in War and Peace” articles in *Proceedings* (with commentaries) (Jan-Nov 1974)

224

Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)



◆ How it was written

- ◆ Drafted at newly-transformed Naval War College
- ◆ Drafter: NAVWARCOL President, VADM Stansfield Turner (Jun 1972-Aug 1974)
 - ◆ Had conceived and drafted CNO ADM Zumwalt's *Project SIXTY*
 - ◆ Director of OPNAV analysis office (OP-96) before going to NWC
 - ◆ Leaving Naval War College for command of US Second Fleet
- ◆ Editor & sounding board: CDR George Thibault

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)



◆ Key ideas (I):

◆ 4 “Missions”

Naval War College Review
order

- Strategic deterrence
- Projection of power
- Sea control
- Naval presence

Naval Institute Proceedings
order

- “Warfighting missions”
 - Sea control
 - Projection of power
- “Deterrent missions”
 - Naval presence
 - Strategic deterrence

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

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♦ Key ideas (II):

- ♦ Each of 4 missions subdivided into “tactics”
- ♦ Detailed & nuanced definitions & discussions of each

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ Key ideas (III):

- ♦ “To force the Navy to think in terms of output rather than input”
 - ♦ (Key goal of McNamara-instituted PPBS since 1961-2)
- ♦ Missions as “outputs”.
 - ♦ Tied to national objectives
 - ♦ Interdependent
 - ♦ NOT prioritized
- ♦ Tradeoffs within/among missions
- ♦ USMC implements a few of the tactics

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

CNA


◆ Key ideas (IV):

- ◆ USN officers should think deeply about their service
- ◆ USN sea control focus may yield to naval presence focus (*Proceedings* article)
- ◆ Discussed historical development of Navy concepts
- ◆ Placed 4 Missions in historical context
- ◆ Soviets the priority threat
- ◆ Discussion of “blockade” as a discreet naval operation

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

CNA



Interdependent Naval Missions

Reproduced with permission from: Naval War College Review, Mar-Apr 1974 Vol XXVI, #5. "Missions of the U.S. Navy," by Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy, President, Naval War College.

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

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- ◆ What was new?
 - ◆ Going public with *Project SIXTY* 4-capability construct
 - ◆ Explicit discussion of “sea control” as superseding “control of the sea” terminology
 - ◆ Rejection of “command of the seas” and “sea power” terminology
 - ◆ Explication of “Presence” mission
 - ◆ Tying mission areas to tactics
 - ◆ Wide subsequent influence and citation

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

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- ◆ Not addressed (I)
 - ◆ *Explicit* priorities among missions
 - ◆ Non-Soviet threats
 - ◆ World trade issues
 - ◆ Counterinsurgency & irregular warfare
 - ◆ Coastal & riverine operations & programs
 - ◆ Maritime Security Operations
 - ◆ Terrorist threats
 - ◆ Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

CNA

- ◆ Not addressed (II)
 - ◆ Sealift
 - ◆ US Coast Guard; U.S. Army
 - ◆ U.S. Merchant marine
 - ◆ US industrial base & shipbuilding
 - ◆ U.S. government interagency partners
- ◆ Little joint or allied mention

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

CNA

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses
 - ◆ ADM E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., *On Watch* (1976)
 - ◆ John Allen Williams, "Strategies and Forces of the U.S. Navy: A Critical Reappraisal," *Armed Forces & Society* (Summer 1981)

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

◆ Criticisms

- ◆ These weren't really "missions"?
- ◆ These weren't really the right missions.
- ◆ "Sea control" really 2 missions: "Offensive" & "Defensive" (CDR/Dr John Allen Williams USNR)
- ◆ Sea control & power projection intertwined, not bifurcated
- ◆ Presence not really a "mission"
- ◆ All 4 missions not co-equal
 - ◆ Implicit primacy of "sea control" right/wrong
- ◆ New vocabulary shouldn't supersede older terms

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

- ◆ Subsequent evolution of ADM Turner's thought
 - ◆ 4 roles/missions of the Navy
 - ◆ Sea control
 - ◆ Projection of power by amphibious assault
 - ◆ Projection of power ashore by bombardment
 - ◆ Strategic nuclear retaliation
 - ◆ "Today a new mission may be emerging"
 - ◆ "Defending the homeland or other land areas against attack by missiles through space"
 - ◆ "Setting aside homeland defense . . . The other four missions are today of lessening importance to our country's security"

ADM Stansfield Turner USN (Ret)
"Is the U.S. Navy Being Marginalized?"
Naval War College Review (Summer 2003)

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

- ◆ Influence:
 - ◆ Very wide. Cited throughout world defense literature
 - ◆ E.g.: Japanese admiral quoted in 2007 conference paper
 - ◆ Spilled over into CNO ADM Holloway 1st (Mar 75) Posture Statement & Jun 75 *Proceedings* article
- ◆ Why?
 - ◆ Simple, elegant construct; Filled a conceptual void & need
 - ◆ Widely adopted by Navy leadership
 - ◆ Personality: VADM Turner reputation as USN's intellectual leader, inside & outside USN
 - ◆ Adopted by academia (civilian & military)
 - ◆ Links to ADM Zumwalt policies muted

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ New vocabulary used in almost all
 - ◆ But "control of the seas" & "sea power" persisted too
 - ◆ 4-mission framework triggered contrary views in *Strategic Concepts of the US Navy & The Future of U.S. Sea Power*
 - ◆ Missions restated, re-ordered and/or modified somewhat in *Forward . . . From the Sea, Anytime, Anywhere, Naval Power 21*, *Sea Power 21*, & added to in NOC (2006)
 - ◆ Missions repeated in 2007 *Program Guide to the U.S. Navy* ("crisis response" added)
 - ◆ Missions formed 4 of 6 "core capabilities" of *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (2007)

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ADM James L. Holloway III (CNO Jun 1974-Jul 1978)

- ◆ Dec 1975 *Strategic Concept for the U.S. Navy (S)*
- ◆ 1976-78 CNO Reports (Posture Statements)
- ◆ Jul 1976 "U.S. Navy: A Bicentennial Appraisal"
- ◆ Jan 1977 *Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (NWP 1)*
- ◆ May 1978 *Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy NWP 1 (Rev. A)*
- ◆ (Mar 1978) *(Sea Plan 2000) (S)*
 - ◆ A force planning study



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
ADM James L. Holloway III (CNO Jun 1974-Jul 1978)

- ◆ Naval aviator (nuclear power trained)
- ◆ Experienced in initiating concepts & processes
 - ◆ NATOPS; USN program planning; CV concept (1968); changed USN frigate nomenclature; CVBGs (1977); flexible, reconfigurable air wing; fostered CWC concept
- ◆ Initially let previous concepts stand (had been VCNO under ADM Zumwalt)
- ◆ Progressively developed & promulgated a new coherent set of concepts to replace them
- ◆ At end of his term, promulgated a final comprehensive statement
- ◆ Signature program: CVN

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis



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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Overview

- ◆ Drafted and signed by CNO ADM Holloway
- ◆ “Strategic Concepts”
- ◆ Principal targets: USN officer corps & Capitol Hill
- ◆ CLAS memo, then UNCLAS article, NWP, posture statement brochures, revised NWP
- ◆ Concepts evolved through various editions
- ◆ Comprehensive analysis of naval requirement development
- ◆ Rigorous flow from national policy to systems
- ◆ Focus on naval warfare tasks, across platforms
- ◆ Still modestly influential

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA

- ◆ Signed by:
 - ◆ CNO ADM James L. Holloway, III
 - ◆ Successive drafts after 1 ½ years in office



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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA

- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as "Strategic concept(s)"
 - ◆ Secret signed document circulated to Fleet Commanders for comment (Dec 1975)
 - ◆ *CNO Reports* (Posture Statements)
(Jul 76, Apr 77, Mar 78)
 - ◆ Pocket-sized for portability
 - ◆ *Proceedings* article (Jul 1976)
 - ◆ UNCLAS Naval Warfare Publications (NWP)
 - ◆ NWP 1 (Jan 1977)
 - ◆ NWP 1(A) (May 1978): 37 pages
 - ◆ Still in force as of Feb 1987
 - ◆ Later boiled down in Holloway 1985 *Oceanus* article

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Why it was written (I)

- ◆ So USN officers would understand basic USN concepts, doctrine & processes, in order to be able to contribute effectively to internal Navy decisions, make effective external cases for the Navy, and understand the implications of making changes
- ◆ To lay out the capabilities of the US Navy in support of the nation, including aircraft carriers
- ◆ Reaction to *Project SIXTY* & Turner “Missions”
- ◆ “Consolidation” of internal USN thinking, esp. “missions”
- ◆ To emphasize warfare tasks over platforms
 - ◆ And in so doing highlight the versatility of the aircraft carrier

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Why it was written (II)

- ◆ To reflect evolution of CNO ADM Holloway's thinking
- ◆ To influence Administration policies:
 - ◆ To create a coherent Navy policy statement in anticipation of a possible Jan 1977 change in administrations (1975-6)
 - ◆ To try to influence new administration policies (1977)
 - ◆ To try to change administration policies (1978)
 - ◆ To enlist Congressional support in influencing/changing Administration policies (1977-8)
- ◆ Principal targets: USN officer corps, Capitol Hill, DOD

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)



◆ Context (I)

- ◆ CNO ADM Holloway (1974-78)
- ◆ 2nd year of Ford (R) administration (1974-77) thru 2nd year of Carter (D) administration
- ◆ US voters repudiated Ford administration (Nov 1976)
- ◆ SECDEFs Laird, Rumsfeld (1975-77); SECNAV Middendorf
- ◆ SECDEF Brown (1977-81); SECNAV Claytor
- ◆ US economic growth after recession, but inflation rate rising & unemployment rate high

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)



◆ Context (II)

- ◆ National policy shift from Pacific military commitments
- ◆ Outgoing Ford Administration policies comfortable for Navy, if underfunded
- ◆ Soviets deployed SS-20 nuclear missiles Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Central Europe (1975)
- ◆ US countered with Pershing II & GLCM INF deployment plans
- ◆ New Carter administration defense focus on NATO central region & USN Atlantic SLOC protection
 - ◆ Robert Komer as DOD Special Assistant for NATO

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ Arms Control Agreements & talks
 - ◆ Seabed, INCSEA, SALT I, ABM
 - ◆ US-Soviet talks to demilitarize Indian Ocean (1977-8)
- ◆ Soviet fleet build-up
 - ◆ New Delta II-class SSBNs (1972)
 - ◆ Soviet SSBNs no longer needed to deploy far forward & transit GIUK & other barriers to reach CONUS targets
 - ◆ Backfire-B bomber with ASMs (1972)
 - ◆ To keep US carrier aviation beyond striking range of Soviet targets
 - ◆ 2nd Soviet global naval exercise: Okean 75
- ◆ 1st USN, Soviet Navy reciprocal port visits (1975)

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (IV)

- ◆ Close Soviet-Indian military ties
- ◆ 1st nuclear weapon test by Soviet-friendly India (1974)
- ◆ Improving US relations with PRC
- ◆ Portuguese empire freed (1974-5)
- ◆ Panama Canal transfer treaty signed (1977)
- ◆ Executive branch, Congress reluctant to intervene overseas in 3rd world ("Vietnam syndrome")
 - ◆ Congress blocked US aid to anti-Communist forces in civil war in newly-independent Angola (1975-6)

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA

◆ Context (V)

- ◆ Declining USN force levels, fluctuating budgets
- ◆ USN in 1978: 468 ships; 18 new ships authorized
- ◆ Emerging USN force level goal: 600 ships
- ◆ New systems entering fleet
- ◆ CWC concept entering fleet
- ◆ Internal USN “Repeal Zumwalt” debates
- ◆ Bitter internal US government aircraft carrier, VSTOL budget debates
 - ◆ Culmination: Congress debated adding CVN 71 to carrier-less FY 79 defense budget (Feb-Aug 1978)

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA

◆ Context (VI)

- ◆ Specialized USN ASW carriers disappeared
 - ◆ CVA/CVAN/ CVS → CV/CVN
 - ◆ CVWs transformed from 2 specialized air wing types to one general multi-mission model
- ◆ New fleet battle organization (1977)
 - ◆ CVTF/CTVG → CVBF/CVBG
- ◆ CNO ADM Holloway initiatives

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

◆ Context (VII)

- ◆ USN surface ship reclassifications (1975)
 - ◆ CNO ADM Holloway initiatives
 - ◆ Brought USN "frigate" nomenclature in line with international practice
 - ◆ Eliminated perceived USN-Soviet Navy "cruiser gap"
 - ◆ Eliminated USN surface combatant "escort" terminology
 - ◆ CG/CLG → CG
 - ◆ DL/DLG → CG or DDG
 - ◆ DD/DDG → DD/DDG
 - ◆ DE/DEG → FF/FFG
 - ◆ PF → FFG
- ◆ CNO ADM Holloway decision to halt CGN procurement

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

◆ Context (VIII)

- ◆ New SACLANT/CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/C2F plans to shift Atlantic convoy routes south, to free up escort forces for northern forward ops
- ◆ New CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT/C7F plans for northern offensive vs. Soviets in NW Pacific
- ◆ CINCUSNAVEUR/C6F plans to stand & fight in central, eastern Med
- ◆ But NATO CINCSOUTH ADM Turner plans to move forces to western Med & LANT in time of crisis

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

◆ Context (IX)

- ◆ USN Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) created (1975)
- ◆ NAVWARCOL Center for Advanced Research created (1975)
- ◆ John F. Lehman as CNO consultant (from 1977)
- ◆ Army at TRADOC developed defensive operational doctrine focused on Europe (1976)
- ◆ Increasing USAF minelaying, surveillance support at sea
- ◆ Military Reform Movement (from 1976)
 - ◆ SEN Taft, then SEN Hart. Bill Lind
 - ◆ Adopted & advocated "lo" end of Zumwalt "hi-lo mix"
- ◆ Committee on the Present Danger (from 1976)
 - ◆ Paul Nitze, John Lehman, etc.

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

◆ Cited references

- ◆ Title 10 of U.S. Code
- ◆ DOD Dir 5100.1 *Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (31 Dec 1958)
- ◆ DOD Total Force Policy
- ◆ *Unified Command Plan*
- ◆ JCS & USN Readiness Reporting Systems
- ◆ Discussed historical development of USN strategy & law of the sea

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ NIE 11-15-74 *Soviet Naval Policy and Programs* (Dec 1974)
 - ◆ ADM Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace" *Proceedings* articles (w/ USN flag officer commentaries) (1974)
 - ◆ Bound & published as *Red Star Rising at Sea* (1974)
 - ◆ USN-USAF MOA on cooperation at sea (1975)
 - ◆ NSDM 242 *Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons* (Jan 1974) (flexible nuclear options)
 - ◆ NSDM 344 *Navy Shipbuilding Program* (Jan 1977)
 - ◆ Lame duck Ford Admin call for 600 ships; VSTOL carriers
 - ◆ Based on NSC study on "U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements" (Sept 1976)
 - ◆ NSC PRM 10 *Military Strategy & Force Posture Review* (1977) & PD 18 *US National Strategy* (Aug 1977)
 - ◆ *Sea Plan 2000* naval force planning study (1978)

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ CINCPACFLT ADM Hayward "Sea Strike" briefings (1977-9)
 - ◆ CBO (Dov Zakheim) reports on USN (1975-80)
 - ◆ USN *Sea Based Air Platform Study* (1978)
 - ◆ Record & Binkin (Brookings), *Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here?* (1976)
 - ◆ SEN Taft "White Paper on Defense" (1976)
 - ◆ US Army FM 100-5 *Operations ("active defense")* (1976)
 - ◆ Robert Komer RAND studies on NATO (1973-6)

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8) CNA

♦ How it was written (I)

- ♦ Personality: CNO ADM Holloway the driver
 - ♦ Saw importance of “writing it all down”, himself
 - ♦ Advocate of direct senior involvement; not “completed staff work”
 - ♦ Advocate of standardized processes throughout his career
 - ♦ Denigrated fancy pictures and art work
- ♦ Assisted by
 - ♦ Executive Assistant CAPT John Poindexter as sounding board
 - ♦ CNO Fellow
 - ♦ OP-60N (LCDR Joseph Strasser, Fletcher PhD); 1-on-1 mtgs
 - ♦ CAPT Dirk Pringle (OP-64) for “readiness” section

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8) CNA

♦ How it was written (II)

- ♦ Unhappy with “4 Missions of the Navy,” (which had informed his 1st Posture Statement & 1st *Proceedings* article)
- ♦ Continuously reworked his ideas, in various media
- ♦ Added “readiness” section IRT perceived SECDEF Brown confusion on readiness terminology at Armed Forces Policy Council mtg
- ♦ Published in final form as *NWP 1 (Rev A)* in May 1978
- ♦ Saw it as a baseline. Ok to deviate from as required
 - ♦ “If you’re going to break the rules, you’ve got to have rules to break”

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

◆ Key ideas (I)

- ◆ Strategic concepts drive force requirements
- ◆ Formal orderly top-down general processes
- ◆ Used accepted DOD definitions of terms
 - ◆ "Mission," "roles," "functions," etc.
- ◆ Importance to US of open & free seaborne trade
- ◆ Importance of factors unique to shipbuilding

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

◆ Key ideas (II)

- ◆ Utility & importance of net assessment & analysis
- ◆ Importance of ship & a/c readiness & employment cycles
- ◆ Forward deployment & surge posture balance
- ◆ *Coordinated* joint & allied ops
- ◆ USN sea control a prerequisite for sustained Army, Air Force overseas campaigns (enabling)
- ◆ Capabilities-based. Discussed only generic threats
 - ◆ Soviets not mentioned

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

◆ Key ideas (III)

- ◆ Revised (& complexified) Turner concepts, vocabulary
 - ◆ 2 basic USN *functions*
 - ◆ Sea control (prerequisite)
 - ◆ Power projection
 - ◆ 3 USN *roles*
 - ◆ Strategic nuclear deterrence
 - ◆ SLOC security
 - ◆ Overseas deployed forces
 - ◆ Presence = a "clear side benefit" of forward deployment
 - ◆ Must reflect "combat capability"
 - ◆ Presence nota mission; buys "reduced response time"

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

◆ Key Ideas (IV)

- ◆ Fundamental warfare tasks
 - ◆ AAW
 - ◆ ASW
 - ◆ ASUW
 - ◆ Strike
 - ◆ Amphibious
 - ◆ Mine
- ◆ Supporting warfare tasks
 - ◆ Special warfare
 - ◆ Ocean surveillance
 - ◆ Intelligence
 - ◆ C³
 - ◆ EW
 - ◆ Logistics

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ NWP 10(B) (1970) “Types of naval operations”

- ◆ Strike force operations
- ◆ Amphibious operations
- ◆ Anti-air warfare
- ◆ Anti-submarine warfare
- ◆ Mining & mine countermeasures

- ◆ Riverine operations
- ◆ Support operations
- ◆ Surveillance & blockading
- ◆ Search and rescue
- ◆ Domestic emergency operations

◆ NWP 1 (Rev A) (1978) “Warfare tasks”

- ◆ Anti-air warfare
- ◆ Anti-submarine warfare
- ◆ Anti-surface warfare
- ◆ Strike warfare
- ◆ Amphibious warfare
- ◆ Mine warfare

- ◆ Special warfare
- ◆ Ocean surveillance
- ◆ Intelligence
- ◆ C3
- ◆ Electronic warfare
- ◆ Logistics

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (V)

- ◆ Warfare tasks across platforms
 - ◆ Update of earlier NWP 10 listings
 - ◆ Implicit primacy of strike warfare & carrier platform
 - ◆ New CVBG force packages to incorporate CVS missions
- ◆ USMC = $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1 of 6 “fundamental” warfare tasks

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
Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

- ◆ Key ideas (VI): Evolution of CNO ADM Holloway thinking
 - ◆ 1975 Posture Statement & NIP article
 - ◆ Followed Zumwalt-Turner "4 Missions" construct
 - ◆ Dec 1975 SECRET *Strategic Concept for the U.S. Navy*
 - ◆ "Sea Control is the fundamental U.S. Navy function"
 - ◆ Naval presence a "unique capability"
 - ◆ 1976 Posture Statement & July 1976 *Proceedings* article
 - ◆ Two principal functions: Sea Control & Power Projection
 - ◆ 1977 & 1978 Posture Statements
 - ◆ May 1978 NWP 1 (Rev A)
 - ◆ Naval presence a "clear side benefit"

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

Generation of Naval Force Requirements



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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

- ◆ What was new?
 - ◆ Heavy CNO involvement in initial drafting
 - ◆ CNO signature
 - ◆ Contrast with *Naval Warfare* (NWP 10) of 1950s & 60s
 - ◆ Taxonomies & processes
 - ◆ Capabilities-based threats
 - ◆ No mention of Soviets
 - ◆ Contrast with Zumwalt & Turner
 - ◆ NWP-Posture Statement congruence

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

- ◆ Not addressed
 - ◆ Soviets by name
 - ◆ Terrorist threats
 - ◆ Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response
 - ◆ Maritime Security Operations
 - ◆ US Coast Guard
 - ◆ Arms control
 - ◆ U.S. government interagency partners
 - ◆ Blockade

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA

- ◆ Barely addressed
 - ◆ "Sealift" mentioned as part of "logistics" task
 - ◆ Unconventional warfare, coastal & riverine *interdiction* subsumed under Naval Special Warfare

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses
 - ◆ ADM James L. Holloway III, *Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation* (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007)

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)



◆ Criticisms

- ◆ Too long & complex
- ◆ Too dry & lifeless
- ◆ Too generic, general & abstract
- ◆ Too hard to update & keep current
- ◆ Too “doctrinal”
- ◆ All form & no substance
- ◆ Did not convey a “story”
- ◆ Not aligned with contemporary national defense policies

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)



◆ Influence:

- ◆ In NWP format, modest within USN
 - ◆ Used in war colleges
 - ◆ Still cited in 2005
 - ◆ Liotta & Lloyd Naval War College Review article on strategy & force planning
- ◆ In Posture Statement format, influential on Capitol Hill during budget battles
 - ◆ Especially spring-summer 1978 re: FY 79 budget & CVN-71.
- ◆ ADM Holloway influence on John Lehman

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Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Why did it have the influence it did?
 - ◆ Deep, personal involvement by CNO ADM Holloway
 - ◆ But ADM Holloway little known to defense academics
 - ◆ Comprehensive
 - ◆ Wide distribution as USN NWP & external Posture Statements
 - ◆ But USN “wary of doctrine;” limited buy-in by officers
 - ◆ Posture Statement format had short shelf life
 - ◆ Overshadowed by *Sea Plan 2000* debate
 - ◆ Superseded by *The Maritime Strategy*
 - ◆ Never updated

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



Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Warfare tasks adopted in *The Maritime Strategy*

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)



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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- ◆ Overview
 - ◆ Signed by SECNAV Claytor
 - ◆ Article signed by Under SECNAV Woolsey
 - ◆ Principal target: SECDEF, OSD, Joint Staff, OPNAV
 - ◆ SECRET 2-volume force planning study
 - ◆ Separate UNCLAS abridgement of executive summary
 - ◆ USN Woolsey *International Security* article
 - ◆ Maintain stability - Contain crises - Deter war spectrum
 - ◆ 7 USN missions
 - ◆ New technology as USN enabler
 - ◆ 3 USN force level options
 - ◆ Great short-term influence. Overshadowed later by Hayward views & *The Maritime Strategy*

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

CNA

- ◆ Document signed by:
 - ◆ SECNAV W. Graham Claytor
 - ◆ 2nd year in office
 - ◆ Article signed by:
 - ◆ Under SECNAV R. James Woolsey
 - ◆ 2nd year in office



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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

CNA

- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as a “force planning study”
 - ◆ “Major source document of DoN planning and policy”
 - ◆ Massive SECRET study
 - ◆ 889 pages in two volumes
 - ◆ UNCLAS abridgement of Executive Summary
 - ◆ 23 pages
 - ◆ SECDEF Brown tasked SECNAV Claytor (Aug 1977)
 - ◆ SECNAV Claytor signed (Mar 1978)
 - ◆ Under SECNAV Woolsey summarized in *International Security* (Summer 1978)
 - ◆ “Planning a Navy: The Risks of Conventional Wisdom”

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- ◆ Why it was written
 - ◆ To show USN relevance to conflict with Soviets, primarily through forward, global, offensive US naval operations
 - ◆ To try to reverse policies & concepts underlying PRM 10, PD 18, general Carter Administration/SECDEF Brown defense policy & strategy, & US Army/USEUCOM recommendations on US defense policy & strategy, especially focus on central Europe & ground combat
 - ◆ To bolster Congressional Navy supporters in ongoing bitter inter-branch government debates on funding more carriers, esp. CVN-71
 - ◆ To act as an advocacy vehicle for SECNAV Claytor & USN Woolsey
 - ◆ Principal target: NSC staff, SECDEF & OSD, Joint Staff, OPNAV, Capitol Hill

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- ◆ Context: (I)
 - ◆ Early in 2nd year of Carter administration
 - ◆ SECDEF Brown (1977-81)
 - ◆ Robert Komer as Special Assistant for NATO Affairs
 - ◆ SECNAV Claytor; USN Woolsey
 - ◆ Outgoing CNO ADM Holloway
 - ◆ Low US economic growth; high unemployment and very high inflation
 - ◆ Executive branch, Congress reluctant to intervene overseas in 3rd world ("Vietnam syndrome")
 - ◆ Congress blocked US aid to anti-Communist forces in civil war in newly-independent Angola (1975-6)

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context: (II)

- ◆ Administration defense focus on NATO central region & USN SLOC protection
 - ◆ Focus on ASW, ASUW, AAW, readiness, not strike, amphibious ops
- ◆ NSC PRM 10 & PD 18 policies slighted Navy roles
- ◆ OMB Randy Jayne indicted Navy for incoherence
- ◆ Bitter internal US government CVN, VSTOL budget debates, culminating in carrier-less FY 79 DOD & presidential budget proposal (Feb 1978)
- ◆ Congressional dissatisfaction with Carter Administration naval policies, especially omission of new CVN in FY 79 defense budget proposal

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context: (III)

- ◆ USN in 1978: 468 ships; 18 new ships authorized
- ◆ Evolving 600-ship Navy force goal
 - ◆ 1974: Zumwalt HASC recommendation: 600 ships
 - ◆ 1974: Holloway HASC recommendation: 600 ships
 - ◆ 1974: DEPSECDEF HASC statement: 575-600 ships
 - ◆ 1977: NSDM 344: About 600 ships in mid-1990s
 - ◆ 1977: Outgoing SECDEF Rumsfeld: "closer to 600 than to the present 485 ships" by mid-1990s

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- ◆ Context: (IV)
 - ◆ Soviet fleet buildup
 - ◆ Especially submarines & Backfire-B bombers w/ ASMs
 - ◆ Increasing Soviet "out-of-area" deployments
 - ◆ USN budget & force levels decreasing
 - ◆ OPNAV morale rattled
 - ◆ New systems entering USN fleet
 - ◆ Unofficial "Commanders Cabal" DC-area officer discussion group (late 1970s)
 - ◆ Convener: CDR Norm Mosher
 - ◆ Members included *Sea Plan 2000* contributors
 - ◆ CWC becoming institutionalized in fleet

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- ◆ Context: (V)
 - ◆ Increasing USAF minelaying, surveillance support at sea
 - ◆ US Army implementing defensive operational doctrine focused on Europe
 - ◆ Internal Army resistance to defensive concepts building, esp. at TRADOC
 - ◆ Soviets deploying SS-20 missiles in Europe (1977)
 - ◆ US rapprochement with PRC
 - ◆ Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai dead (1976)
 - ◆ Deng Xiaoping takes power (1978)
 - ◆ Panama Canal transfer treaty signed (1977)

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Context: (VI)
 - ◆ Operations & plans
 - ◆ Jordanian crisis (1970)
 - ◆ Cienfuegos crisis (1970)
 - ◆ Indo-Pakistan War (1971)
 - ◆ Mideast War/ resupply of Israel (1973)
 - ◆ Mayaguez incident (1975)
 - ◆ Increased war gaming activity at NAVWARCOL
 - ◆ Center for Advanced Research created (1975)
 - ◆ ONI "Newport Detachment" created (1977)

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Context: (VII)
 - ◆ Non-DOD policy experts
 - ◆ Military Reform Movement (SEN Hart & Bill Lind)
 - ◆ Adopted & advocated "lo" end of Zumwalt "hi-lo mix"
 - ◆ RADM (Ret) Gene Laroque & Center for Defense Information (CDI) (1972)
 - ◆ "Team B" assessment of Soviet threat (1976)
 - ◆ Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) revitalized (1976)
 - ◆ John Lehman as independent US Navy CNO consultant

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

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◆ Context (VIII)

- ◆ New SACLANT/CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/C2F plans to shift Atlantic convoy routes south, to free up escort forces for northern forward ops
- ◆ New CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT/C7F plans for northern offensive vs. Soviets in NW Pacific
- ◆ CINCUSNAVEUR/C6F plans to stand & fight in central, eastern Med
- ◆ But NATO CINCSOUTH ADM Turner had planned to move forces to western Med & LANT in time of crisis (1975-7)

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

CNA

◆ Cited references

- ◆ NSSM 3 (1970)
- ◆ NSC PRM 10 *Military Strategy & Force Posture Review* (1977)
- ◆ SEN Taft "White Paper on Defense" (1976)
- ◆ Other (DOD papers, congressional reports, studies & theses)

290

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ NATO MC 14/3 *Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area* (1968)
 - ◆ NATO MC 48/3 *Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area* (1969)
 - ◆ Flexible response
 - ◆ Robert Komer RAND studies on NATO (1973-6)
 - ◆ NATO *Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP)* (1977)
 - ◆ DOD Dir 5100.1 *Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (31 Dec 1958)
 - ◆ *Consolidated Guidance*
 - ◆ JSCP & OPLANS

291

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ NSDM 344 "Navy Shipbuilding Program" (Jan 1977)
 - ◆ Lame duck Ford Admin call for 600 ships; VSTOL carriers
 - ◆ Based on NSC study on "U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements" (Sept 1976)
 - ◆ GAO UNCLAS report on NSC study (Mar 1978)
 - ◆ PD 27 *Procedures for Dealing with Non-Military Incidents* (1978)
 - ◆ USN-USAF MOA on cooperation at sea (1975)
 - ◆ US Army FM 100-5 *Operations ("active defense")* (1976)

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ ADM Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace" *Proceedings* articles (w/ USN flag officer commentaries) (1974)
 - ◆ Bound & published as *Red Star Rising at Sea* (1974)
 - ◆ CBO (Dov Zakheim) reports on USN (1975-80)
 - ◆ Record & Binkin (Brookings), *Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here?* (1976)
 - ◆ Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," (*Commentary* Jul 1977)

293

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
 - ◆ NIE 11-15-74 *Soviet Naval Policy and Programs* (Dec 1974)
 - ◆ USN SEAMIX I study (1973)
 - ◆ USN SEAMIX II study (1975)
 - ◆ CNA Sea War 85 study (1975-8)
 - ◆ Atlantic campaign in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war
 - ◆ (Scenario for Tom Clancy (LT Larry Bond) *Red Storm Rising*)
 - ◆ CINCPACFLT ADM Hayward "Sea Strike" briefings ongoing (1977-9)
 - ◆ CNO ADM Holloway NWP 1 "Strategic Concepts" drafting efforts ongoing
 - ◆ USN *Sea Based Air Platform Study* (Feb 1978)
 - ◆ Ongoing simultaneously
 - ◆ Re: CVNs, CVVs, VSSs, etc.

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

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♦ How it was written (I)

- ♦ SECNAV Claytor, USN Woolsey requested SECDEF authorize DON study of range of USN roles (Jul 1977)
- ♦ SECDEF so tasked SECNAV (Aug 1977)
- ♦ To examine probable range of naval tasks
- ♦ A series of policy and feasibility analyses
- ♦ USN-USMC study group drafted
 - ♦ Director: F.J. (Bing) West, Jr. (NWC civilian professor; former USMC)
 - ♦ 12 military team members (10 USN; 2 USMC)
 - ♦ Staff incl/ LCDR Ken McGruther (NWC) & LCDR Jim Stark (OPNAV OP-965)

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ How it was written (II)

- ♦ SECNAV Graham Claytor, USN James Woolsey, VCNO ADM Robert Long active oversight
- ♦ No significant CNO (ADM Holloway) role
- ♦ Liaison with ADM Hayward & staff (CINCPACFLT)
- ♦ Influence of consultant Hon. John Lehman
- ♦ Analytic support: Presearch, Inc.
 - ♦ Len Gollubin, President
- ♦ Tensions between “policy analysts” & “quantitative analysts”
- ♦ SECNAV delivered study to SECDEF (Mar 1978)
- ♦ USN Woolsey summarized in *International Security* (Summer 1978)

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- ◆ Key ideas (I):
 - ◆ 3 national security objectives & 7 USN Missions
 - I. Maintain stability
 - 1. Forward deployments
 - II. Contain crises
 - 2. Calibrated use of force against the shore
 - 3. Superiority at sea in a crisis setting
 - III. Deter global war
 - 4. SLOC defense
 - 5. Reinforcement of allies
 - 6. Pressure upon the Soviets
 - 7. Hedge against uncertainties of the distant future
 - ◆ No priorities given
 - ◆ Disregarded Zumwalt/Turner & Holloway typologies

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- ◆ Key ideas (II):
 - ◆ Soviets the dominant threat, across the spectrum
 - ◆ One single dominant force sizing criterion is wrong focus for naval forces
 - ◆ Carriers necessary, important, not highly vulnerable
 - ◆ New technology enabled strike fleets to win
 - ◆ Especially Aegis, EW
 - ◆ Entire Volume II addressed technology assumptions
 - ◆ Navy-Marine Corps team
 - ◆ Sufficient numbers of ships are important
 - ◆ Especially carrier numbers
 - ◆ “Forward naval operations can have a decisive effect on the outcome of a land war in Europe”
 - ◆ NATO Europe center & flanks interdependent

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

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◆ Key ideas (III)

- ◆ Deter major war: USN contributions
 - ◆ War with Soviets will be global
 - ◆ USN forces should take the offensive worldwide
 - ◆ Operate forward & increase risks to Soviets
 - ◆ Survivable USN SSBN force
 - ◆ USN SLOC protection
 - ◆ Support allies
 - ◆ Capability to open second front, especially in Pacific
 - ◆ Hedge against uncertainty of where & how war would start
- ◆ A primary use of naval forces:
 - ◆ Contain conflicts & so prevent outbreak of major conflict

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (IV):

- ◆ Passing mention of “blockade” as a naval activity
- ◆ 3 USN force level alternatives
 - ◆ Option 1
 - ◆ 439 ships (1% budget growth)
 - ◆ Option 2
 - ◆ 535 ships (3% budget growth)
 - ◆ Option 3
 - ◆ 585 ships (4% budget growth)

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

COMPARISON OF SEA PLAN 2000 FORCE OPTIONS

Measure	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3
Maintain Stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relax current forward deployment • Reduced U.S. visibility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain current deployment • Resolve versus Soviet growth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Current deployment at objective rotation • Enhanced perception
Contain Crises	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crisis/deployment tradeoff • High D-day "shootout less" 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustain forward deployments during a crisis • Create SAGs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustain forward deployments during crises • Significant residuals
Deter Global War	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some SLOCs • No forward ops • At best, defensive 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protects SLOCs • Enables 2-4 forward ops • Second front option 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All-around superiority
Risk Assessment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High risk; minimal capability; not flexible 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimum acceptable risk; maintains selective superiority vs. Soviets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lower risk; provides hedge and options

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Illustrative Alternative Force Levels

	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3
Total active ships	439	535	585
Attack submarines	80	94	98
Aircraft carriers	10	12	14
Surface combatants	220	276	300
Amphibious ships	52	66	78

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

CNA
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◆ What was new? (I)

- ◆ Major Navy future force level needs study (since at least 1945)
- ◆ Strong SECNAV, Under SECNAV, VCNO involvement
- ◆ Drafting by committee
- ◆ Peace-crisis-war spectrum used as framework
- ◆ 7-mission construct
- ◆ USN lead in anti-air warfare touted
 - ◆ Aegis system introduction

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ What was new? (II)

- ◆ Naval forces can be **decisive** in crises & in war with Soviets
- ◆ Horizontal escalation
- ◆ Strong USMC amphibious assault role
- ◆ Call for perception management
- ◆ Naval forces can **prevent major global war** through containing lesser conflicts
- ◆ Identification of four “uncertainties” to hedge against

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- ◆ Not addressed (in UNCLAS "Executive Summary")
 - ◆ Priorities among missions
 - ◆ World trade issues
 - ◆ Jointness
 - ◆ U.S. Army
 - ◆ Mine warfare
 - ◆ Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Response
 - ◆ Maritime Security Operations
 - ◆ US Coast Guard
 - ◆ US Merchant Marine
 - ◆ US inter-agency partners

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses
 - ◆ James Hessman, "Sea Plan 2000," *Sea Power* (May 1978)
 - ◆ "Notebook," US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (June 1978)
 - ◆ GAO, *How Good Are Recent Navy Studies Regarding Future Forces?* (Feb 1980)
 - ◆ John Allen Williams, "Strategies and Forces of the U.S. Navy: A Critical Reappraisal," *Armed Forces & Society* (Summer 1981)
 - ◆ Hattendorf, *Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986* (Naval War College Press, 2004)

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

♦ Criticisms:

- ♦ Unrealizable
- ♦ Unrealistic funding assumptions
- ♦ Overly optimistic re: Soviet threats
- ♦ Questionable assumptions
- ♦ Too carrier-centric
- ♦ Overly focused on conventional anti-Soviet warfighting & offensive sea control; not enough on defensive sea control or 3rd world contingencies (CAPT John Allen Williams USNR) (1981)
- ♦ Not aligned with contemporary national defense policies
- ♦ GAO critique “How Good are Recent Navy Studies Regarding Future Forces”
- ♦ “Executive Summary” not always congruent with analysis

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

♦ Influence:

- ♦ Highly controversial for a few years
- ♦ Center of intense open & classified discussions on USN roles & forces
- ♦ Used to support arguments inside & outside Congress for increased Navy funding, especially for CVN 71
- ♦ Experience helped develop new cadre of USN strategists (e.g.: LCDR Stark, LCDR McGruther)
- ♦ Influenced 1980s efforts by OP-603 & SSGs
- ♦ Launched Global War Games to test hypotheses

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

CNA

- ◆ Why did it have the influence it did?
 - ◆ Strong SECNAV, Under SECNAV, VCNO, other USN leadership involvement & ownership
 - ◆ Most coherent & detailed compilation to date of Navy strategy views in current world & US policy context
 - ◆ Study format & study team composition limited buy-in by the fleet
 - ◆ Soon superseded by CNO ADM Hayward views & *The Maritime Strategy* (which incorporated many elements)

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

CNA

- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Strong & direct conceptual influence on “The Future of U.S. Sea Power” and *The Maritime Strategy*
 - ◆ Horizontal escalation
 - ◆ Centrality of naval strike & amphibious assault
 - ◆ Vital importance of NATO flanks & NE Pacific
 - ◆ Enumeration & analysis of uncertainties
 - ◆ “Peace-crisis-war” framework used in *The Maritime Strategy, Forward . . . From the Sea, Navy Operating Concept, & Sea Power 21*
 - ◆ Also, *Sea Plan 2000* influenced USCINCPAC ADM Long *Pacific Campaign Plan*, which formed core construct for 2nd version of *The Maritime Strategy* (1984)
 - ◆ ADM Long had been VCNO overseeing *Sea Plan 2000*

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ADM Thomas B. Hayward (CNO Jul 1978-Jun 1982)

- ◆ Jan 1979 CNO Strategic Concepts (Top Secret)
- ◆ Jan 1979 CNO Posture Statement (UNCLAS)
- ◆ May 1979 The Future of U.S. Sea Power (UNCLAS)
 - ◆ Fundamental principles



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
ADM Thomas B. Hayward (CNO Jul 1978-Jun 1982)

- ◆ Naval aviator
- ◆ Began term as CNO having developed new theater strategies for the Pacific & influenced *Sea Plan 2000*
- ◆ Within 6 months had expanded on his Pacific thinking to embrace the globe
- ◆ Created flag officer dialogue during 1st year in office
- ◆ Maintained same course for duration of his term
- ◆ Encouraged NWC Global War Game; founded SSG

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CNO Strategic Concepts (1979)


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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Overview

- ◆ Signed by CNO ADM Hayward
- ◆ Primary targets: OSD, Congress, USN officer corps
- ◆ CLAS briefings & letter, then UNCLAS Posture Statement & article
- ◆ “Fundamental principles of naval strategy”
- ◆ Call for USN maritime superiority, indeed, supremacy
- ◆ Global forward, offensive USN ops vs Soviets
- ◆ More allied naval contributions encouraged
- ◆ 12 CVBGs the centerpiece
- ◆ Need to keep USN technological edge
- ◆ Heavy influence on *The Maritime Strategy*

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

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◆ Signed by:

- ◆ CNO ADM Thomas B. Hayward
- ◆ 3 versions within 1st year in office



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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as “Fundamental principles of naval strategy”
 - ◆ Classified versions
 - ◆ TS “CNO Strategic Concepts” (Jan 1979)
 - ◆ Vetted at Flag Officer conferences
 - ◆ Briefings
 - ◆ Then short UNCLAS versions
 - ◆ FY80 CNO Report (Posture Statement) before Congress (Jan 1979)
 - ◆ Proceedings “Naval Review” issue article “The Future of Sea Power” (May 1979) culled from Posture Statement
 - ◆ 6 pages
 - ◆ Briefings

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

Why it was written (I)

- ◆ To show USN relevance to conflict with Soviets, primarily through forward, global, offensive US naval operations
 - ◆ Dampen Zumwalt/Turner/Carter emphasis on SLOC protection
- ◆ Influence & change perceptions about utility of USN
 - ◆ By U.S. political leadership
 - ◆ By Soviets
- ◆ Explain why US needed “maritime superiority” – even “supremacy” – especially in war with the Soviets
- ◆ Elevate debates on USN budget to strategic level, especially to provide rationale for high-quality platforms & systems over less capable ones, and to deploy 12 carrier battle groups

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

CNA

Why it was written (II)

- ◆ To catalyze US Navy strategic thinking:
 - ◆ To influence and/or resist Carter Administration policies (1978-80)
 - ◆ To influence Congressional policies toward the Navy (1978-80)
 - ◆ To prepare for possible Administration change (1980)
- ◆ Expand CNO ADM Hayward's earlier C7F & CPF fleet operational concepts to global policy & strategic level
- ◆ Primary targets: OSD, Capitol Hill, USN officer corps

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

CNA

◆ Context (I)

- ◆ 3rd year of Carter administration (1977-81)
- ◆ SECDEF Brown (1977-81)
 - ◆ Robert Komer now Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- ◆ Continued Carter administration focus on NATO central region & USN SLOC protection
- ◆ New CNO ADM Hayward (1978-82)
- ◆ Low US economic growth; high unemployment and very high inflation

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

CNA

◆ Context (II)

- ◆ Continuing US rapprochement with PRC
 - ◆ Deng Xiaoping takes power in PRC (1978)
- ◆ Emerging concerns over oil security & Gulf region
- ◆ Israeli-Egyptian Camp David Accords (Sep 1978)
- ◆ Panama Canal transfer treaty signed (1977)
- ◆ SALT II Agreement limitations (1979)

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

CNA

Context (III)

- ◆ Continuing Soviet Navy build-up
 - ◆ Especially submarines, Backfire-B bombers with ASMs
 - ◆ Continued increase in Soviet "out of area" deployments
- ◆ Declining US Navy budget & force levels
- ◆ USN in 1979: 473 ships; 16 new ships authorized
- ◆ New systems deploying in USN Fleet
- ◆ CWC concept becoming institutionalized in fleet
- ◆ CMC full member of JCS (1978)
- ◆ Increasing USAF minelaying, ISR support at sea
- ◆ US Army developing new, more offensive operational doctrine

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

Context (IV)

- ◆ Intensified bitter internal US government debates on carrier funding (1978-79)
 - ◆ Congress added unrequested CVN 71 to FY 79 defense budget (Aug 1978)
 - ◆ President Carter vetoed entire budget bill due to CVN funding
 - ◆ Congress could not override CVN veto (Oct 1978)
 - ◆ CVN \$ to other USN, Army, Air Force programs
 - ◆ CAPT John McCain head of OLA (1977-1981)
- ◆ Feb 1979 DOD budget request for FY 80 included CVV

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

Context (V)

- ◆ Major public debates on US defense policy & strategy
 - ◆ Military Reform Movement (SEN Hart & Bill Lind)
 - ◆ Retired RADM Gene Laroque & Center for Defense Information (CDI) (1972)
 - ◆ Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) revitalized (from 1976) (Paul Nitze, John Lehman, etc.)

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)



Context (VI)

- ◆ Evolving 600-ship Navy force goal
- ◆ OPNAV morale wavering
- ◆ VADM Bill Crowe (OP-06) & RADM Bob Hilton (OP-60) created new OPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) (1978)
 - ◆ CDR Hank Mauz, CDR John Bitoff, CDR Bill West, LCDR Phil Dur, LCDR Joe Strasser, LCDR Peter Swartz, etc.
- ◆ Global War Games began at Newport (1979)
- ◆ TACTRAGRUUs created
- ◆ Unofficial "Commanders Cabal" DC-area officer discussion group (late 1970s)
 - ◆ Convener: CDR Norm Mosher (OP-965)

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The Future of US Sea Power (1979)



◆ Context (VII)

- ◆ New SACLANT/CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/C2F plans to shift Atlantic convoy routes south, to free up escort forces for northern forward ops
- ◆ New CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT/C7F plans for northern offensive vs. Soviets in NW Pacific
- ◆ CINCUSNAVEUR/C6F plans to stand & fight in central, eastern Med
- ◆ But NATO CINCSOUTH ADM Turner had planned to move forces to western Med & LANT in time of crisis (1975-7)

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Important contemporary publications (I)
(none cited in document)
 - ◆ NATO MC 14/3 *Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area* (1968)
 - ◆ NATO MC 48/3 *Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area* (1969)
 - ◆ Flexible response
 - ◆ DOD Dir 5100.1 *Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (31 Dec 1958)
 - ◆ CINCPACFLT ADM Hayward "Sea Strike" briefings (1977-9)
 - ◆ CAPT William Cockell & CAPT James Patton
 - ◆ NSDM 344 "Navy Shipbuilding Program" (Jan 1977)
 - ◆ Lame duck Ford Admin call for 600 ships; VSTOL carriers

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Important contemporary publications (II)
(none cited in document)
 - ◆ *Consolidated Guidance*
 - ◆ NSC PRM 10 *Military Strategy & Force Posture Review* (1977) & PD 18 *US National Strategy* (Aug 1977)
 - ◆ USN-USAF MOAs on cooperation at sea (1975, 1979)
 - ◆ *Sea Plan 2000* naval force planning study (1978)
 - ◆ *USN Sea Based Air Platform Study* (1978)
 - ◆ CNA outer air battle studies
 - ◆ John F. Lehman, Jr., *Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices* (1978)

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)



- ◆ Context: Important contemporary publications (III)
(none cited in document)
 - ◆ NIE 11-15-74 *Soviet Naval Policy and Programs* (Dec 1974)
 - ◆ Jamie McConnell et al. (CNA), "Strategy & Missions of the Soviet Navy" (1978), etc.
 - ◆ ADM Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace" *Proceedings* articles in (w/ USN flag officer commentaries) (1974)
 - ◆ Bound as *Red Star Rising at Sea* (1974)
 - ◆ CBO (Dov Zakheim) reports on USN (1975-80)
 - ◆ Taft-Hart-Lind *White Paper on Defense* (1978 ed.)
 - ◆ Gen Sir John Hackett, *The Third World War, August 1985* (1978)
 - ◆ Col John Boyd USAF briefings on defense reform, maneuver warfare, OODA Loop (1970s)

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)



- ◆ How it was written (I)
 - ◆ Drafted by CNO EA (CAPT Cockell)
 - ◆ Sovietologist w/ law degree
 - ◆ Prior tour as ADM Zumwalt's CEP Director (OP-00K)
 - ◆ Influenced by Hayward CEP Director CAPT Jim Patton (OP-OOK)
 - ◆ Fletcher School PhD
 - ◆ Prior tour on SECSTATE Kissinger Policy Planning Staff
 - ◆ Heavy personal CNO ADM Hayward involvement
 - ◆ Influenced by recent fleet experience as C7F, CINCPACFLT
 - ◆ Influenced by previous OPNAV experience as Director, Navy Program Planning (OP-090)

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

♦ How it was written (II)

- ♦ Roots: Hayward thinking in fleet as C7F, CPF (1976-9); previous experience as USN program planner (OP-090)
 - ♦ "Sea Strike:" Hayward-Cockell-Patton-Dr. Al Brandenstein PACFLT "prompt offensive action" concept vs. Soviet Far East
 - ♦ To pin Soviet forces in place in global war (& avoid PACFLT "swing" to LANT/EUR), influence PR /Japan decisions (1977-79)
 - ♦ Leveraged existing & new USN technologies. Included USMC
 - ♦ Listed "incompatibilities" that impeded implementation
 - ♦ "Sea Strike" existed only in briefing format. An alternative concept. Did not reflect actual war plans of the period
 - ♦ Tested in at sea exercises & war games
 - ♦ "Influenced Sea Plan 2000; CINCPAC (former VCNO) ADM Long PACOM campaign plan; subsequent PACOM, PACFLT war plans 331

The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

♦ How it was written (III)

- ♦ Circulation to flag officers by TS memo as "CNO Strategic Concepts" (TS) (Spring 1979)
- ♦ Numerous flag officer conferences (1979)
 - ♦ Opinions & insights debated
 - ♦ Annapolis, Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, San Diego
- ♦ Publicized externally through briefings, Posture Statement, *Proceedings* article

CNO Strategic Concepts (TS) (1979)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (I):

- ◆ Focus on global conventional war with Soviets
 - ◆ NATO had global concerns
 - ◆ War in Europe the least likely scenario
 - ◆ USN NORLANT convoy escort only one of many important USN roles
 - ◆ Why & how a war starts will influence USN response capabilities
 - ◆ Uncertainties re: Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea
 - ◆ Strategic nuclear forces & other contingencies not considered

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CNO Strategic Concepts (TS) (1979)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (II):

- ◆ Global Conventional War vs. Soviets (continued)
 - ◆ NATO-Pact War will be global
 - ◆ USN must be offensively capable to destroy Soviet forces
 - ◆ US is and will be outnumbered
 - ◆ USN margin of superiority = carriers & at-sea sustainability
 - ◆ USN must not mirror-image Soviets
 - ◆ USN must retain technological superiority
 - ◆ USN must draw on sister services & allies
 - ◆ US must capitalize on Soviet geographical disadvantages & defensive mentality
 - ◆ USN must fight with what it has on hand
 - ◆ USN must use tactics that ensure favorable attrition ratios
 - ◆ NATO northern flank has direct impact on NATO center
 - ◆ The "Swing Strategy" is an anachronism
 - ◆ US must prioritize key areas & choose order for sequential control, given limited USN force levels

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

- ◆ Key ideas (I):
 - ◆ Call for USN “maritime superiority” (even “supremacy”)
 - ◆ “Sea Control” & “Power Projection” seen as confusing concepts
 - ◆ Soviets the priority threat
 - ◆ War with Soviets will be global
 - ◆ Not confined to Central Europe
 - ◆ Swing strategy an anachronism
 - ◆ US & Allied naval forces will do more in global war with Soviets than protect sea-lanes
 - ◆ Offensive strike operations
 - ◆ Exploit Soviet disadvantages

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

- ◆ Key ideas (II):
 - ◆ 12 CVBG minimum: The centerpiece & priority
 - ◆ Need to distribute USN offensive capability among greater number of platforms
 - ◆ But *quality* of platforms has priority over *quantity* Need for highly capable USN platforms
 - ◆ Vs. Low-end USN ships
 - ◆ *Offensive* USN ops/ systems have priority over *defensive*
 - ◆ Need to keep USN technological edge
 - ◆ Sequential operations necessary, given USN force levels
 - ◆ Need for perception management

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

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- ◆ Key ideas (III):
 - ◆ Discussion of:
 - ◆ 8 principles
 - ◆ 5 conclusions
 - ◆ Regions of the world
 - ◆ No priorities provided

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

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What was new?

- ◆ Fleet origins
- ◆ Call for allied & sister service support to achieve maritime superiority
- ◆ Emphasis on the Persian Gulf & access to oil
- ◆ Call for favorable attrition ratios
- ◆ Role of naval forces post-conflict

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

- ◆ Not addressed
 - ◆ Priorities among regions
 - ◆ Non-Soviet threats
 - ◆ US Marine Corps
 - ◆ Amphibious assault
 - ◆ Sealift
 - ◆ U.S. Coast Guard
 - ◆ U.S. Merchant Marine
 - ◆ U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
 - ◆ US inter-agency partners

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses
 - ◆ ADM (Ret) Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., "Total Force," US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (May 1979)
 - ◆ In same issue as ADM Hayward article
 - ◆ Focus on SLOC protection as well as NATO flanks
 - ◆ Pessimistic on Soviets, USN CVN vulnerability
 - ◆ Advocated "hi-lo mix" of USN platforms
 - ◆ "Comment & Discussion," US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Jul-Dec 1979; Jan 1980)
 - ◆ John Hattendorf, *Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986* (2004)
 - ◆ Gregory Vistica, *Fall from Glory* (1995)

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)



♦ Criticisms

- ♦ Too ambitious. Unexecutable
- ♦ Not aligned with contemporary Carter Administration national defense policies
- ♦ Over-emphasis on power projection & carrier strike warfare; neglect of SLOC security
- ♦ Only European theater should matter, not Pacific

34.1

The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)



♦ Influence: Significant

- ♦ Engaged Navy Flag Officers & OPNAV staff
- ♦ Set stage for Strategic Studies Group (SSG) & influenced Global War Games
- ♦ Influenced Capitol Hill debates
- ♦ Congress replaced DOD-requested CVV with unrequested CVN 71 in FY 80 defense budget (Oct 1979)
 - ♦ Weakened President Carter did not veto; signed into law (Dec 1979)
 - ♦ Later christened USS *Theodore Roosevelt* (1984)

34.2

The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Why this influence?
 - ◆ Powerful, clear, simple messages
 - ◆ Direct CNO involvement & ownership
 - ◆ Repetition
 - ◆ Reinforced by fleet exercises & Global War Games
 - ◆ Not aligned well with Carter administration defense policy
 - ◆ But aligned with rising popular, Congressional defense views

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

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- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Strong & direct conceptual influence on *The Maritime Strategy*
 - ◆ Especially calls for:
 - ◆ Global offensive forward ops vs. Soviets,
 - ◆ Sister service & allied naval support to USN
 - ◆ Perception management

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End of the 1970s: State of Navy

CNA

- ◆ Navy leadership ended decade with low morale
 - ◆ Concerns over increasing Soviet naval threat
 - ◆ Concerns over US national defense strategy
 - ◆ Concerns over USN capabilities & readiness
 - ◆ Concerns over declining ship numbers
- ◆ Some bright spots
 - ◆ New systems in fleet showing great promise
 - ◆ New institutions spawning renaissance of naval strategic, operational thinking (OP-603, NWC, etc.)
 - ◆ Fleet commanders energetically trying to devise new strategies, operations, tactics

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The 1980s

CNA

- ◆ 1982 *The Maritime Strategy* (SECRET brief)
- ◆ 1984 *The Maritime Strategy* (SECRET pub)
- ◆ 1985 *The Amphibious Warfare Strategy* (SECRET Pub)
- ◆ 1985 *The Maritime Strategy* (SECRET pub rev)
- ◆ 1986 *The Maritime Strategy* (UNCLAS booklet)
- ◆ 1987 "Looking Beyond the Maritime Strategy"
(UNCLAS article)
- ◆ 1989 *The Maritime Strategy* (SECRET pub rev)
- ◆ 1990 "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s" (UNCLAS article)



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1980s: The world, the nation, & the USN

World Events	Year	Administration	SECNAV	CNO	Capstone Document
NATO CONMAROPS	1981	Reagan	Weinberger	Lehman	
Israeli Bekaa Valley AAW wins Belrut/Grenada	1982 1983				Watkins <i>Maritime Strategy (Brief) (S)</i>
Iran-Iraq War	1984				<i>Maritime Strategy (Pub) (S)</i>
Gorbachev GSCPSU Walkers arrested	1985				<i>Amphibious Strategy (S)</i> <i>Maritime Strategy (Rev) (S)</i> <i>Maritime Strategy (U)</i>
Goldwater/Nichols	1986				
Libya strikes	1987				Trost "Looking Beyond Maritime Strategy" (U)
Praying Mantis	1988		Carlucci	Webb	
Cold War Ends	1989	Bush	Cheney	Garrett	<i>Maritime Strategy (Rev) (S)</i>
Tiananmen Square Iraq Invades	1990				"Maritime Strategy for the 1990s" (U)

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1980s: The world (I)

- ◆ A very violent world
- ◆ Bi-polar international system
 - ◆ Global alliance & treaty systems continued
- ◆ Fall-off in world trade volume, then recovery
- ◆ Trans-Pacific trade > trans-Atlantic trade (1983)
- ◆ Declining oil prices throughout the decade
- ◆ Cold War deepened, then began to relax in mid-decade
- ◆ No new nuclear states since 1979 (S. Africa)

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1980s: The world (II)

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- ◆ Continued rise in reported climatic & other natural disasters in the world
- ◆ Major changes in leadership, policies & cohesion of Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact
 - ◆ Rapid succession of Soviet leaders
 - ◆ Brezhnev (1964-82); Andropov (1982-84); Chernenko (1984-85); Gorbachev (1985-91)
 - ◆ Continued military buildup
 - ◆ Polish “Solidarity” Crisis; martial rule (1980-81)
 - ◆ Soviets shot down KAL airliner over Sakhalin (1983)
 - ◆ Rapid unraveling (1989-1991)

1980s: The world (III)

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- ◆ Soviet Navy continued expansion, then precipitous decline
 - ◆ Coherent Soviet peacetime naval diplomacy & wartime sea denial/ strategic nuclear force strategies developed
 - ◆ Increased quieting of Soviet submarines
 - ◆ Soviet SSBN bastions shifting to Arctic, under ice
 - ◆ Soviet Navy now using former USN Cam Ranh Bay Vietnam base
 - ◆ PRC-VN animosity (1979 PRC invasion)
 - ◆ ADM Chernavin replaced ADM Gorshkov as CinC (1985)
 - ◆ Soviet naval arms control offensive (1986+)
 - ◆ Gorbachev “Murmansk speech” pushing northern Europe arms control (1987)

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1980s: The world (IV)



- ◆ High PRC economic growth
- ◆ PRC still energy self-sufficient
- ◆ PRC decided USSR no longer a threat (from mid-1980s)
 - ◆ PLAN posture changed from anti-Soviet coastal defense
 - ◆ PRC announced naval doctrine of “Offshore Defense” & operations farther out to sea
 - ◆ PLAN deployed 1st SSBN (1987)
- ◆ Taiwan isolated, but increasing economic growth & political liberalization under KMT

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1980s: The world (V)



- ◆ Increasing economic, ethnic, political strains in Yugoslavia, following death of Marshal Tito (1980)
- ◆ Saddam Hussein continued in power in Iraq
 - ◆ Soviet support
- ◆ Iran-Iraq War (1980-88)
- ◆ Activist anti-western Gaddafi Libyan regime endured, sponsored terrorist acts
- ◆ Gen Siad Barre continued rule in Somalia
- ◆ Anti-US Islamic Army faction in power in Sudan (from 1989)

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1980s: The world (VI)

- ◆ Arab-Israeli inter-state peace held
 - ◆ Mubarak followed murdered Egypt president Sadat (1981)
- ◆ Palestinian *intifada* vs. Israelis (from 1987)
- ◆ Lebanon civil war, Israeli attacks (to 1990)
- ◆ Iranian theocracy hostile to West
 - ◆ Ouster of Shah (1979)
 - ◆ US hostage crisis (1979-80)
- ◆ Civil war in Afghanistan (1979-1989)
 - ◆ US-backed insurgents vs. Communist gov't & USSR. USSR bogged down, withdrew (1989)

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1980s: The world (VII)

- ◆ Continued NATO strategy of “flexible response” (since 1968)
- ◆ France deployed 1st SSN (1983)
- ◆ US NATO allies denied US base access during US strikes on Libya (1986)
- ◆ Continued Stalinist dictatorship in DPRK under Kim Il-Sung, supported by Soviets
 - ◆ DPRK assassination of ROK officials in Burma
- ◆ Continued Muslim separatist insurgencies in Mindanao, southern Philippines

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1980s: The world (VIII)

- ◆ Marxist Sandinistas in power in Nicaragua, opposed by US-supported Contras (1979-1990)
- ◆ Marxist insurgency vs. US-supported government in El Salvador (1980-1992)
- ◆ Haiti's President-for-life "Baby Doc" Duvalier ousted, followed by civil upheaval (1986)
- ◆ USCG icebreaker *Polar Sea Northwest Passage* transit rekindled Canadian concerns re: Arctic sovereignty (1985)
 - ◆ Canada officially drew baselines around Arctic Archipelagic claims (1986)

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1980s: The world (IX)

- ◆ UN Law of the Sea Treaty concluded (1981)
 - ◆ US refusal to sign (seabed mining issues)
 - ◆ Treaty renegotiated (1986-94)
- ◆ International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) created International Maritime Bureau (IMB) vs. maritime crime & malpractice (1981)
- ◆ Insignificant # of reported incidents of piracy or maritime terrorism
- ◆ IMO Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) signed (1988)

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1980s: The world (X)

♦ Terrorist incidents increased over 1970s

♦ Examples:

- ♦ Hezbollah kidnapped Americans in Lebanon (1980s)
- ♦ Islamic Jihad destroyed US Embassy Beirut (1983)
- ♦ Shiites destroyed USMC, French Barracks Beirut (1983)
- ♦ Shiites attacked US Embassy Kuwait (1983)
- ♦ Truck bomb outside US Embassy Annex Beirut (1984)
- ♦ Hezbollah hijacked TWA flight. USN diver killed (1985)
- ♦ Libyans, PLF hijacked *Achille Lauro* cruise ship (1985)
- ♦ Libyans bombed Rome, Vienna airports (1985)
- ♦ Libyans bombed US-frequented Berlin disco (1986)
- ♦ Organization of Jihad Brigades bombed Naples USO. USN diver killed (1988)
- ♦ Libyans bombed PANAM flight over Scotland (1988)

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1980s: The nation (I)

♦ Reagan (Republican) administration

- ♦ 1st Reagan term (1981-5): Initiatives vs Soviets
- ♦ 2nd Reagan term (1985-9): Relaxing anti-Soviet stance

♦ Bush (Republican) administration (1989-93)

- ♦ Managing end of the Cold War

♦ Divided control of the Congress

- ♦ Democrats control House of Representatives
- ♦ Republicans control Senate (1981-7)

♦ Resurgent US popular support for its military

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1980s: The nation (II)

- ◆ US continued as world's largest economy
- ◆ Recessions, then economic boom (1983 on)
- ◆ Big tax cuts; high federal budget deficits
- ◆ Big drops in inflation & unemployment rates
- ◆ US dependence on imported oil falls somewhat, then rises sharply
- ◆ US refusal to sign Law of the Sea convention due to mining provisions (1982)
- ◆ US declaration subscribing to Law of the Sea navigation & overflight rights regime, as now customary international law (1988)

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1980s: U.S. economy & defense spending

YEAR	PRESIDENT	ECONOMY	DOD % OF GDP	DOD TOA (Constant FY 09 \$)	CNO	CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
1981	Reagan		5.1	422B	Hayward	
1982		Recession	5.7	465B	Watkins	<i>Maritime Strategy (Brief) (S)</i>
1983			6.0	495B		<i>Maritime Strategy (Pub) (S)</i>
1984			5.7	517B		<i>Amphibious Warfare Strategy (S)</i>
1985		Gramm-Rudman Act	5.9	539B		<i>Maritime Strategy (Rev) (S)</i>
1986			6.0	530B		<i>Maritime Strategy (U)</i>
1987		Stock Market Crash	5.9	524B	Trost	<i>Maritime Strategy (Rev) (U)</i>
1988			5.8	514B		<i>Maritime Strategy (Rev) (S)</i>
1989	Bush	Savings & Loan Crisis	5.5	503B		<i>Maritime Strategy (Rev) (U)</i>
1990		Oil Crisis Recession	5.1	489B	Kelso	

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1980s: US planned & actual adversaries

CNA

- ◆ Combat in Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Persian Gulf, Panama, Med
- ◆ Deter/plan vs. USSR, W. Pact, forward Soviet naval forces, Cuba, Iran
- ◆ Deter/plan vs. N. Korea. Incidents. Deter PRC/plan Taiwan defense
- ◆ Military assistance in Central America
- ◆ Plans & operations vs. state- & non-state sponsored terrorists



1980s: US national security policies (I)

CNA

- ◆ Continued focus on 1 over-arching global threat
 - ◆ Goal: **Contain** & even roll back Soviet Union & allies
 - ◆ Soviets viewed as illegitimate, expansionist, “evil empire”
 - ◆ Early decade: Big US defense budget increases; strident US rhetoric; suspicion of arms control benefits to US
 - ◆ Big military pay raises (1980 & 1981)
 - ◆ Mid-decade: Restrained rhetoric; engagement w/ Soviets; declining defense budgets
 - ◆ Decade’s end: Goal became peaceful demise of Warsaw Pact; reunified Germany in NATO (1990)

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1980s: US national security policies (II)



- ◆ **Continued primacy of “NATO contingency” vs Soviets for DoD planning & force sizing**
 - ◆ Now seen as global, as Navy had argued
 - ◆ Defense planning scenario: War would start in SWA
 - ◆ Navy opposed SWA start as ill-advised
- ◆ **Horizontal escalation policy**
- ◆ **Constrain Soviet influence globally**
 - ◆ Esp. in Middle East, Central America, Africa

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1980s: US national security policies (III)



- ◆ **# of US strategic nuclear warheads increased over the decade**
- ◆ **BMD policy: SDI initiative: increased R & D**
 - ◆ MAD seen as inadequate basis for national security
 - ◆ CNO ADM Watkins & staff played large role (1983)

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1980s: US national security policies (IV)

- ◆ US resisted Soviet, Western academic conventional naval arms control proposals
- ◆ US Intel community united re: Soviet naval threat
- ◆ US led establishment of voluntary international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
- ◆ Continued SACEUR/USCINCEUR disinterest in naval issues
 - ◆ Focus on INF, FOFA, AirLand Battle, CFE, etc.

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1980s: US national security policies (V)

- ◆ US-PRC relations normalized & expanded
 - ◆ US recognized PRC (1979)
 - ◆ US-PRC military, intelligence cooperation in containing Soviet Union
 - ◆ US assistance to PRC military modernization
 - ◆ Taiwan Relations Act (1979)
 - ◆ US to maintain capacity to protect Taiwan
 - ◆ US assistance to Taiwan ("defensive arms" only)
- ◆ Most US overseas alliances held
 - ◆ US suspended ANZUS treaty obligations to New Zealand due to NZ nuclear warship ban (1985)

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1980s: US national security policies (VI)

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- ◆ Continued deterrence of N. Korea attacks on South
- ◆ Close US military relations with Pakistan
- ◆ Terrorism incidents & US responses
- ◆ US State Dept added Cuba (1982), Iran (1984), DPRK (1988) to list of state sponsors of terrorism
 - ◆ List also included Libya, Iraq, South Yemen, Syria (from Dec 1979)
 - ◆ Iraq removed from list (1982-1990)

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1980s: US national security policies (VII)

CNA
Center for National Defense

- ◆ Return to (small-scale) global US military activism
 - ◆ Small US interventions in Grenada, Lebanon, Central America, Libya, Gulf, Panama
 - ◆ “Reagan Doctrine”: Help anti-communist gov’ts & fighters (1985)
 - ◆ Esp. El Salvador, Nicaragua, Afghanistan

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1980s: US national security policies (VIII)

CNA
Center for National Defense

- ◆ Continued Arab-Israeli peace
- ◆ Western access to Gulf oil, Gulf stability
- ◆ Confrontation vs. Iran throughout decade
 - ◆ Deter spread of Iranian influence & power
 - ◆ Pro-Iraq "tilt" during Iran-Iraq Gulf War

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1980s: US national security policies (IX)

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Center for National Defense

- ◆ Small increases in US counter-insurgency capabilities
- ◆ US extended territorial seas to 12 miles (1988)
- ◆ Congress, President expand DOD roles in Drug War: Foreign training & support; detection (1989)
- ◆ Increasing quality of US military recruits

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1980s: US national security policies (X)

CNA

♦ Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) (I)

- ♦ Major changes to DoD command relationships
- ♦ Enhanced operational command roles of CINCs at the expense of service chiefs, including CNO
- ♦ Enhanced advisory powers of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the expense of service chiefs
- ♦ Created VCJCS position
- ♦ Mandated increased Professional Military Education emphasis on *joint* strategy, planning and operations
 - ♦ Led to NAVWARCOL and other service war colleges reducing emphasis on strategic approaches focused on only one medium or service

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1980s: US national security policies (XI)

CNA

♦ Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) (II)

- ♦ Mandated joint duty for officers, including USN
- ♦ Mandated:
 - ♦ Annual presidential *National Security Strategy* reports
 - ♦ Biennial SECDEF program, budget guidance to DOD
 - ♦ Biennial SECDEF contingency planning guidance to CJCS
 - ♦ Biennial Unified Command Plan showing CINC responsibilities
- ♦ Reflected in revised DOD “Functions Paper”
 - ♦ DOD Dir 5100.1 *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components* (April 1987 & Sep 1987) (replaced 1980 edition)

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1980s: US national security policies (XII)

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♦ Critics:


- ♦ Military Reform Movement endured
 - ♦ James Fallows, Gary Hart, Bill Lind, etc.
- ♦ Center for Defense Information (CDI) endured
 - ♦ Retired RADMs Gene Laroque, Eugene Carroll; retired VADM John J. Shanahan
- ♦ Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
 - ♦ CDR/Dr. Harlan Ullman (Ret) as senior fellow (1985)
 - ♦ Increased focus on naval issues

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1980s: Combatant & component commands

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- ♦ USPACOM
 - PACFLT
- ♦ USSOUTHCOM
 - USNAVSO (from 1985)
- ♦ USLANTCOM
 - LANTFLT
- ♦ USEUCOM
 - NAVEUR
- ♦ USCENTCOM (from 1983)
 - NAVCENT
- ♦ REDCOM (to 1987)
- ♦ ADCOM (to 1986)
- ♦ USSPACECOM (from 1985)
 - NAVSPACECOM
- ♦ USSOCOM (from 1987)
 - NAVSPECWARCOM
- ♦ SAC
- ♦ MAC (to 1988)
- ♦ USTRANSCOM (from 1987)
 - MSC
- ♦ FORSCOM (from 1987)



1980s: Higher authorities & USN capstone documents

Year	President	National Document	SECDEF	CJCS	Defense Document	CNO	USN CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
1981	Reagan	NSSDs & NSDDs	Weinberger Vessey Crowe Carlucci Cheney	Jones USAF	JSPS Docs Defense Guidance (DG) Weinberger Doctrine DOD 5100.1 Discriminate Deterrence JMNA Base Force	Hayward Watkins Trost JMNA Base Force	
1982		NSDD 32					<i>Maritime Strategy (Brief) (S)</i>
1983		NSDD 75 SDI					
1984		Reagan Doctrine Stockholm Agreement					<i>Maritime Strategy (Pub) (S)</i> <i>Amphibious Warfare Strategy (S)</i> <i>Maritime Strategy (Rev) (S)</i> <i>Maritime Strategy (U)</i>
1985		<i>Nett Security Strategy</i> <i>INF Treaty</i> <i>Nett Security Strategy</i>					
1986							
1987		<i>Nett Security Strategy</i>					"Looking Beyond Maritime Strategy" (U)
1988							<i>Maritime Strategy (Rev) (S)</i> "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s" (U)
1989	Bush	NSRs & NSDs					
1990		<i>Nett Security Strategy</i> Vienna Document					

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1980s: USN dollars, numbers, capabilities

YEAR	CNO	CAPSTONE DOCUMENT	DON TOA FY09\$	NEW SHIPS	BATTLE FORCE SHIPS	ACTIVE PERSONNEL	NEW CAPABILITIES INTRODUCED
1981	Hayward		\$135B	18	491	540K	Phalanx CIWS, Kidd-class DDG, Ohio-class SSBN, JOTS
1982	Watkins	<i>Maritime Strategy (Brief) (S)</i>	\$148B	17	513	553K	INMARSAT, New Jersey-class BB
1983		<i>Maritime Strategy (Pub) (S)</i> <i>Maritime Strategy (Rev) (S)</i> <i>Amphib. Strategy (S)</i> <i>Maritime Strategy (U)</i>	\$164B	14	513	558K	Ticonderoga-class Aegis CG, Dry deck shelters, TACTAS, Mk 67 SLMM
1984			\$162B	16	523	565K	T-LAM, F/A-18A, SH-60 Lamps III, Strike U, Stalwart-class T-AGOS ship
1985			\$181B	19	545	571K	LCAC, Skipper LGBs, Nixie decoy
1986	Trost	"Looking Beyond Maritime Strategy" (U)	\$178B	20	555	581K	VLS, ELF SSBN Comms, HARM, NTU, Mercy-class T-AH, HJ Kaiser-class T-AO
1987			\$176B	17	568	587K	Avenger-class MCM, Osprey MHC, MH-53E AMCM helo, Pioneer UAV
1988		<i>Maritime Strategy (Rev) (S)</i> "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s" (U)	\$181B	15	565	593K	Improved Los Angeles-class SSN, F-14B AAW a/c, Mk 48 ADCAP
1989			\$169B	19	566	593K	ELF operational, E-6A, Mk 50 ALWT
1990	Kelso		\$165B	15	546	583K	Wasp-class LHD, SLAM ASM, Trident II D-5 SLBM

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1980s: Capstone documents & force goals

CNA

YEAR	CNO	FORCE GOAL DOCUMENT	FORCE LEVEL GOAL	BATTLE FORCE SHIPS	CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
1981	Hayward	DOD & SECNAV goal	600	> 491	
1982			600	> 513	Maritime Strategy (Brief) (S)
1983	Watkins		600	> 513	
1984			600	> 523	Maritime Strategy (Pub) (S)
1985			600	> 545	Amphib. Warfare Strategy (S), Maritime Strategy (Rev) (S)
1986	Trost		600	> 555	Maritime Strategy (U)
1987			600	> 568	Maritime Strategy (Rev) (U)
1988				565	
1989				566	Maritime Strategy (Rev) (S)
1990	Kelso	DOD Base Force	400+	< 546	Maritime Strategy (Rev) (U)

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1980s: USN force structure goals

CNA


- ◆ 1980: Republican Party platform: 600 ships
- ◆ 1981-1987: “600-Ship Navy;” e.g.:
 - ◆ 15 Carrier Battle Groups (CVBG)
 - ◆ 4 Battleship Surface Action Groups (BBSAG)
 - ◆ 100 Nuclear-powered Attack Submarines (SSN)
 - ◆ Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN)
 - ◆ MAF-plus-MAB Assault Echelon Lift (Amphibs)
 - ◆ 100-110 Frigates
 - ◆ 31 Mine Countermeasures Ships
 - ◆ Support Ships to match
 - ◆ (14 Active & 2 Reserve Carrier Air Wings (CVW))

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1980s: USN deployment strategy

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- ◆ 2 forward fleets: 1 forward-based; 1 forward deployed
- ◆ New 3rd (IO) hub; permanent combat-credible presence
- ◆ 2 home fleets. Increased surge ops
- ◆ Aggressive SSN ops; SSBNs deployed w/in target range
- ◆ Renewed focus on homeland security & defense



1980s: USN operations & exercises

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1980s: State of the Navy (I)

- ◆ USN the world's leading Navy; strong Soviet Navy challenge till end of decade
- ◆ USN force levels rose, peaked, started to fall
- ◆ LANTFLT significantly larger than PACFLT
 - ◆ 56/44 split (27% larger)
- ◆ Continued extensive, varied & global USN ops & exercises
- ◆ USN budgets increased, fluctuated, then fell
- ◆ Experience in operating new fleet systems & tactics gave fleet sailors operational confidence
 - ◆ Average age of active ships going down

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1980s: State of the Navy (II)

- ◆ Continued bifurcation of USN strategic thinking vs. Soviets increasingly seen as dysfunctional
 - ◆ New intel on Soviet intentions & capabilities drove realization that isolation of anti-SSBN campaign from other campaigns was counter-productive and indeed no longer possible
 - ◆ SSG I study & product showed virtues of integration
 - ◆ CNO ADM Watkins finally forced USN strategic integration at all levels of classification (1986)

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1980s: State of the Navy (III)

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- ◆ USN surface, air operators focused on SWA
 - ◆ High but fluctuating Gulf presence
- ◆ USN planners more focused on NATO & WestPac
 - ◆ Wary of SWA commitments in global war
- ◆ USN submariners increasingly focused on Arctic
- ◆ CWC concept institutionalized in the fleet
- ◆ Lengthening USN forward deployments followed by imposition of OPTEMPO limits (6 months portal-to-portal)

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1980s: State of the Navy (IV)

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- ◆ USN strike capabilities start to be more widely disbursed among platform types, beyond carriers
 - ◆ Surface combatant capabilities jumped (TLAM, AEGIS, VLS)
 - ◆ TLAM on SSNs
- ◆ Multi-purpose carrier air wings
 - ◆ Mix dependent on CV/CVN capacities
- ◆ Search for follow-on attack aircraft to A-6
 - ◆ OSD decision: Develop A-12 naval stealth aircraft

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1980s: State of the Navy (V)

- ◆ “Super-CAGs” created to command carrier air wings
- ◆ “Strike U” established at NAS Fallon (1984)
 - ◆ In wake of 6th Flt Lebanon strike ops
- ◆ Carrier AEW Weapons School (CAEWS) (“Top Dome”) established at NAS Miramar (1989)
- ◆ SSBN/SLBM force still optimized for counter-value vice counterforce targeting, but developing accurate counterforce MIRVed Trident II SLBM

385

1980s: State of the Navy (VI)

- ◆ SSN force focused on anti-Sov ISR missions for I&W, ASW
- ◆ Beginning of shift to active sonar solutions to counter increased Soviet submarine quieting
 - ◆ Walker Family spy ring arrested (1985)
 - ◆ CNO Urgent ASW Research & Development Program (CUARP) (1985)
- ◆ 4 Iowa-class battleships re-commissioned
- ◆ 4 Kidd-class DDGs commissioned (1981-2)
 - ◆ Originally destined for Imperial Iranian Navy

386

1980s: State of the Navy (VII)



- ◆ Creation & expansion of MSC civilian-manned T-AGOS fleet with SURTASS
- ◆ Riverine capability reoriented toward Naval Special Warfare; Coastal warfare capability reoriented toward forward port security
- ◆ 2 T-AHs converted, put in service
 - ◆ USNS *Mercy* humanitarian assistance shakedown cruise to Philippines (1987)

387

1980s: State of the Navy (VIII)



- ◆ Waxing internal OPNAV influence of OP-06 (DCNO for Strategy, Plans and Policy)
- ◆ ADM Rickover retired by SECNAV Lehman (1982)
 - ◆ Followed in both USN & DOE roles by succession of double-hatted 4-star submarine officers

388

1980s: State of the Navy (IX)

- ◆ SECNAV Lehman antipathy to program planning, campaign analyses, net assessment, OP-96
- ◆ OPNAV OP-095 re-designated Director of Naval Warfare
 - ◆ Mandate to transcend platform focus in Navy programming
- ◆ New OP-095-driven OPNAV “CNO Program Appraisal Memoranda” (CPAM) construct (and OP-095 internal branch organization) based on *NWP-1 warfare areas (1981-1991)*
 - ◆ Aim: Cross-cutting warfare appraisals across platform community lines

390

1980s: State of Navy (X)

- ◆ Formal USN officer strategy/policy fora
 - ◆ Navy Long-Range Planners Conference
 - ◆ Convened by OPNAV OP-00X/00K
 - ◆ Held annually at US Naval Academy (1985-89)
- ◆ Informal USN officer strategy/policy fora
 - ◆ Navy Discussion Group (mid- & again in late 1980s)
 - ◆ Convener: CDR, later CAPT Jim Stark
 - ◆ “Young Turks” lunches w/ SECNAV (Early 1980s)
 - ◆ Convener: SECNAV John Lehman
 - ◆ US Naval Institute symposia (mid-late 1980s)
 - ◆ Coordinator: *Proceedings* editor-in-chief Fred Rainbow
 - ◆ CNA annual symposia
- ◆ Participants included *Maritime Strategy* authors

390

1980s: State of Navy (XI)

CNA

- ◆ Fall-off after mid-decade in Navy use of civilian graduate programs in Poli Sci & IR
 - ◆ Reduced numbers to Fletcher, etc.
- ◆ Creation of national security affairs curriculum at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Monterey
- ◆ SECNAV Lehman instituted mandatory Maritime Strategy course at NPS Monterey (1985)
- ◆ CDR Jim Tritten (USC PhD) detailed from OP-60 to Monterey to establish Maritime Strategy education classes, courses & programs
- ◆ NPS “OP-06 Chair of Strategic Planning” created (1989)

391

1980s: State of Navy (XII)

CNA

- ◆ Continued high NAVWARCOL capability, prestige
 - ◆ Creation of SSG, expanded Global War Games, etc.
- ◆ By end of decade, top USN post-graduate-educated officers increasingly detailed to Joint Staff vice OPNAV
 - ◆ Effect (intended) of Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986)
- ◆ Continued strong community management of Navy pol-mil/ strategic planning sub-specialists by several OP-06 & OP-60 flag officers
 - ◆ Continued strong cadre of competitive, educated, experienced Navy strategy action officers in OP-603

392

1980s: Naval policy literature of the period

- ◆ New literature emerging on US strategy, including naval strategy
 - ◆ Tom Buell, *Master of Sea Power* (FADM King) (1980)
 - ◆ Hackett, *The Third World War, August 1985* (1978) & *The Third World War, The Untold Story* (1982)
 - ◆ Summers, *On Strategy* (1982)
 - ◆ Clancy, *Red Storm Rising* (1986)
 - ◆ Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1987)
 - ◆ Palmer, *Origins of the Maritime Strategy* (1988)
 - ◆ Miller & Van Evera (eds.), *Naval Strategy and National Security: An International Security Reader* (1988)
 - ◆ Friedman, *The US Maritime Strategy* (1988)
 - ◆ Lehman, *Command of the Seas* (1988)
 - ◆ Hattendorf (ed), RADM J.C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control* (1989)
 - ◆ Gray & Barnett, *Seapower and Strategy* (1989)

393

1980s: State of the Navy (XIII)

- ◆ Systems in development &/or construction
 - ◆ Ships
 - ◆ BB re-commissioning
 - ◆ Fast sealift ships (SL-7)
 - ◆ Hospital ships (T-AH)
 - ◆ Improved Los Angeles class SSN
 - ◆ Wasp-class LHD
 - ◆ Burke-class DDG
 - ◆ Seawolf-class SSN (SSN 21)
 - ◆ Avenger-class MCM
 - ◆ Osprey-class MHC
 - ◆ Cardinal-class MSH (cancelled)
 - ◆ Aircraft
 - ◆ F-14B
 - ◆ A-12 (later cancelled)
 - ◆ E-6A TACAMO
 - ◆ T-45A Goshawk
 - ◆ SH-60B/F
 - ◆ Weapons & systems
 - ◆ Trident II D-5 MIRV missile
 - ◆ Pioneer UAV
 - ◆ Skipper LGB

354

1980s: Public ONI threat documents

- ◆ *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*,
(4th ed) (1981)
- ◆ *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*,
(5th ed) (1985)



395

1980s: State of Navy: Sealift (I)

- ◆ **Sealift build-up: “Military sealift renaissance”**
 - ◆ SECNAV Lehman declared strategic sealift “a distinct Navy function along with sea control and power projection” (1984)
 - ◆ New OPNAV strategic sealift office (OP-42)
 - ◆ Military control & development favored over reliance on subsidized commercial shipping
 - ◆ Increase in gov’t & privately-owned US sealift ships
 - ◆ Suitable for military cargo
 - ◆ Continued planned reliance on EUSC ships, allies
 - ◆ Creation & expansion of prepositioning fleet

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1980s: State of Navy: Sealift (II)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Navy gave MSC commander VADM rank again
 - ◆ From 1981
- ◆ MSC subsumed under new joint Transportation Command (1987)
 - ◆ Also Military Airlift Command (MAC) & MTMC
 - ◆ MTMC takes over most commercial shipping contracts
 - ◆ TRANSCOM authority over MSC limited to wartime

397

1980s: State of Navy: Sealift (III)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Build-up of robust US gov't-owned fleets:
Pre-positioning & Fast Sealift
 - ◆ From 7 NTPF to 17 APF to 37 APF ships
 - ◆ IO Near Term Prepositioning Force (1980)
 - ◆ 7 ships on station at Diego Garcia with afloat staff
 - ◆ Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF) (1983)
 - ◆ 3 Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) squadrons for USMC
 - ◆ Other prepo ships holding USA, USAF, & DLA cargo
 - ◆ Located at Diego Garcia, Guam & Saipan, US East Coast
- ◆ Use subject to CINC demand, JCS adjudication
- ◆ But little operational use in 1980s

398

1980s: State of Navy: Sealift (IV)

CNA
CORPORATION & INSURANCE

- ◆ USN bought, converted SL-7 Fast Sealift Force (1981-4)
- ◆ USN converted containerships to crane ships (T-ACS)
 - ◆ Placed in MARAD RRF
- ◆ USN developed Sealift Enhancement Features (SEF) to adapt containerships to military use
 - ◆ Flatracks, sea sheds, etc.

399

1980s: State of Navy: Sealift (V)

CNA
CORPORATION & INSURANCE

- ◆ MARAD moved from Dep't of Commerce to Dep't of Transportation (DOT) (1981)
- ◆ MARAD NDRF ship #'s rise, then fall
 - ◆ 1980: 303 1984: 386 1990: 329
- ◆ Continued build-up of MARAD RRF for rapid MSC sealift deployment
 - ◆ 1980: 24 1985: 65 1990: 96
- ◆ Ready Reserve Fleet renamed Ready Reserve Force (1982)

400

1980s: State of Navy: Sealift (VI)



- ◆ Continued transfer of USN Combat Logistics Force ships to civilian-crewed MSC Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF)
- ◆ 18 civ-crewed MSC T-AGOS ships (1984-90)
- ◆ Contract operation of MSC special mission ships begins (1984)
 - ◆ OMB circular A-76 (1983): Encouraged government reliance on commercial sector

401

1980s: State of Navy: Sealift (VII)



- ◆ Continued Germany, Korea reinforcement exercises
 - ◆ “REFORGER” ; “Team Spirit”
- ◆ But . . . implications of *The Maritime Strategy*:
 - ◆ Soviets to be held at bay well north of SLOCs
 - ◆ Downgraded anticipated Soviet threat to SLOCs
 - ◆ Reduced perceived need for replacements for attrited merchant shipping
- ◆ Bush Administration NSD 28: *National Security Directive on Sealift*
 - ◆ 5 Oct 1989
 - ◆ Broad policy guidance supportive of US commercial ocean carrier industry, but with caveats

402

1980s: State of the Navy: Basing (I)

- ◆ Naval Districts disestablished (1980)
 - ◆ Functions assumed by base commanders
- ◆ SECNAV Lehman “Strategic Homeporting” initiative (1981-6)
 - ◆ New bases at Staten Island, Mobile, Ingleside, Everett, Pascagoula
 - ◆ Continued buildup on Diego Garcia
 - ◆ USN leased barges as afloat bases in Persian Gulf during Operation *Earnest Will*
 - ◆ New CONUS SSBN bases operational
 - ◆ Kings Bay GA (1979); Bangor WA (1981)

403


1980s: State of the Navy: Basing (II)

- ◆ MSC Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF) locations established at Diego Garcia, Guam & Saipan, & US East Coast
- ◆ Major base closure legislation (1988)
 - ◆ 1st BRAC round: 3 NAVSTAs closed

404

1980s: US Merchant Marine (I)

CNA



1980s: US Merchant Marine (II)

CNA

- ◆ Depression in world shipping continued until late 1980s
- ◆ US commercial MM decline continued
 - ◆ Ocean-going ships (1000 gross tons & over)
 - ◆ 1980: 849
 - ◆ 1985: 748
 - ◆ 1990: 635
 - ◆ US MM only 4-5% of world fleet tonnage
- ◆ Effective US Control (EUSC) fleet also declined, precipitously
 - ◆ 1982: 466
 - ◆ 1986: 326
 - ◆ 1989: 228
- ◆ 1986 tax law reduced US investment in US-owned, foreign-flagged ships

406

1980s: US Merchant Marine (III)


CNA
Center for National Defense

- ◆ # of US non-gov't civilian merchant mariners continued to drop
 - ◆ 1980: 19,600 1985: 13,100 1990: 11,100
 - ◆ RRF activation contingent upon availability of US civilian merchant mariners
- ◆ MSC began to contract out its special mission ship operations (1984)
 - ◆ Reagan administration cost-effective privatization of government functions
 - ◆ OMB Budget Circular A-76
 - ◆ 12 survey ships contracted out (1985)
 - ◆ Non-CIVMAR crews

407

1980s: US shipbuilding (I)

CNA
Center for National Defense



408

1980s: US shipbuilding (II)


CNA

- ◆ USN warship shipbuilding: Between 10-23 ships annually
- ◆ US domestic merchant ship construction fell off, ceased towards end of decade
 - ◆ US Merchant Marine went overseas for ships
- ◆ Reagan Administration:
 - ◆ USN build-up, including MSC fleet
 - ◆ Distrusted commercial shipbuilding subsidies
 - ◆ Ended construction-differential policy
 - ◆ Allowed foreign construction of US-flag vessels
 - ◆ Deregulated liner shipping for carriers & shippers
- ◆ # of US (gov't) naval shipyards stayed at 8

409

1980s: TOA by US military department


CNA



410

1980s: US service active duty personnel

CNA



411

1980s: USN-USMC relations (I)

CNA

- ◆ Continued routine & crisis-response USMC forward deployments on USN ships
 - ◆ MAUs on amphibious ships
 - ◆ MARDETs on non-amphibious ships
- ◆ Close USN-USMC relations during most of decade
 - ◆ CMCs Robert Barrow & Paul X. Kelley (1979-1987)
 - ◆ “600 Ship navy” goal included MAF/MAB amphibs
 - ◆ “DON LIFT” study & agreed force goals (1983)
 - ◆ NATO flanks, Soviet Far East amphib plans, exercises
 - ◆ Both USN, USMC opted for, bought, flew F/A-18C/Ds
 - ◆ CNO’s SSG at NPT incl/ USMC membership

412

1980s: USN-USMC relations (II)



- ◆ USMC developed OTH assault & Prepo concepts & systems
 - ◆ LSD-41s, LCACs, initial LHD entered service
 - ◆ USS *Nassau* deployed with all-Harrier air wing (1981)
 - ◆ USMC pushed “mobility triad:” LCAC, AAAV, V-22
 - ◆ 3 new USMC afloat MPFs & Norway NALMEB prepo forces operational
 - ◆ USMC Blount Island Command to support all USMC prepo (1989)
- ◆ USMC created Fleet Anti-terrorism Security Teams (FAST) to augment USN FP (1987)

413

1980s: USN-USMC relations (III)



- ◆ USN-USMC relationship: “Strategic coordination” vice “Integration”
 - ◆ Joint Pub 3-02 *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* signed (1986)
 - ◆ 1st joint amphibious doctrine pub since World War II
 - ◆ Continued C2 division at water’s edge: CATF/CLF
 - ◆ More “coordinated” than “integrated”
 - ◆ USN CVBGs, SSNs operated separately from ARGs
 - ◆ USMC plans for Norway (& Korea): Priority to pre-war non-amphibious deployments
 - ◆ USMC continued focus on SWA planning
 - ◆ NTPF, later MPF (1995) afloat support
 - ◆ Continued lesser interest by USN; but built lift
- ◆ Easy collaboration on 1st several versions of *The Maritime Strategy (1982-86)*
 - ◆ *Amphibious Warfare Strategy (1985)*

414

1980s: USN-USMC relations (IV)



- ◆ **USN, USMC drifting apart by end of decade**
 - ◆ CMC Gen Al Gray (1987-1991)
 - ◆ CMC refocused USMC on warfighting in 3rd world, vice anti-Soviet NATO & NE Pacific campaigns
 - ◆ CMC restyled USMC forces “expeditionary” vice “amphibious” (1988)
 - ◆ **FMFM 1 Warfighting (1989)**
 - ◆ Maneuver warfare focus
- ◆ **CMC, USMC committed to LCAC, AAAV, V-22**
- ◆ **MEUs became “Special Operations Capable” (SOC) (1987)**
 - ◆ Unlike USN SEALS, USMC not part of new USSOCOM
 - ◆ **MEU(SOC) Operations Playbook (1989)**

415

1980s: USN-USMC relations (V)



- ◆ **Continued slight decline in amphib % of active fleet**
 - ◆ 1960s: 15% 1970s: 13% 1980s: 11%
- ◆ **USN-USMC budget differences**
 - ◆ “Blue-in-support-of-green” dollars at issue
 - ◆ Especially cost of V-22
 - ◆ Gray demarche on amphibious forces

416

1980s: USN-USMC relations (VI)

CNA
Commonwealth National

- ◆ Continued increasing USMC autonomy
 - ◆ 1st USMC Unified Command CINC appointed (1985)
 - ◆ Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) reorganized & renamed (1987)
 - ◆ Had been Marine Corps Development & Education Command (MCDEC)
 - ◆ Marine Corps University organized (1989)
 - ◆ Marine Corps War College established (1990)

417

1980s: USN-USCG relations (I)

CNA
Commonwealth National

- ◆ USCG in Department of Transportation
 - ◆ No direct participation in Reagan defense buildup
 - ◆ SECDOT Lewis attempt to privatize USCG (1981-3)
- ◆ USCG cutters & PSUs integrated into USN component commanders war plans
- ◆ USN funding of USCG defense hardware
 - ◆ Includes WHEC FRAM, Harpoon
 - ◆ USN funded 16 of new USCG 110-foot WPB fleet
- ◆ USCG acquires E-2C Hawkeye a/c (1987)

418

1980s: USN-USCG relations (II)

- ◆ **USN-USCG NAVGARD Board for policy coordination (established 1980)**
 - ◆ CNO Hayward initiative, w/ COMDT COGARD Hayes
- ◆ **MARDEZes established (1984)**
 - ◆ Missions: CONUS port security, harbor defense, coastal warfare
 - ◆ When activated, USCG area commanders to report to USN fleet commanders
 - ◆ **CNO-COMDT COGARD MARDEZ MOA (1984)**

419

1980s: USN-USCG relations (III)

- ◆ **USN-USCG counter-drug ops**
 - ◆ USCG LEDETs on USN warships (from 1982)
 - ◆ USCG flag officer-led drug interdiction JTFs 4 & 5 set up under USCINCLANT & USCINCPAC (1989)
- ◆ **Other USN-USCG integrated ops:**
 - ◆ Mariel (Cuba) Boatlift (1980); KAL 007 post-shootdown recovery ops (1983); *Exxon Valdez* oil spill (1989)
 - ◆ **No USCG role in *Urgent Fury* (Grenada 1983) or *Just Cause* (Panama 1989)**

420

1980s: USN-USAF relations (I)



- ◆ USAF deployment strategy
 - ◆ TACAIR in ready forward Europe/WESTPAC garrisons
 - ◆ Strategic forces in ready CONUS garrisons
 - ◆ Frequent alert, surge & other exercises
- ◆ Continued heavy USAF purchases of new F-15s, F-16s, plus F-117s
- ◆ DON USN-USMC TOA generally > USAF TOA
 - ◆ Exceptions: FYs 84-6
- ◆ USAF active duty end strength > USN
 - ◆ Until FY 1988

421

1980s: USN-USAF relations (II)



- ◆ Further refinement of US naval aviation TTP
 - ◆ To conduct autonomous strike & AAW campaigns on NATO flanks & NE Asia
 - ◆ De-confliction with USAF as necessary
 - ◆ Close cooperation in Pacific theater

422

1980s: USN-USAF relations (III)

CNA
INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES

- ◆ Increased USN-USAF dialogue & cooperation
 - ◆ Navy-Air Force MOAs (1982, 1983, 1985, 1988)
 - ◆ B-52 ASUW (Harpoon), mining capabilities, exercises
 - ◆ USAF aerial refueling & AWACS support
- ◆ USAF replaced Iceland air defense F-4s with new F-15s (1985)
- ◆ USN MSC deployed prepositioning ships forward with USAF munitions

423

1980s: USN-USAF relations (IV)

CNA
INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES

- ◆ Libya joint strike ops (1986)
 - ◆ *Attain Document* & *El Dorado Canyon*
 - ◆ Simultaneous USN-USMC & USAF strikes geographically separate & de-conflicted
 - ◆ Little unity of command
 - ◆ Most significant joint air ops betw/ VN & Gulf wars
- ◆ Persian Gulf ops (1987-1988)
 - ◆ Operations *Earnest Will* & *Praying Mantis*
 - ◆ USAF tankers refuel USN TACAIR over Gulf
 - ◆ USAF a/c transport USN MCM forces forward

424

1980s: USN-USAF relations (V)



- ◆ B-52s fully Harpoon-capable (1985-1989)
 - ◆ At Loring (Maine) & Anderson (Guam) AFBs
- ◆ USN components under USAF general officer-led joint operational command
 - ◆ NAVSPACECOM under CINCUSSPACECOM (1985)
 - ◆ MSC under CINCUSTRANSCOM (1987)
- ◆ Brief OPNAV-Air Staff strategy Action Officer exchange
- ◆ USN difficulties obtaining USAF stealth technology for new USN A-12 attack aircraft

425

1980s: USN-USAF relations (VI)



- ◆ AFM 1-1 *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force* (1984)
- ◆ JCS Pub 26 *Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations (from Overseas Land Areas)* (1986)
 - ◆ 1st doctrinal appearance of JFACC concept
- ◆ *Omnibus Agreement for Command and Control of Marine TacAir in Sustained Operations Ashore* (1986)
 - ◆ Guidelines for tactical control of USMC a/c

426

1980s: USN-USAF relations (VII)

CNA

- ◆ NWC Global War Games include USAF players
- ◆ Col John Warden USAF, *The Air Campaign* (1988)
 - ◆ Independent air operations potentially decisive
 - ◆ Air attacks on centers of gravity, esp. leadership
- ◆ Continued high USN use of USAF space systems
 - ◆ Continued modest USN funding of space systems
 - ◆ USN assigned Alternate Space Control Center (ASCC) mission (1987)
 - ◆ USAF launched 1st GPS satellites (from 1988)

427

1980s: USN-US Army relations (I)

CNA

- ◆ Continued clash of strategic concepts
 - ◆ Revised US Army operational doctrine:
 - ◆ Return to offensive concepts, focus on entire campaign
 - ◆ FM 100-5 Operations ("AirLand Battle") (1982, 1986)
 - ◆ COL Harry Summers, *On Strategy* (1982)
- ◆ Continued narrow US Army preoccupation with USN sealift, prepo, and close-in protection of shipping
 - ◆ "The Navy ('s) . . . major mission was to protect the Atlantic sea-lanes so that we could get to Europe to fight World War III"

GEN Colin Powell (Ret), *My American Journey* (1995)

428

1980s: USN-US Army relations (II)

CNA

- ◆ Army distrust of *The Maritime Strategy* as USN force-building argument at expense of Army
 - ◆ Rejected Navy bids for MarStrat-AirLand Battle integration
 - ◆ Refused to supply photos for 1986 *Proceedings* article
- ◆ Dr. Keith Dunn & COL Bill Staudenmeier at Army War College
 - ◆ Numerous writings vs. *The Maritime Strategy*
- ◆ Builder, *The Army in the Strategic Planning Process* (1986)
 - ◆ Would become *Masks of War* (1989)

429

1980s: USN-US Army relations (III)

CNA

- ◆ Army plans for infantry, air defense reinforcement of forward islands
 - ◆ Iceland, Azores, Aleutians
- ◆ NWC Global War Games include Army players
- ◆ Brief OPNAV-Army Staff strategy action officer exchange
- ◆ *Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)* established at Ft. Leavenworth KS (1985)
- ◆ New—largely US Army—USSOCCOM (1987)
 - ◆ Subsumed Navy Special Warfare ops
- ◆ Competition for USCCINCENT billet (1988)

430

1980s: USN-US Army relations (IV)



◆ Small joint operations

- ◆ Operation URGENT FURY (1983)
 - ◆ Grenada intervention & regime change
 - ◆ Widely publicized Army-Navy interoperability issues
 - ◆ E.g.: Tactical comms; Army helicopters on USN ships
- ◆ Operation EARNEST WILL (1987-9)
 - ◆ Persian Gulf “Tanker War”
 - ◆ Operation PRIME CHANCE I: USA Special Forces helos on USN FFGs as AFSBs (1987)
- ◆ Operation JUST CAUSE (1989)
 - ◆ Panama intervention & regime change
 - ◆ US Army Transportation Corps watercraft support for USN SEALS

431

1980s: USN-US Army relations (V)



- ◆ USN MSC deployed afloat prepositioned Army equipment forward & expanded Army sealift
- ◆ Army Transportation Corps expanded & modernizes its watercraft fleet
- ◆ Army-Navy Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) exercises

432

1980s: USN-foreign navy relations (I)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ **USN focus: Increasing capabilities of US allies & friends to counter Soviets & allies**
- ◆ **Coordination, not integration, with allied forces**
- ◆ **Division of labor: Allied expertise encouraged in:**
 - ◆ NCAPS, convoy escort, mine & coastal warfare, forward basing support, port security
- ◆ **Security fears limited classified info exchanges**
- ◆ **Interoperability through LIMDIS NATO pubs**
- ◆ **OPNAV, fleet commanders drove USN policy**

433

1980s: USN-foreign navy relations (II)

CNA

- ◆ **A few multi-lateral naval coordination & cooperation ops**
 - ◆ Off Lebanon (1982-4)
 - ◆ Gulf of Suez mine clearance (1984)
 - ◆ Persian Gulf “tanker war” ops (1987-8)
- ◆ **Enabled by prior exercises, interoperability programs, staff talks, education & training, tech transfer, etc.**

434

1980s: USN-foreign navy relations (III)



- ◆ International Seapower Symposia (ISS) ongoing biennially at NWC Newport RI
- ◆ Bi-lateral Navy-to-Navy staff talks programs continued, expanded
- ◆ CNO Coalition Strategy Enhancement Program (CSEP) (1988)
 - ◆ *The Maritime Strategy* as centerpiece for bilateral naval discussions & war games w/ foreign navies
 - ◆ CSEP OPNAVINST drafter was OPNAV OP-603 *Maritime Strategy* AO (CDR Mitch Brown)

435

1980s: USN-foreign navy relations (IV)



- ◆ NAVWARCOL curricula for foreign officers
 - ◆ Other foreign navy educations & training
 - ◆ NWC accepts foreign officers as research scholars
- ◆ NWC Global War Games include allied players
- ◆ Worldwide Naval Control & Protection of Shipping (NCAPS) network
 - ◆ USNR participates for USN
- ◆ Arms & technology transfers (both ways)
- ◆ Intel & communications collaboration
 - ◆ AUSCANZUKUS
- ◆ Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) ongoing

436

1980s: USN-foreign navy relations (V)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ **NATO relationships**
 - ◆ Command structures, staffs, plans & exercises
 - ◆ Tri-MNC CONMAROPS
 - ◆ Rationalization, standardization, interoperability
 - ◆ USN-RN debates on NORLANT SLOC protection
- ◆ **RN deployed upgraded “Chevaline” Polaris missiles, as UK strategic deterrent**
- ◆ **RN planned to deploy Trident D-5**
 - ◆ US-UK Trident II D5 sales agreement (1982)
- ◆ **US/USN tilt to UK/RN in Falklands War (1982)**
- ◆ **USN opposed Canadian Navy SSN plans (1987-8)**

437

1980s: USN-foreign navy relations (VI)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ **LATAM navy relationships**
 - ◆ UNITAS
 - ◆ IANC
 - ◆ Bilateral maritime strategy efforts
- ◆ **JMSDF, ROKN, RTN, RAN relationships**
 - ◆ RIMPAC exercises continue, expand
 - ◆ Cobra Gold exercises begin, expand (from 1981)
 - ◆ Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) (from 1988)
 - ◆ Nuclear PVST issue cuts RNZN relationships (1986)
 - ◆ USN unsuccessfully opposed S. Korean submarine purchases; backed Japanese Aegis purchase

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1980s: USN-foreign navy relations (VII)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Warm Navy-to-Navy relations with PRC (to 1989)
 - ◆ ADM Watkins 1st CNO to visit PRC (1986)
 - ◆ Other flag officer visits
 - ◆ 1st USN-PLAN reciprocal PVSTs in 37 yrs (1987)
 - ◆ USN agrees to sell 4 Mark-46 torpedoes to PRC
 - ◆ Relationships broken off after Tiananmen Square Massacre (1989)
- ◆ Continued buildup of Royal Saudi Navy
- ◆ Annual USN-SovNav INCSEA meetings
- ◆ Informal SU-UK-US naval talks began (1988)
- ◆ ADM Trost 1st CNO to visit USSR (1989)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Overview
 - ◆ Signed by CNOs ADMs Watkins & Trost
 - ◆ Coordinated with SECNAVs & CMCs
 - ◆ Primary targets: Numerous, esp. USN officers, Soviets
 - ◆ Billed as a “strategy”
 - ◆ 8+ SECRET, UNCLAS, & “higher classification” versions.
Multi-media.
 - ◆ USN makes a strategic difference
 - ◆ Peace-Crisis-War spectrum
 - ◆ 3-phase global campaign vs. Soviets
 - ◆ Uncertainties
 - ◆ Highly influential

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis


- ◆ Signed by:
 - ◆ CNO ADM James D. Watkins
 - ◆ CNO Carlisle A.H. Trost
- ◆ *Amphibious Warfare Strategy* signed by:
 - ◆ CNO ADM James D. Watkins
 - ◆ CMC Gen Paul X. Kelley
- ◆ “600-ship Navy” companion piece signed by:
 - ◆ SECNAV John F. Lehman, Jr.



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1980s: Text & context of each document

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ADM James D. Watkins (CNO June 1982-June 1986)

- ◆ Nov 1982 *The Maritime Strategy* (SECRET brief)
(Unsigned)
- ◆ May 1984 *The Maritime Strategy* (SECRET pub)
- ◆ Jun 1985 *The Amphibious Warfare Strategy*
(SECRET pub)
- ◆ Nov 1985 *The Maritime Strategy* (SECRET pub rev.)
- ◆ Jan 1986 *The Maritime Strategy*
(UNCLAS *Proceedings* insert)



443

ADM James D. Watkins (CNO June 1982-June 1986)

- ◆ Served under President Reagan, SECDEF Weinberger, SECNAV Lehman
- ◆ *The Maritime Strategy* was developed by his flag officers & staff, during his first 2 years of office
- ◆ During last 2 years, he embraced and used it, himself
- ◆ By end of his term, he considered it his chief legacy

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ADM Carlisle A. H. Trost (CNO July 1986-June 1990)

- ◆ Jan 1987 "Looking Beyond the Maritime Strategy"
(UNCLAS *Proceedings* article)
- ◆ Feb 1989 *The Maritime Strategy*
(SECRET pub revised)
- ◆ May 1990 "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s"
(UNCLAS *Proceedings* article)



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ADM Carlisle A. H. Trost (CNO July 1986-June 1990)

- ◆ Served during transitions: Reagan-to-Bush; Weinberger-to-Carlucci-to-Cheney; Lehman-to-Webb-to-Ball-to-Garrett
- ◆ Provided continuity
- ◆ Had participated in development of *The Maritime Strategy* as VADM
- ◆ As CNO, endorsed staff & fleet initiatives to promulgate & test *The Maritime Strategy*
- ◆ Sought at times to "bring the debate indoors"
- ◆ Periodically tasked and signed out updated concepts, within original Maritime Strategy framework, including "the last word" in 1990

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)



◆ What it was (I)

- ◆ Billed as a “Strategy”
 - ◆ Naval Institute styled 1st UNCLAS version a “White Paper”
 - ◆ “Maritime component of national military strategy”
 - ◆ Consolidation of existing thinking. Not a vision
 - ◆ Explanation of use of current forces

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)



◆ What it was (II)

- ◆ Published: Multi-media:
 - ◆ 1st 2 years: SECRET briefing (lingua franca of the Pentagon)
 - ◆ Later: SCI, SECRET, UNCLAS briefings, pubs; *Proceedings, International Security*, journal articles; book (Norman Friedman); video
 - ◆ Included 8 successive CNO-signed official versions
 - ◆ SECRET versions: 70 to 87 to 70 to 51 pages
 - ◆ *Amphibious Warfare Strategy*: 47 pages
 - ◆ UNCLAS versions: 40 pages; then 4 & 9 pages
 - ◆ Cited but not reprinted verbatim in annual *CNO Reports* (“posture statements”)
 - ◆ A “work in progress” throughout its lifetime

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Why it was written (I)

- ◆ To show USN vital relevance to conflict with Soviets, primarily through forward, global, offensive, joint & allied naval operations, especially in Pacific, on European flanks, & against Soviet ocean bastions
- ◆ To deter Soviets through communicating to them USN capabilities & intentions
- ◆ To show fit between Reagan Administration national security policies & USN recommended strategy, especially to Congress
- ◆ To underpin arguments for the Reagan Administration "600-ship Navy" building program, especially CVNs

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CNA

◆ Why it was written (II)

- ◆ To incorporate new intel view of Soviet naval capabilities & intentions
- ◆ To counter SECNAV Lehman arguments that USN officer corps had no strategy
- ◆ To educate the OPNAV staff on wider world of joint & USN intel, strategic plans & policy
 - ◆ Driver for OP-06 AO drafters
- ◆ To vet fleet & CNO SSG operational & tactical-based inputs
- ◆ To identify & spur internal Navy addressal of "uncertainties"
- ◆ Primary targets: Numerous, but esp. USN officer corps

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Context (I):
 - ◆ Context shifted during 1980s
 - ◆ Phase I: 1981-1986
 - ◆ Phase II: 1986-1988
 - ◆ Phase III: 1988-1990
 - ◆ *The Maritime Strategy* reflected these shifts
 - ◆ 1st, 2nd, 3rd, Amphib, UNCLAS editions (1982-6)
 - ◆ UNCLAS article (1987)
 - ◆ 4th edition, UNCLAS article (1989, 1990)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Context (II): Phase I: Early 1980s (thru Jan 1986)
 - ◆ 1st ed. *Maritime Strategy* (1982)
 - ◆ Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty (1979)
 - ◆ Congress had put CVN-71 into FY 80 budget (1979)
 - ◆ President Carter did not veto this time
 - ◆ 1980 “Carter Doctrine”: US use of force in Gulf
 - ◆ Desert One debacle (1980)
 - ◆ US voters repudiated Carter administration (1980)
 - ◆ Polish “Solidarity” Crisis; martial rule (1980-81)
 - ◆ New Reagan administration(1981-89)
 - ◆ New SECDEF Weinberger; New SECNAV Lehman (1981-87)
 - ◆ Defense budget increases; anti-Soviet policies, rhetoric
 - ◆ UN Convention on Law of the Sea signed (1982)
 - ◆ President rejected LOS seabed mining terms

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context (III): Phase I: Early 1980s (cont)

- ◆ 2nd & 3rd eds. *Maritime Strategy* (1984-5)
- ◆ UNCLAS edition (Jan 1986)
- ◆ Small-scale real-world ops in Middle East & Caribbean
- ◆ President Reagan “Evil Empire” speech (March 1983)
- ◆ Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) (1983)
 - ◆ CNO ADM Watkins, RADM Holland, CAPT Brooks, etc.
- ◆ US deployed GLCMs & IRBMs to Europe (1983)
 - ◆ Triggered so-called Soviet Navy “analogous response” Delta II-class SSBNs deployed off US coasts (1984-7)
- ◆ Soviets shot down ROK civilian airliner KAL-007 (1983)
- ◆ Soviet “Able Archer” NATO exercise war scare (1983)
- ◆ President Reagan re-elected (1984)
- ◆ Walker brothers arrested (1985)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

Context (IV): Phase I: Early-1980s (cont)

- ◆ US economy pulling out of recession; high government deficit spending
- ◆ Reagan defense budget increases (1981-5); included 600-ship BF goal
- ◆ USN force budgets, force levels rising
 - ◆ USN in 1981: 491 ships
 - ◆ USN by 1987: 568 ships
- ◆ Push for increased US jointness
 - ◆ Standup of USCENTCOM (1983), USSPACECOM (1985),
 - ◆ USN vainly opposed all

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Context (V): Phase II: Mid-1980s (1986-8)
 - ◆ *Maritime strategy article* (1987)
 - ◆ Gorbachev became GS CPSU (1985)
 - ◆ Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva summit mtg (Nov 1985)
 - ◆ Reagan-Gorbachev Reykjavik summit (Oct 1986)
 - ◆ Failed to agree on arms control & SDI
 - ◆ INF negotiations led to INF Treaty (1985-7)
 - ◆ Eliminated all IRBMs & GLCMs on both sides
 - ◆ Reagan to Gorbachev: "Tear down this wall" (1987)
 - ◆ Increased Soviet push for naval arms control
 - ◆ Gorbachev "Murmansk Speech" pro-Arctic arms control (Oct 1987)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

Context (VI): Phase II: Mid-1980s (1986-8) (cont)

- ◆ Tanker War (1984-8)
- ◆ USN force levels & budgets plateaued
 - ◆ USN in 1987: 568 ships
 - ◆ USN in 1989: 566 ships
- ◆ Push for increased US jointness continued
 - ◆ Goldwater-Nichols Act 1986
 - ◆ Standup of USSOCCOM & USTRANSCOM (1987)
 - ◆ USN vainly opposed all
- ◆ International Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988)

456

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)



- ◆ Context (VII): Phase III: Late-1980s (1988-90)
 - ◆ 4th ed. *Maritime Strategy (1989)* & *Maritime strategy article (1990)*
 - ◆ US Navy force levels, budgets dropped
 - ◆ USN in 1989: 566 ships
 - ◆ USN in 1990: 546 ships

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)



- ◆ Context (VIII): Phase III: Late-1980s (cont)
 - ◆ George H.W. Bush elected president (1988)
 - ◆ Soviet retreat from Afghanistan (1988-9)
 - ◆ Non-Communist gov't in Poland (1989)
 - ◆ PRC Tiananmen Square massacre (Jun 1989)
 - ◆ Berlin Wall down (Nov 1989)
 - ◆ Operation *Just Cause* (Panama) (1989-90)
 - ◆ Bush-Gorbachev at-sea "Malta Summit" (Dec 1989)
 - ◆ CFE Treaty signed; Germany reunified (1990)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (IX)

- ◆ CNOs ADMs Watkins (1982-86) & Trost (1986-90)
(submariners)
- ◆ VCNO ADM Small (1981-3)
- ◆ USN ASW prowess peaked
- ◆ Agreed new US intelligence on Soviet Navy
- ◆ New systems & tactics entering fleet, especially
AAW, ASW, ASUW, strike

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

Context (X)

- ◆ CWC concept institutionalized in the fleet
- ◆ “Strike U” established at NAS Fallon (1984)
- ◆ USN SEAD capabilities improved
- ◆ Maritime Defense Zones created (1984)
- ◆ Soviet submarines becoming progressively quieter
- ◆ USN FLEXOPS deployment policy (1982-5)
- ◆ USN OPTEMPO & PERSTEMPO goals (from 1986
on)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)



Context (XI)

- ◆ Navy Long Range Planners Conferences & unofficial "Navy Study Groups"
- ◆ OP-095 became Director of Naval Warfare vice only ASW (1980)
- ◆ OP-00X (Long-Range Planning) created (1980)
 - ◆ USN Long-Range Planners Conferences (1985-9)
- ◆ Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) re-directed (1981)
- ◆ SECNAV Lehman shut down OPNAV campaign analysis & Net Assessment efforts
 - ◆ OP-96 (Systems Analysis) became OP-91
 - ◆ OPNAV Office of Net Assessment abolished

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)



Context (XII)

- ◆ NAVWARCOL Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) (created 1981)
 - ◆ Director: Bob Murray
- ◆ CNO ADM Hayward created Strategic Studies Group (SSG) under CNWS (1981)
 - ◆ Director: Former UNDERSECNAV Bob Murray
 - ◆ "To make captains of ships into captains of war"
 - ◆ SCI access; well-funded & staffed
 - ◆ SSG I SCI games yielded preferred USN CONOPs (1982)
 - ◆ Defeat Soviets at sea, combined arms, attrite SSBNs
 - ◆ Widely briefed to USN leadership
- ◆ NWC Global War Games continued, expanded
 - ◆ Focus on superpower war (through 1988)

462

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ Cited references (I)
 - ◆ Alliances & treaties
 - ◆ US Reply to NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ)
 - ◆ NATO CONMAROPS (1981, 1988)
 - ◆ Title 10 of the U.S. Code
 - ◆ National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs)
 - ◆ NSDD-32 *U.S. National Security Strategy* (Mar 1982)
 - ◆ Superseded PD 18 *US National Strategy* (Aug 1977)
 - ◆ NIE 11-15-82/D *Soviet Naval Strategy* (Mar 1983)
 - ◆ NIE 11-15-89 *Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs toward the 21st Century* (Jun 1989)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ Cited references (II)
 - ◆ *Defense Guidance* (DG)
 - ◆ *Joint Strategic Planning Document* (JSPD)
 - ◆ *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP)
 - ◆ Unified & specified commander (CINC) plans
 - ◆ CNO-CSAF MOA (1982)
 - ◆ CNO-CCG MOA (MARDEZ) (1984)
 - ◆ CSA-CSAF MOA (1985)
 - ◆ *Escort Requirements Study* (1982)
 - ◆ Included annotated bibliography (1986)

464

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ NATO MC 14/3 *Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area* (1968)
 - ◆ NATO MC 48/3 *Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area* (1969)
 - ◆ Flexible response
 - ◆ NSDM 344 "Navy Shipbuilding Program" (1977)
 - ◆ Last Carter Administration budget (1981)
 - ◆ Turnaround: Call for strong carrier strike force (for SWA)
 - ◆ President Reagan "Evil Empire" speech (March 1983)
 - ◆ DOD Dir 5100.1 *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components* (Successive editions: Jan 1980, Apr 1987, Sep 1987)

465

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ Stockholm Agreement (CSBMs) (1986)
 - ◆ Included naval CSBMs when linked to ground ops
 - ◆ Superseded by Vienna Document (1990)
 - ◆ US-USSR DMA Agreement (1989)
 - ◆ 1st Reagan *National Security Strategy* (1987)
 - ◆ 2nd Reagan *National Security Strategy* (1988)
 - ◆ NIE 11-15-84/D *Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs through the 1990s* (Mar 1985)

466

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ New SECDEF *Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning* (1980+)
 - ◆ Weinberger Doctrine of “Full Force” (1984)
 - ◆ Major contributions by LTG Colin Powell USA
 - ◆ JCS Pub 26 *Joint Doctrine for Counter Operations* (includes JFACC) (1986)
 - ◆ CINC & Navy component plans & CONOPS
 - ◆ ADM Long PACOM Campaign Plan (1982)
 - ◆ CINC CONOPS briefs to CJCS GEN Vessey (1982)
 - ◆ Iklé, Holloway et al, *Discriminate Deterrence* (1988)
 - ◆ DOD, *Soviet Military Power* (10 editions, 1981-1991)

467

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
 - ◆ *Project SIXTY* (1970)
 - ◆ NWP 1 (1978)
 - ◆ *Sea Plan 2000* (1978)
 - ◆ “The Future of US Sea Power” (1979)
 - ◆ SECNAV John Lehman, “Rebirth of U.S. Naval Strategy,” *Strategic Review* (Summer 1981)
 - ◆ Other SECNAV Lehman speeches interviews, articles, testimony (1981+)
 - ◆ Strategic Studies Group (SSG) reports & briefings (1982-89)
 - ◆ Esp. Owens-Cebrowski SSG I game brief (1982)
 - ◆ DON, *Lessons of the Falklands* (1983)
 - ◆ “DON Lift 1” & “DON Lift 2” studies (1983, 1990)

468

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
 - ◆ C2F/JTF 120 "Fighting Instructions" (1982-89)
 - ◆ PACFLT & other fleet "Fighting Instructions"
 - ◆ CNA studies
 - ◆ Soviet Navy policy, strategy & doctrine studies
 - ◆ E.g.: Jamie McConnell, "Strategy & Missions of the Soviet Navy" (1978)
 - ◆ Outer Air Battle study (1981-3)
 - ◆ Northern Region Warfare Assessments campaign analyses (1983-6)
 - ◆ USN presence & responses to crises studies
 - ◆ USN outer air battle studies
 - ◆ Offensive Mining Study
 - ◆ ADM Gorshkov, *Sea Power of the State* (English translation) (1979)
 - ◆ Navy Strategic Planning Experiment (NSPE) "Maritime Balance Study" (1979)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (VI)
 - ◆ FM 1-1 *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force* (1984)
 - ◆ JCS Pub 26 "*Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations (from Overseas Land Areas)*" (1986)
 - ◆ *Omnibus Agreement for Command and Control of Marine TacAir in Sustained Operations Ashore* (1986)
 - ◆ Col John Warden, *The Air Campaign* (1988)
 - ◆ US Army FM 100-5 *Operations* (1982, 1986) (AirLand Battle)
 - ◆ FMFM 1 *Warfighting* (1989)

470

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (VII)
 - ◆ Paul Nitze et al, *Securing the Seas* (1979)
 - ◆ RADM (Ret) Henry Eccles, *Military Power in a Free Society* (1979)
 - ◆ J. A. Williams, "Strategies & Forces of the USN" (1981)
 - ◆ Alva Bowen, Ron O'Rourke CRS reports
 - ◆ Gen Sir John Hackett
 - ◆ *The Third World War, August 1985* (1978)
 - ◆ *The Third World War, The Untold Story* (1982)
 - ◆ Tom Clancy
 - ◆ *The Hunt for Red October* (1984)
 - ◆ *Red Storm Rising* (1986)
 - ◆ Movie "Top Gun" (1986)
 - ◆ Cher USS Missouri (BB-63) music video "If I Could Turn Back time" (1989)

471

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (VIII)
 - ◆ Col John Boyd, briefings on defense reform, maneuver warfare, OODA Loop (1980s)
 - ◆ James Fallows, *National Defense* (1981)
 - ◆ COL Harry Summers, *On Strategy* (1982)
 - ◆ Bill Lind, *The Manoeuvre Warfare Handbook* (1985)
 - ◆ Carl Builder, *Army in the Strategic Planning Process* (1986)
 - ◆ Will become *Masks of War* (1989)
 - ◆ SEN Gary Hart & Bill Lind, *America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform* (1986)

472

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (IX)
 - ◆ Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (1971)
 - ◆ Morton Halperin et al., *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (1974)
 - ◆ ADM (Ret) Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., *On Watch* (1976)
 - ◆ Barry Blechman & Stephen Kaplan, *Force without War* (1978)
 - ◆ CAPT Wayne Hughes, *Fleet Tactics* (1986)
 - ◆ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (1986)
 - ◆ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1987)
 - ◆ RADM Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon International Politics* (1900)

473

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ How it was written (I)
 - ◆ An organic process. No master POA&M
 - ◆ Socialization throughout Navy staffs of "Sea Strike", *Sea Plan 2000*, ADM Hayward strategy, SSG I briefings, new intel assessments, Global War Game insights, new PACOM/PACFLT & LANTCOM/LANTFLT warfighting concepts, etc.(1978-82)
- ◆ SECNAV Lehman pronouncements on strategy (1981-2)
 - ◆ "Strategy . . . had to be my business"
 - ◆ "Strategy is the logical set of allocations and priorities that guide how the Navy Department spends its money and trains its people"
 - ◆ "Hail the Return of Strategy" speech (NAVMARCOL 1981)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

◆ How it was written (II)

- ◆ ENS David Rosenberg USNR *Project SIXTY* analysis for CDR Harlan Ullman (OP-965) (July 1982)
 - ◆ Showed utility of such a document
- ◆ VCNO ADM Bill Small Aug 1982 tasker: A document to kick off/ inform OPNAV POM-85 force structure decisions
- ◆ Personalities (& interactions): Many (West, Hayward, Train, Long, Lehman, Murray, Inman, Haver, Hay, Watkins, Small, Ullman, Moreau, Lyons, Mustin, Larson, Pendley, etc.)
- ◆ Essential foundations: ADMs Long/Hayward/Train PACOM/PACFLT & LANTCOM/LANTFLT war plan concepts of operations
- ◆ CNO ADM Watkins initially a customer, not an author

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

◆ How it was written (III)

- ◆ “Hand-picked” OPNAV Strategy & Concepts Branch (OP-603) drafted & briefed successive unsigned SECRET briefings, revisions (1982-4)
- ◆ Widely vetted. Inputs:
 - ◆ Existing CINC & NCC OPLAN & CONPLAN CONOPS
 - ◆ Intel community, SSGs 1 & 2, NWC Global War Games
 - ◆ Fleet experience & inputs: Operations, exercises, advanced trng
 - ◆ CNA: Analyses, tactics, Sovietology
 - ◆ Perception management: Bill Manthorpe
 - ◆ OPNAV OP-095 (To ensure “fit” with POM development)
- ◆ Signed SECRET document finally gelled by May 1984

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ How it was written (IV)

- ♦ Debated in unofficial DC-area “Navy Study Group”
(1983-5) convened by CDR Jim Stark (PhD Fletcher)
- ♦ Various UNCLAS briefs, articles written in 1985
- ♦ CNO ADM Watkins tasked OP-00K to draft UNCLAS version (Jan 1986)
 - ♦ Anti-SSBN ops, rationale not explicit until CNO ADM Watkins decision Dec 1985

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ How it was written (V)

- ♦ Efforts at higher levels of classification
- ♦ Spin-off strategies drafted
- ♦ Strategy conferences with USA & USAF
- ♦ USN-initiated strategy officer exchange w/ USA, USAF
- ♦ Semi-official history published
- ♦ Annotated bibliography tracked & debated issues

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)



♦ How it was written (VI)

- ♦ Initial Nov 1982 SECRET brief
 - ♦ Principal drafters: CDR Spence Johnson
(Fletcher MA);
LCDR Stan Weeks
(American U PhD)
 - ♦ Inputs from CAPT Bill Manthorpe
(Ex-Net Assess/; GWU MA)
CDR Ken McGruther
(SSG staff ; Brown U MA)
 - ♦ Branch Head oversight CAPT Bill Garrett
(SAIS PhD)
 - ♦ Later enhancements CAPT Betsy Wylie
(Fletcher PhD)
CDR Tom Marfiak
(Fletcher MA)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)



♦ How it was written (VII)

- ♦ May 1984 SECRET Pub
 - ♦ Principal drafters: CAPT Roger Barnett
(USC PhD)
CDR Peter Swartz
(SAIS, Columbia MAs)
 - ♦ Assist from CDR Jim Stark
(Fletcher PhD)
(Sea Plan 2000 team)
 - ♦ Inputs from SSGs, fleets, Intel, etc.
 - ♦ Intentionally eye-catching bright yellow cover

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

◆ How it was written (VIII)

◆ Principal drafters:

◆ May 1985 SECRET	CAPT Larry Seaquist
<i>Amphibious Warfare Strategy</i>	Col Phil Harrington
(Roots in SSG effort)	
◆ Nov 1985 SECRET Pub Rev	CAPT Larry Seaquist
	CDR T. Wood Parker

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

◆ How it was written (IX)

◆ Principal drafters:

◆ Jan 1986	UNCLAS Booklet	CAPT Linton Brooks; CDR Robby Harris (CNO Watkins text)
		Maj Hugh O'Donnell (CMC Kelley & O'Donnell text)
		Dr. Harvey Sicherman; CAPT Peter Swartz (SECNAV Lehman text)
		CAPT Peter Swartz & NIP E-I-C Fred Rainbow (artwork, photos, captions)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ How it was written (X)
 - ◆ Principal drafters:

◆ Jan 1987	UNCLAS article	CNO OP-00K staff
◆ Feb 1989	SECRET Pub rev.	CDR Mitch Brown
	◆ CNO Trost tasker directed rewrite	(OP-603)
◆ May 1990	UNCLAS article	CNO OP-00K staff
 - ◆ All 3 UNCLAS versions professionally edited by US Naval Institute *Proceedings* staff
 - ◆ Classified naval special warfare strategy – nicknamed “SEALSTRAT” -- also drafted & signed
 - ◆ Unsigned “LOGSTRAT” effort also undertaken

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ How it was written: USN-USMC coordination (I)
 - ◆ SSG included USMC members from the start
 - ◆ HQMC staff officers LtCol Tom Wilkerson & Maj Tony Wood actively participated in drafting early SECRET versions
 - ◆ Col Phil Harrington wrote *The Amphibious Warfare Strategy* (SECRET) with CAPT Seaquist
 - ◆ CNO ADM Watkins & CMC Gen Kelley signed SECRET *Amphibious Warfare Strategy* (1985)
 - ◆ Maj Hugh O'Donnell published 1st real UNCLAS discussion of *The Maritime Strategy* (*Proceedings*, Sept 1985)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ How it was written: USN-USMC coordination (II)
 - ◆ CMC Gen P.X. Kelley & Maj Hugh O'Donnell co-signed UNCLAS "Amphibious Warfare Strategy" article in Jan 1986 *Proceedings* booklet, following CNO ADM Watkins "Maritime Strategy" article
 - ◆ CMC Adm Gray, PP&O LtGen Carl Mundy inputted, chopped on 1989 SECRET version, signed by CNO ADM Carl Trost
 - ◆ OP-603 incl/ USMC (& USA & USAF) AOs in mid-late 1980s
- ◆ But CMC almost never a co-equal signatory
- ◆ USCG inputs sought & used
 - ◆ Via USCG AO assigned to OPNAV OP-60 staff
 - ◆ COMDT COGARD not directly involved

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)


- ◆ How it was written: Semi-official documents (I)
 - ◆ Swartz annotated bibliographies (1986, 1987, 1988, 2004)
 - ◆ VADM Hank Mustin, "The Role of the Navy and Marines in the Norwegian Sea," (Mar-Apr 1986 *NWCR* article)
 - ◆ "600-Ship Navy & The Maritime Strategy" (1986 HASC print)
 - ◆ 3-part presentation: Strategy; 600-Ship Navy; Affordability
 - ◆ CAPT Linton Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security" (Fall 1986 *International Security* article)



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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ How it was written: Semi-official documents (II)
 - ◆ CAPT Tom Daly, CDR Al Myers, CDR Chris McMurray, "The Maritime Strategy" (1986 UNCLAS CHINFO video)
 - ◆ RADM Bill Pendley, "Comment & Discussion: The Maritime Strategy," Jun 1986 *Proceedings* letter
 - ◆ Ellmann Ellingsen, ed. *NATO and US Maritime Strategy* (1987 edited book)
 - ◆ CAPT Linton Brooks, "The Nuclear Maritime Strategy," (April 1987 *Proceedings* article)
 - ◆ RADM Bill Pendley, "The U.S. Navy, Forward Defense, & Air-Land Battle" (1988 book chapter)



487

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ How it was written: Semi-official documents (III)
 - ◆ Norman Friedman, *The US Maritime Strategy* (1988 book)
 - ◆ John Lehman, *Command of the Seas: Building the 600-Ship Navy* (1988 book)
 - ◆ John Hattendorf, "The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy" (Summer 1988 NWCR article; SECRET study)
 - ◆ Fred Hartmann, *Naval Renaissance: The U.S. Navy in the 1980s* (1990 book)



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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ Activity at higher levels of classification (I)
 - ◆ New intel views of Soviet Navy concepts & intentions
 - ◆ DDCI VADM Inman
 - ◆ DNIs RADMs Shapiro, Butts, Brooks
 - ◆ Rich Haver
 - ◆ New NIEs on Soviet Navy; downgraded to SECRET in 1983
 - ◆ VCNO efforts (ADM Bill Small & successors)
 - ◆ DNI & DNW (OP-095) efforts (RADM Shapiro & VADM McKee & successors)
 - ◆ OP-009J (Rich Haver et al.) & OP-095 "Team Charlie" (Alf Andreassen et al.) (from 1980)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ Activity at higher levels of classification (II)
 - ◆ Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) (1975)
 - ◆ Senior flags "Board of Directors" under VCNO ADM Small & successors (from 1981)
 - ◆ ATP Soviet strategy study group (1982)
 - ◆ ATP Working Group (1984)
 - ◆ CAPT Linton Brooks et al.
 - ◆ NAVWARCOL Newport war gaming
 - ◆ ONI Det NFOIO-05 (1977)
 - ◆ Strategic Studies Group (SSG) access (from 1981)
 - ◆ War Plans changes
 - ◆ CAPT (Ret) Bill Manthorpe as liaison

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

◆ Key ideas (I)

- ◆ Maritime component of national military strategy
- ◆ Consolidate & organize existing USN views
- ◆ Peace, crises, war, war termination
 - ◆ Not just warfighting. "Violent Peace"
 - ◆ Peace-crisis-war spectrum borrowed from *Sea Plan 2000*
- ◆ Explain how USN would actually be used in war
- ◆ Global, forward offensive ops vs. Soviet Union
 - ◆ Not just vs. Soviet Navy
 - ◆ 3 phases. Horizontal escalation options
- ◆ US naval operations "make the strategic difference"

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

◆ Key ideas (II)

- ◆ Turner terms used as vocabulary, not as a framework
- ◆ Sea control a secondary means. Power projection the primary means
 - ◆ But priority to ASW (in 1987)
- ◆ Adopted *NWP 1* warfare tasks vocab: AAW, ASW, etc.
 - ◆ Explicit & deliberate use as organizing concept: 1984-6
 - ◆ Fit with OPNAV "warfare appraisal" programming process
 - ◆ Fit with fleet CWC warfighting concept
 - ◆ Implicit primacy of strike warfare
- ◆ Showed global campaign, with geography & sequence.
Told a story

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

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◆ Key ideas (III)

- ◆ USN officers should think deeply about their service
- ◆ Rooted in current force levels, not future plans, programs or visions
- ◆ Very joint (coordinated, not integrated); very allied
- ◆ Included discussion of “uncertainties”

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

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◆ Key ideas (IV)

- ◆ Future war with Soviets the central planning case
 - ◆ Reflected war planning & fleet exercises
 - ◆ USN Pacific posture to attack Soviets, influence China role
 - ◆ Pacific region priority increased in 1989
 - ◆ Soviet bastions attacked to eliminate planned Soviet SSBN strategic reserves, alter “correlation of forces”
- ◆ IAW new agreed intel on Soviets
 - ◆ Deep intel penetration of Soviets
- ◆ Management of Soviet perceptions
 - ◆ Signaled that USN knew how they planned to fight, & would deal with it
- ◆ Increasing recognition of important non-Soviet threats (1986-90)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

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◆ Key ideas (V)

- ◆ Showed how all the players might play
 - ◆ USN LANT-MED-PAC-IO-CARIB forces
 - ◆ USN above-the-line & below-the-line forces
 - ◆ Sealift and pre-positioning forces
 - ◆ USMC & USCG
 - ◆ USAF & USA
 - ◆ Allied & friendly navies and other armed forces
 - ◆ "Neutrals" (like China)
- ◆ Showed how new kinds of force packages might play
 - ◆ BBSAGs, MARDEZs, MPSRONs

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

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◆ Key ideas (VI)

- ◆ Some discussion of "littoral" operations
 - ◆ Only in *The Amphibious Warfare Strategy* (1985)
 - ◆ Cited as a US Army responsibility (1984-5)
- ◆ FLEXOPS policy optimized & balanced peacetime forward deployment scheduling (1984-5)
- ◆ Naval forces *prevent major global war* through controlling crises & containing limited wars (from 1985)
- ◆ Incorporated USMC OTH & pre-positioning concepts

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)


- ◆ Key ideas (VII)

- ◆ “Sealift” as “3rd primary mission of the Navy” (1986)
 - ◆ Along with “sea control” and “power projection”
- ◆ Sealift given ample coverage in slides & text
- ◆ But . . . implications of *The Maritime Strategy*:
 - ◆ Soviets to be held at bay well north of SLOCs
 - ◆ Downgraded anticipated Soviet threat to SLOCs
 - ◆ Reduced perceived need for replacements for attrited merchant shipping
 - ◆ Dovetailed with Reagan Administration policies to avoid subsidizing the US civilian Merchant Marine

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CONTRIBUTIONS TO WAR TERMINATION



498

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)



Was **not**:

- ◆ USN go-it-alone
- ◆ Blue-water, open ocean, sea control focused
- ◆ Only about war fighting
- ◆ Single CVBG operations only
- ◆ The product of a carefully orchestrated CHINFO campaign
- ◆ Solely the product of SECNAV Lehman
- ◆ Merely an ex post facto justification for the 600-ship Navy
- ◆ Without significant USMC or USCG input
- ◆ Unconnected to national strategy

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)



These later characterizations based on:

- ◆ Not actually having read it (or Hattendorf book) or *Reagan National Security Strategy*
- ◆ Perception that any single-service product must be an argument at the expense of the other services and the joint commanders
- ◆ Simultaneous strong & public SECNAV & Navy anti-Goldwater-Nichols stance
- ◆ Perceived need by later naval strategists to characterize earlier efforts as obsolete
- ◆ USMC 1990s agenda to emphasize non-global-war nature of USMC capabilities & operations

500

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

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◆ What was new? (I)

- ◆ Integration of anti-SSBN campaign & all other naval campaigns into a coherent conceptual whole
- ◆ *Public discussion of anti-SSBN campaign (from 1986 on)*
- ◆ Centrality of far forward campaigns vs. Soviets & downgrading of mid-ocean operations, in light of new intel view of Soviet capabilities & intentions
- ◆ Mention of naval arms control (if only in passing)
 - ◆ As a Soviet agenda
 - ◆ Only in 1989-90

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

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◆ What was new? (II)

- ◆ Significant discussion of roles of:
 - ◆ US Coast Guard (from 1984 on)
 - ◆ Sealift (from 1984 on)
 - ◆ Allied & friendly land-based TACAIR (from 1984 on)
- ◆ Wartime US coastal defense (from 1984 on)
- ◆ Terrorism as a threat (from 1984 on)
- ◆ Fanatics & insurgents as threats (1987)
- ◆ Drug trafficking as a threat (from 1989 on)
- ◆ Non-state actions as a threat category (from 1989 on)
- ◆ Humanitarian support ops mentioned (in passing) as a US naval capability (1989)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

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- ◆ What was new? (III)
 - ◆ Comprehensive drawing together of many previous & current campaign strands
 - ◆ Versions signed by 2 CNOs in a row
 - ◆ Multimedia effort
 - ◆ Tracking the debate on the strategy, to help ascertain effects
 - ◆ Recording the history of its development, to help capture lessons learned

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

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- ◆ Not addressed
 - ◆ Sea-based ballistic missile defense
 - ◆ Counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, anti-piracy ops
 - ◆ Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
 - ◆ Homeland defense besides in US coastal waters
 - ◆ Maritime security, interdiction, interception ops
 - ◆ US Navy as an “enabling” force for other services
- ◆ Didn’t anticipate 1991 USSR collapse, Gulf War

504

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

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- ◆ Barely addressed
 - ◆ Naval arms control (only 1989 & 1990, in passing)
 - ◆ Blockade (only 1989 & 1990, in passing)
 - ◆ Major regional contingencies
 - ◆ US gov't inter-agency partners

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

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- ◆ Trends across versions
 - ◆ Increased discussion & integration of all elements – and gelling of format – between MS I (1982) & MS II (1984)
 - ◆ General similarity of approach in MS II, Amphibious Warfare Strategy, & UNCLAS "White Paper" (1984-6)
 - ◆ More attention to non-Soviet threats and responses, more focus on USN, more focus on Pacific, more focus on ASW, divergences from 1984-86 format (1987-1990)

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

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- ◆ Generated fierce open debates on:
 - ◆ Utility of naval forces across the spectrum of warfare
 - ◆ Optimal SLOC defense operations, doctrine, TTP
 - ◆ Horizontal escalation
 - ◆ Deterrence vs. provocation
 - ◆ Efficacy of attacks on Soviet homeland, strategic forces
 - ◆ Nuclear stability
 - ◆ Role of USN & USMC Pacific & Indian Ocean forces
 - ◆ Resource allocations to USN/USMC vice USAF/USA

507

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CNA

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses (I)
 - ◆ ADM (Ret) Stansfield Turner (Ret) & CAPT George Thibault, "Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy," (*Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1982)
 - ◆ Barry Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation & NATO's Northern Flank," *International Security* (Fall 1982)
 - ◆ Bob Komer, *Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense* (1984)
 - ◆ Keith Dunn, COL Bill Staudenmeier, "Strategic Implications of the Continental-Maritime Debate (CSIS, 1984)
 - ◆ F.J. "Bing" West, "Maritime Strategy & NATO Deterrence," *Naval War College Review* (Sep-Oct 1985)

508

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CNA

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses (II)
 - ◆ John Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," (*International Security*, Fall 1986)
 - ◆ Colin Gray, *Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics and the Defense of the West* (1986)
 - ◆ Kaufmann, William W., Annual broadside booklets vs. the Navy & The Maritime Strategy (Brookings, 1980s)
 - ◆ Eric Grove, *Battle for the Fiords: NATO's Forward Maritime Strategy in Action* (1991)
 - ◆ CAPTs (Ret) Byron & Swartz, "Make the Word Become the Vision," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (Nov 1992)
 - ◆ David Rosenberg, "Process: The Realities of Formulating Modern Naval Strategy," in Goldrick & Hattendorf (eds.), *Mahan is Not Enough* (1993)

509

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

CNA

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses (III)
 - ◆ Bud Hay & Bob Gile, *Global War Game: The First Five Years* (1993)
 - ◆ John Hattendorf, *Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986* (2004)
 - ◆ Robert Gile, *Global War Game: Second Series, 1984-1988* (2004)
 - ◆ Christopher Ford & David Rosenberg, *The Admirals' Advantage: U.S. Navy Operational Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War* (2005)

510

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ Criticisms (I)

- ♦ Unexecutable
- ♦ Wasteful & unnecessary
- ♦ Dangerously escalatory by threatening Soviet SSBNs
- ♦ Not best way to achieve SLOC protection
- ♦ Same old stuff: not visionary or innovative
- ♦ A major change in national and NATO policy & strategy
- ♦ Too specific & detailed
- ♦ Too general; not enough detail
- ♦ Irrelevant ("we're never going to fight the Russians")
- ♦ Took needed resources away from the Central Front

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ Criticisms (II)

- ♦ Too sensitive; gave too much away to the Soviets on how USN would act
- ♦ Promulgating the strategy needlessly called negative attention to the Navy and invited criticism
- ♦ Developed subsequent to the Navy force level goal it allegedly justified
- ♦ At the end, unwilling to recognize that the Soviet Union was no longer a superpower or a threat

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ Influence: Significant

- ♦ Within the Navy & USMC
- ♦ W. House, OSD, Joint Staff
- ♦ US Army & US Air Force
- ♦ Soviets
- ♦ Allied navies & militaries
- ♦ Allied parliaments
- ♦ US, foreign academia
- ♦ Capitol Hill
- ♦ US defense industry
- ♦ Programs & acquisitions
- ♦ Fleet exercises
- ♦ Global War Games
- ♦ CNO SSG
- ♦ JSPS pubs, esp JSCP
- ♦ Joint, CINC, NCC staffs
- ♦ OPLANs & CONPLANs
- ♦ USN tactical innovations
- ♦ USN morale
- ♦ Naval education, esp NPS
- ♦ Naval literature

513

The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

♦ Why so influential? (I)

- ♦ Well-aligned with national defense policies
- ♦ Well-aligned with USN & USMC strategic cultures
- ♦ Filled a need for clarity and consolidation of thinking
- ♦ Major involvement, ownership & support by SECNAV, Navy Flags, SSG, OP-06
- ♦ USN confidence & eagerness to debate
- ♦ Created by consensus-building approach
- ♦ Argued for build-up of naval forces of all types
- ♦ Presented to Congress as tied to 600-ship Navy & USN affordability programs

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

◆ Why so influential? (II)

- ◆ Good fit with Navy internal PPBS processes (CPAMs)
- ◆ Good fit with how fleet thought about warfighting (CWC)
- ◆ Good fit with Navy doctrine (*NWP 1* warfare areas)
- ◆ Reflected in changing fleet ops & exercise program
- ◆ Official history, annotated bibliography conveyed breadth, depth, legitimacy, openness to criticism
- ◆ Constructively exposed alignment issues among CINCs, NCCs, fleets, SUBFORs
- ◆ Multi-media approach to dissemination

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

◆ Why so influential? (III)

- ◆ Conscious efforts to ensure buy-in & continuity
 - ◆ Sense of ownership & pride across the officer corps
 - ◆ Endorsed & signed by 2 CNOs in a row (Watkins, Trost)
 - ◆ Calculated efforts to invoke Hayward roots
 - ◆ Praise by succeeding CNO (Kelso), despite obsolescence
 - ◆ Sense of continuity in OP-603 & SSG
 - ◆ Praise for efforts of predecessors by successive action officers
- ◆ “Success had many fathers”
 - ◆ Desire – usually justified – by respected leaders, staff offices, operators to take credit

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Became a “gold standard” against which subsequent (& previous) documents were judged
 - ◆ Cited in *The Way Ahead, NDP 1, Sea Power 21*
 - ◆ Alleged to be the only USN “strategy” until 2007 *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, by the latter’s authors*
 - ◆ Format never repeated, however

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The Maritime Strategy (1982-90)

- ◆ Led to CNO Coalition Strategy Enhancement Program (CSEP) (1988)
 - ◆ *The Maritime Strategy* as centerpiece for bilateral naval discussions & war games w/ foreign navies
 - ◆ CSEP OPNAVINST drafter was OPNAV OP-603 *Maritime Strategy* AO (CDR Mitch Brown)

518

End of the 1980s: State of Navy



- ◆ **Navy ended decade with high morale**
 - ◆ Upbeat triumphalism at end of Cold War
 - ◆ Confident in strategy & policy-making prowess
 - ◆ Confident in operational & tactical prowess
 - ◆ Confident in modernity of systems
 - ◆ Confident in fleet deployment strategy & readiness
- ◆ **A few concerns**
 - ◆ Declining ship numbers
 - ◆ A-12 program difficulties; BB *Iowa* turret explosion
 - ◆ Anti-Soviet ASW had become difficult again
 - ◆ Increasing joint integration

519

The 1980s vs. the 1970s



- ◆ **1980s**
 - ◆ Warm administration attitude to USN
 - ◆ Unity of thought across CNOs
 - ◆ Intel community unanimity
 - ◆ Defense budget largesse
- ◆ **1970s**
 - ◆ Lukewarm administration attitude to USN
 - ◆ Successive CNO course corrections
 - ◆ Intel community disagreements
 - ◆ Defense budget squeeze

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The 1990s

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- ◆ 1991 *The Way Ahead*
- ◆ 1992 *The Navy Policy Book*
- ◆ 1992 . . . *From the Sea*
- ◆ 1994 *Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare*
- ◆ 1994 *Forward . . . From the Sea*
- ◆ 1997 *Navy Operational Concept (NOC)*
- ◆ 1997 *Anytime, Anywhere*
- ◆ 1999 & 2000 *Navy Strategic Planning Guidance*




521

1990s: The Cold War ends

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522

1990s: The world, the nation, & the USN

World Events	Year	Administration		SECNAV	CNO	Capstone Document	
Gulf War	1991	Bush	Cheney	Garrett	Kelso	<i>The Way Ahead</i>	
Somalia ops	1992			O'Keefe		<i>The Navy Policy Book, ...From The Sea</i>	
Yugoslav split	1993		Clinton	Aspin		<i>NDP 1 Naval Warfare</i>	
Southern Watch	1994		Perry	Dalton		<i>Forward...From The Sea</i>	
Iraq TLAM strike	1995			Boorda			
Haiti crises	1996						
Adriatic ops	1997			Johnson		<i>Navy Operational Concept; Anytime, Anywhere</i>	
Somalia ops	1998					<i>NSPG I</i>	
Bosnia ops	1999		Cohen	Danzig		<i>NSPG II</i>	
Taiwan Straits crisis	2000		Clark				

523

1990s: The world (I)

- ◆ Post-Cold War but pre-9/11
- ◆ Increasing globalization of world economy & society
 - ◆ Significant growth in world seaborne trade volume, then leveling off
- ◆ Decreasing magnitude & number of wars
- ◆ Uni-polar international system. US the sole remaining global superpower
- ◆ No new nuclear states
 - ◆ But DPRK, Iran, Iraq, Libya suspected
 - ◆ Indian, Pak nuclear tests trigger US sanctions (1998)

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1990s: The world (II)

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- ◆ Global diffusion of low- & medium tech military weapons & expertise
- ◆ “Rogue” states: North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Serbia: Proliferation, terrorism issues
- ◆ Increase in importance of violent transnational & sub-national non-state actors
 - ◆ Al Qaeda & other transnational terrorists
 - ◆ Transnational crime, including drug trafficking
 - ◆ Dramatic rise in worldwide reports of pirate attacks & armed robbery at sea, especially in South China Sea & Strait of Malacca
 - ◆ ICC IMB created Piracy Reporting Center in Kuala Lumpur (1992)

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1990s: The world (III)

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- ◆ Relatively stable oil prices throughout decade
 - ◆ Bracketed by oil price spikes in 1990 & 1999
- ◆ Renegotiated Law of the Sea treaty now in force (1994)
 - ◆ US signed (but Senate would not ratify)
- ◆ Large rise in number of reported global climatic, other natural disasters
- ◆ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted (1998)
 - ◆ To punish individuals guilty of genocide
 - ◆ US signs (2000), but does not submit to Senate for ratification, to protect US service personnel

526

1990s: The world (IV)

- ◆ **Rough balance of power in western Eurasia**
 - ◆ Collapse of Warsaw Pact & USSR (1989-91)
 - ◆ Russia, other republics, satellites all independent
 - ◆ Sharp decline in Russian economic, political, military, demographic power under Yeltsin regime (1991-)
 - ◆ Rapid decline of Russian Navy capabilities
 - ◆ Kursk submarine explosion disaster (2000)
- ◆ **NATO transformation, expansion, engagement w/ former Soviet, W. Pact states, incl. Russia**
 - ◆ Expansion along Baltic (Ex-DDR 1990; Poland 1999)
 - ◆ New strategic concepts, command structures, ops
- ◆ **Increased EU coordination & expansion**
- ◆ **Europeans prefer EU vice NATO initiatives**
- ◆ **Violent progressive disintegration of Yugoslavia. Major ethnic violence.**

527

1990s: The world (V)

- ◆ **Rough balance of power in E. Asia-W. Pacific**
 - ◆ PRC economic & military expansion continues
 - ◆ Becomes net importer of energy, oil
 - ◆ Increased PRC regional power & influence
 - ◆ Increased PLA modernization, including PLAN
 - ◆ US-PRC economic relations expand
 - ◆ PLA, PLAN focus on conventional war vs. Taiwan &, if necessary, sea denial ops vs. USN
 - ◆ Hong Kong reverted to PRC (1997)
 - ◆ PRC, US agree USN PVSTs to continue
 - ◆ Taiwan transformed into prosperous democracy
 - ◆ US-Japan relations tenser, then strengthen
 - ◆ Japanese economy stagnated (from 1990)

528

1990s: The world (VI)

- ◆ **Rough balance of power in E. Asia-W. Pacific**
 - ◆ PRC, Russia resolved most border issues, demilitarize border, establish direct presidential hotline
 - ◆ PRC resumed Russian military ties, purchases
 - ◆ 4 Kilo SSs, 2 Sovremenny DDGs delivered (1995-2000)
 - ◆ Annual meetings of “Shanghai Five” leaders (from 1996)
 - ◆ PRC, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
 - ◆ Agreed on military confidence-building measures

520

1990s: The world (VII)

- ◆ **Korean peninsula conventional balance of power shifts in favor of economically prosperous ROK**
 - ◆ Continued Stalinist dictatorship, economic stagnation in DPRK under Kim Il-Sung & son Kim Jong-Il (incl/ famine)
 - ◆ Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (1992)
 - ◆ DPRK agrees to respect Yellow Sea “Northern Limit Line”
 - ◆ DPRK nuclear weapons development program frozen by international agreement (1994)
 - ◆ New ROK gov’t DPRK “sunshine policy” (1998)
 - ◆ ROK-DPRK Yellow Sea patrol boat naval battles (1999)
- ◆ **Muslim separatist insurgencies expand in Mindanao, southern Philippines**
 - ◆ Emergence of Al Qaeda-linked Abu Sayef terrorists
- ◆ **Unrest, revolt, counter-revolution in East Timor**

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1990s: The world (VIII)

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- ◆ Continued anti-American hostility by Iranian theocratic regime, Libya's Gaddhafi, Syria
- ◆ Saddam Hussein still ruled Iraq despite Gulf War defeat (1991) & post-war allied operations
- ◆ Political turmoil, warlordism & civil wars in Afghanistan (1989-2000) culminating in Taliban control of Kabul (1996), control of most of the country, & harboring of Al Qaeda network & camps

531

1990s: The world (IX)

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- ◆ No effective national government in Somalia
 - ◆ Pro-US dictator Siad Barre overthrown (1991)
 - ◆ Warlords, civil wars, famines (from 1991)
- ◆ Israeli-Arab disputes dampened
 - ◆ Oslo Accord (1993)
- ◆ Anti-US Islamic Army faction in power in Sudan (from 1989)
- ◆ US added Sudan to list of state sponsors of terrorism (1993)

532

1990s: The world (X)



- ◆ Continued India-Pakistan enmity & conflict
 - ◆ 1990 crisis over Kashmir Muslim insurgency. US acts as moderating influence; imposes military, economic sanctions on Pakistan
 - ◆ 1998 Indian & Pakistani nuclear tests heighten tensions
 - ◆ 1999 Kargil War in Kashmir triggers US moderating influence & Pakistan military coup by Gen Musharaf
- ◆ Political turmoil in Haiti
- ◆ Stability in Panama following US invasion (1989)

533

1990s: The world (XI)



- ◆ Terrorist incidents increased over 1980s
 - ◆ Examples:
 - ◆ Hezbollah bombed Buenos Aires Israeli Embassy (1992)
 - ◆ Islamists bombed NYC World Trade Center garage (1993)
 - ◆ Iraqis tried to kill ex-US President Bush in Kuwait (1993)
 - ◆ Right-wing US extremists bombed Oklahoma City federal bldg (1995)
 - ◆ Cult Sarin nerve gas attack in Tokyo subway (1995)
 - ◆ Rocket fired at Athens, Greece US Embassy (1996)
 - ◆ Hezbollah bombed USAF Dhahran, Saudi Arabia Khobar Towers barracks (1996)
 - ◆ Paris, France subway bombing (1996)
 - ◆ Al-Qaeda bombed Kenya, Tanzania US Embassies (1998)
 - ◆ Al-Qaeda bombed USS Cole in Aden harbor, Yemen (2000)

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1990s: The nation (I)

CNA
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

- ◆ Bush (Republican) administration (1989-1993)
- ◆ Clinton (Democrat) administration (1993-2001)
 - ◆ Entering the post-Cold War era
- ◆ Democrats yielded control of Congress to Republicans (1995)
- ◆ Continued US popular support for its military
- ◆ Triumphalism in wake of Cold War, Desert Storm victories
- ◆ Despite successful US-led effort to revise Law of the Sea convention mining provisions, Senate would not ratify

535

1990s: The nation (II)

CNA
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

- ◆ US continued as world's largest economy
- ◆ Recession (Bush), then modest economic growth (Clinton)
- ◆ "Peace Dividend"
- ◆ Federal budget deficits decline; then surplus
- ◆ Low (& declining) inflation, unemployment rates
- ◆ US dependence on imported oil rises sharply
- ◆ US free trade policy offensive, encouraging globalization
 - ◆ NAFTA (1993)
 - ◆ WTO (1995)
 - ◆ Russia in WTO (1995)
 - ◆ Full US trade relations with PRC & Vietnam

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1990s: US economy & defense spending

YEAR	President	ECONOMY	DOD % of GDP	DOD TOA (Constant FY 09 \$)	CNO	CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
1991	Bush	Oil Crisis Recession	4.4	495B	Kelso	The Way Ahead
1992			4.8	448B		Navy Policy Book, ...From the Sea
1993	Clinton		4.2	419B		NDP 1 Naval Warfare
1994			3.9	383B		Forward...From the Sea
1995			3.6	379B	Boorda	
1996			3.3	371B		
1997		Stock Market Crash	3.2	361B	Johnson	NOC, Anytime, Anywhere
1998			3.0	358B		NSPG I (S)
1999			2.9	368B		NSPG II (U)
2000			2.9	377B	Clark	

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1990s: US planned & actual adversaries

- ◆ Operations in Kuwait, Iraq, Somalia, Former Yugoslavia, Haiti
- ◆ Deter/plan vs. North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Cuba. Incidents.
- ◆ Deter PRC/plan to defend Taiwan
- ◆ Military assistance in Colombia & other Latin America
- ◆ Anti-drug trafficker operations
- ◆ Plans & ops vs. state-and non-state sponsors of terrorism



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1990s: US national security policies (I)

CNA
Center for National Policy

- ◆ US global conventional warfare predominance
- ◆ US defense budget the world's largest
- ◆ Post-Cold War defense budget "peace dividend" decline; buildup resumed at end of decade
 - ◆ Began w/ CJCS GEN Powell-led "Base Force" cuts (1991)
 - ◆ Then Clinton-Aspin "Bottom-Up Review" cuts (1993)
 - ◆ Then "QDR" cuts (1997)
- ◆ US willingness to create & use international institutions, organizations, treaties, along with unilateral actions

539

1990s: US national security policies (II)

CNA
Center for National Policy

- ◆ Single overarching Soviet threat disappeared
 - ◆ Decay & dismemberment of Soviet military, incl. Navy
- ◆ Peaceful demise of Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact
- ◆ Soviet (later Russia)-US maritime boundary re-confirmed (1990)
 - ◆ U.S. Senate ratified (1991)
- ◆ Emergence of many disparate, lesser threats
- ◆ Search for overarching US security policy
 - ◆ Leaked draft GHW Bush Administration DPG (1992)
 - ◆ Permanent US primacy, preemption, ad hoc coalitions
 - ◆ Emerging activist global forward national security strategy

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1990s: US national security policies (III)

- ◆ Calls for (& some steps toward) “transformation”
 - ◆ New technology-based warfighting concepts:
 - ◆ Revolution in Military Affairs, Full-Spectrum Dominance, Dominant Battlespace Knowledge, Rapid Decisive Ops, Shock & Awe, Halt Phase, Network Centric Ops, Effects Based Ops
 - ◆ New TTP using speed, knowledge, precision, light forces
 - ◆ New technologies:
 - ◆ Precision strike munitions, ISR, & IT
 - ◆ Especially USAF, USN, some in USA
 - ◆ ADM Owens & VADM Cebrowski in forefront
 - ◆ Push-back from Army (MG Scales), USMC (LtGen Van Riper), others
 - ◆ Saw continued need for “boots on the ground” in strength

541

1990s: US national security policies (IV)

- ◆ Threat-based US military planning vs. “rogues” & PRC attacks on Taiwan
- ◆ Central DoD force-sizing requirement to fight 2 major regional wars (e.g.: North Korea & Iraq)
- ◆ Search for effective “capabilities-based” analyses
- ◆ Revival of interest in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), “engagement” & “shaping”
- ◆ Major ops in/over Iraq, Somalia (debacle), Haiti, former Yugoslavia

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1990s: US national security policies (V)

CNA
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

- ◆ Bush administration Gulf defense refocus from Soviets to Iraq (from 1990)
- ◆ Clinton administration “dual containment” policy vs. Iran & Iraq (from 1993)
- ◆ Plans & ops vs. state-and non-state sponsors of terrorism, esp. in Middle East
 - ◆ State Dept. designated sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, DPRK, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan (from 1993), Syria
- ◆ Al Qaeda, other Islamic terror attacks & responses

543

1990s: US national security policies (VI)

CNA
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

- ◆ US-PRC political, military relations strained
 - ◆ Relations – never warm -- fluctuated through decade
 - ◆ Lows: Tiananmen Square (1989); Taiwan Straits (1996); PRC EMB Belgrade bombing accident (1999)
 - ◆ US military technology transfer programs cancelled
 - ◆ Military-to-military engagement activities cut back
 - ◆ Other sanctions imposed
 - ◆ US-PRC Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (1998)
- ◆ President Clinton sent USAF humanitarian assistance flights to Rwanda, in the wake of Hutu genocide of Tutsis there (1994)
 - ◆ Criticized for not intervening in greater strength
 - ◆ Illustrated US military intervention policy selectivity

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1990s: US national security policies (VII)

- ◆ All 3 legs of “nuclear triad” retained but reduced
- ◆ Theater nuclear weapons retired or reduced
- ◆ Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTRP) (from 1991 on)
- ◆ START II Treaty (signed in 1993 but unratified)
 - ◆ Reduced US missile & warhead force levels
- ◆ BMD policy: TMD R&D and deployment; NMD R&D
- ◆ TTBT (1974) & PNET (1976) finally ratified (1990)
- ◆ No US nuclear testing (moratorium from 1992)
- ◆ Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) (from 1994)
 - ◆ Life Extension Programs (LEPs)
- ◆ CTBT (1997): Senate rejected ratification (1999)

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1990s: US national security policies (VIII)

- ◆ US military forces stationed in Europe cut by 2/3
- ◆ Peacetime OPCON of ROK forces transferred from US to ROK command (1994)
- ◆ Strained US military relations w/ India, Pakistan
 - ◆ Sanctions after Indian, Pakistani nuclear tests (1998)
- ◆ Most US military alliances held
 - ◆ NATO expansion eastward
 - ◆ Strains with Philippines over base withdrawal (1991-2)
- ◆ Emerging importance of Singapore as ally
- ◆ Congress cut Indonesia IMET, arms sales (1992-4)
- ◆ US Arctic policy focused on scientific research, environmental protection: PDD 26 (1994)

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1990s: US national security policies (IX)



- ◆ DOD roles & missions governed by DOD Dir
5100.1 Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components (Sep 1987)
- ◆ Tense Clinton Administration civil-military relations
 - ◆ “Don’t Ask; Don’t Tell” policy toward military gays
 - ◆ CJCS GEN Powell national & global stature
 - ◆ Academic discussions of civil-military “crisis”
- ◆ Congress mandated Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) (1996)
- ◆ Congress mandated subsequent QDRs (1999)

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
1990s: US national security policies (X)



- ◆ Critics:
 - ◆ Center for Defense Information (CDI) endured
 - ◆ VADM John J. Shanahan (Ret) Director (1994-7)
 - ◆ Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)
 - ◆ LTC/Dr. Andrew Krepinevich became Executive Director
 - ◆ Increased focus on naval strategy, policy, systems

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1990s: Combatant & component commands



1990s: Higher authorities & USN capstone documents

Year	President	National Document	SECDEF	CJCS	Defense Document	CNO	USN CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
1991	Bush	<i>Nat'l Security Strategy PNI START Treaty NSR, NSD NATO SC</i>	Cheney	Powell USA	JSPS Doce 1st GNFPP, Base Force JT PUB 1, DPG, CPG Nat'l Military Strategy	Kelso	<i>The Way Ahead</i>
1992					Bottom-Up Review CJCS Report on Role, Missions & Functions Nuclear Posture Review		<i>Navy Policy Book, ... From the Sea</i>
1993	Clinton	<i>Nat'l Security Strategy (START II) Nat'l Security Strategy</i>	Aspin	Shall USA			
1994					JT PUB 1, NMS, CORM Report	Boorda	<i>NDP 1 Naval Warfare Fwd...From the Sea</i>
1995		<i>POD 25 Nat'l Security Strategy</i>	Perry		Joint Vision 2010		
1996		<i>Nat'l Security Strategy</i>			1st QDR National Military Strategy	Johnson	<i>Navy Operational Concept; Anytime, Anywhere</i>
1997		<i>Nat'l Security Strategy</i>	Cohen	Shelton USA	JV 2020, JT PUB 1		<i>NSPG I</i>
1998		<i>Nat'l Security Strategy</i>					<i>NSPG II</i>
1999		<i>Nat'l Security Strategy, Clinton Doctrine, NATO Strategic Concept, Nat'l Security Strategy</i>				Clark	
2000							

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1990s: USN dollars, numbers, capabilities

CNA

YEAR	CNO	CAPSTONE DOCUMENT	DON TOA FY09\$	NEW SHIPS	BATTLE FORCE SHIPS	ACTIVE PERSONNEL	NEW CAPABILITIES INTRODUCED
1991	Kelso	<i>The Way Ahead</i>	\$162B	11	526	571K	Tomahawk use
1992		<i>Navy Policy Book, ... From the Sea</i>	\$143B	11	466	542K	Burke-class DDG
1993			\$132B	7	435	510K	UHF FO satellite, MILSTAR, Cyclone-class PC
1994		<i>NDP 1 Naval Warfare</i>	\$117B	4	388	469K	SIPRNET, Link 16, TLAM Block III, Supply-class T-AOE
1995	Boorda	<i>Fwd...From the Sea</i>	\$115B	4	372	435K	Fifth Fleet, DMS e-mail system
1996			\$114B	5	355	417K	Naval Strike & Air Warfare Center, AMRAAM, F-14 Bomcat
1997	Johnson	<i>Navy Operational Concept; Anytime, Anywhere</i>	\$111B	4	354	396K	Seawolf-class SSN, F-14 LANTIRN pod
1998			\$112B	5	333	382K	IT-21, JDAM, GBS satellite, JTIDS, E-6B
1999		<i>NSPG I</i>	\$113B	5	317	373K	JSOW AGM, Nulka
2000		<i>NSPG II</i>	\$115B	6	318	373K	SLAM-ER ASM, NMCI
	Clark						

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1990s: Capstone documents & force goals

CNA

YEAR	CNO	FORCE GOAL DOCUMENT	FORCE LEVEL GOAL	BATTLE FORCE SHIPS	CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
1991	Kelso	DOD Base Force	400+	526	<i>The Way Ahead</i>
1992			400+	466	<i>Navy Policy Book, ... From the Sea</i>
1993		DOD Bottom Up Review (BUR)	346	435	
1994			346	388	
1995	Boorda		346	372	<i>NDP 1 Naval Warfare, Forward...From the Sea</i>
1996			346	355	
1997	Johnson	QDR #1 (USN View)	310-305	354	<i>NOC; Anytime, Anywhere</i>
1998			310-305	333	
1999			310-305	317	<i>NSPG I (S)</i>
2000	Clark	Shipbuilding Rep't	360-305	318	<i>NSPG II (U)</i>

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1990s: USN Force Structure Goals

CNA


Plan	1980s 600-ship	1990 Base Force	1993 BUR	1997 QDR	2000 Shipbuilding Report
Total battle force ships	600	451/416	346	~305/317	305-360
Attack submarines	100	80/~55	11+1	50/55	50/66
Aircraft carriers	15	12	11+1	11+1	11-15
Surface combatants	242/228	~150	~124	116	116-133
Amphibious ships	~75	51	36	36	36-42

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1990s: USN deployment strategy

CNA

- ◆ 5 fleets: 1 forward-based, 2 forward deployed, 2 home
- ◆ Draw-down of forces in Med hub
- ◆ Changing SSN & SSBN deployments
- ◆ Continued counter-drug homeland security ops
- ◆ Routinized deployment schedules



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1990s: USN operations & exercises

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis



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1990s: State of the Navy (I)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ **USN the world's dominant sea power**
- ◆ **Continued extensive, varied, global ops, exercises**
- ◆ **Decline in USN conventional, nuclear force levels & budgets**
- ◆ **LANTFLT remained larger than PACFLT**
 - ◆ 55/45 split (22% larger)
- ◆ **Increased strike precision, networking priority**
 - ◆ Desert Shield /Desert Storm "wake-up call"
 - ◆ Conventional Tomahawk transforms strike warfare
 - ◆ Accelerated USN procurement of/ training with precision guided munitions (PGMs), Tomahawk

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1990s: State of the Navy (II)

CNA
The Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ USN strike capabilities increasingly disbursed among platform types
- ◆ Carrier air wings increasingly optimized for strike operations
- ◆ Need for follow-on strike aircraft for A-6
 - ◆ SECDEF Cheney cancels USN A-12 stealth aircraft program (1991)
 - ◆ Breach of Contract litigation drags on through 2007
 - ◆ Declining DOD budgets, but 4 DOD tactical aircraft in development
 - ◆ F/A-18E/F, F-22, F-35 JSF
 - ◆ Decision: Rapid development & deployment of F/A-18E/F
- ◆ Declining combat radius of USN strike aircraft

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1990s: State of the Navy (III)

CNA
The Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Major shift in ASW operations & programs
 - ◆ Dismantling of Cold War ASW capabilities
 - ◆ All 46 Knox-class FFs decommissioned (1991-94)
 - ◆ DD-963s & MSC T-AGOS ships taken out of service
 - ◆ Big drawdown of SSN, FFG-7, P-3, S-3 forces
 - ◆ SOSUS array shutdowns
 - ◆ USCG cutters lost ASW missions & equipment
 - ◆ Increase in active sonar solutions to quiet littoral anti-access submarine problem
 - ◆ Concomitant increase in public concerns for marine mammal safety
- ◆ SSN force refocused on ISR, ASUW, strike
- ◆ Naval arms control disappeared as an issue

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1990s: State of the Navy (IV)

- ◆ Continued northern SSN deployments
 - ◆ Occasional USN-Russian SSN collision incidents
- ◆ Build-up of accurate Trident II D-5 MIRVed strategic nuclear forces, for counterforce targeting, & retirement of earlier systems
 - ◆ Planned conversion of 4 SSBNs to SSGNs
- ◆ No non-strategic nuclear weps on USN ships
- ◆ All 4 Iowa-class BBs decommissioned (1990-91)
- ◆ All 9 CGNs decommissioned (1993-9)
- ◆ Naval Special Warfare subsumed under SOF
- ◆ Progressive erosion of USN forward Med hub
- ◆ Creation of Fifth Fleet (1995)
- ◆ Small USNR forward port security capability

559

1990s: State of the Navy (V)

- ◆ Russia ceased to be an important focus of USN ops & plans
- ◆ Continuous USN interventions, responses off Iraq, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, East Asia
- ◆ Major drawdown of ISN intel org, capabilities, resources; integrated into joint intel orgs, ops
- ◆ VADM, then ADM William Owens (OPNAV N8, then VCJCS) "Mobile Operating Base" (MOB) advocacy & reaction
- ◆ USN began sea-based BMD R & D (1991)
- ◆ Widespread use of PCs; cell phones; networks

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1990s: State of the Navy (VI)

- ◆ Major OPNAV staff reorganization & redesignations (from 1992)
 - ◆ DCNO for Navy Program Planning (OP-08) re-designated DCNO for Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessments (N8)
 - ◆ OP-08 had been OP-090 before 1987
 - ◆ Platform “barons” (OP-02, OP-03, OP-05) subsumed under N8
- ◆ Cuts in total Navy flag billets & increase in Navy-manned joint flag officer billets influenced reorgs in OPNAV & throughout the fleet
- ◆ Major OPNAV POM development process changes
 - ◆ OPNAV resumed, developed campaign analysis efforts ISO POM, budget development

561

1990s: State of the Navy (VII)

- ◆ New Joint Mission Areas Assessment Process (JMAs) (Sep 1992- 1998)
 - ◆ New Navy mission-area categories
 - ◆ Joint strike
 - ◆ Joint littoral warfare
 - ◆ Joint surveillance
 - ◆ Joint Space-Electronic Warfare/Intelligence
 - ◆ Strategic deterrence
 - ◆ Strategic sealift/protection
 - ◆ Presence
 - ◆ Deliberately created to “free thought and discussion”
- ◆ Replaced by Integrated Warfare Architectures (IWARS) 1998-2003)
 - ◆ 5 new warfare sub-categories
 - ◆ Information superiority & sensors, Sea dominance, Power Projection, Air Dominance, Deterrence

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1990s: State of the Navy (VIII)



- ◆ OPNAV DCNO for Plans, Policy & Operations (OP-06) re-designated N3/N5 (1992)
- ◆ OPNAV Director for Strategy, Plans and Policy (OP-60) re-designated N51 (1992)
- ◆ Waning internal OPNAV influence of N3/N5
- ◆ Intra-USN fora: Cooke conferences (1990-95); Sestak mtgs; unofficial “Navy Study Groups” (1989-91 “Ancient Mariners” & 1992-2003)
- ◆ “Bad Press” : Tailhook, Boorda suicide, etc.

563

1990s: State of the Navy (IX)



- ◆ Episodic USN interest in improving USN conceptual thinking
 - ◆ Strategic-level efforts
 - ◆ Draft & final Capstone documents
 - ◆ Operational & tactical-level efforts
 - ◆ New Naval Doctrine Command & new naval doctrine
 - ◆ Eventual subsuming of NDC under Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)
 - ◆ Maritime Battle Center created; Fleet Battle Experiments
- ◆ CNA created “Project Asia,” with focus on Chinese military (1998)

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1990s: State of the Navy (X)



- ◆ NWC PME curriculum increased addressal of joint strategy & policy; necessarily de-emphasized focus on maritime & naval strategy
- ◆ NWC Global Wargames restyled “Title X Games”
- ◆ CNO ADM Boorda shifted SSG mandate from *strategy* to *innovation & concept generation* (1995)
- ◆ Continued fall-off in Navy use of civilian graduate programs in Poli Sci & IR
- ◆ Maturation of national security affairs curriculum at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey
- ◆ Continued detailing of active duty OP-60/N51 officer alumni to NPS to teach maritime strategy

1990s: State of the Navy (XI)



- ◆ Top USN post-graduate-educated officers continued to be detailed to Joint Staff vice OPNAV
 - ◆ Continued effect (intended) of Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986)
- ◆ Increasingly junior flag & action officers placed in OPNAV N3/N5

1990s: Naval policy literature of the period (I)

- ◆ New literature emerging on strategy, but also military technological innovation & civil-military relations
 - ◆ Carl Builder, *The Masks of War* (1989)
 - ◆ Eric Grove, *The Future of Sea Power* (1990)
 - ◆ Frederick Hartmann, *Naval Renaissance* (1990)
 - ◆ Eric Grove, *Battle for the Fjords* (1991)
 - ◆ Edward S. Miller, *War Plan Orange* (1991)
 - ◆ Fukuyama, *The End of History & the Last Man* (1992)
 - ◆ Harry Summers, *On Strategy II* (1992)
 - ◆ Russell Weigley, "The American Military" (1993), etc.
 - ◆ Jan Breemer, "The End of Naval Strategy," *Strategic Review* (1994)
 - ◆ Murray/Knox/Bernstein, *The Making of Strategy* (1994)

567

1990s: Naval policy literature of the period (II)

- ◆ New literature emerging on strategy, but also military innovation & civil-military relations
 - ◆ Hayes & Smith (eds), *Politics of Naval Innovation* (1994)
 - ◆ Gregory Vistica, *Fall from Glory* (1995)
 - ◆ VADM Bill Owens, *High Seas* (1995)
 - ◆ Col Charles Dunlap USAF, "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007," (Jan 1996)
 - ◆ Harlan Ullman & James Wade, *Shock & Awe* (1996)
 - ◆ ADM Paul David Miller 3 IFPA monographs (1992-3)
 - ◆ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996)
 - ◆ Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win* (1996)
 - ◆ ADM Paul Reason, *Sailing New Seas* (1998)

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1990s: Naval policy literature of the period (III)

CNA

- ◆ Spate of new syntheses & interpretations of the sweep of US & world naval history, incl/ strategy
 - ◆ John Hattendorf, *Mahan on Naval Strategy* (1991)
 - ◆ Kenneth Hagan, *This People's Navy* (1991)
 - ◆ Stephen Howarth, *To Shining Sea* (1991, 1999)
 - ◆ Colin Gray, *The Leverage of Sea Power* (1992)
 - ◆ Robert Love, *History of the U.S. Navy* (1992)
 - ◆ George Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power* (1993)
 - ◆ Frank Uhlig, *How Navies Fight* (1994)
 - ◆ Craig Symonds, *Historical Atlas of the US Navy* (1995)
 - ◆ Clark Reynolds, *Navies in History* (1998)
 - ◆ John Hattendorf et al., *America and the Sea* (1998)
 - ◆ Paolo Coletta, *American Naval History* (2000)

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1990s: State of the Navy (XII)

CNA

- ◆ Systems in development &/or construction
- ◆ Ships
 - ◆ Virginia-class SSN
 - ◆ Was New Attack Submarine
 - ◆ Ohio-class SSGN
 - ◆ San Antonio-class LPD
 - ◆ CVNX
 - ◆ DD-21
 - ◆ Later DD(X), DDG-1000
 - ◆ T-AKE
 - ◆ LMSR
 - ◆ MPF(F)
 - ◆ JCC (never built)
- ◆ Aircraft
 - ◆ F/A-18E/F
 - ◆ MH-60S
 - ◆ MH-60R
 - ◆ E-6B TACAMO
- ◆ Weapons & systems
 - ◆ Tactical Tomahawk
 - ◆ Cooperative Engagement Capability (CSC)
 - ◆ Underwater unmanned vehicles (UUV)
 - ◆ TBMD systems
 - ◆ ERGM round (later canxed)

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1990s: Public ONI threat documents

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments* (6th ed.) (1991)
- ◆ *Worldwide Submarine Proliferation in the Coming Decade* (1995)
- ◆ *Worldwide Submarine Challenges* (1996)
- ◆ *Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare* (1996)
- ◆ *Worldwide Submarine Challenges* (1997)
- ◆ *Worldwide Maritime Challenges* (1997)
- ◆ *Challenges to Naval Expeditionary Warfare* (1997)
- ◆ *Threats and Challenges to Maritime Security 2020* (1999)



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1990s: State of the Navy: Sealift (I)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Bush, Clinton Administrations continued to favor military control & development over subsidizing commercial shipping industry
- ◆ But Merchant Marine Act of 1996 continued & updated some subsidy programs
- ◆ Continued divergence of specialized civilian shipping into specific surge, sustainment roles
- ◆ Unlike 1980s, 1990s saw heavy operational use of sealift & prepositioning ships

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1990s: State of the Navy: Sealift (II)

- ◆ **Desert Shield/Storm experience (1990-1)**
 - ◆ Largest, fastest deployment of US mil. forces ever
 - ◆ **230 US Gov't owned/chartered sealift ships deploy**
 - ◆ Shortages of available US-flag civilian ships, Ro-Ros, seamen
 - ◆ Innovative ad hoc charter agreements
 - ◆ E.g.: Special Middle East Shipping Agreement (SMESA))
 - ◆ **79 RRF ships activated**
 - ◆ But 80% were late in breaking out
 - ◆ **% of US military cargo shipped to theater**
 - ◆ NDRF/RRF: 36%
 - ◆ Other US flag ships: 35%
 - ◆ Foreign-flag ships: 29%
 - ◆ Some foreign-flag ships refused to enter Gulf
 - ◆ US gov't dissatisfaction with dependence on foreign ships

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1990s: State of the Navy: Sealift (III)

- ◆ **Desert Shield/Desert Storm**
 - ◆ 1st operational use of MPF
 - ◆ Offloaded prepo ships used for sealift runs
 - ◆ Numerous lessons learned, incl. command & control
- ◆ **MSC sealift & prepositioning ship support for Somalia, Bosnia, & Kosovo contingencies**
- ◆ **RRF ships activated for Haiti, Somalia, etc.**
 - ◆ RRF state merchant marine academy troopship activated for US Army Somalia-Kenya run, due to fears of airliner vulnerability (1994)

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1990s: State of the Navy: Sealift (IV)

CNA
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- ◆ Post-Desert Storm expansion & modernization of MSC surge sealift & prepo forces
 - ◆ *Bottom-Up Review (BUR) fallout (1993)*
 - ◆ MPSRONs for USMC expanded & rebalanced
 - ◆ 19 Large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ships delivered (1997-2003) to USN, US Army
 - ◆ Some foreign-built/US converted; most US-built
- ◆ Total NDRF ship #s fluctuated
 - ◆ 1990: 329 1994: 286 2000: 325
- ◆ NDRF RFF ship #s fluctuated
 - ◆ 1990: 96 1994: 102 2000: 90

575

1990s: State of the Navy: Sealift (V)

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- ◆ USCINCTRANS gains more authority (1992):
 - ◆ Peacetime as well as wartime authority over MSC
 - ◆ Becomes DOD “single manager for transportation”
 - ◆ Replaces MSC as single manager for sealift
- ◆ Reinforcement of Germany (REFORGER) exercises ended (1993)
- ◆ “Team Spirit” Korean reinforcement exercises (stopped in 1993)
- ◆ Continued conversion of USN Navy-manned auxiliaries to MSC civilian-crewing
- ◆ MSC more focused now on other missions than sealift

576

1990s: State of the Navy: Basing (I)

- ◆ **2nd BRAC round (1991): 3 NAVSTAs closed**
- ◆ **3rd BRAC round (1993): 1 shipyard, 12 NAVSTAS, 3 hospitals, etc., close**
- ◆ **4th BRAC round (1995): Shipyards, other naval facilities closed. (Last BRAC for 10 years)**
- ◆ **Admiral Owens unsuccessfully advocated creation of afloat Mobile Operating Bases (MOBs)**

577

1990s: State of the Navy: Basing (II)

- ◆ **Access to Singapore facilities (1990)**
 - ◆ US-Singapore MOU
- ◆ **USN Philippine bases closed (1992)**
 - ◆ COMLOGWESTPAC move from Subic to Singapore
- ◆ **AS, SSBNs leave Holy Loch, UK (1992)**
- ◆ **NAF Midway closed (1993)**
- ◆ **NAF Lajes (Azores) disestablished (1994)**
- ◆ **NAS Bermuda closed (1995)**
- ◆ **NAS Adak closed (1997)**
- ◆ **Closure of SOSUS stations**
- ◆ **USN Panama bases closed (1999)**

578

1990s: State of the Navy: Basing (III)


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- ◆ MPSRON 1 re-located from US East Coast forward to Mediterranean (1995)
- ◆ NAVSTA GITMO used to house Cuban, Haitian migrants (1991-6)
- ◆ FLTRAGRU relocated from GTMO to Mayport (1995)
- ◆ “Top Gun,” “Top Dome” & “Strike U” consolidated under Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) at NAS Fallon (1996)
 - ◆ BRAC moved NAS Miramar to USMC control

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1990s: US Merchant Marine (I)

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580

1990s: US Merchant Marine (II)

- ◆ **US commercial MM decline continued**
 - ◆ Ocean-going ships (1000 gross tons & over)
 - ◆ 1990: 635 1995: 512 2000: 461
 - ◆ Dropped from 5% to 2% of world tonnage
 - ◆ Carried only 4% of US international trade
 - ◆ # of US non-gov't civ mariners continued to drop
 - ◆ 1990: 11,100 1995: 7,900 1999: 7,300
 - ◆ RRF relied on availability of US merchant mariners
- ◆ **Maritime Security Act of 1995**
 - ◆ Maritime Security Program (MSP)
 - ◆ Subsidies for 47 militarily useful civilian ships in exchange for DOD emergency access
 - ◆ Voluntary Intermodal Shipping Agreement (VISA)
 - ◆ DOD cargo preference in exchange for DOD emergency access

581


1990s: US Merchant Marine (III)

- ◆ **Effective US Control Fleet (EUSC) also declined**
 - ◆ Rose, then declined again
 - ◆ 1989: 228 1997: 280 2000: 204

582

1990s: US shipbuilding (I)

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583

1990s: US shipbuilding (II)


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- ◆ Annual USN warship deliveries in double digits
- ◆ But US commercial merchant marine shipbuilding averages less than 2 per year
 - ◆ Near-cessation of US ocean-going merchant shipbuilding
- ◆ Major consolidations in US defense industry
 - ◆ Included shipbuilding
- ◆ BRACs cut # of US (gov't) naval shipyards from 8 to 4

584


1990s: TOA by US military department

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1990s: US service active duty personnel

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1990s: USN-USMC relations (I)

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1990s: USN-USMC relations (II)

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- ◆ **USN-USMC relations often fractious**
 - ◆ SECNAV Danzig particularly active/frustrated at slow pace of integration
- ◆ **CMCs Carl Mundy, Charles Krulak (1991-1999)**
- ◆ **Continued routine & crisis-response USMC forward deployments on USN ships**
 - ◆ MEU(SOC)s on amphibious ships
 - ◆ MARDETs on non-amphibious ships (till 1997)
- ◆ **1990-91 Desert Shield/Desert Storm amphibious feints & aborted assault plans**
 - ◆ *USS Nassau* as “Harrier carrier” (1991)

588

1990s: USN-USMC relations (III)

- ◆ **USN-USMC-USCG National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) created (1994)**
- ◆ **Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) instituted (2000)**

589

1990s: USN-USMC relations (IV)

- ◆ **Joint Pub 3-02 *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* signed (1992)**
 - ◆ Superseded 1986 edition
- ◆ **USMC maneuver warfare focus**
 - ◆ *FMFM 1 Warfighting* (1989)
 - ◆ *MCDP 1 Warfighting* (1997)
- ◆ **USMC MajGen became OPNAV N85 (1993)**
 - ◆ No USMC officer in N513/N5SC (from 1999)
- ◆ **Marine Corps Warfighting Lab created (1995)**

590

1990s: USN-USMC relations (V)

- ◆ **USMC warfighting concepts developed (1996-8)**

- ◆ CMC, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* (OMFTS) (1996)
- ◆ CG MCCDC, *Ship to Objective Maneuver* (STOM) (1997)
- ◆ CG MCCDC, *A Concept for Future Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain* (1997)
- ◆ CMC, *Maritime Prepositioning Force 2010 & Beyond* (1997)
- ◆ CMC, *Beyond C2: A Concept for Comprehensive Command & Coordination of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force* (1998)
- ◆ DCOS PP&O, *Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons* (1998)
- ◆ CMC, *The MAGTF in Sustained Operations Ashore* (1998)
- ◆ CG MCCDC *Advanced Expeditionary Fire Support* (1998)
- ◆ CG MCCDC, *A Concept for Antiarmor Operations* (1998)
- ◆ CG MCCDC & COMNAVDOCCOM, *Concept for Future Naval Mine Countermeasures in Littoral Power Projection* (1998)
- ◆ CG MCCDC & COMNAVDOCCOM, *Seabased Logistics* (1998)
- ◆ CG MCCDC, *A Concept for Information Operations* (1998)

All with some Navy participation

591

1990s: USN-USMC relations (VI)

- ◆ **Marines deployed to LANT & Med on USN carriers (1991-3)**
 - ◆ C6F (later OPNAV N8) VADM Owens strong USN-USMC integration advocate
- ◆ **MPS ship (*Lummus*) attached to ARG (1992)**
 - ◆ Experiment during Somalia ops
- ◆ **7 LHDs commissioned (1989-2001)**
- ◆ **USMC still committed to LCAC, AAAV, V-22**
- ◆ **USMC developed, deployed small riverine capability**
- ◆ **Amphib % of active fleet stabilized**
 - ◆ 1960s: 15% 1970s: 13% 1980s: 11% 1990s: 11%

592

1990s: USN-USMC relations (VII)

CNA

- ◆ Increased USMC autonomy & service equality
 - ◆ More USMC generals become unified CINCs (1992)
 - ◆ Gen Sheehan appointed SACLANT/COMUSACOM (1994)
 - ◆ 1st non-Navy SACLANT/COMUSACOM
 - ◆ USMC components established at unified combatant commands(1992)
 - ◆ Increased USMC general officer numbers
 - ◆ CMC & staff moved into Pentagon spaces (1996)
 - ◆ USN gives up spaces within DON space allocation
 - ◆ No drop in USMC active end strength in 1990s
 - ◆ Strong contrast to USA, USN, USAF
 - ◆ Inter-service end strength ratios altered significantly

593

1990s: USN-USMC relations (VIII)

CNA

- ◆ USN-USMC issues multiplied (I)
 - ◆ USMC viewed itself as nation's expeditionary force
 - ◆ USMC disavowed Cold War, *Maritime Strategy* participation
 - ◆ NETF command & control doctrine
 - ◆ USMC on non-amphib USN ships
 - ◆ Last MARDETs removed (1997)
 - ◆ FAST companies to fulfill roles instead
 - ◆ Alleged CNO-CMC friction on issue caused real frictions down the line
 - ◆ USMC role in sustained operations ashore

594

1990s: USN-USMC relations (IX)



- ◆ **USN-USMC issues multiplied (II)**
 - ◆ Declining budgets & increasing but diverging aviation requirements & costs exacerbated tensions
 - ◆ **F/A-18 issues (resolved)**
 - ◆ USMC rejected F/A-18E/F; wanted more F/A-18C/Ds
 - ◆ USN wanted to close F/A-18C/D line
 - ◆ SECNAV-CNO-CMC agreement
 - ◆ F/A-18 C/D line to close. USN to buy F/A-18E/F. Excess USN F/A-18C/Ds to go to USMC
 - ◆ OSD, Hill relations (e.g.: USMC V-22 “end run”)

595

1990s: USN-USMC relations (X)



- ◆ **USN-USMC issues multiplied (III)**
 - ◆ “DON LIFT 2” study & agreed force goals (1990)
 - ◆ Increased USMC amphibious ship requirements
 - ◆ MAGTF weight/square/cube growth
 - ◆ MPF(F) design
 - ◆ NAVDOCCOM issues
 - ◆ USMC never disestablished its own service doctrine organization & melded it into NAVDOCCOM
 - ◆ USMC never provided a general officer NAVDOCCOM deputy or an alternating NAVDOCCOM commander
 - ◆ USN resentment at “2-way USMC veto of USN doctrine”
 - ◆ Need to continue to coordinate with MCCDC
 - ◆ O-6 USMC deputy within NAVDOCCOM
 - ◆ Continued simultaneous USMC development of single-service vision, concept, strategy & doctrine pubs

596

1990s: USN-USMC relations (XI)



- ◆ **USN-USMC issues multiplied (IV)**
 - ◆ USN resentment at new co-equality within DON & JCS of a smaller, formerly subordinate service
 - ◆ USMC resentment at lack of USN recognition of USMC as co-equally relevant (indeed perhaps more relevant) service
 - ◆ USMC saw USN as keeping it down & poor
 - ◆ USN saw USMC demands as unreasonable
 - ◆ USN resented USMC influence over capstone documents
 - ◆ USMC resented USN programs & budgets not well aligned with capstone document policies
 - ◆ Programs & budgets seen as still too "blue-water"; not "littoral" enough

597

1990s: USN-USMC relations (XII)



- ◆ **USN-USMC issues multiplied (V)**
 - ◆ CMC cited . . . *From the Sea & Forward . . . From the Sea* in seminal USMC Operational Maneuver *From the Sea* (OMFTS) concept
 - ◆ But no further co-signed CMC - CNO capstone documents (1995-2000)

598

1990s: USN-USCG relations (I)

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- ◆ **USCG still in Department of Transportation**
- ◆ **USCG cutters, WPBs, PSUs lose planned anti-Soviet wartime roles, w/ end of Cold War**
 - ◆ USCG cuts all “defense-only” requirements & capabilities
 - ◆ USCG eliminates ASW as a WHEC capability (1992)
 - ◆ USCG removes remaining ASW & ASUW systems from 12 WHECs; drops E-2Cs
 - ◆ Decreased USN funding of USCG defense gear
- ◆ **USCG gains roles in new joint MTW/MRC war plans of 1990s**
 - ◆ Uses its non-defense capabilities in defense roles

599

1990s: USN-USCG relations (II)

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- ◆ **MARDEZ concept expanded to include overseas forward deployments (1994)**
- ◆ **Periodic WHEC forward deployments ISO regional CINCs & NCCs**
 - ◆ 1st WHEC deploys integrated into USN CVBG (1995)
- ◆ **USCG officially joins US intel community**
- ◆ **USN-USMC-USCG National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) created (1994)**

600

1990s: USN-USCG relations (III)

CNA

- ◆ **USN-USCG counter-drug ops intensify**
 - ◆ USCG-led JTFs 4, 5 now USCG-led JIATFs East, West (1994)
 - ◆ USN aircraft, USN warships w/ USCG LEDETs
 - ◆ USCG established armed helo HITRONs (1999)
- ◆ **Abortive USN plan to transfer 7 PCs to USCG**

601

1990s: USN-USCG relations (IV)

CNA

- ◆ **USCG Desert Shield/Desert Storm participation (1990-1991)**
 - ◆ USCG PSUs, LEDETs, a/c deployed in theater
 - ◆ No cutters deployed in theater
- ◆ **Cuba, Haiti ops (1993-5)**
 - ◆ Haiti denies USN entry; allows USCG cutters (1993)
 - ◆ USCG deploys cutters, LEDETs, buoy tenders, patrol boats, PSUs
 - ◆ 1st naval force into Haiti
- ◆ **Caribbean Support Tender (CST) (1999)**
 - ◆ *USCGC Gentian*
 - ◆ Multi-national-crewed for in-theater TSC ops

602

1990s: USN-USCG relations (V)

- ◆ **USN-USCG NAVGARD Board for policy coordination continues**
- ◆ **DOT-DOD MOA establishes 5 USCG defense missions (1995)**
 - ◆ MIO, environmental defense, deployed port security, peacetime engagement, coastal sea control ops
 - ◆ Based on USCG core capabilities
- ◆ **1st signed USN CNO – COMDT USCG *National Fleet* policy statement (1998)**
- ◆ **USN NAVSEA oversees construction of USCG research icebreaker *Healy***

603

1990s: USN-USAFAF relations (I)

- ◆ **USAFAF capstone publications**
 - ◆ SECAF Rice, “Global Reach-Global Power” (1990)
 - ◆ AFM 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force* (1992)
 - ◆ SECAF Widnall & CSAF Gen Fogelman, “Global Presence”(1995)
 - ◆ SECAF Widnall & CSAF Gen Fogelman, “Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force”(1996)
 - ◆ SECAF Peters & CSAF Gen Ryan, “America’s Air Force Vision 2020: Global Vigilance, Reach & Power” (1997)

604

1990s: USN-USAF relations (II)



◆ **USN-USAF conceptual issues**

- ◆ USN derided USAF concept of “virtual presence”
- ◆ USAF decried Navy claims of autonomous at-sea operations, rapid response

605

1990s: USN-USAF relations (III)



◆ **Drastic cuts in new USAF aircraft purchases.**

- ◆ USAF fleet age increase

◆ **USAF transformed its TACAIR deployment strategy**

- ◆ Forward-based theater garrisons reduced, especially in Europe

- ◆ CONUS-based “Expeditionary Aerospace Force” created to surge respond to contingencies, worldwide

- ◆ AEF to Bahrain (1995)

- ◆ CSAF Gen Ryan “Expeditionary Aerospace Force” announcement (1998)

- ◆ 10 AEFs stood up (1999)

606

1990s: USN-USAF relations (IV)

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- ◆ DON (USN-USMC) TOA > USAF TOA
- ◆ USN active duty end strength > USAF
- ◆ Routine Navy & Air Force (NAVAF) Board mtgs
- ◆ Increasingly tight US naval aviation joint integration IAW USAF-led doctrine & TTP
 - ◆ USN adapted rapidly to USAF-led doctrine & TTP, in wake of Operation Desert Storm (e.g.: improved ATO processing, improved CAOC participation)
 - ◆ USN still concerned at rigidity of ATO in Operation Deliberate Force (Former Yugoslavia strike ops)
 - ◆ Improved integration in Northern, Southern Watch
- ◆ Increased USAF & USN strike precision

607

1990s: USN-USAF relations (V)

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- ◆ Increasing USN dependence on USAF for
 - ◆ Aerial refueling
 - ◆ USN KA-6Ds retire; USAF tankers modified to refuel USN a/c
 - ◆ Long-haul airlift of critical parts, supplies, pers
 - ◆ AWACs support in Iraq (Operations "Desert Storm", "Southern Watch")
- ◆ Atrophy of USAF capabilities to support maritime campaign
 - ◆ Harpoons removed from B-52s (1989)
- ◆ AFDD 2-1.4 *Countersea Operations* (1999)

608

1990s: USN-USAF relations (VI)

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- ◆ Land-based intra-theater airlift issues
 - ◆ Commission on Roles & Missions (CORM) recommended reduction & assignment of most USN Operational Support Airlift (OSA) aircraft to USAF, to be managed by USTRANSCOM (1995)
 - ◆ USN sought to retain admin & operational authority over USN OSA aircraft, under USN fleet commanders
 - ◆ DEPSECDEF (former CORM chairman) transferred scheduling authority in CONUS for USN OSA aircraft to USCINCTRANS (1996)
 - ◆ Scheduling authority for overseas theater USN OSA transferred to geographical unified commanders (1996)
 - ◆ USN retained ADCON over OSA VR squadrons & aircraft

609

1990s: USN-USAF relations (VII)

CNA

- ◆ Joint exercises
 - ◆ E.g.: Northern Edge
- ◆ USN, USMC EA-6Bs sole US tactical electronic attack capability; USAF EF-111As retire (1995)
 - ◆ Support AEFs as well as USN, USMC units
 - ◆ USAF provides some crews (1997-2005)
- ◆ USN/USAF developed, deployed common trainer
 - ◆ T-6A Texan II Joint Primary Air Training System (JPATS)
 - ◆ Joint program; USAF as Executive Service
 - ◆ USN, USAF consolidate some flight training
- ◆ USAF-developed LANTIRN deployed on USN F-14s (1997)

610

1990s: USN-USAF relations (VIII)

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- ◆ **USN SSBN forces placed under operational command of USCINCSTRAT (1992)**
 - ◆ 1st USN admirals command USSTRATCOM
 - ◆ (1994-6, 1998-2002)
- ◆ **USN Strategic Communications Wing ONE & its land-based E-6 TACAMO SSBN communications aircraft relocate to Tinker AFB, OK (1992)**
 - ◆ Inherit “Looking Glass” NCA strategic command & control role from USAF (1998)

611

1990s: USN-USAF relations (IX)

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- ◆ **Continued high USN use of USAF space systems**
 - ◆ USAF-led GPS operational; joint use in *Desert Storm*
 - ◆ Continued modest USN funding of space systems
 - ◆ USN “leverage” strategy to influence USAF decisions
 - ◆ USAF passed FLTSATCOM control to USN
 - ◆ USN & USAF developing UHF Follow-On to replace FLTSATCOM
- ◆ **Continued forward USN MSC prepositioning of USAF munitions**
- ◆ **Increased joint USN-USAF education & training consolidation**

612

1990s: USN-US Army relations (I)

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- ◆ Major US Army redeployments & force cuts
 - ◆ Cuts more serious in active force than in Guard
 - ◆ Army considers more “expeditionary” options
- ◆ Post-Cold War requirements to change concepts & doctrine in both services
 - ◆ Army FM 100-5 “Operations” (“AirLand Battle Future”) (1993)
 - ◆ “Force XXI” campaign to re-design Army
- ◆ USN (briefly) emulated Army doctrinal models

613

1990s: USN-US Army relations (II)

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- ◆ USN-US Army conceptual issues
 - ◆ Army stressed primacy of “boots on the ground” as physical & visible symbol of commitment, & tool of forward US military presence
 - ◆ Navy stressed virtues of unobtrusiveness and modulated forward presence offshore, with no adverse impact on national sovereignty or local sensitivities, and freedom from locally-imposed constraints
 - ◆ Army decried Navy focus on technological solutions to military problems

614

1990s: USN-US Army relations (III)

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- ◆ 3 US Army generals as CJCS (1989-2001)
- ◆ Continued Army interest in & requirement for USN fast sealift & forward prepositioning
- ◆ Joint Shipboard Helicopter Integration Process (JSHIP) JTF initiated (1998)
 - ◆ HQ at NAS Patuxent River
 - ◆ Dedicated At Sea Tests (DASTs)
- ◆ Army-Navy Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) exercises & symposia

615

1990s: USN-US Army relations (IV)

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- ◆ 1st Persian Gulf War (1990-91)
 - ◆ Extensive USN MSC sealift support for US Army
 - ◆ Issue: Validation of 1980s AirLand Battle doctrine & *The Maritime Strategy* in 1st Gulf War
 - ◆ COL Harry Summers, *On Strategy II*: Both validated
 - ◆ VADM Bill Owens, *High Seas*: Only ALB validated
- ◆ Operation UPHOLD/RESTORE DEMOCRACY (Haiti) (1994)
 - ◆ US Army 10th MD & Special Forces troops & helos poised to launch airmobile assault from 2 USN carriers

616

1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (I)

- ◆ **USN focus: Coordinating & *integrating* allied capabilities in real world regional contingencies**
 - ◆ Desert Shield/Storm set tone
- ◆ **Exercises, education & training, tech transfer**
 - ◆ NATO exercises smaller, fewer; command structure leaner
 - ◆ Continued increase in international meetings & staff talks
- ◆ **Wide NATO pub declassification, dissemination**
- ◆ **CJCS & CINCs increasingly drove policy**
 - ◆ Theater Engagement Plans, etc.

617

1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (II)

- ◆ **Major multi-lateral coalition Desert Shield/Desert Storm & follow-on naval ops (1990-)**
 - ◆ Naval coalition pushed hard by OPNAV
 - ◆ Enabled by prior NATO interoperability programs
- ◆ **Multilateral naval operations off Somalia (1991-95)**
- ◆ **Bi-lateral Navy-to-Navy staff talks programs continue**
- ◆ **Integration of selected allied warships into USN CVBGs (from 1995)**

618

1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (III)


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- ◆ Allied officers assigned to new NAVDOCCOM (1993-8)
- ◆ NAVDOCCOM-led *Multi-lateral Maritime Operations* (MMOPS) pub effort (1996)
- ◆ Arms & technology transfers (both ways)
- ◆ Intel & communications collaboration
 - ◆ AUSCANZUKUS
- ◆ ISS on-going biennially at NWC Newport RI
- ◆ NAVWARCOL curricula for foreign officers
 - ◆ Other foreign navy educations & training
- ◆ Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) ongoing

619

Multinational Maritime Operations (1996)

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620

Multinational Maritime Operations (1996)



- ◆ Signed by COMNAVDOCCOM
- ◆ Available to all navies on the web
- ◆ Unclassified generic multinational doctrine
- ◆ NAVDOCCOM lead; international working group
- ◆ Collection of fundamental principles
- ◆ USN interest waned following publication

621

1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (IV)



- ◆ **NATO relationships**
 - ◆ NATO conducted 1st real-world naval ops, in/from Adriatic Sea off/over former Yugoslavia
 - ◆ Command structures, staffs, plans & exercises cut back & evolved. USN continues to dominate.
 - ◆ Unsuccessful French bid for Southern Region command
 - ◆ **NATO expanded in Baltic**
 - ◆ Germany unifies; Poland joins NATO (1999)
 - ◆ **Rationalization, standardization, interoperability**
 - ◆ Expansion & wide distro of UNCLAS EXTAC pub series
 - ◆ **Accidental USN CV missile firing on Turkish DD (1992)**

622

1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (V)



- ◆ **Partnership for Peace (PfP) relationships**
 - ◆ NATO organized PfP (1994)
 - ◆ PfP naval exercises (from 1994)
 - ◆ PfP navies join BALTOPS
- ◆ **Chiefs of European Navies (CHENS) (1992-)**
 - ◆ CNE an observer
- ◆ **Regional Seapower Symposium (since 1996)**
- ◆ **RN deployed US Trident D-5 missiles as UK strategic deterrent, with USN assist**
- ◆ **RN acquired US Tomahawk missiles (1998)**
- ◆ **1st E-2Cs delivered for new FN CVN CDG**

623

1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (VI)



- ◆ **East Asian relationships**
 - ◆ JMSDF, ROKN, RTN, RAN relationships expand
 - ◆ JMSDF deployed Aegis AAW system
 - ◆ Singapore Navy relationships expand
 - ◆ RIMPAC, Western Pacific Naval Symposia (WPNS) continue, expand
 - ◆ CARAT exercises instituted in SE Asia (1995)
 - ◆ Cobra Gold exercises continue, expand
- ◆ **USN-PLAN relations fluctuate**
 - ◆ Flag contacts, PVSTs
 - ◆ **US-PRC Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) (1998)**

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1990s: USN-foreign navy relations (VII)


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- ◆ **LATAM navy relationships**
 - ◆ UNITAS altered
 - ◆ IANC continued
 - ◆ Operation Black: Chile provided diesel submarines for USN ASW training (from 1995)
 - ◆ Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network upgraded to satellite
- ◆ Annual USN-Russian Navy INCSEA meetings
- ◆ **RUKUS talks formalized & expanded**
 - ◆ Include games, then at-sea exercises
- ◆ **West African Naval Symposium (1992)**
 - ◆ One-off

625

1990s: Text & context of each document

CNA
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ADM Frank B. Kelso III (CNO Jun 1990-Apr 1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Apr 1991 *The Way Ahead*
 - ◆ Vision
- ◆ May 1992 *The Navy Policy Book*
 - ◆ Policy
- ◆ Nov 1992 ...*From the Sea*
 - ◆ Vision
- ◆ Mar 1994 *Naval Warfare (NDP 1)*
 - ◆ Doctrine




ADM Frank B. Kelso III (CNO Jun 1990-Apr 1994)

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- ◆ Submarine officer
 - ◆ 3rd submarine officer CNO in a row
- ◆ Had participated in development and testing of *The Maritime Strategy* throughout his career as a flag officer
- ◆ Called for a new “maritime policy”, vice strategy
- ◆ Strove to supplement it with new visions policies & doctrines, both internal & external
- ◆ Strained relations with USMC

The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA



629

The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA

◆ Overview

- ◆ Signed by SECNAV Garrett, CNO ADM Kelso, CMC Gen Gray
- ◆ Billed as a "Way Ahead"
- ◆ Primary targets: USN, USMC officer corps
- ◆ UNCLAS. *Proceedings & Gazette* articles & stand-alone pub
- ◆ Called for new deployment patterns, forward presence, surge, emphasis on presence & MOOTW
- ◆ Remarkably prescient
- ◆ Little influence at the time

630

The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA

- ◆ Signed by:
 - ◆ SECNAV H. Lawrence Garrett, III
 - ◆ CNO ADM Frank B. Kelso, II
 - ◆ Almost 1 year in office
 - ◆ CMC Gen Alfred M. Gray, Jr.



631

The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA

- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as a “Way ahead”; “an article”
 - ◆ Actually a “vision”
 - ◆ Short UNCLAS *Proceedings, Gazette* articles (April 1991)
 - ◆ Stand-alone reprint pub
 - ◆ 12 pages
 - ◆ Not repeated verbatim in Posture Statements

632

The Way Ahead (1991)

- ◆ Why it was written

- ◆ To demonstrate that the Navy understood the world had changed and that the Navy was changing too
- ◆ To provide a vision with a detailed agenda for the changes the Navy foresaw it would have to make
- ◆ To provide a replacement for the suddenly-obsolete *Maritime Strategy*; replacing SLOC defense w/ "enabling"
- ◆ To show links between the Navy & evolving Bush administration policies, refocusing on regional threats
- ◆ To provide a basis for new rationales for new, lower 450-ship Base Force USN force level goal
- ◆ To demonstrate Navy-Marine Corps solidarity
- ◆ To answer USAF "Global Reach—Global Power" (1990)
- ◆ Primary targets: USN, USMC officer corps

6.33

The Way Ahead (1991)

- ◆ Context (I)

- ◆ 2nd year of Bush administration (1989-93)
- ◆ SECDEF Cheney (1989-93)
- ◆ New CNO ADM Kelso (1990-94)
- ◆ US economy pulling out of recession; unemployment & inflation rates climbing; high budget deficits
- ◆ Fundamental change in world power relationships
- ◆ Cold War ending
 - ◆ Soviet Union still intact
 - ◆ Warsaw Pact disintegrated
 - ◆ Germany reunited (Oct 1990)
 - ◆ NATO expansion along south Baltic littoral (former DDR) began
 - ◆ US-Soviet maritime boundary re-confirmed (1990)
 - ◆ START Treaty signed (1991)

6.34

The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (II)

- ◆ Bush administration calls for a “new world order”
- ◆ Operations *Desert Shield & Desert Storm* ongoing (Aug 1990-Feb 1991)
 - ◆ USN unease over its Desert Storm performance
- ◆ Increased role of CJCS & Joint Staff
- ◆ US estrangement from PRC since Tiananmen Square crackdown (Jun 1989)
 - ◆ Leadership visits, ship visits, arms sales cancelled
- ◆ Democracy comes to Taiwan (from 1987)
- ◆ Trade disputes threaten US relations with Japan
- ◆ Japanese economic crisis (1990-91)

635

The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ *USS Iowa* explosion & investigation (1989)
- ◆ USN “Base Force” 451-ship Battle Force force goal (1990)
- ◆ Declining USN force levels & budgets
 - ◆ USN in 1991: 526 ships; 11 new ships authorized
 - ◆ Down 42 ships from 1987; down 20 ships from 1990
 - ◆ Decommissioning of all 46 Knox-class ASW FFs began (1991)
- ◆ SECDEF cancelled A-12 (1991)
- ◆ Annual ADM Charles M. Cooke Conferences for Naval Strategists & Planners began (1990)
 - ◆ Coordinators: NPGS (CDR Brown) & NWC (Dr. Daniel)
- ◆ Unofficial DC-area “Navy Discussion Group” (1989-91)
 - ◆ Convener: CAPT Jim Stark
 - ◆ Participants included *The Way Ahead* contributors

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The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA

♦ Context (IV)

- ♦ US Navy immediate post-Cold War expectations (on eve of Operation Desert Shield & promulgation of CJCS GEN Powell "Base Force" construct):
 - ♦ US Navy Cold War strategy, concepts, doctrine, tactics & systems very adaptable to post-Cold War environment & conflicts
 - ♦ US Navy more relevant to post-Cold War environment & conflicts than other services
 - ♦ US Navy stature & budget share will go up
 - ♦ US Navy confident in its ability to control its own destiny

637

The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA

♦ Cited references

- ♦ Title 10 of U.S. Code
- ♦ President Bush Aspen speech (Aug 1990)
 - ♦ Soviet threat remote, but could recur
 - ♦ US forces needed for peacetime forward presence, rapid regional crisis response
 - ♦ Need to restructure US forces as well as reduce by 25%
- ♦ FMFM 1 *Warfighting* (1989)
- ♦ Also cited: *The Maritime Strategy*

638

The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other important contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986)
 - ◆ 1st Bush *National Security Strategy* (1990)
 - ◆ CJCS GEN Powell Base Force (1990)
 - ◆ 451-ship Battle Force goal
 - ◆ CJCS *Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA)* (Mar 1991)
 - ◆ 1st CJCS *Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP)* (1991)
 - ◆ *Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)*
 - ◆ *Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)*

639

The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ CNO SSG reports
 - ◆ USN "Worthington Study" on riverine warfare (Dec 1990) (ignored)
 - ◆ CNA studies on USN presence & responses to crises
 - ◆ "DON LIFT 2" study (1990)
 - ◆ FMFM 1-1 *Campaigning* (1990)
 - ◆ Col John Warden, *The Air Campaign* (1988)
 - ◆ SECAF Rice "Global Reach-Global Power" (1990)

640

The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ William S. Lind et al., "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." *Marine Corps Gazette & Military Review* (Oct 1989)
 - ◆ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *National Interest* (1989)
 - ◆ Global triumph of Western liberal democracy
 - ◆ Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* (1989)
 - ◆ Carl Builder, *The Masks of War* (1989)

641

The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA

- ◆ How it was written (I)
 - ◆ Various aborted OPNAV staff efforts begun, responding to changes in the world (1989-1990)
 - ◆ Key players: CAPT Dick Diamond (OP-607, later OP-603); CAPT Jim Stark (OP-OOK); HQMC PP&O
 - ◆ Discussion venues:
 - ◆ Navy Long-Range Planners' Conference at USNA (1989)
 - ◆ Unofficial "Ancient Mariners" officer study group
 - ◆ Kicked around emerging naval concepts
 - ◆ CAPT Jim Stark (OP-OOK) administered
 - ◆ Representation from across OPNAV
 - ◆ CDR Joe Sestak & "enabling" concept

642

The Way Ahead (1991)

◆ How it was written (II)

◆ Personalities:

- ◆ New CNO ADM Frank Kelso (Jun 1990)/ new EA CAPT Dan Murphy
- ◆ VADM Paul David Miller (OP-07)
 - ◆ Former close Lehman Secretariat Kelso, Murphy colleague
- ◆ CAPT Bill Center, CDR Rick Wright (principal OP-07 drafters)
- ◆ (VADM Barney Kelly) (New OP-06)
- ◆ CAPT Dick Diamond (OP-607, then OP-603)
- ◆ CDR Mike Dunaway (principal OP-603 drafter)
- ◆ CMC Gen Gray
- ◆ HQMC PP&O LtGen Carl Mundy; AO Maj Al Heim

643

The Way Ahead (1991)

◆ How it was written (III)

- ◆ SECNAV/CNO "The Way Ahead" memo tasked OP-07 to develop formal USN program planning options for discussion and decision. USMC to participate (23 Aug 1990)
- ◆ 3-way rivalry developed: OP-06, OP-07, & HQMC PP&O
 - ◆ Competing OP-06 & OP-07 briefings all through 1990
 - ◆ USMC insistence on full equality, heavy emphasis on amphibious, expeditionary warfare

644

The Way Ahead (1991)



- ◆ How it was written (IV)
 - ◆ OP-603 "Won if by Sea" briefing circulated, briefed to CMC Al Gray (Sept 1990)
 - ◆ OP-07 drafted Final "Way Ahead" version
 - ◆ Adopted earlier OP-603-incubated "Won if by Sea" ideas
 - ◆ CNO ADM Kelso-CMC Gen Mundy-OP-07 VADM Miller endgame at CNO Quarters
 - ◆ Published as *Proceedings, Gazette* articles (April 1991)
 - ◆ USN-USMC equality drafting, signing, publishing

645

The Way Ahead (1991)



- ◆ Key ideas (I)
 - ◆ "The Maritime Strategy . . . remains on the shelf."
 - ◆ Hedge vs. resurgent Soviets
 - ◆ "Meeting our presence requirements with fewer assets calls for...new patterns in length and location of deployments, as well as in the composition of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups"
 - ◆ "The changes occurring in our security environment will require us to break out of these hubs"
 - ◆ USN SSNs "freed from a nearly full-time requirement to train for ASW in far forward areas . . . can now be available for more regional power projection and support missions"

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The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY & STRATEGY

◆ Key ideas (II)

- ◆ “The need for focused forward presence & credible surge capability—more than historical deployment patterns—will dictate peacetime employment of naval forces”
 - ◆ Last call for “credible surge capability” until 2003
- ◆ “We must continue to distribute all forms of striking firepower among many platforms”
- ◆ “Presence; humanitarian assistance; nation-building; security assistance; and peacekeeping; counter-narcotic, counterterrorist, counterinsurgency, and crisis response operations will receive new emphasis as we focus our efforts on developing and maintaining regional stability”

647

The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY & STRATEGY

◆ Key ideas (III)

- ◆ Change is necessary due to:
 - ◆ Uncertain world; end of bipolarity & central agreed-upon threat
 - ◆ Constrained available resources
- ◆ Focus on “regional contingencies in trouble spots”
- ◆ Preparation for war with Soviets less important
 - ◆ Cut back on USN ASW forces, e.g.: SSNs, FFs)
- ◆ Global proliferation of military technology
- ◆ Joint power-projection ops required
- ◆ Strategic sealift: “a critical component of our maritime force structure”

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The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (IV)

- ◆ Zumwalt/Turner terms used as vocabulary, not as a framework
- ◆ Cited 4 elements of Bush Administration national security policy (from 1990 Aspen speech)
 - ◆ Deterrence
 - ◆ Forward presence
 - ◆ Crisis response
 - ◆ Force reconstitution

649

The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ What was new? (I)

- ◆ Attempt to lead change
- ◆ Major USMC influence. USN-USMC drafting, signing & publishing equality
- ◆ Focus on what would later be called shaping
- ◆ Emphasis on *credibility* of forward deployed forces

650

The Way Ahead (1991)

◆ What was new? (II)

- ◆ Focus on special nature of naval operations in *littoral* regions
- ◆ Naval services to “pave the way” for other joint, combined forces
 - ◆ “Enabling and participatory”
- ◆ Call for “transformation throughout the naval services”
- ◆ 450-ship “base force” goal
- ◆ Total Quality Leadership (TQL) approach initiated in USN & USMC

651

The Way Ahead (1991)

◆ Not addressed

- ◆ World trade issues and globalization
- ◆ Threats to the homeland
- ◆ Piracy threats
- ◆ U.S. Coast Guard
- ◆ Allied navies
 - ◆ But allied forces in general were discussed
- ◆ Sea-based ballistic missile defense
- ◆ U.S. merchant marine, industrial base, shipbuilding
- ◆ U.S. government interagency partners
- ◆ Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
- ◆ Naval arms control as an issue
- ◆ Blockade as a discrete naval operation

652

The Way Ahead (1991)

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses
 - ◆ Laura Zabriskie, "New Maritime Strategy will Elevate Marine Corps' Role in Naval Operations," *Inside the Navy* (Dec 24, 1990)
 - ◆ Dr. Scott C. Truver, "Tomorrow's Fleet," USNI *Proceedings* (Jun 1992)
 - ◆ CAPT Bradd C. Hayes, "Keeping the Naval service Relevant," USNI *Proceedings* (Oct 1993)
 - ◆ "The Main Aspects of the 'New U.S. Naval Strategy,' in Meconis & Makeev (eds.), *U.S.-Russian Naval Cooperation* (1996)

653

The Way Ahead (1991)

- ◆ Criticisms
 - ◆ Merely an attempt to save USN force structure
 - ◆ Made no choices. Set no priorities against which to budget
 - ◆ Developed subsequent to and separate from USN 451-ship Battle Force Base Force goal
 - ◆ No visible USN follow-up or buy-in on vision

654

The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Influence:

- ◆ Little. *The Way Ahead* was “way ahead” of its time
- ◆ A vision for the 2000s, but not for the 1990s

655

The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Why so little influence?

- ◆ Salience of GEN Powell's Base Force & USN Desert Storm experience
- ◆ Overtaken by NCA, CINC, BUR, GNFPP 2/3-hub forward presence & MCO planning demands
- ◆ “Tailhook” scandal eroded authority of USN leaders
- ◆ SECNAV resigned soon, under a cloud
- ◆ VADM Miller to CINCLANTFLT; staff scattered
- ◆ Superseded within 6 months by “Naval Forces Capabilities Planning Effort”
- ◆ Little attempt to repeat many techniques used to develop, disseminate, & institutionalize *The Maritime Strategy*

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The Way Ahead (1991)

CNA
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- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Minimal

657

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis



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The Navy Policy Book (1992)

CNA
CNA Foundation

◆ Overview

- ◆ Signed by SECNAV Garrett & CNO ADM Kelso
- ◆ Billed as “policy” & “guiding principles”
- ◆ Primary target: USN officers & enlisted
- ◆ UNCLAS stand-alone internal USN pub
- ◆ Tied to USN TQL program
- ◆ Laid out “strategic principles,” nature of USN as an organization
- ◆ Little influence beyond ADM Kelso’s term

659

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

CNA
CNA Foundation

◆ Signed by:

- ◆ SECNAV H. Lawrence Garrett, III
- ◆ CNO ADM Frank B. Kelso, II
- ◆ At end of 2nd year in office



660

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

CNA
CNA Foundation

- ◆ What it was

- ◆ Billed as "Policy," "principles"
- ◆ Actually, it was "doctrine"
- ◆ Subtitle: "A Single Reference of the Most Important Guiding Principles of Our Navy"
- ◆ UNCLAS pamphlet (May 1992)
- ◆ 40 pages

661

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

CNA
CNA Foundation

- ◆ Why it was written

- ◆ Provide common internal USN understanding of explicit USN values, principles by all USN officers, enlisted, civilians, to increase USN performance & effectiveness
- ◆ Ref A for "Total Quality Leadership" (TQL) effort
 - ◆ Adaptation of Deming "Total Quality Management" approach in business world
 - ◆ Key to Deming's thinking: Every company should have an "Owner's Manual" for current employees & new hires to consult
 - ◆ CNO ADM Kelso dedicated to institutionalizing TQL in USN
 - ◆ CNO ADM Kelso view: Post-Cold War world now needed a Navy Policy, not just a maritime strategy
- ◆ To counter Tailhook Scandal implications re: USN values
- ◆ Target: USN officers & enlisted

662

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context:

- ◆ 4th year of Bush (R) administration (1989-93)
- ◆ SECDEF Cheney (1989-93)
- ◆ CNO ADM Kelso (1990-94) & TQL
- ◆ Cold War over
- ◆ Desert Storm over
- ◆ USN in 1992: 466 ships; 11 new ships authorized
- ◆ *USS Iowa* explosion & investigation (1989)
- ◆ “Tailhook” scandal (1991-2)
- ◆ General interest (and concern) in US re: Japanese vs. US business practices

663

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

CNA

◆ Cited references

- ◆ Constitution of the U.S.
- ◆ W. Edwards Deming, *Out of the Crisis* (1982)
- ◆ American business policy books
- ◆ Title 10 of U.S. Code
- ◆ Military Code of Conduct

◆ Included Professional Reading list

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The Navy Policy Book (1992)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other important contemporary publications
 - ◆ United Parcel Service (UPS) Policy Book

665

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

CNA

- ◆ How it was written
 - ◆ Drafted in OP-00K (CAPT James Stark oversaw; CDR Judith Holden coordinated)
 - ◆ CAPT Stark had been heavily involved in development of *Sea Plan 2000*, *The Maritime Strategy*, run-up to *The Way Ahead*
 - ◆ Inputs from throughout OPNAV
 - ◆ OP-603 (CAPT Richard Diamond) drafted strategy & policy sections
 - ◆ Used United Parcel Service (UPS) Policy Book as model
 - ◆ Included *The Navy's Vision, Guiding Principles and Strategic Goals*
 - ◆ Signed by SECNAV Garrett, CNO ADM Kelso, & CMC Gen Carl Mundy

666

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

- ◆ Key ideas (I)
 - ◆ Nature of the Navy as an organization
 - ◆ Stressed importance of people, accountability, responsibility & good stewardship to US Navy culture
 - ◆ "People" discussed before "Mission"
 - ◆ Very joint. Call for integrated joint campaigns
 - ◆ Laid out USN PERSTEMPO deployment policy
 - ◆ Provided history of USN
 - ◆ Included extensive references to *past* blockades
 - ◆ Sought to summarize existing policy, not create new ideas

667

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

- ◆ Key ideas (II)
 - ◆ All four Zumwalt/Turner missions discussed, but within list of some 20-odd characteristics of naval operations
 - ◆ "Force projection is our number one warfighting priority"
 - ◆ Cited 4 elements of Bush Administration national security policy (from 1990 Aspen speech)
 - ◆ Deterrence
 - ◆ Forward presence
 - ◆ Crisis response
 - ◆ Force reconstitution

668

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ What was new?
 - ◆ Focus on “policy”, not “strategy” or “strategic concepts”
 - ◆ Internal Navy orientation
 - ◆ Tie-in to TQL program
 - ◆ Appended *Navy Professional Reading List*

669

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

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Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Not addressed
 - ◆ Surge capabilities & operations
 - ◆ Threats to the U.S. homeland
 - ◆ Counter-drug and anti-piracy operations
 - ◆ U.S. Coast Guard
 - ◆ Interagency partners & NGOs
 - ◆ U.S. Merchant Marine
 - ◆ Links to force level planning, programming, budgeting
- ◆ Only passing mention of USMC
 - ◆ Complementary amphibious warfare capability
- ◆ Coastal, riverine *interdiction* ops mentioned only as part of naval special warfare

670

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

CNA

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses
 - ◆ "Book Reviews," US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Oct 1992)
 - ◆ RADM W. J. "Jerry" Holland USN (Ret)
 - ◆ LtGen Bernard E. "Mick" Trainor USMC (Ret)
 - ◆ RADM James A. Winnefeld USN (Ret)

671

The Navy Policy Book (1992)

CNA

- ◆ Criticisms
 - ◆ Unnecessary & irrelevant
 - ◆ A collection of homilies, good advice, uplifting thoughts, and goals
 - ◆ Internal USN opposition & indifference to TQL
 - ◆ USMC not adequately treated

672

The Navy Policy Book (1992)



- ◆ Influence: Little
- ◆ Why?
 - ◆ Never intended as external document
 - ◆ *USS Iowa* & Tailhook scandals eroded influence & credibility of USN leaders
 - ◆ SECNAV gone within months
 - ◆ TQL had strong CNO support, but never took within the Navy, & disappeared when CNO ADM Kelso retired

673

The Navy Policy Book (1992)



- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Minimal
 - ◆ Cited in ...*From the Sea*
 - ◆ Never updated or repeated

674

...From The Sea (1992)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis



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...From The Sea (1992)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Overview
 - ◆ Signed by SECNAV O'Keefe, CNO ADM Kelso, CMC Gen Mundy
 - ◆ Billed as a "white paper" & "combined vision"
 - ◆ Primary target: Many, but esp. USN, USMC officers
 - ◆ UNCLAS. *Proceedings* & *Gazette* articles & stand-alone pub, & on the web
 - ◆ Joint, littoral, enabling operations
 - ◆ Focus on strike & power projection ops vs. the shore
 - ◆ Wide influence. Still cited in 2007

676

...From The Sea (1992)

CNA

- ◆ Signed by:
 - ◆ SECNAV Sean O'Keefe
 - ◆ CNO ADM Frank B. Kelso, II
 - ◆ 3rd year in office
 - ◆ CMC Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr.



677

...From The Sea (1992)

CNA

- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as a "White Paper" & a "combined vision"
 - ◆ Subtitle: "Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century: A New Direction for the Naval Service"
 - ◆ Dated & distributed 29 Sept 1992
 - ◆ Issued as USN news release Oct 1992
 - ◆ Signed *Proceedings & Gazette* articles (Nov 1992)
 - ◆ Stand-alone pub, & on the web
 - ◆ Very short: 4 pages
 - ◆ Unsigned versions circulated after President Clinton inauguration
 - ◆ Cited in 1993-2000 DON Posture Statements

678

...From The Sea (1992)

♦ Why it was written (I)

- ◆ To provide a conceptual basis for the shift in US Navy focus to joint, forward littoral, enabling, expeditionary operations in regional contingencies
- ◆ To guide Navy programmatic decisions away from sea control programs & toward power projection programs
- ◆ To highlight continuing regional naval peacetime presence, crisis response & warfighting requirements, despite ending of global anti-Soviet war requirements
- ◆ To demonstrate Navy-Marine Corps solidarity, & USN embrace of USMC concepts
- ◆ To overcome *Desert Storm*'s negative legacy in USN
- ◆ To demonstrate USN recognition of the importance of doctrine

679

...From The Sea (1992)

♦ Why it was written (II)

- ◆ Similar reasons to *The Way Ahead*
 - ◆ To demonstrate that the Navy understood the world had changed and that the Navy had changed too
 - ◆ To leave the 1980s, the Cold War, and *The Maritime Strategy* behind
 - ◆ To provide a basis for 450-ship USN force level goal
 - ◆ To answer USAF "Global Reach—Global Power" (1990)
- ◆ To show USN was pacing evolving Bush Administration policy & strategy
- ◆ To catalyze Navy strategic thinking in anticipation of a possible change in Administrations
- ◆ To make up for lack of traction of *The Way Ahead*
- ◆ Primary target: Many, but esp. USN, USMC officers, OSD, Joint Staff

680

...From The Sea (1992)

◆ Context (I)

- ◆ 4th & last year of Bush (R) administration (1989-93)
- ◆ Bush administration calls for a “new world order”
- ◆ US economy pulling out of recession; unemployment & inflation rates climbing; high budget deficits
- ◆ Election year (Pres. Bush vs. Gov. Clinton)
- ◆ SECDEF Cheney (1989-93)
- ◆ New SECNAV O’Keefe (Oct 1992-Jan 1993)
- ◆ CNO ADM Kelso (1990-94)
- ◆ Post Goldwater-Nichols,-Cold War,-Desert Storm
- ◆ Soviet Union had finally collapsed (Dec 1991)
- ◆ Trade disputes threatened US relations with Japan
- ◆ Japanese economic crisis (1990-91)
- ◆ Inter-Korean Basic Agreement signed (1991)

681

...From The Sea (1992)

◆ Context (II)

- ◆ CJCS Powell & Base Force (1990)
 - ◆ 451-ship Battle Force goal (1990)
- ◆ Central DOD force-sizing requirement to fight 2 major regional wars (e.g.: North Korea & Iraq)
- ◆ Somalia, Haiti, Iraq operations
 - ◆ Major coalition ops in DS/DS, other ops
 - ◆ Somali government collapse (1991)
- ◆ “1/3-1/3-1/3” service \$ share stability era beginning
- ◆ Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTRP) begun (1991)

682

...From The Sea (1992)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ US Senate ratified 1990 Soviet/Russia-US maritime boundary agreement (1991)
- ◆ Bush PNI announced removal of nonstrategic nuclear weps from US ships, subs, aircraft (1991)
- ◆ Stand up of USSTRATCOM (with USN SSBN components); & of USMC components (1992)
- ◆ Reduced submarine threat perception
- ◆ USN declassification of SOSUS mission (1991)

683

...From The Sea (1992)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (IV)

- ◆ Declining USN force levels & budgets
 - ◆ USN in 1992: 466 ships; 11 new ships authorized
 - ◆ Down 40 ships from 1991; down 80 ships from 1990
 - ◆ Decommissioning of all 46 Knox-class ASW FFs continuing
- ◆ SECDEF cancelled A-12 attack a/c program (1991)
 - ◆ Need for new A-6 replacement a/c
- ◆ *USS Iowa* explosion & investigation (1989); Tailhook scandal & investigation (1991-2)
- ◆ USN (& USAF) withdrawal from Philippine bases (1992)
- ◆ 1st CJCS *Global Naval Force Presence Policy* (GNFPP) (1991)

684

...From The Sea (1992)

◆ Context (V)

- ◆ VADM Owens as powerful OPNAV N8 (1992)
- ◆ OPNAV joint-inspired reorganization (1992)
 - ◆ Subordination and demotion of the platform barons
- ◆ New OPNAV POM Assessment Process
 - ◆ Aimed at breaking down internal Navy community stovepipes
 - ◆ Deliberately new USN joint program vocabulary
- ◆ New Expeditionary Warfare OPNAV division (N85), headed by USMC general (1992)
- ◆ Unofficial DC-area "Navy Discussion Group" ongoing (1989-91)
 - ◆ Convener: CAPT James Stark (OPNAV N00K)
 - ◆ Participants included . . . *From the Sea* contributors

685

...From The Sea (1992)

◆ Context (VI)

- ◆ US Navy unease following promulgation of CJCS GEN Powell "Base Force" construct
 - ◆ US Navy budget share will not go up; could go down
 - ◆ US Navy feared its control over its own destiny slipping
- ◆ USN unease over Desert Storm performance
 - ◆ Not at the forefront of DS planning or operations
 - ◆ Spotty integration with DS joint C2 & TTP
 - ◆ Little opportunity to show AAW, ASUW, ASW, amphibious prowess
 - ◆ Salience of mine threat; USN mine warfare weaknesses
 - ◆ US Navy Cold War strategy, concepts, doctrine, tactics & systems might not be well-adapted to post-Cold War environment, conflicts
 - ◆ US Navy could possibly be considered less relevant to post-Cold War environment & conflicts than other services

686

...From The Sea (1992)

◆ Context (VII)

- ◆ Some at-sea organizational experimentation
 - ◆ CINCLANTFLT, later SACLANT/ USCINCLANT/ CINCUSACOM ADM Paul David Miller "Adaptive Force Packaging" concepts
 - ◆ C6F VADM Bill Owens initiatives (1990-1992)
 - ◆ Maritime Action Groups (Surface combatants, SSNs, MPA)
 - ◆ LHD USS *Wasp* as sea control ship; Harriers for ASUW, AAW
 - ◆ Operation SAFE HAVEN (1991)
 - ◆ CV USS *Forrestal* embarked 400 Marines, 10 USMC helos
 - ◆ Somalia ops (1992)
 - ◆ MPS ship (*Lummus*) attached to ARG

687

...From The Sea (1992)

◆ Cited references

- ◆ 2nd Bush National Security Strategy (1991)
- ◆ Navy Policy Book
- ◆ Marine Corps Master Plan
- ◆ President Bush Aspen Institute speech (Aug 1990)
- ◆ "Base Force" concept

688

...From The Sea (1992)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ Naval Force Capability Planning Effort (NFCPE): *Strategic Concept of the Naval Service* (1992)
 - ◆ USN/USMC joint, littoral, enabling ops
 - ◆ Need for naval doctrine & naval doctrine command
 - ◆ NATO Alliance's New Strategic Concept (Nov 1991)
 - ◆ Emphasis on cooperation w/ East & security of all Europe
 - ◆ DPG, CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS
 - ◆ DPG leaked to *New York Times* (Mar 1992)

689

...From The Sea (1992)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ JCS Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces* (1991)
 - ◆ 1st National Military Strategy (Jan 1992)
 - ◆ DoD Mobility Requirements Study (1992)
 - ◆ "DON Lift 2" study & SECNAV decisions (1990)
 - ◆ U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Plan (1992)
 - ◆ CNO SSG Reports (annual)
 - ◆ FMFM 1-1 *Campaigning* (1990)
 - ◆ FMFM 1 *Warfighting* (1989)
 - ◆ FMFM 1-1 *Campaigning* (1990)
 - ◆ SECAF Rice "Global Reach—Global Power" (1990)

690

...From The Sea (1992)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ CNA (Siegel) *Use of Naval Forces* study (1991)
 - ◆ CNA *Desert Storm Reconstruction Reports* (1991)
 - ◆ Peter Schwartz, *Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World* (1991)
 - ◆ USN "Worthington Study" on riverine warfare (Dec 1990) (ignored)
 - ◆ OPNAV *The United States Navy in "Desert Shield" "Desert Storm"* (1991)
 - ◆ Byron & Swartz, "Make the Word become the Vision," *Proceedings* (Nov 1992)

691

...From The Sea (1992)

- ◆ How it was written (I)
 - ◆ SECNAV Garrett tasked CNO & CMC 20 Nov 1991
 - ◆ Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort (NFCPE)
 - ◆ Nov 1991-Mar 1992 at CNA
 - ◆ Complex, multi-faceted, formal process
 - ◆ Large working groups
 - ◆ Seminars
 - ◆ 3-star & 4-star conferences
 - ◆ War games
 - ◆ Co-chairs: VADM Leighton Smith (OP-06) & LtGen Hank Stackpole USMC (PP&O) (OPSDEPs)
 - ◆ Working Group oversight: RADM Ted Baker & MGen M. Caulfield
 - ◆ CAPT (Ret) Bill Manthorpe & "Manthorpe curve" presentation
 - ◆ Several products
 - ◆ Included "White Paper:" *The Strategic Concept of the Naval Service*

692

...From The Sea (1992)

- ♦ How it was written (II)
 - ♦ NFCPE products influential but not definitive
 - ♦ Flag officer inputs, esp ADM Miller, VADM Tuttle
 - ♦ Wholesale rewriting: Personalities: VADM Leighton Smith, LtGen Stackpole, BGen-SEL Wilkerson, CAPT Petrea, etc.
 - ♦ Endgame (more rewriting): VADM Smith, CAPT Petrea, Gen Krulak, new OPNAV N8 VADM Owens, new SECNAV O'Keefe & CDR Stavridis
 - ♦ Endgame coincident w/ VADM Owens's new OPNAV Assessment Process & OPNAV reorganization
 - ♦ Contractor drafting & polishing support (Dr. Scott Truver)
 - ♦ USMC very much a co-equal player throughout
 - ♦ CMC Gen Mundy had been PP&O for *The Maritime Strategy* (IV)
 - ♦ BGen-SEL Tom Wilkerson active (had been principal USMC POC for *The Maritime Strategy* (I) & (II))

693

...From The Sea (1992)

- ♦ Key ideas (I)
 - ♦ Times have changed; so has the Navy
 - ♦ Acknowledged demise of Soviet Union unequivocally
 - ♦ “fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea to joint operations conducted *from the sea*”
 - ♦ *Regional, joint, forward, littoral, enabling, expeditionary*
 - ♦ Shift from global threat to regional challenges
 - ♦ Enormous uncertainty in critical regions
 - ♦ Extensive development of sea-shore *littoral warfare* concepts
 - ♦ *Littoral* reaches as far as 650 nm inland

694

...From The Sea (1992)

◆ Key ideas (II)

- ◆ Emphasis on joint & combined operations
- ◆ Emphasis on Navy-Marine Corps integration
- ◆ “de-emphasize efforts in some warfare areas”
- ◆ Naval services as *enabling & continuing to participate*
- ◆ Conventional strategic defense, incl. theater missile defense
- ◆ Need to “structure a fundamentally different naval force”
 - ◆ Call for “New Expeditionary Force Packages”
 - ◆ Integrated Naval Expeditionary Forces & Naval Expeditionary Task Forces (NETFs)

695

...From The Sea (1992)

◆ Key ideas (III)

- ◆ “Sealift is an enduring mission for the Navy”
- ◆ Peacekeeping, coalition building, humanitarian ops
- ◆ Naval “Maneuver from the sea” a potent tool for the JTF commander
- ◆ Mandated actions, incl:
 - ◆ Create NAVDOCCOM (alternating RADM/MajGen command)
 - ◆ COMUSNAVCENT as VADM
 - ◆ Create “new naval force packages for expeditionary ops”
 - ◆ Expand integration of USN & USMC TACAIR
 - ◆ Fully integrate SSNs, MPA, MWF into expeditionary task forces

696

...From The Sea (1992)

- ◆ Key ideas (IV)
 - ◆ Cited 6 “maritime capabilities”
 - ◆ Powerful yet unobtrusive presence
 - ◆ Strategic deterrence
 - ◆ Control of the seas
 - ◆ Extended and continuous on-scene crisis response
 - ◆ Project precise power from the sea
 - ◆ Provide sealift if larger-scale warfighting scenarios emerge

697

...From The Sea (1992)

- ◆ Key ideas (V)
 - ◆ But later cited 4 “traditional operational capabilities”
 - ◆ Forward deployment
 - ◆ Crisis response
 - ◆ Strategic deterrence
 - ◆ Sealift
 - ◆ To which it then added . . .

698

...From The Sea (1992)

◆ Key ideas (VI)

- ◆ . . . 4 required “key operational capabilities”
in addition to the 4 traditional capabilities
 1. Command, control and surveillance
 - ◆ Naval Force commanders as Joint Force Commanders
 2. Battlespace dominance
 - ◆ Beyond mere sea control (which is never mentioned)
 - ◆ “Decisive power on and below the sea, on land, and in the air”
 3. Power projection
 - ◆ “Joint operations between Naval and Air Force strike assets . . . have become standard”
 4. Force sustainment
 - ◆ Including strategic sealift


699

...From The Sea (1992)

◆ Key ideas (VII)

- ◆ Based on feedback from Capitol Hill & defense policy experts:
 - ◆ Deliberately more focus on forward littoral warfighting
 - ◆ Deliberately less focus on forward peacetime presence operations & requirements

700



...From The Sea (1992)

CNA

- ◆ What was new? (I)
 - ◆ Focus on strike and power projection
 - ◆ *No mention of sea control*
 - ◆ 1st mention of maritime interdiction operations
 - ◆ 1st discussion of sea-based theater missile defense
 - ◆ 1st discussion of maneuver from the sea

702

...From The Sea (1992)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ What was new? (II)
 - ◆ Heavy USMC influence
 - ◆ Naval Expeditionary Forces & Naval Expeditionary Task Forces
 - ◆ Mandated actions

703

...From The Sea (1992)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ What was new? (III)
 - ◆ 4 “key operational capabilities”
 - ◆ Command, Control and surveillance
 - ◆ Battlespace dominance
 - ◆ Power projection
 - ◆ Force sustainment
 - ◆ These would morph over time into 4 Sea Power 21 “pillars”
 - ◆ FORCENet
 - ◆ Sea Shield
 - ◆ Sea Strike
 - ◆ Sea Basing

704

...From The Sea (1992)

- ◆ Not addressed
 - ◆ World trade issues & globalization
 - ◆ Sea control
 - ◆ Surge capabilities & operations
 - ◆ Terrorism, piracy and drug-trafficking
 - ◆ Threats to the homeland
 - ◆ U.S. merchant marine, industrial base, shipbuilding
 - ◆ Non-governmental organizations
- ◆ Explicit de-emphasis of ASW

705

... From the Sea (1992)

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses (I)
 - ◆ SECNAV Sean O'Keefe, "Be Careful What You Ask For," USNI *Proceedings* (Jan 1993)
 - ◆ Tom Barnett & Hank Gaffney, "It's Going to be a Bumpy Ride," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Jan 1993)
 - ◆ Col Gary Anderson USMC, *Beyond Mahan: A Proposal for a U.S. Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century* (Aug 1993)
 - ◆ CAPT Bradd Hayes, "Keeping the Naval Service Relevant," (USNI *Proceedings* Oct 1993)
 - ◆ Jan Breemer, "Naval Strategy is Dead," USNI *Proceedings* (Feb 1994); & "The End of Naval Strategy," *Strategic Review* (Spring 1994)

706

706

... From the Sea (1992)

CNA

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses (II)
 - ◆ CAPT Ed Smith, "What '... From the Sea' Didn't Say" (NWCR 1995)
 - ◆ VADM Bill Owens, *High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World* (1995); *Lifting the Fog of War* (2000)
 - ◆ "The Main Aspects of the 'New U.S. Naval Strategy,' in Meconis & Makeev (eds.), *U.S.-Russian Naval Cooperation* (1996)
 - ◆ Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map* (2004)
 - ◆ CAPT Terry Pierce, *Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation* (2004)
 - ◆ CAPT Bill Manthorpe (Ret), "Personal Reflections," *Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly* (Fall 2005 & Winter 2006)

707

...From The Sea (1992)

CNA

- ◆ Criticisms (I)
 - ◆ Many in USN saw USMC influence as too heavy
 - ◆ Integrated Naval Expeditionary Forces & Naval Expeditionary Task Forces gained little traction in USN
 - ◆ CVBGs, ARGs & SSNs continued to train & deploy separately
 - ◆ Many in USN saw "integration" as "subordination". Resisted both.
 - ◆ Downplayed traditional "blue water" naval tasks too much
 - ◆ Not transformational enough; still informed by too much Cold War thinking
 - ◆ USN can't implement
 - ◆ Despite positive statements on jointness, no call for *integrated* joint operations

708

...From The Sea (1992)

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◆ Criticisms (II)

- ◆ Subsequent Navy programs & budgets not aligned enough with the rhetoric
 - ◆ Not enough emphasis in programs & budgets on the littorals
 - ◆ Programs & budgets still too "blue water" & "high end"
 - ◆ Document developed separately from & subsequent to USN 451-ship Base Force Battle Force goal; prior to VADM Owens (as OPNAV N-8) force structure changes

709

...From The Sea (1992)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Influence:

- ◆ Wide. Cited in Posture Statements. Resource for flag officer speeches & testimony. Taught at war colleges.
- ◆ Some civilian defense expert commentary
- ◆ Modest direct influence on USN POM development
- ◆ But provided conceptual underpinnings for USN programmatic, operational emphasis on strike warfare; de-emphasis of ASW; acceptance of joint & USAF doctrine, TTP
- ◆ Considerable influence on British naval thinking
- ◆ Influence continued despite resignation/retirement of SECNAV & CNO soon after signature

710

...From The Sea (1992)



- ◆ Why did it have this influence? (I)
 - ◆ Active distribution by Secretariat, OPNAV, HQMC
 - ◆ Coordinated media campaign
 - ◆ Example of *The Maritime Strategy*
 - ◆ Navy at all levels hungering for a new “white paper”
 - ◆ Declarations from SECNAV & CNO that this was it

711

...From The Sea (1992)



- ◆ Why did it have this influence? (II)
 - ◆ Reflected actual fleet operations & changing fleet composition & basing structure
 - ◆ Useful in justifying concomitant changes in OPNAV organization & program planning processes
 - ◆ But its organizing constructs were immediately superseded for *OPNAV internal program planning* by Joint Mission Area Assessments (JMAs)
 - ◆ Timing did not matter
 - ◆ Last months of George H.W. Bush Republican administration

712

...From The Sea (1992)


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- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Significant
 - ◆ Focus on littoral & strike continued
 - ◆ Cited in *NDP-1, Forward...From the Sea, Navy Operational Concept*, "Anytime, Anywhere"; NSPGs, *Naval Operational Concept, Sea Power 21, Naval Operations Concept*
 - ◆ 4 "key operational capabilities" repeated in *NDP-1*; renamed, embedded and expanded upon in NSPG 2000; and renamed yet again as in *Naval Power 21, Sea Power 21, NOCJO*, and *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08*
 - ◆ Cited in CMC *Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS)* concept (Jan 2006)
 - ◆ Cited in Dec 2007 CNO testimony on *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Dec 2007)

713

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA
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NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

◆ Overview


- ◆ Signed by CNO ADM Kelso & CMC Gen Mundy
- ◆ Billed as "doctrine"
- ◆ Primary target: All US Navy & Marine personnel, active & reserve
- ◆ UNCLAS glossy new Naval Doctrine Pub (NDP), & on the web
- ◆ Principles of war; maneuver warfare
- ◆ War, deterrence, presence, OOTW
- ◆ Close Navy-Marine Corps integration
- ◆ Very joint & combined
- ◆ Continued use as a reference in 2008 (largely outside USN)

715

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

◆ Signed by:

- ◆ CNO ADM Frank B. Kelso, Jr.
 - ◆ 3rd year in office
- ◆ CMC Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr.



716

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA

- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as “Doctrine”
 - ◆ Long UNCLAS glossy new Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) (Mar 1994)
 - ◆ 76 pages
 - ◆ Put on the web
 - ◆ Deliberately similar in format to Joint Doctrine Pubs

717

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA

- ◆ Why it was written
 - ◆ USN unhappy Desert Storm experience with USAF-dominated joint air command and control doctrine
 - ◆ Fill externally- and internally-felt need for Navy strategy & operations to become more doctrinally-based
 - ◆ To tie Navy doctrine more closely to joint and USMC doctrine – especially maneuver style of warfare
 - ◆ Provide a basis for a future family of USN doctrinal pubs
 - ◆ Part of wholesale overhaul of USN warfare Pub system (NWP 1-01)
 - ◆ First of a planned series of 6 NDPs
 - ◆ To reinforce concepts in . . . *From the Sea*
 - ◆ Primary target: All US military & defense civilians

718

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (I)

- ◆ 2nd year of Clinton (D) administration (1993-2001)
- ◆ SECDEFs Aspin (1993-4) & Perry (1994-7)
- ◆ Outgoing CNO ADM Kelso (1990-94)
- ◆ CJCS GEN Shalikashvili
- ◆ Jointness & joint doctrinal frenzy
 - ◆ Goldwater-Nichols Act had strengthened CJCS joint doctrinal responsibilities (1986)

719

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (II)

- ◆ USN still traumatized by Desert Storm experience
 - ◆ Including joint commander direction that JFACC doctrine be used
- ◆ Civil-military relations debates in academia
- ◆ Adaptive Joint Force Packages deployed & debated (1993-4)
 - ◆ CINCUSACOM ADM Paul David Miller
- ◆ USN in 1994: 388 ships; 4 new ships authorized
 - ◆ Downward trend in force level
- ◆ USN-USMC differences accelerating, over joint & amphibious operations command relationships

720

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA

- ◆ Context (III)
 - ◆ New OPNAV Joint Mission Areas Assessment Process (JMAs) (Sep 1992- 1998)
 - ◆ 7 new Navy mission-area categories
 - ◆ Joint strike
 - ◆ Joint littoral warfare
 - ◆ Joint surveillance
 - ◆ Joint Space-Electronic Warfare/Intelligence
 - ◆ Strategic deterrence
 - ◆ Strategic sealift/protection
 - ◆ Presence

721

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA

- ◆ Cited references
 - ◆ 3rd & last Bush *National Security Strategy* (1993)
 - ◆ DoD Directive 5100.1 (Functions Paper) (1993)
 - ◆ 1st CJCS (Powell) *National Military Strategy* (1992)
 - ◆ New Joint Pub 1: *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces* (1991)
 - ◆ *The Maritime Strategy* (1980s)
 - ◆ ...*From the Sea* (1992)

722

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA

- ◆ Suggested follow-on reading
 - ◆ Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (1993)
 - ◆ FMFM 1, *Warfighting* (1989)
 - ◆ FMF 1-2, *Role of the Marine Corps in National Defense* (1991)
 - ◆ Army FM 100-5, *Operations* (1993)
 - ◆ "AirLand Battle Future"
 - ◆ AFM 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force* (1992)
 - ◆ Clausewitz, Corbett, Liddell Hart, Wylie, Mahan, Sun Tzu

723

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications
 - ◆ *Bottom-Up Review* (BUR) (1993)
 - ◆ 2 near-simultaneous MRCs. State-on-state wars
 - ◆ USN sized for presence as well as MRCs
 - ◆ ADM P.D. Miller monographs
 - ◆ CJCS Report on *Roles, Missions, & Functions* (1993)
 - ◆ Russell Weigley, "The American Military" (1993), etc.
 - ◆ Defense academics posit a crisis in US civil-military relations
 - ◆ NWP 1-01 *The Naval Warfare Publication System* (1994)
 - ◆ Annual SSG Reports

724

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ How it was written (I)

- ◆ Drafted at new Naval Doctrine Command (est. 1993)
 - ◆ CDR Rob Zalaskus (AO) with Col Marv Floom USMC (DEPCOMNAVDOCCOM)
 - ◆ Mostly fleet sailors. Few with background in strategy/concepts/ doctrine
 - ◆ But also: Dr. Jim Tritten; CAPT (Ret) Sam Leeds (ex-SSG 1), Floyd Kennedy (CNA Field Rep)
- ◆ Strong COMNAVDOCCOM command support (RADM Fred Lewis)
- ◆ Used USAF & USA doctrine pubs as models, but more condensed

725

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA

◆ How it was written (II)

- ◆ Adopted same paperback format as new Joint Doctrinal Pubs
 - ◆ Advocated by CAPT Peter Bulkeley, Head of NAVDOCCOM Doctrine Branch
 - ◆ Little AO-level outreach for inputs/ to obtain buy-in
 - ◆ Little early or continuous engagement w/ outside experts, academia
 - ◆ Numerous active & retired flag review boards
 - ◆ USNI edit & photos. Commercially printed.
 - ◆ Oral history of project recorded (Tritten-Zalaskus)
- ◆ NDPs 2, __, 4, 5, 6 published
- ◆ USN & USMC could never agree on NDP 3 content
 - ◆ Dozens of drafts attempted

726

NDP1: Naval Warfare (1994)



727

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)



- ◆ Key ideas (I):
 - ◆ Who we are: The nature of naval services
 - ◆ Ready. Flexible. Sustainable. Mobile.
 - ◆ What we do: Employment of naval forces
 - ◆ Deterrence, forward presence, NOOTW, sealift, joint ops, etc.
 - ◆ How we fight: Naval Warfare
 - ◆ Styles. Conduct. Principles. Preparation.
 - ◆ Where we are headed: Into the 21st century
 - ◆ C2S. Battlespace dominance. Power projection. Etc.

728

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (II):

- ◆ Doctrine matters to the USN
 - ◆ Link between strategy & tactics, techniques & procedures
- ◆ “The uses of military force are being redirected toward regional contingencies and political persuasion, moving away from the prospect of all-or-nothing global war with another superpower”
- ◆ US & global economic dependence on sea-based commerce, including continued oil availability
- ◆ “What we do:” E.g.: 10 characteristics, incl. Deterrence, presence, war from the sea, war at sea, sealift, etc.
 - ◆ Turner 4 missions embedded & reordered

729

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (III):

- ◆ “While naval forces are built to fight and win wars, perhaps as important, is their contribution to deterring conflict”
- ◆ “ . . . Naval forces prepare to fight and win wars. We also play an important role in preventing them”
- ◆ Shift from blue-ocean maritime strategy to joint, littoral , enabling operations . . . from the sea
- ◆ Littoral warfare

730

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (IV):

- ◆ (Joint) distinctions between “roles,” “missions,” “functions”
- ◆ Emphasis on the offensive, task organization
- ◆ Emphasis on integrated joint & multinational ops
- ◆ Naval services as enabling force
- ◆ Naval operations— other than war
- ◆ Humanitarian assistance operations
- ◆ Combat terrorism
- ◆ Counter-drug operations

731

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (V):

- ◆ All naval (not just amphibious) forces prefer *maneuver* style of warfare over *attrition* style
 - ◆ USMC influence
- ◆ USCG a major partner: “three maritime services”
 - ◆ Integration of USCG ops & relationships throughout
- ◆ Coastal/riverine interdiction a sub-set of naval SPECWAR
- ◆ Levels of war
 - ◆ Tactical, operational, strategic
- ◆ USN, USMC, USCG historical vignettes
 - ◆ Technique borrowed from *Joint Pub 1*
- ◆ Recommended reading list

732

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA

- ◆ Key ideas (VI):
 - ◆ Critical operational capabilities naval expeditionary forces can provide:
 1. Command, control and surveillance
 2. Battlespace dominance
 3. Power projection
 4. Force sustainment
 - ◆ Repeated from . . . *From the Sea* & amplified

7.13

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA

- ◆ What was new (I)
 - ◆ NDPs themselves
 - ◆ Emphasis on *doctrine* & its role in the Navy
 - ◆ Discussion of *operational level of war*
 - ◆ Applicability of *maneuver style of warfare* to all naval warfare, not just amphibious ops

7.14

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA

- ◆ What was new (II)
 - ◆ 1st mention of *maritime intercept operations* (MIO)
 - ◆ 1st mention of *non-governmental organizations* (NGOs)
 - ◆ 1st extended substantive treatment of HA/DR ops
 - ◆ Inclusion of analysis of classic “Principles of War”
 - ◆ Unique among Navy capstone documents

735

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA

- ◆ Not addressed (I)
 - ◆ Surge capabilities & operations
 - ◆ Mine warfare
 - ◆ Sea based ballistic *missile defense*
 - ◆ *Sea basing*
 - ◆ Threats to the U.S. *homeland*
 - ◆ Threats from *piracy*
 - ◆ U.S. *Merchant Marine*
 - ◆ U.S. government *inter-agency* partners
 - ◆ *Partner navies*
 - ◆ Although partner military forces generally mentioned

736

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA

- ◆ Not addressed (II)
 - ◆ Links to *force levels, programming & budgeting*
 - ◆ *Joint Mission Area (JMA) categorization scheme* used in OPNAV program planning
 - ◆ Naval Expeditionary Forces or Naval Expeditionary Task Forces
- ◆ Little on *Information Warfare*

737

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses (I)
 - ◆ CAPT Wayne Hughes USN (Ret), *Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice* (1986)
 - ◆ "Book Reviews," US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Dec 1994)
 - ◆ ADM David E Jeremiah USN (Ret)
 - ◆ COL Peter F. Herrly USA
 - ◆ Col John A. Warden III USAF
 - ◆ Dr. Scott Truver

738

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses (II)
 - ◆ CDR James Tritton USN (Ret)
 - ◆ Naval Doctrine Command in-house civilian doctrine guru (1993-)
 - ◆ PhD USC; Former OP-60 AO, NPS maritime strategy professor
 - ◆ Large oeuvre on naval doctrine (1990s)
 - ◆ Milan Vego, "Dangerous Waters: Ignoring Operational Art at Sea Could Doom U.S. Maritime Strategy," *Armed Forces Journal* (Oct 2007)

739

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA

- ◆ Criticisms:
 - ◆ Deterrence requires more than shows of force
 - ◆ More than one "center of gravity" is possible
 - ◆ Overstated Navy ability to operate autonomously
 - ◆ Not enough on naval operational art; too tactical
 - ◆ Imperfect fit with joint doctrine
 - ◆ Little of substance
 - ◆ Substance deferred to *NDP 3*, which was never signed

740

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)



◆ Influence: Modest

- ◆ Little influence within the US Navy
 - ◆ VADM Morgan cited in "Principles of War" article (2003)
- ◆ **But secondary audiences still use, even in 2009**
 - ◆ Taught at other service & allied war colleges, other schools
 - ◆ Cited in other service, allied, academic writings
 - ◆ Used by modeling & simulation community, civilian naval analysts

741

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)



◆ What accounted for its modest influence? (I)

- ◆ Answered no fleet need
- ◆ Lack of an *NDP 3 Naval Operations* discredited entire NDP series within USN
 - ◆ Strong USN-USMC disagreements on command relationships
- ◆ Spotty CNO follow-through & USN publicity
 - ◆ E.g.: In 1994 *Posture Statement*, but not 1995
- ◆ Salience of doctrine in USN waxed, then waned
 - ◆ USN slowly embraced TACAIR operational integration with USAF
- ◆ Not directive in nature
 - ◆ "If it stimulates discussion, promotes further study, and instills in readers a feeling of ownership . . . then *NDP 1* will have properly served its purpose"

742

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

- ◆ What accounted for its modest influence? (II)
 - ◆ USN remained wary/uninterested/unaccepting of doctrine
 - ◆ USN bristled at CJCS direction that joint doctrine is “authoritative; as such, commanders will apply this doctrine except when exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise” (July 1994)
 - ◆ NAVDOCCOM disestablished; functions subsumed under new NWDC (1998)
 - ◆ CNO ADM Kelso left office immediately after. No apparent interest by his successors
 - ◆ Subsequent parade of NOCs usurped intended *NDP 1* role as bridge betw/ strategy & tactics, techniques & procedures
 - ◆ Little AO-level buy-in by OPNAV, fleets, Naval War College
 - ◆ “Not invented here”

743

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

- ◆ What accounted for its modest influence? (III)
 - ◆ Navy officers suspicious of emphasis on maneuver warfare, viewing it as symptomatic of too strong USMC influence
 - ◆ Overshadowed by competing capstone documents
 - ◆ . . . *From the Sea* (1992)
 - ◆ *Forward . . . From the Sea* (1994)
 - ◆ But “Doctrine” did not have negative connotations outside USN that it had inside
 - ◆ “Naval Doctrine Pub 1” had (unjustified) aura of importance & authoritativeness, to outsiders

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NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ♦ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ♦ Minimal
 - ♦ Never updated, despite tasking in NOCJO (2003)
 - ♦ Otherwise, never cited
- ♦ Influence on subsequent non-Navy documents
 - ♦ Appreciably more
 - ♦ E.g.: One of only 2 USN documents cited in Joint Pub 5-0 *Joint Operation Planning* (Dec 2006)

745

ADM Jeremy M. Boorda (CNO Apr 1994-May 1996)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ♦ Oct 1994 *Forward...From the Sea*
 - ♦ “A strategic concept”



746

ADM Jeremy M. Boorda (CNO Apr 1994-May 1996)



CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Surface warfare officer
 - ◆ Followed 3 submariner CNOs
- ◆ With his staff, sought to update ...*From the Sea*
- ◆ Influenced by preceding tour as NATO CINCSOUTH & USN CINCUSNAVEUR (Adriatic operations)
- ◆ Also pursuing “2020 Vision” drafting effort
- ◆ Signature program: “Arsenal Ship”
- ◆ Continued strains in USN-USMC relations

747

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis



748

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Overview

- ◆ Signed by SECNAV Dalton, CNO ADM Boorda, CMC Gen Mundy
- ◆ Billed as a “strategic concept”
- ◆ Principal target: Many, esp. USN officer corps
- ◆ UNCLAS. *Proceedings & Gazette* articles, stand-alone pub, & on the web
- ◆ Emphasis on combat credible forward presence in & between 3 hubs
- ◆ Reaffirmed traditional sea control ops
- ◆ Still cited in 2006 *Naval Operations Concept*

749

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA

◆ Signed by:

- ◆ SECNAV John H. Dalton
- ◆ CNO ADM Jeremy M. Boorda
 - ◆ During 1st year in office
- ◆ CMC Gen Carl E. Mundy



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Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as a “strategic concept”
 - ◆ UNCLAS Oct 1994 *Marine Corps Gazette* & Dec 1994 USNI *Proceedings* articles & stand-alone pub
 - ◆ Very short: 4 pages
 - ◆ Put on the web
 - ◆ Cited in 1995-2000 *Posture Statements*

751

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Why it was written
 - ◆ To improve visibility of combat-credible forward presence as a central US naval concept, primarily to protect US Navy force structure
 - ◆ To capitalize on new Clinton Administration *Bottom-Up Review* policy decision to use forward presence as justification for Navy forces, as well as MTWs
 - ◆ To supplement Republican SECNAV O’Keefe’s . . . *From the Sea* and put a Clinton Democrat SECNAV Dalton imprimatur on USN concepts
 - ◆ For the Navy, to distance itself from the NETF concept
 - ◆ To underpin US Navy inputs to the ongoing CORM
 - ◆ Principal target: Many, esp. USN officer corps

752

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

- ◆ Context (I)

- ◆ US voters repudiated Bush administration (1992)
- ◆ 2nd year of new Clinton (D) administration (1993-2001)
 - ◆ SECDEF Aspin (1993-94); SECDEF Perry (1994-7)
 - ◆ SECNAV Dalton (1993-98)
- ◆ US economy starting to boom.
 - ◆ Unemployment rate, inflation rate, deficits falling
- ◆ DOD policy emphasis on Peace Operations
- ◆ New CNO ADM Boorda (1994-96)
- ◆ US Army, Air Force downsizing forward & coming home
- ◆ 1995 Commission On Roles & Missions (CORM) impending
- ◆ Civil-military relations debate in academia

753

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

- ◆ Context (II)

- ◆ Central DOD force-sizing requirement to fight 2 major regional wars (e.g.: North Korea & Iraq)
- ◆ OSD (NA) push re: RMA (from 1993 on)
- ◆ Declining USN force levels & budgets
 - ◆ 12th carrier, etc. justified by presence requirements,
 - ◆ USN in 1994: 388 ships; 4 new ships authorized
 - ◆ Down 78 ships from 1992 (. . . From the Sea)
 - ◆ Decommissioning of all 46 Knox-class ASW FFs concluding
- ◆ 346-ship *Bottom-Up Review* Battle Force goal (1993)
- ◆ “Don’t Ask; Don’t Tell” policy (2003)
- ◆ Southern Watch, Adriatic, Somalia, Haiti ops
- ◆ Islamic terrorist attack on WTC basement (1993)

754

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ Trade disputes threaten US relations with Japan
- ◆ Japanese economy stagnant
- ◆ LOS Treaty modified IAW US demands (1994)
- ◆ Bosnian War (1992-5)
- ◆ Somali civil war (1992-)
- ◆ Reengagement w/ PRC military leadership (1993)
- ◆ New PRC national military strategy promulgated
- ◆ Expansion of F/A-18E/F program, in wake of A-12 cancellation (1991)

755

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (IV)

- ◆ USN-Russian Navy submarine collision incidents (1992-3)
- ◆ 1st “Partnership for Peace” at-sea exercise (1994)
 - ◆ *Cooperative Venture 94*
 - ◆ Included NATO, Russian, Lithuanian, Polish, Swedish navies

756

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

♦ Context (V)

- ♦ CJCS *Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP)* process continuing
- ♦ Adaptive Joint Forces Packages deployed & debated (1993-4)
 - ♦ CINCUSACOM ADM P.D. Miller
- ♦ LANTCOM became USACOM (1993)
 - ♦ Adds focus on joint force integration
 - ♦ Navy-Marine Corps differences on implementing Naval Expeditionary Task Force vision of . . . *From the Sea & NDP 1 Naval Warfare*

757

Forward ...From The Sea (1994)

♦ Context (VI)

- ♦ VADM Owens as OPNAV N8 (1992-3)
- ♦ New OPNAV Joint Mission Areas (JMA) Assessment Process (Sep 1992- 1998)
 - ♦ 7 new Navy mission-area categories
 - ♦ Joint strike
 - ♦ Joint littoral warfare
 - ♦ Joint surveillance
 - ♦ Joint Space-Electronic Warfare/Intelligence
 - ♦ Strategic deterrence
 - ♦ Strategic sealift/protection
 - ♦ Presence

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Forward ...From The Sea (1994)

CNA

◆ Context (VII)

- ◆ OPNAV joint-inspired reorganization (since 1992)
 - ◆ Subordination and demotion of the platform barons
- ◆ New Expeditionary Warfare OPNAV division (N85), headed by USMC general (since 1992)
- ◆ Unofficial DC-area Navy Study Group (1992-2005)
 - ◆ Convener: Dr. David Rosenberg
 - ◆ Participants included *Forward . . . From the Sea* contributors

759

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA

◆ Cited references

- ◆ *Bottom-Up Review (BUR) (1993)*
 - ◆ 2 near-simultaneous MRCs. State-on-state wars
 - ◆ USN to be sized for presence as well as MRCs
- ◆ *1st Clinton National Security Strategy of Engagement & Enlargement (1994)*

◆ Also cited: ...*From the Sea*

760

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ 1st CJCS (Powell) *National Military Strategy* (1992)
 - ◆ CJCS *Report on Roles, Missions & Functions* (1993)
 - ◆ DoD *Nuclear Posture Review* (1994)
 - ◆ US nuclear arsenal reductions; retention of "hedge" forces
 - ◆ 4 SSBNs→SSGNs
 - ◆ USN eliminated ability to return TACNUKES to surface combatants
 - ◆ PDD 25: "US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" (1994)
 - ◆ Russell Weigley, "The American Military," (1993), etc.

761

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ DPG, CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS
 - ◆ DOD *Mobility Requirements Study* (1992)
 - ◆ "DON Lift 2" study & SECNAV decisions (1990)
 - ◆ *Force 21: 1993* (1st annual US Navy "Program Guide")
 - ◆ *FMFM 1 Warfighting* (1989)
 - ◆ ADM P.D. Miller monographs
 - ◆ CNO SSG Reports
 - ◆ Jan Bremer, "Naval Strategy is Dead," *Proceedings* (Feb 1994)
& "The End of Naval Strategy," *Strategic Review* (Spring 1994)

762

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ CAPT Linton Brooks (Ret), *Peacetime Influence Through Forward Naval Presence* (CNA 1993)
 - ◆ Tom Hirschfeld, *Multinational Naval Cooperation* (CNA 1993)
 - ◆ Brad Dismukes CNA studies on forward naval presence
 - ◆ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992)
 - ◆ Global triumph of Western liberal democracy
 - ◆ Michael Crichton, *Rising Sun* (book 1992; Sean Connery film 1993)
 - ◆ Japanese economic threat

763

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA

- ◆ How it was written
 - ◆ Personalities:
 - ◆ SECNAV Dalton, RADM Phil Dur (N51); CAPT Joe Sestak (N513); LCDR Ed O'Callahan (N513 AO); CDR Ed Smith; MajGen Tom Wilkerson (HQMC Plans); CAPT Robby Harris (OLA)
 - ◆ Development methodology
 - ◆ Drafted in OPNAV N51, with OLA impetus & HQMC participation
 - ◆ Heavy involvement of RADM DUR & MajGen Wilkerson
 - ◆ Workshop series
 - ◆ OPNAV N51 RADM Dur, "Presence: Forward, Ready, Engaged," *Proceedings* (June 1994) as trial balloon
 - ◆ Contractor drafting support (Dr. Scott Truver)

764

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (I):

- ◆ Updated and expanded strategic concepts in ...*From the Sea (1992)*
- ◆ Importance of forward deployed naval forces
- ◆ "The most important role of naval forces in situations short of war is to be engaged in forward areas, with the objective of *preventing* conflicts and controlling crises"
- ◆ Peace-crisis-war spectrum as organizing construct
- ◆ Resource reductions necessitate refocusing naval assets on highest priorities, most immediate challenges
- ◆ Emphasis on joint & combined exercises & ops

765

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (II):

- ◆ Humanitarian assistance & disaster relief ops
- ◆ Show effects of presence (+ process)
- ◆ Extending conventional deterrence & protective cover through sea-based theater ballistic missile defense
- ◆ Long-range deep-strike operations beyond the littoral
- ◆ Early forcible entry
- ◆ Very joint & combined
- ◆ Importance of sealift and its protection
- ◆ Naval forces as enabling & continuing participatory force
- ◆ Explicit link to DON budget changes in favor of littoral warfare and power projection forces

766

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Key ideas (III):
 - ◆ “Naval forces have five fundamental and enduring roles”:
 1. Projection of power from sea to land
 2. Sea control and maritime supremacy
 3. Strategic deterrence
 4. Strategic sealift
 5. Forward naval presence
 - ◆ Reordering & “Lehman expansion” of 4 Zumwalt/Turner missions

767

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ What was new?
 - ◆ Emphasis on “*preventing* conflict”
 - ◆ Efforts to measure effects of presence
 - ◆ 1st use of concept & term “sea bases”

768

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

- ◆ Not addressed (I)

- ◆ 4 "key operational capabilities" from . . . *From the Sea* & *NDP-1*
- ◆ Surge capabilities & operations
- ◆ Mine warfare
- ◆ Terrorism
- ◆ Piracy
- ◆ Drug-trafficking
- ◆ Threats to the U.S. homeland
- ◆ U.S. Coast Guard

769

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

- ◆ Not addressed (II)

- ◆ U.S. Merchant Marine
- ◆ U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
- ◆ U.S. government interagency partners
- ◆ Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
- ◆ Globalization
- ◆ Naval Expeditionary Forces or Naval Expeditionary Task Forces
- ◆ *Joint Mission Area* (JMA) categorization scheme used in OPNAV program planning since 1992

770

Forward . . . From the Sea (1994)

CNA

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses (I)
 - ◆ RADM Phil Dur, "Presence: Forward, Ready, Engaged," US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Jun 1994)
 - ◆ ADM J.M. Boorda, "The Art of the Long View: Enduring Naval Principles," *Vital Speeches* (Dec 1994)
 - ◆ Lt Col Frank Hoffman USMCR, "Stepping Forward Smartly: 'Forward . . . From the Sea,' The Emerging Expanded Naval Strategy," *Marine Corps Gazette* (Mar 1995)
 - ◆ Gen Carl Mundy, USMC (Ret) "NAVY marine corps team," US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Dec 1995)
 - ◆ ADM Frank Kelso, USN (Ret) response (US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Jan 1996)

771

Forward . . . From the Sea (1994)

CNA

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses (II)
 - ◆ "The Main Aspects of the 'New U.S. Naval Strategy,'" in Meconis & Makeev (eds.), *U.S.-Russian Naval Cooperation* (1996)
 - ◆ Dr. Ed Rhodes, ". . . From the Sea' and Back Again," *Naval War College Review* (1999)
 - ◆ CAPT Sam Tangredi, "Who's Afraid of the NETF?", US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (1999)
 - ◆ LCDR Jeff Macris, "Reform is Overdue," US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Nov 2001)

772

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

◆ Criticisms (I)

- ◆ A step backward in Navy-Marine Corps integration
- ◆ Effects of naval forward presence hard to quantify & prove
 - ◆ Over-promised positive effects
- ◆ Focus on presence downgraded readiness to surge
- ◆ Presence is costly & unsustainable
- ◆ Emphasis on “far inland” ops pulled USN away from littoral
- ◆ Not new & innovative; just an update of the Navy’s Cold War presence patterns & arguments

773

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

◆ Criticisms (II)

- ◆ USN programs, budgets not well aligned with the rhetoric
 - ◆ Not enough emphasis in programs & budgets on the littorals
 - ◆ Programs & budgets still too “blue water”
 - ◆ Document developed subsequent to & separately from *Bottom Up Review* (BUR) 346-ship USN Battle Force force level goal (1993)
- ◆ Little traction on Capitol Hill
- ◆ Rendered out of date by US policy & strategy changes following 9-11 Al Qaeda attacks on America (2001)

774

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Criticisms (III)

- ◆ Focus on “enabling” downplayed USN continuing participatory roles during major combat ops
 - ◆ “Foyer...From The Sea” canard
- ◆ Naval presence often unnecessary as joint force enabler
- ◆ Despite positive statements on jointness, no call for *integrated* joint operations. A step back from *NDP-1*
- ◆ Parochial focus on uniqueness of naval forward presence effects triggered violent backlash from Army & Air Force
- ◆ Combat-credible forward presence viewed as an oxymoron by other services. Forward naval force packages not viewed as combat-credible

775

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Influence (I)

- ◆ Widely cited; touted in Posture Statements; solidified Forward Presence as central USN tenet; Resource for flag officer speeches & testimony
- ◆ USMC often (but not always) ignored it
- ◆ Considerable influence on British naval thinking

776

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ Influence (II)

- ♦ Helped make Navy budget case for at least two years (but sowed seeds for subsequent Army/Air Force counter-attacks)
- ♦ Joint Staff, other services opposed as parochial, but emulated
 - ♦ Other services developed arguments for their own contributions to forward presence, & increased their own focus on/ capabilities for forward presence
 - ♦ Spawned USAF *Global Presence* White Paper (1995)
 - ♦ Joint Staff & COCOMs pressed for more control over forward naval ops, more naval integration with other service forward ops

777

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA

♦ Why did it have the influence it did? (I)

- ♦ Strong SECNAV & CNO support
- ♦ Advocacy by intelligent & aggressive USN flag officers, branch heads, action officers
- ♦ Reflected strong perceived USN need to explain forward presence rationale
- ♦ Responded to national strategy
- ♦ Reflected actual fleet deployments and operations

778

Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Why did it have the influence it did? (II)
 - ◆ USMC concern that USN returning to “blue water” focus
 - ◆ Mention of sea control and maritime supremacy
 - ◆ Capitol Hill interest is naval wartime requirements, not peacetime ops

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Forward...From The Sea (1994)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Significant
 - ◆ Focus on naval forward presence continued
 - ◆ Cited in *Navy Operational Concept; Anytime, Anywhere; NSPGs; Sea Power 21; Naval Operations Concept*
 - ◆ CMC cited in *Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS)* concept (Jan 2006)
 - ◆ CNO cited in testimony on *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Dec 2007)

780

ADM Jay L. Johnson (CNO May 1996-Jul 2000)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ May 1997 *Navy Operational Concept*
- ◆ Nov 1997 *Anytime, Anywhere*
 - ◆ A vision
- ◆ Aug 1999 *Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (POM-02) (SECRET)*
- ◆ Apr 2000 *Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (POM-03) (UNCLAS)*



781

ADM Jay L. Johnson (CNO May 1996-Jul 2000)

CNA

- ◆ Naval aviator
- ◆ Trying to keep Navy public profile low, in the wake of much “bad news”
- ◆ Documents aimed at internal Navy audiences only
- ◆ Reluctance to sign up to all SECNAV Danzig concepts
- ◆ Continued USN-USMC disagreements
- ◆ Signature program: F/A-18E/F

782

1990s: Negative publicity on USN (I)

- ◆ “Illi Wind” DON corruption investigation, convictions (1988-94)
- ◆ USS *Iowa* explosion & investigation (1989-)
- ◆ A-12 cancellation & lawsuits (1991-)
- ◆ “Tailhook” scandal & investigation (1991-2)
- ◆ Accidental USN CV missile firing on Turkish DD (1992)
- ◆ USNA cheating scandal (1992-4)
- ◆ SECNAV & SN Garrett favoritism verdict (1994)

763


1990s: Negative publicity on USN (II)

- ◆ LT Kara Hultgreen crash (1994)
- ◆ Failed ADM Stan Arthur CINCPAC nomination (1994)
- ◆ CINCPAC ADM Macke gaffe (1995)
- ◆ Larry DiRita *Proceedings* article censorship issue (1995)
- ◆ Greg Vistica book *Fall from Glory* (1995)
- ◆ ADM Mike Boorda suicide (1996)
- ◆ USN sonars implicated in whale strandings (1990s)

784

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

CNA



785

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

CNA

♦ Overview

- ♦ Signed by CNO ADM Johnson
- ♦ Billed as an “operational concept”
- ♦ Current & future concepts
- ♦ Principal target: USN officer corps
- ♦ UNCLAS. CNO e-mail to flags; then on web; then *Sea Power* article
- ♦ Tied to CJCS strategy & vision
- ♦ *Operational maneuver & speed of command* concepts
- ♦ Little influence

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Navy Operational Concept (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Signed by:
 - ◆ CNO ADM Jay L. Johnson
 - ◆ During 1st year in office



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Navy Operational Concept (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as an “Operational concept”
 - ◆ Actually both current & future concepts
 - ◆ Short: 8 pages.
 - ◆ UNCLAS.
 - ◆ CNO Jan 1997 e-mail to flag officers, then published on the web; then later in *Sea Power* (May 1997)
 - ◆ Cited in 1998 *Posture Statement* & OPNAV N51-drafted OPNAVINSTs

788

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

◆ Why it was written

- ◆ To stimulate future internal USN doctrinal innovation & elevate future USN contributions to joint doctrine
- ◆ To answer some internal Navy concerns that USN forward presence & enabling focus had become stale & even counter-productive in joint, OSD arenas
- ◆ To set forth new concepts of naval operational maneuver & speed of command
- ◆ To present a Navy concept of equal stature to USMC's *Operational Maneuver From the Sea*
- ◆ Not to supplant or compete with...FTS & F...FTS as capstone Navy documents (and program drivers)
- ◆ Highlight that naval forces not only enabling but also complementary & amplifying, & useful post-conflict
- ◆ Tie Navy to CJCS *Joint Vision 2010*
- ◆ Principal target: USN (& USMC) officer corps

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Navy Operational Concept (1997)

◆ Context (I)

- ◆ 2nd Clinton (D) administration term (1997-2001)
- ◆ US economy booming
 - ◆ Unemployment rate, inflation rate, deficits falling
- ◆ SECDEF Perry (1994-7)
- ◆ 1st Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in progress
- ◆ National Defense Panel (NDP) deliberations ongoing
- ◆ Increasing jointness
- ◆ CNO ADM Boorda (1994-96)
 - ◆ NOOK "2020 Vision" draft (1995-7) (aborted)
 - ◆ "Arsenal ship" concept (1995-7) (aborted)
- ◆ New CNO ADM Johnson (1996-2000)

790

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (II)

- ◆ US force planning for 2 major regional wars (e.g.: North Korea & Iraq)
 - ◆ North Korean nuclear weapons program frozen by international agreement (1994)
- ◆ Reduced US interest in military ground interventions overseas
 - ◆ Failed Somali interventions 1993-4
 - ◆ Minimal intervention in Rwanda genocide (1994)
 - ◆ Khobar Towers Islamic terrorist bombing (1996)
- ◆ UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in force (1994)

791

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ Southern Watch & Adriatic SEAD & strike ops (from 1991)
- ◆ Fifth Fleet created (1995)
- ◆ USAF AEF deployment to Bahrain (1995)
- ◆ Desert Strike (1996)

792

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ Context (IV)

- ♦ Korea show-of-force (1994)
- ♦ Russians deliver 4 Kilo subs to PRC (1995-8)
- ♦ PLAN occupied Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in Spratley Islands (Feb 1995)
- ♦ USN port visits to PRC resume (Mar 1995)
 - ♦ 1st PVST to PRC since 1989
- ♦ Aum Shinrikyo cult biological attack in Japan (1995)
- ♦ Taiwan Straits Crisis (1996)

793

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ Context (V)

- ♦ Declining USN force levels & budgets
- ♦ 1997 QDR USN force goal: 305 ships
- ♦ USN in 1997: 354 BF ships; 4 ships authorized
- ♦ F/A-18E/F acquisition priority
- ♦ Abortive OPNAV 2020 Vision effort
- ♦ Fleet Battle Experiments (FBE) begun (1996)
- ♦ *Multinational Maritime Operations* published (1996)
- ♦ USMC frictions
 - ♦ *Operational Maneuver From the Sea* (OMFTS) (1996)
 - ♦ MCDP1-1 Strategy (1997)
 - ♦ Major MCCDC concept development efforts on-going

794

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (VI)

- ◆ OPNAV program planning still using Joint Mission Areas Assessment Process (JMAs) (Sep 1992-1998)
 - ◆ 7 Navy mission-area categories
 - ◆ Joint strike
 - ◆ Joint littoral warfare
 - ◆ Joint surveillance
 - ◆ Joint Space-Electronic Warfare/Intelligence
 - ◆ Strategic deterrence
 - ◆ Strategic sealift/protection
 - ◆ Presence

795

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (VII)

- ◆ Influence of network-minded flag officers (ADMs Owens, Tuttle, Clemins, Cebrowski)
- ◆ CNO ADM Boorda redirected SSG from "strategy" to generation of "innovative future naval warfare concepts" (1995)
- ◆ Last annual ADM Charles M. Cooke Conference for Naval Strategists & Planners (1995)
- ◆ Unofficial DC-area Navy Study Group (1992-2005)
 - ◆ Convener: Dr. David Rosenberg
 - ◆ Participants included NOC contributors

796

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- ◆ Cited references (I)
 - ◆ CJCS GEN Shalikashvili *National Military Strategy* (1995)
 - ◆ "A Strategy for Flexible and Selective Engagement"
 - ◆ CJCS GEN Shalikashvili *Joint Vision 2010* (1996)
 - ◆ First CJCS vision statement
 - ◆ Heavy influence by ADM Owens & VADM Cebrowski

797

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- ◆ Cited references (II)
 - ◆ New CNO ADM Johnson "vision for the Navy" speech (1996)
 - ◆ 4 guiding stars: operational primacy, leadership, teamwork, pride
 - ◆ Drafted by CNO speechwriter LT Bryan McGrath
 - ◆ ...*From the Sea* (1992)
 - ◆ *Forward...From the Sea* (1994)

798

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ 3rd Clinton *National Security Strategy* (1996)
 - ◆ PDD 25 *Peace Operations* (1994)
 - ◆ PD 39 *US Policy on Counterterrorism* (1995)
 - ◆ CORM report *Directions for Defense* (1995)
 - ◆ Revised Joint Pub 1: *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (1995)
 - ◆ DoD *Nuclear Posture Review* (1994)
 - ◆ US nuclear arsenal reductions; retention of "hedge" forces
 - ◆ DOD *Mobility Requirements Study* (1995)
 - ◆ DOD-DOT MOA on USN & USCG (1995)

799

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ VCJCS ADM Bill Owens, *High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World* (1995)
 - ◆ Mundy, Kelso, Mixson duels in *Proceedings* (1995-6)
 - ◆ VCJCS ADM Bill Owens, "The Emerging U.S. System-of-Systems," INSS (Feb 1996)
 - ◆ CMC "Operational Maneuver From The Sea" (OMFTS) concept (1996)
 - ◆ MCDP 1 *Warfighting* (1997)

800

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ NAVDOCCOM *Multi-lateral Maritime Operations (MMOPS)* pub (1996)
 - ◆ BR 1806, *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine* (1995)
 - ◆ “Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force”(1996)
 - ◆ Col Charles Dunlap USAF, “How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007,” (Jan 1996)

801

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
 - ◆ Harlan Ullman & James Wade, *Shock & Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance* (1996)
 - ◆ Greg Vistica, *Fall From Glory: The Men Who Sank the U.S. Navy* (1996)
 - ◆ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996)
 - ◆ Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (1996)
 - ◆ Andrew Krepinevich, *A New Navy for a New Era* (CSBA, 1996)

802

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- ◆ How it was written (I)
 - ◆ Originally a CMC (Gen Krulak) initiative for a *Naval Operational Concept*
 - ◆ USMC wary of *F... FTS* and NOOK "2020 Vision" as return to "blue water"
 - ◆ OPNAV N513 (CAPT Bouchard) had planted seed
 - ◆ USN wariness of NAVDOCCOM & *NDP 1*; lack of an *NDP 3*
 - ◆ *USN-USMC disagreements* led to a USN-only document
 - ◆ New CNO ADM Johnson saw as internal USN document
 - ◆ Principal target: USN (& USMC) officer corps

803

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- ◆ How it was written (II)
 - ◆ Personalities: CDR Bouchard (N513); VADM Cebrowski (N6); CMC Gen Krulak; CNO, ADMs Boorda & Johnson
 - ◆ Drafted in OPNAV N513 (CAPT Joe Bouchard)
 - ◆ CAPT Bouchard had been planning a follow-on to *Forward...From the Sea* since 1995
 - ◆ Heavy OPNAV N6 input (VADM Art Cebrowski)
 - ◆ N513 saw as a counter to OPNAV NOOK concepts in aborted "2020 Vision" effort, & to "Arsenal Ship" concept
 - ◆ Focus on precision naval fires
 - ◆ Widely vetted before signature
 - ◆ CNO ADM Johnson a "customer," not an author

804

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

◆ Key ideas (I)

- ◆ Guidance on CNO *operational primacy* “guiding star”
- ◆ Discussed concepts more than strategy
- ◆ Peace-crisis-war spectrum as organizing framework
 - ◆ “Peacetime engagement -- deterrence and conflict prevention -- fight and win”
 - ◆ Taken from CJCS *National Military Strategy*
- ◆ ...FTS & F...FTS continue to drive US Navy
- ◆ Naval forces not only enabling but also complementary & amplifying, & also useful post-conflict
- ◆ “Combat-credible forward presence”
 - ◆ 1st use of the term

805

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

◆ Key ideas (II)

- ◆ Rapid innovation to “transform the Navy into a 21st century force”
- ◆ Two key “closely related concepts”:
 - ◆ *Naval operational maneuver*
 - ◆ CAPT Bouchard championed
 - ◆ *Speed of command*
 - ◆ VADM Cebrowski championed
- ◆ USN can serve as afloat JFACC & afloat CJTF
- ◆ Forward deployment “hubs” & dispersal from same
- ◆ Effects-based deep precision naval fires
 - ◆ Incorporated from aborted N00K 2020 *Vision* draft
- ◆ Protection for joint and coalition forces *ashore*

806

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- ◆ Key ideas (III)
 - ◆ Navy-Marine Corps team
 - ◆ MIO ops mentioned, though just in passing
 - ◆ Strategic sealift, pre-positioning & protection of same
 - ◆ Future USN modernization & innovation concepts IAW CJCS *Joint Vision 2010*
 - ◆ Most of NOC dealt with the present; last part dealt with future
 - ◆ Fleet Battle Lab experiments
 - ◆ Cooperative Engagement Concept (CEC)
 - ◆ Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)
 - ◆ Integrated joint fires
 - ◆ Priorities implicit, not explicit

807

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- ◆ What was new?
 - ◆ Publication of an “operational concept”
 - ◆ Close integration with CJCS documents
 - ◆ Emphasis on speed of command
 - ◆ 1st use of term “combat-credible forward presence”
 - ◆ 1st use of term “protective shield”
 - ◆ 1st discussion of Navy post-conflict roles (“Phase IV”)
 - ◆ “Naval forces can remain on scene after the joint campaign concludes to enforce sanctions and to maintain a U.S. presence for regional stability”

808

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Not addressed (I)

- ◆ Neither Zumwalt/Turner “4 missions” nor . . . *From the Sea* “4 key operational capabilities” frameworks
- ◆ OPNAV program planning Joint Mission Area categories
- ◆ World trade issues
- ◆ Surge capabilities and operations
- ◆ Mine warfare
- ◆ Terrorism
- ◆ Piracy
- ◆ Drug trafficking
- ◆ Threats to the U.S. homeland

809

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Not addressed (II)

- ◆ U.S. Coast Guard
- ◆ U.S. Air Force & U.S. Army
- ◆ Foreign partners, including partner navies
- ◆ U.S. Merchant Marine
- ◆ U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
- ◆ U.S. government interagency partners
- ◆ Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
- ◆ Links to force level planning, programming & budgeting

810

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses
 - ◆ Rhodes, "... From the Sea' and Back Again," (*NWCR* 1999)

811

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

- ◆ Criticisms
 - ◆ Unnecessary
 - ◆ Little known
 - ◆ Relationship to *NDP 1* (1994) unclear
 - ◆ Relationship to "Anytime, Anywhere" (1997) unclear

812

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Influence:
 - ◆ Little
 - ◆ Cited in 1998 & 1999 DON Posture Statements

813

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Why so little influence?
 - ◆ Little CNO ownership, involvement, follow-through
 - ◆ Little internal Navy leadership support
 - ◆ Never meant for wide distribution outside USN
 - ◆ Competition with other Navy capstone documents
 - ◆ USMC ignored
 - ◆ Superseded by NOCJO (2003)

814

Navy Operational Concept (1997)



- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Cited in *Anytime, Anywhere* (1997)
 - ◆ Launch platform for concepts that would become “Network Centric Warfare”
 - ◆ Launch pad for concept that would become “Sea Shield” in *Sea Power 21*

815

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)



Anytime, Anywhere

A Navy for the 21st Century

*"Reprinted from Proceedings with permission; Copyright © Nov. 1997 U.S. Naval Institute/
www.navalinsitute.org"*

816

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Overview

- ◆ Signed by CNO ADM Johnson
- ◆ Billed as a “vision”
- ◆ Principle target: Many, esp. USN officer corps
- ◆ UNCLAS *Proceedings* article
- ◆ Emphasis on warfighting, sea control, power projection
- ◆ USN “operational primacy”
- ◆ Direct, decisive USN influence ashore
- ◆ Document had little influence

817

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Signed by:

- ◆ CNO ADM Jay L. Johnson
- ◆ During 2nd year in office



818

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA

◆ What it was

- ◆ Billed as a “Vision”
- ◆ Subtitle: “A Navy for the 21st Century”
- ◆ UNCLAS Nov 1997 *Proceedings article*
- ◆ Very short: 3 pages
- ◆ Title, concepts, but not text, repeated in 1998 *Posture Statement*

819

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA

◆ Why it was written

- ◆ To correct a perceived lack of positive USN public presence, on the part of several important senior OPNAV officers
- ◆ To correct a perceived lack of US Navy vision
- ◆ To re-emphasize US Navy warfighting capabilities, not just forward presence
 - ◆ To highlight especially capabilities to conduct sea & area control & precision strike operations
 - ◆ To assert the decisive nature of Navy warfighting contributions
- ◆ Not to supplant . . . FTS, F . . . FTS, or the NOC
- ◆ Principle target: Many, including USN officer corps

820

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)



- ◆ Context (I)
 - ◆ Essentially same as for NOC (1997)
 - ◆ 2nd term of Clinton administration (1993-2001)
 - ◆ US economy booming
 - ◆ Unemployment rate, inflation rate, deficits falling
 - ◆ Stock market volatility (Asian financial crisis (from Jul 2007))
 - ◆ SECDEF Perry (1994-97)
 - ◆ CNO ADM Johnson (1996-2000)
 - ◆ USN keeping low public profile
 - ◆ Central DoD force-sizing requirement to fight 2 major regional wars (e.g.: North Korea & Iraq)
 - ◆ North Korean nuclear weapons program frozen by international agreement (1994)

821

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)



- ◆ Context (II)
 - ◆ Reduced US inclination for military ground intervention overseas
 - ◆ Southern Watch & Adriatic Ops
 - ◆ Taiwan Straits Crisis (1996)
 - ◆ Desert Strike (1996)

822

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

- ◆ Context (III)
 - ◆ Declining USN force levels & budgets
 - ◆ 1997 QDR USN force goal: 305/310 ships
 - ◆ USN in 1997: 354 BF ships; 4 ships authorized
 - ◆ Accelerated F/A-18E/F acquisition program
 - ◆ Fleet Battle Experiments (FBE) begin (1997)
 - ◆ “SURGEX”: USS *Nimitz*/ CVW 9 surge op (Jul 1997)
 - ◆ Carrier strike high sortie rate demonstration
 - ◆ Unofficial DC-area Navy Study Group (1992-2005)
 - ◆ Convener: Dr. David Rosenberg
 - ◆ Members included *Anytime, Anywhere* authors
 - ◆ Major on-going USMC concept development effort

823

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

- ◆ Context (IV)
 - ◆ OPNAV program planning still using Joint Mission Areas Assessment Process (JMAs) (Sep 1992- 1998)
 - ◆ 7 Navy mission-area categories
 - ◆ Joint strike
 - ◆ Joint littoral warfare
 - ◆ Joint surveillance
 - ◆ Joint Space-Electronic Warfare/Intelligence
 - ◆ Strategic deterrence
 - ◆ Strategic sealift/protection
 - ◆ Presence

824

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA

- ◆ Cited references
 - ◆ ...*From the Sea*
 - ◆ *Forward...From the Sea*
 - ◆ *Navy Operational Concept*

825

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ N00K "2020 Vision" draft for ADM Boorda (1996)
 - ◆ NFCPE output (pre-1994)
 - ◆ CORM Report *Directions for Defense* (1995)
 - ◆ 1st *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* (1997)
 - ◆ 2 MTWs become 2 MRCs; state-on-state war
 - ◆ Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
 - ◆ 4th Clinton *National Security Strategy for a New Century* (1997)
 - ◆ Shape, respond, prepare (including "transform")

826

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ CJCS GEN Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010* (1996)
 - ◆ CJCS Shalikashvili *National Military Strategy* (1997)
 - ◆ "Shape, respond, prepare now"
 - ◆ *Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force* (1996)
 - ◆ CMC *Operational Maneuver from The Sea* (OMFTS) concept (1996)
 - ◆ MCDP 1 *Warfighting* (Jun 1997)
 - ◆ Mundy-Kelso-Mixson duels in *Proceedings* (1995-6)
 - ◆ New USMC concepts on STOM, MOUT (1997)

827

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ Ongoing National Defense Panel reports (1997)
 - ◆ Saw future US forward access threatened
 - ◆ DOD *Mobility Requirements Study* (1995)
 - ◆ DOD-DOT MOA on USN & USCG (1995)
 - ◆ VCJCS ADM William Owens, *High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World* (1995)
 - ◆ VCJCS ADM Bill Owens, "The Emerging U.S. System-of-Systems," INSS (Feb 1996)
 - ◆ NAVDOCCOM *Multi-lateral Maritime Operations* (MMOPS) pub (1996)
 - ◆ BR 1806, *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine* (1995)

828

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
 - ◆ Harlan Ullman & James Wade, *Shock & Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance* (1996)
 - ◆ Greg Vistica, *Fall From Glory: The Men Who Sank the U.S. Navy* (1996)
 - ◆ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996)
 - ◆ Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (1996)
 - ◆ Andrew Krepinevich, *A New Navy for a New Era* (CSBA, 1996)

829

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA

- ◆ How it was written
 - ◆ Overseen by "CNO Strategic Planning Group" (CSPG)
 - ◆ VCNO ADM Don Pilling, OPNAV N3/N5 VADM Jim Ellis, OPNAV N6 VADM Art Cebrowski, OPNAV N8 VADM Connie Lautenbacher, CHINFO RADM Kendall Pease, OPNAV N00K CAPT Robby Harris
 - ◆ Drafted in N00K (CAPT Ed Smith, CAPT Robby Harris)
 - ◆ Repackaged some earlier N00K CAPT Smith "2020 Vision" concepts
 - ◆ CNO ADM Johnson a "customer," not an author

830

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (I):

- ◆ Emphasis (priority) on warfighting missions
 - ◆ Naval presence discussed but not highlighted
- ◆ Navy-Marine Corps “Operational Primacy”
- ◆ “The US Navy will influence, directly and decisively, events ashore from the sea -- anytime, anywhere”
- ◆ “We can and will fight our way through any opposition”

831

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (II):

- ◆ VADM Turner’s “4 Missions” modified & re-ordered
- ◆ “Broad missions”
 - ◆ Sea (and area) control
 - ◆ Power projection
 - ◆ Presence
 - ◆ Deterrence
- ◆ Importance of sea (and area) control
 - ◆ “at the core of U.S. security requirements lies one prerequisite: Sea control”
 - ◆ “expanded area control is our greatest challenge”

832

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (III):

- ◆ Power projection 1000 miles or more from the coast
 - ◆ "Mass the effects of distributed but precise fires from the sea"
 - ◆ "Disorient and shock an enemy sufficiently to break his resistance"
- ◆ "Naval presence to foreclose an enemy's options entirely"
- ◆ Continuity: ...*From the Sea, Forward...From the Sea & Navy Operational Concept*
- ◆ Passing reference to shaping, littorals, deterrence, enabling, joint integration, allies, USMC, cooperative engagement, sealift, sea-based missile defense

833

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ What was new?

- ◆ Return to focus on warfighting
- ◆ Added emphasis on *decisive role of Navy*

834

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Not addressed (I)
 - ◆ 4 “critical operational capabilities from . . . *From the Sea* & *NDP 1*
 - ◆ The *Navy Operational Concept*’s 2 key concepts
 - ◆ Naval operational maneuver; Speed of command
 - ◆ OPNAV program planning joint mission area categories
 - ◆ World trade issues, “globalization”
 - ◆ Surge capabilities & operations
 - ◆ Mine warfare
 - ◆ Humanitarian assistance/disaster response

835

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Not addressed (II)
 - ◆ Threats to the U.S. homeland
 - ◆ Terrorism, piracy and drug-trafficking
 - ◆ U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army
 - ◆ U.S. Merchant Marine
 - ◆ U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
 - ◆ U.S. government inter-agency partners & NGOs
 - ◆ Links to force level plans, programs, budgets
- ◆ Very little on USMC roles

836

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses

837

837

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

CNA

- ◆ Criticisms
 - ◆ Little known
 - ◆ Too ambitious
 - ◆ Too parochial
 - ◆ Backed away from emphasis on forward naval presence
 - ◆ *Decisive role for USN not reflected in subsequent real-world joint ops, e.g. Kosovo (1999)*
 - ◆ Not well aligned with national defense policy
 - ◆ Relationship to *Navy Operational Concept (1997)* unclear

838

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)



- ◆ Influence
 - ◆ Influenced CNO SSG guidance & subsequent SSG products
 - ◆ Helped drive USN “Revolution in Training” program, to enable decisive influence
 - ◆ Catchy title had more influence than content

839

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)



- ◆ Why did it have the influence it had?
 - ◆ Little CNO involvement, ownership, follow-through
 - ◆ Subsequent real-world ops: USN not the “decisive” service
 - ◆ E.g.: Kosovo ops
 - ◆ Catchy title captured Navy officer corps view of the essence of their service

840

Anytime, Anywhere (1997)



CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Developed strike, defense & basing concepts that would become Sea Strike, Sea Shield, & Sea Basing pillars in *Sea Power 21*
 - ◆ Catchy title repeated in *NSPG 2000*, next CNO (ADM Clark) maiden speech, *Naval Power 21*, *Sea Power 21*, posture statements, etc.

841

Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis



842

Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA

♦ Overview

- ♦ Signed by CNO ADM Johnson
- ♦ Billed as “strategic planning guidance” to influence POM decisions
- ♦ Principle target: DON planners, programmers & budgeters
- ♦ Stand-alone pubs
- ♦ 1st was SECRET; 2nd was UNCLAS
- ♦ Forward presence & knowledge superiority
- ♦ 5-Dimensional battlespace
- ♦ Modest, short-term influence

843

Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA

♦ Signed by:

- ♦ CNO ADM Jay L. Johnson
- ♦ During 3rd & 4th years in office



844

Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)



- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as “strategic planning guidance”
 - ◆ Subtitle: “(With) Long Range Planning Objectives”
 - ◆ Increasingly lengthy & detailed stand-alone pubs
 - ◆ NSPG 1999: 55 pages
 - ◆ NSPG 2000: 90 pages
 - ◆ Aug 1999 NSPG classified due to intel section
 - ◆ Apr 2000 NSPG UNCLAS to widen influence, especially to potential adversaries
 - ◆ Cited in DON 2000 *Posture Statement*

845

Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)



- ◆ Why it was written
 - ◆ To try to ensure Navy programs and budgets were influenced by strategy and policy considerations
 - ◆ To take credit beyond the Navy for doing so (2000)
 - ◆ To catalyze Navy strategic thinking in anticipation of certain change in Administrations
 - ◆ To advance the influence and ideas of OPNAV N51 (& RDML Sestak) within the Navy

846

Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA

◆ Context (I)

- ◆ 2nd term of Clinton administration ending (1993-2001)
- ◆ 2000 an election year (Bush vs. Gore)
- ◆ SECDEF Cohen (1997-2001)
 - ◆ New SECNAV Danzig (1998-2001)
- ◆ “Engagement–enlargement”
- ◆ Feb 1999 “Clinton Doctrine”: Selective US intervention
- ◆ QDR 97 experience assimilated; QDR 2001 impending
- ◆ US stock market crash & Asian financial crisis (1997-8)
- ◆ But US economy still robust
 - ◆ Unemployment rate, inflation rate falling.
 - ◆ Federal budget in surplus
- ◆ Central DOD force-sizing requirement to fight 2 major regional wars (e.g.: North Korea & Iraq)

847

Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA

◆ Context (II)

- ◆ DPRK Taepo-dong (unsuccessful) third stage (potential ICBM) missile test (1998)
- ◆ US-PRC Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (1998)
- ◆ New PRC PLA warfighting doctrine (1999)
- ◆ Russians delivered 4 Kilo SSs & 2 Sovremenny DDGs to PRC (1995-2000)
- ◆ NATO Kosovo air-only campaign (Mar-Jun 1999)
- ◆ NATO accidentally bombs PRC Belgrade embassy (1999)
- ◆ Kenya, Tanzania AMEMBS bombed (1998)
- ◆ Pakistan tests 1st nuclear weapon (1998)
- ◆ India, Pakistan fight in Kargil, Kashmir (1999)

848

Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA
The Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ Combat-credible-forward presence-in-3- hubs = accepted USN dogma
- ◆ Southern Watch Iraq air ops continuing (1992-2003)
- ◆ Osama bin Laden issued *fatwa* declaring it the individual duty of every Muslim to kill Americans & their allies around the world (Feb 1998)
- ◆ Operation *Infinite Reach* (USN attacked Afghan, Sudan targets) (Aug 1998)
 - ◆ Retaliated for terror bombing of US E. African embassies (1998)
- ◆ Operation Desert Fox Iraq bombing (Dec 1998)
- ◆ New ROK gov't DPRK "sunshine policy" (1998)
- ◆ DPRK-ROK Yellow Sea naval clashes (1999)
- ◆ Canal returned to Panama (1999)

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA
The Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (IV)

- ◆ USN re-focus on readiness
- ◆ Rising Navy budgets; steady force levels
- ◆ 1997 QDR USN force goal: 305/310 ships
- ◆ 2000 USN *Interim Long Range Plan* goal: 305-360 ships
- ◆ USN in 1999: 317 Battle Force ships; 4 ships authorized
- ◆ Accelerated entry of F/A-18E/F into the fleet
 - ◆ A-12 Breach of Contract litigation continues
- ◆ Unpublished N51 "4x4" and "Beyond the Sea..." drafts
 - ◆ SECNAV-CNO differences
- ◆ Protests over Navy bombing range on Vieques, Puerto Rico, preoccupy OPNAV N3/N5 & staff (1999-2001)

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

◆ Context (V)

- ◆ OPNAV program planning JMAs replaced by new Integrated Warfare Architectures (IWARS) (1998)
- ◆ 5 new warfare IWAR categories
 - ◆ Information superiority & sensors
 - ◆ Sea dominance
 - ◆ Power projection
 - ◆ Air dominance
 - ◆ Deterrence
- ◆ Unofficial DC-area Navy Study Group (1992-2005)
 - ◆ Convener: Dr. David Rosenberg
 - ◆ Participants included NSPG contributors

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

◆ Context (VI)

- ◆ NWDC established at Newport (1998)
 - ◆ To revitalize Navy operational and tactical thinking
 - ◆ Subordinate command to Naval War College
 - ◆ NWC President was VADM Art Cebrowski
 - ◆ Included doctrine and concept development divisions
 - ◆ Naval Doctrine Command disestablished (1998)
 - ◆ New NWDC Maritime Battle Center created to run FBEs (1998)
- ◆ Major USMC concept development effort ongoing
- ◆ USAF stood up 10 AEFs (1999)

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

- ◆ Cited references (I)
 - ◆ 5th Clinton *National Security Strategy for a New Century* (1998)
 - ◆ 1st *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* (1997)
 - ◆ 2 MRCs & RMA
 - ◆ *FY02-07 Defense Planning Guidance*
 - ◆ *POM-02 and PR-03 SECNAV Planning Guidance*

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

- ◆ Cited references (II)
 - ◆ CJCS Shalikashvili *National Military Strategy* (1997)
 - ◆ "Shape, Respond, Prepare Now"
 - ◆ CJCS Shalikashvili *Joint Vision 2010* (1996)
 - ◆ ...*From the Sea* (1992)
 - ◆ *Forward...From the Sea* (1994)
 - ◆ USMC *Operational Maneuver From the Sea* (OMFTS) concept (1996)
 - ◆ USMC *Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM)* concept (1997)
 - ◆ *Naval Operations in the Information Age* concept
 - ◆ *Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP)*

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ NATO *Strategic Concept of the Alliance* (1999)
 - ◆ Emphasis on crisis management
 - ◆ NAVDOCCOM *Multi-lateral Maritime Operations (MMOPS)* pub (1996)
 - ◆ BR 1806, *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine* (1995)
 - ◆ *Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)*
 - ◆ National Defense Panel (NDP) report, *Transforming Defense* (1997)
 - ◆ MCDP 1 *Warfighting* (1997)
 - ◆ Large family of USMC concepts (1996-8)
 - ◆ 1st USN-USCG "National Fleet" policy statement (1998)

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ VCJCS ADM Bill Owens, "The Emerging U.S. System-of-Systems," INSS (Feb 1996)
 - ◆ ADM Paul Reason, *Sailing New Seas* (1998)
 - ◆ VADM Cebrowski & J. Garstka, "Network Centric Warfare," *Proceedings* (Jan. 1998)
 - ◆ VADM Cebrowski & CAPT (Ret) Hughes, "Rebalancing the Fleet," *Proceedings* (Nov 1999)
 - ◆ "Street Fighter" small ship concept
 - ◆ NIC, *Global Trends 2010* (1997)
 - ◆ 1st in an increasingly influential quadrennial series

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ Joint CINC Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs)
 - ◆ Hart-Rudman Commission Vols. I & II (1999-2000)
 - ◆ Harlan Ullman & James Wade, *Shock & Awe* (1996)
 - ◆ SECAF Peters & CSAF Ryan, "America's Air Force Vision: Global Vigilance, Reach & Power" (1997)
 - ◆ CSAF Gen Ryan "Expeditionary Aerospace Force" announcement (1998)
 - ◆ Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down* (1999)

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA

- ◆ How it was written (I)
 - ◆ Advocated earlier by CAPT Bouchard (N513) (1997)
 - ◆ Drafted in OPNAV N51 (RDML Sestak)
 - ◆ Built upon several earlier & concurrent aborted N51 strategy efforts
 - ◆ CAPT Tangredi (N513) "4 X 4" (1998)
 - ◆ RDML Sestak "Beyond the Sea" (1999)
 - ◆ RDML Sestak, *Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century* (1999-2001)
 - ◆ Aborted SECNAV Danzig DON strategy efforts (1998-2000)

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA

♦ How it was written (II)

- ♦ Vehicle for unpublished OPNAV N51 "Beyond the Sea..." concepts
 - ♦ Became "Naval Concept: Power...Presence... Knowledge: a Narrative Concept for the Information Age"
- ♦ Personalities:
 - ♦ Main conceptualizer & driver: RDML Joe Sestak (N51)
 - ♦ Harvard U. PhD
 - ♦ Had helped develop Forward . . . From the Sea
 - ♦ Drafters: CDR Craig Faller, LT Chris Cavanaugh
- ♦ ONI provided threat assessment
- ♦ Intended to be an institutionalized annual Navy process
 - ♦ But only two were ever signed

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA

♦ Key ideas (I)

- ♦ New organizing framework of "Means, Ways, Ends"
 - ♦ "Means" = 2 highest naval strategic priorities:
 - ♦ *Forward presence & knowledge superiority*
 - ♦ *Sea control the prerequisite for forward presence*
 - ♦ "Ways" =
 - ♦ *Battlespace control - Battlespace attack - Battlespace sustainment*
 - ♦ "Ways" (and *knowledge superiority* "Means") descend from . . .
From the Sea 4 "key operational capabilities"
 - ♦ Command, control and surveillance -- Battlespace dominance
 - ♦ Power projection – force sustainment

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA
The Future Defense

◆ Key ideas (II)

- ◆ “Overarching strategic imperative:” *Maritime power projection*
- ◆ Inform force posture decisions
 - ◆ Format designed to fit next stage of POM process
 - ◆ Provide *prioritized* set of concept-driven capabilities to IWARs, for further POM development
- ◆ Provided highly detailed discussion of USN program planning processes
 - ◆ Numerous *priorities* (ranked in 5 tiers)
 - ◆ Risk

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA
The Future Defense

◆ Key ideas (III)

- ◆ Included “Maritime Concept” built on . . . FTS and F . . . FTS
- ◆ Included explicit & detailed ONI assessments
 - ◆ Potential Adversaries & Probable Other Areas of Concern
- ◆ USN environment is expanded beyond sea control to 5-dimensional battlespace
- ◆ Navy focus on “the littorals and the land beyond”
- ◆ Heavily influenced by USMC OMFTS

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (IV)

- ◆ "Rogue states," non-state actors
- ◆ Regional, not global threats
- ◆ "Sea Strike" (from Strategic Studies Group):
"Shock" ops
- ◆ USN as enabling force & shield
- ◆ Maritime interception operations
- ◆ Counter-terror, counter-drug, humanitarian assist,
information operations

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

Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (V)

- ◆ "Building close working relationships with other governmental and non-governmental security actors are also priorities"
- ◆ Discussion of refining current Navy operational concepts & development of future concepts
- ◆ Topics for further study & analysis
 - ◆ Extensive list
 - ◆ Reminiscent of *Project SIXTY*, & *Maritime Strategy* "uncertainties"

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA

- ◆ What was new ? (II)
 - ◆ 1st development of concept of *globalization*
 - ◆ 1st discussion of naval counters to threats to US *homeland* itself – not just along US coasts
 - ◆ 1st discussion of Information Operations (IO)
 - ◆ Non-state actors & pirates identified as threats
 - ◆ Evolution of *speed of command* (NOC) to *knowledge superiority* (NSPG)
 - ◆ Discussion of Navy concept development role, processes and examples

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA

- ◆ Not addressed
 - ◆ Priorities among numerous explicit threats discussed
 - ◆ World trade issues
 - ◆ Surge capabilities & operations
 - ◆ U.S. Coast Guard
 - ◆ U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
 - ◆ IWAR warfare categorization scheme

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses
 - ◆ Gregory V. Cox, *Naval defense planning for the 21st century: observations from QDR 2001* (CNA, December 2001)

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

- ◆ Criticisms
 - ◆ Constrained by 1997 QDR & 305-ship force level goal
 - ◆ Did not meaningfully influence POM
 - ◆ Created yet another new short-lived vocabulary
 - ◆ Was never institutionalized
 - ◆ Too long and complex to be well assimilated by busy staff officers
 - ◆ Not designed to mesh well with subsequent OPNAV IWAR program planning processes

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA
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♦ Influence:

- ♦ Modest, short-term
- ♦ Focused Navy efforts on next (2nd) QDR (2001)
- ♦ Continued development of what would become Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and ForceNet

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ Why such influence as it had?

- ♦ Little real CNO involvement, ownership, follow-through
- ♦ CNO, N3/N5, N51 detached later that year
- ♦ New CNO Clark had other ideas on how to improve USN POM development
 - ♦ Did not sign subsequent NSPG 2001 draft
 - ♦ Changed process: Created N7, etc.
- ♦ Length & complexity hindered use
- ♦ Too closely identified with RDML Sestak to achieve wide influence or institutionalization

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Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999 & 2000)

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- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Continued development of what would become Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and ForceNet “pillars” of *Sea Power 21*
 - ◆ Idea of issuing detailed strategic planning guidance to guide Navy program planning would be resurrected in 2006 with *Naval Strategic Plan*

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End of the 1990s: State of Navy

CNA
The Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Navy ended decade with mixed morale
 - ◆ Pride in its operational record, especially presence, multi-platform strike, joint integration, esp w/ USAF
 - ◆ Success of current ship types; strike aviation plans
 - ◆ Acceptance of “ . . . From the Sea” concepts
- ◆ But
 - ◆ Great concern at decline in ship numbers
 - ◆ Worry over decline in ASW capabilities
 - ◆ Concern at increased PLAN anti-access capabilities
 - ◆ Unease at relationships with USMC
 - ◆ Concerns over force protection after USS Cole attack⁴

The 1990s vs the 1980s (I)

CNA
ANALYSTS. INSIGHTS. FORECASTS.

- ◆ Multiplicity of possible threats vs. one central high-priority threat
- ◆ No immediate or near-term challenger to USN supremacy at sea vs. Gorshkov Soviet Navy blue-water challenges
- ◆ Reduced defense & naval budgets & force levels vs. Reagan defense & naval build-up
- ◆ US alliance systems similar in both decades
- ◆ Shift in overseas basing system from the Atlantic & Europe to Southwest Asia, Arabian Sea, & the Gulf

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The 1990s vs the 1980s (II)

CNA
ANALYSTS. INSIGHTS. FORECASTS.

- ◆ Increasingly *integrated* US military jointness vs. *cooperative* & *coordinated* jointness
- ◆ Increased number, intensity of real-world ops
- ◆ Heavy operational demand for sealift & prepositioning ships
- ◆ Quickening pace of computer technology advances & integration into naval operations
- ◆ Focus on naval *littoral* operations vice separate sea & *projection ashore* ops

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The 1990s vs the 1980s (III)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Naval forces as *enabling* forward insertion of USA & USAF, vice *connecting* forward USA & USAF to CONUS bases

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The 1990s vs the 1980s (IV)

CNA

- ◆ 1990s:
 - ◆ Navy budgets decreasing, then turning around at end
 - ◆ Navy force levels decreasing throughout the decade
 - ◆ Navy force level goals decreasing also, but *lower* than current force levels
- ◆ 1980s
 - ◆ Navy budgets increasing, then turning down at end
 - ◆ Navy force levels increasing, then decreasing somewhat
 - ◆ Navy force level goals steady at 600; *higher* than current fleet force levels

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The 1990s vs the 1980s (V)

- ◆ Mostly UNCLAS vs. mostly CLAS documents
- ◆ USMC as co-equal player (or non-player) vs. one of many contributors
- ◆ Many core concepts & names vs one
- ◆ Possible explanations:
 - ◆ Changed, changing and uncertain world environment (Cold War ended)
 - ◆ Changed US administration policies
 - ◆ Changing USN reactions to same
 - ◆ Plethora of 1990s national security & national defense pubs (9 NSSs, NMSs, QDR, CORM, NDP, JV2010, etc.)
 - ◆ Ubiquity of Powerpoint & desktop publishing after 1990

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The 21st Century

- ◆ 2002 *Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS*
- ◆ 2002 *Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision*
- ◆ 2003 *Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO)*
- ◆ 2003 *Fleet Response Plan (FRP)*
- ◆ 2006 *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (SECRET & UNCLAS)*
- ◆ 2006 *Naval Operations Concept (NOC)*
- ◆ 2007 *Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 (SECRET)*
- ◆ 2007 *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
- ◆ 2007 *Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 (Change 1)*
- ◆ 2009 *Navy Strategic Guidance (NSG) ISO PR 11*
- ◆ 2009 *Naval Operations Concept (NOC)*
- ◆ 2009 *NDP 1 Naval Warfare*
- ◆ 2009 *Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 12*



2000s: The world, the nation, & the Navy

World Events	Year	Administration	SECNAV	CNO	Capstone Document
Attack on America Noble Eagle begins OEF begins	2001	G.W. Bush	Rumsfeld	England	Clark
JTF GITMO begins OEF Philippines begins CJTF HOA begins	2002				<i>Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS, Naval Power 21</i>
OIF begins PSI begins	2003				<i>NOCJO, Fleet Response Plan</i>
ABOT security force attack IO tsunami	2004				
Somali pirate attacks	2005				
Katrina response Lebanon evacuation DPRK nuclear & missile tests OIF "surge" Bangladesh cyclone	2006			Mullen	<i>NSP ISO POM 08 NOC</i>
Somalia, Nigeria piracy increases	2007		Gates		<i>NSP ISO POM 10</i>
Mumbai seaborne attack	2008			Rougehead	<i>A Cooperative Strategy, NSP ISO POM 10 (Ch 1)</i>
	2009		Obama		<i>NSG ISO PR 11, NOC, NDP 1, NSP ISO POM 12</i>
	2010				

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2000s: Higher authorities & USN capstone documents

Year	President	National Document	SECDEF	CJCS	Defense Document	CNO	USN CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
2001	GW Bush	NSPDs HSPDs	Rumsfeld	Myers USAF	JSPS Docs NPR, QDR SPG, DPG CPG, SCG NMSPWOT DD 5100.1 JOpsC CJCS JOCs TPG, GDPR,NMS	Clark	<i>Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS, Naval Power 21</i>
2002		NSS NSCWMD					<i>NOCJO</i>
2003		SORT Treaty NSCT PSI					<i>Fleet Response Plan</i>
2004		HSPD 13 (MarSec)					
2005		NSMS					
2006		NSS		Pace USMC	SCA, NDS DOD3000.5 CCJO QDR, NMSPWOT NMSCWMD NMSCO	Mullen	<i>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 Naval Operations Concept Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10</i>
2007		NSCT MDTR NSHS Piracy Policy			JT PUB 1 GDF, GEF NDS CCJO, QRN	Rougehead	<i>A Cooperative Strategy, Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1), Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11, Naval Operations Concept, NDP 1 Naval Warfare, NSP ISO POM 12</i>
2008							
2009	Obama						

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2000s: The world (I)

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- ◆ “Post-Cold War” and “post-9/11” era
- ◆ Continued decreasing magnitude, numbers of wars in world
- ◆ Increasingly multi-power international system, but US still sole comprehensive superpower
- ◆ One new nuclear state (DPRK); Iran nuclear weapons development suspected
- ◆ Continued global diffusion of low- and medium-tech military weapons & expertise

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2000s: The world (II)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Continued increasing globalization of world economy & society
 - ◆ Steady growth in world seaborne trade volume
- ◆ World economic boom, then financial crisis & recession (after Sep 2008)
- ◆ Soaring oil, food prices for most of decade
 - ◆ Oil prices soared, then dropped (Jul 2008)
- ◆ Great economic, technological growth in big “BRIC” states Brazil/Russia/India/China

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2000s: The world (III)

- ◆ Alienation, ferment, crises in parts of non-Western world (“the Gap”)
- ◆ Strong surge of anti-US sentiments worldwide, especially in wake of Iraqi invasion (2003)
- ◆ Increase in cyber security events
- ◆ Climate change opens up Northwest Passage, intensifies international competition for Arctic ocean resources
- ◆ Continued “rogue” activity: N. Korea, Iran, Syria, later Venezuela (Chavez president 1998)
- ◆ Law of the Sea Convention in force (since 1994)

BB5

2000s: The world (IV)

- ◆ Continued increase in importance of violent transnational non-governmental actors
 - ◆ Radical Islamic terrorist threats salient
 - ◆ Sporadic maritime terrorism incidents
 - ◆ Continued increase in transnational crime activity, including drug trafficking
 - ◆ Worldwide piracy attack reports remain high
 - ◆ Decrease in S. China Sea & Strait of Malacca
 - ◆ Attacks off Somalia in Gulf of Aden soared (2008)
 - ◆ Triggered major world reaction
 - ◆ Little evidence yet of linkages between pirates & terrorists

BB6

2000s: The world (V)

◆ Terrorist incidents increased over 1990s

◆ Examples:

- ◆ Al-Qaeda attacks on WTC, Pentagon, Pennsylvania (2001)
- ◆ Yemen small craft attack on French tanker Limburg (2002)
- ◆ Bali, Indonesia discotheque car bomb attack (2002)
- ◆ Riyadh, Saudi Arabia westerner housing bombing (2003)
- ◆ Jeddah, Saudi Arabia US consulate attack (2004)
- ◆ Madrid train attacks (2004)
- ◆ Failed small craft attack on Iraqi oil terminal platforms (2004)
- ◆ Abu Sayyaf attack on Philippine ferry Superferry 14 (2004)
- ◆ Al-Qaeda Amman Jordan hotels attacks (2005)
- ◆ London tube & bus bombings (2005)
- ◆ Terrorists fired missiles at USN amphibs visiting Jordan (2005)
- ◆ Mumbai, India sea-launched hotel attacks (2008)

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2000s: The world (VI)

◆ International efforts to improve security at sea (I)

- ◆ IMO *Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea* (2001)
- ◆ *International Shipping and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS)* (2002)
- ◆ *Container Security Initiative (CSI)* (2002)
- ◆ *Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)* (2003)
- ◆ *Caribbean Regional Maritime Agreement (CRA)* (2003)

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2000s: The world (VII)

- ◆ **International efforts to improve security at sea (II)**
 - ◆ *2005 SUA Protocol* shipboarding regime (2005)
 - ◆ *Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia* (ReCAAP) (2006)
 - ◆ *Cooperative Mechanism* (for Straits of Malacca) (2007)
 - ◆ UNSC Resolutions 1816, 1838, 1846, 1851 (vs. piracy off Somalia) (2008)
 - ◆ Kenya agreement to try Somali pirates captured by US naval forces (Jan 2009)

890

2000s: The world (VIII)

- ◆ **Continued balance of power in Western Eurasia**
 - ◆ Russian energy-based economic resurgence under Putin administration
 - ◆ Russia-US relationship increasingly strained
 - ◆ Russian hostility to US Poland/Czech ABM plans
 - ◆ Limited Russian military resurgence
 - ◆ Increased Russian forward air, naval ops late in decade
 - ◆ Return to intermittent global naval presence: Atlantic, Pacific, Caribbean, Indian Ocean deployments (2008)
 - ◆ Increased Russian rhetoric on need for naval power
 - ◆ Continued decline of Russian Navy capabilities
- ◆ **Pressure on other former USSR republics**
 - ◆ Hostility to Georgia, Ukraine NATO membership
 - ◆ Cyber attacks on Estonia (2007)
 - ◆ Invasion of Georgia (2008)
 - ◆ Included Russian Navy support of ground troops

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2000s: The world (IX)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Europe generally stable

- ◆ But final break-up of Yugoslavia: Montenegrin (2006) & Kosavar (2008) independence
 - ◆ NATO oversight of Kosovo (1999-2008)
- ◆ Real terror, immigrant threats to internal stability
- ◆ NATO expansion on Baltic, Black Sea littorals
 - ◆ Poland (1999), Baltics, Romania Bulgaria members (2004)
- ◆ NATO invoked Article 5 for 1st time, ISO US following al Qaeda attack (2001)
- ◆ Some estrangement from US over Iraq war
- ◆ France deployed 1st CVN (2001)
- ◆ NATO ally Turkey refused US base & overflight access during OIF (2003)
- ◆ European preference for EU vice NATO initiatives

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2000s: The world (X)

CNA
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◆ Continued rough balance of power in East Asia-Pacific

- ◆ Increased PRC global power, influence, military modernization drive change in East Asia
 - ◆ PRC economy world's 3rd largest (2007); grew 10% per year
 - ◆ World's #2 energy consumer (2003). Oil imports lept
 - ◆ 3rd nation to put humans into earth orbit (2003)
- ◆ US-PRC economic ties continue to expand
 - ◆ PLA & PLAN focus on conventional war against Taiwan and, if necessary, sea denial ops vs. US Navy
 - ◆ Sporadic PLAN blue-water operations, incl/ 1st outside Asia
 - ◆ PLAN growth, incl/ anti-ship ballistic missile R & D
- ◆ Taiwan pro-independence party in power (2000-2008), increasing cross-strait tensions
 - ◆ Replaced by less strident KMT regime (2008)
- ◆ Increasingly close Japan-US military, economic, political cooperation

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2000s: The world (XI)

CNA
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- ◆ “Shanghai Five” became Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (2001)
 - ◆ PRC, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan & Uzbekistan
- ◆ Close PRC-Russia military relations continued
 - ◆ 8 more *Kilo* SSs & 2 more *Sovremenny* DDGs delivered

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2000s: The world (XII)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ US-PRC economic interdependence (by 2008)

China:

- Was 2nd largest US trading partner
- Was largest source of imports to US
- Was 3rd largest US export market
- Became largest holder of US public debt

The United States:

- Was China's largest single trading partner
- Was China's 4th largest source of imports
- Was China's largest export market

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2000s: The world (XIII)

- ◆ **Continued shift in balance of conventional power on Korean peninsula in favor of ROK**
 - ◆ Continued hostility to US by failing Stalinist Kim Jong-il regime in DPRK
 - ◆ Continued rise of South Korea as an economic, political, military & naval power
 - ◆ ROK-DPRK Yellow Sea patrol boat naval battles (2002, 2004)
 - ◆ Tortuous international negotiations to limit DPRK nuclear capabilities
 - ◆ ROK gov't DPRK "sunshine policy" (1998-2008)
 - ◆ Distanced ROK from some US defense policies
 - ◆ Rejected at ROK polls; new gov't cooler (2008)
 - ◆ DPRK renounced 1992 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (Jan 2009)
 - ◆ Incl/ renouncing respect for Yellow Sea Northern Limit Line

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2000s: The world (XIV)

- ◆ **Improving, cooperative US-Philippines relations**
 - ◆ Continued Muslim separatist & Abu Sayyaf terrorist insurgencies in Mindanao, Southern Philippines
- ◆ **India-US political, economic, military relations far closer than ever before**
 - ◆ Nuclear cooperation announced (2005)
 - ◆ Bilateral nuclear "123 Agreement" drafted (2007)
 - ◆ But not yet signed by either country (as of 2008)
- ◆ **Pakistan increasingly unstable politically**
 - ◆ Musharaf military regime (1999-2008) closely aligned militarily with US since 9/11 attacks
 - ◆ New civilian Zadari gov't continued policies (2008)
 - ◆ Hostile & active Taliban & Al Qaeda presence in NW⁹⁶

2000s: The world (XV)

- ◆ Middle East generally unstable
- ◆ US-imposed regime change, war, political fragmentation, insurgencies, democratization, reconstruction in Afghanistan, Iraq
- ◆ Continued Iranian regime regional ambitions, hostility to US, sponsorship of terrorism
 - ◆ Major Iranian military R & D & modernization
- ◆ Second Intifada broke out in Palestine (2000)
 - ◆ Breakdown of Oslo Accord regime
- ◆ Israelis attacked Hezbollah in Lebanon (2006), Hamas in Gaza (2009)
 - ◆ Hezbollah land-based missiles hit Israeli ship
- ◆ Libyan policy volte-face & rapprochement with US & the West

897

2000s: The world (XVI)

- ◆ Continued instability in Africa
- ◆ Somalia in turmoil
 - ◆ Continued civil war, secessionist movements, militant Islamist insurgency, humanitarian disasters
 - ◆ No effective national government
 - ◆ Islamist fighters in control in S. Somalia & Mogadishu, before & after Ethiopian intervention (2006 & 2009)
 - ◆ US backed Ethiopian intervention ISO nominal national gov't (2007-8)
 - ◆ Sharp rise in at-sea pirate attacks, esp. Gulf of Aden
- ◆ Anti-US Islamic Army faction in power in Sudan (from 1989)
 - ◆ Rebellion, humanitarian crises in Sudanese Darfur
- ◆ Increasing importance of Nigeria as oil exporter
 - ◆ Criminal activity & insurgency in coastal regions

898

2000s: The world (XVII)

CNA
Center for National Policy

- ◆ Continued political turmoil in Haiti
- ◆ Cuban leadership transition uncertainties
- ◆ Increasing Venezuelan hostility to US
 - ◆ President Hugo Chavez (since 1999)
- ◆ More LATAM countries elected governments unfriendly to US policies
 - ◆ Bolivia (2006)
 - ◆ Nicaragua (2007)
 - ◆ Ecuador (2007)

899

2000s: The nation (I)

CNA

- ◆ 2 G.W. Bush administrations (R) (2001-2009)
- ◆ Barack Obama (D) administration (2009-)
- ◆ Democrats controlled both houses of Congress (from Jan 2007)
- ◆ Continued US popular support for its military
- ◆ US public fear of terrorism
- ◆ Increasing US public disenchantment with foreign intervention
- ◆ Los Angeles/Long Beach dockworker strike showed US vulnerability to port attacks (2002)

900

2000s: The nation (II)

CNA

- ◆ US remained world's largest economy
- ◆ US domestic & foreign economic difficulties
- ◆ Return to high federal budget deficits
- ◆ Continued low unemployment & inflation rates till 2008, but rising
- ◆ US dependence on imported oil continued to rise
- ◆ Recession, then modest growth, then financial & economic collapse (Sep 2008)
- ◆ Unprecedented immediate aggressive large-scale US gov't policy response to economic crisis

901

2000s: The nation (III)

CNA

- ◆ Congress passed American Service-Members Protection Act (2002)
 - ◆ Suspended US military assistance to countries that might prosecute US citizens in International Criminal Court (ICC)
- ◆ Still no Senate ratification of UN Law of the Sea treaty, despite Senate Foreign Relations Committee endorsement (2007)

902

2000s: US economy & defense spending

YEAR	PRESIDENT	ECONOMY	DOD % of GDP	DOD TOA (Constant FY 09 \$)	CNO	CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
2001	GW Bush	Recession	2.9	391B	Clark	
2002		Stock Market Crash	3.2	440B		SP 21 & Global CONOPS, Naval Power 21
2003			3.6	520B		NOCJO, Fleet Response Plan
2004		Oil Prices Rise	3.8	531B		
2005			3.9	561B	Mullen	NSP ISO POM 08, Naval Operations Concept
2006			3.8	580B		NSP ISO POM 10
2007		Subprime Mortgage Crisis	3.9	639B	Roughhead	A Cooperative Strategy, NSP ISO POM 10 (Change 1)
2008		Recession/Financial Crisis				
2009	Obama	Global Economic Crisis				NSG ISO PR 11, NOC, NDP 1, NSP ISO POM 12

2000s: US planned & actual adversaries

- ◆ Combat in Afghanistan & Iraq
- ◆ Deter/plan vs. North Korea, Iran, Iraq (to 2003). Cuba. Incidents.
- ◆ Deter PRC/ plan to defend Taiwan
- ◆ Anti-terrorist military assistance in Colombia, Southern Philippines, etc.,
- ◆ Anti-terrorism, anti-WMD & anti-drug trafficker operations, on land & sea
- ◆ Security assistance & other operations for "Phase 0" & war prevention



2000s: US national security policies (I)

CNA
The National Security Center

- ◆ Continued US global conventional warfare predominance
- ◆ US defense budget the world's largest
- ◆ Significant defense budget & military buildup throughout the decade
- ◆ Continued absence of one, single overarching threat to US national security
- ◆ Continuation of multiple, disparate, lesser threats, incl/ terrorist threats to US homeland
- ◆ Continued activist forward & homeland national security strategy

2000s: US national security policies (II)

CNA
The National Security Center

- ◆ Shift of focus from defense transformation to War on Terror & prosecution of wars in Iraq, Afghanistan after 9/11
- ◆ Deterring China (over Taiwan), Iran, North Korea
- ◆ Lessened reliance on international institutions, organizations, treaties
 - ◆ But many continued formal treaty & informal obligations

2000s: US national security policies (III)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Increased reliance on voluntary, non-binding international partnerships
- ◆ Closer defense relations with Japan
- ◆ Increasingly close military relations with Pakistan & Philippines
- ◆ US-India military rapprochement
 - ◆ Increasingly close military ties
 - ◆ Civil nuclear cooperation established (2005-8)
- ◆ Continued US interest in security of both Israel & Gulf oil states

2000s: US national security policies (IV)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Military relationships with PRC
 - ◆ US measuring, pacing PRC military buildup
 - ◆ Relations – never warm -- fluctuated through decade (as in 1990s)
 - ◆ FY 2000 Authorization Act limited US-PRC interactions
 - ◆ Lows:
 - ◆ USN EP-3 collision with PLAN interceptor (2001)
 - ◆ PLAN submarine penetrated *Kitty Hawk* screen (2006)
 - ◆ PRC canxed USN PVSTs (Nov 2007)
 - ◆ PRC suspended USN PVSTs, other US military ties (Oct 2008)
 - ◆ US military technology transfer programs cancelled
 - ◆ Military-to-military engagement activities cut back
 - ◆ US-PRC military telephone hotline in use (2008)
- ◆ Increased US arms sales to Taiwan

2000s: US national security policies (V)

CNA
The Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Initial GW Bush administration policies
 - ◆ Jan-Sept 2001
 - ◆ Nationalist & unilateralist
 - ◆ Policies to build NMD system, abrogate ABM Treaty
 - ◆ Rejection of Kyoto Global Warning Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), International Criminal Court
 - ◆ Denigration of US military “nation-building”
 - ◆ Anti-terrorism not salient
- ◆ Early post-9/11 GWOT policies
 - ◆ Continued nationalism & unilateralism
 - ◆ Preemption, prevention & “coalitions of the willing”

2000s: US national security policies (VI)

CNA
The Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Initial DOD push for heightened “transformation”
 - ◆ Goal: Smaller, lighter, nimbler, smarter, more precise forces
 - ◆ Concepts: Shock & awe, effects-based ops
 - ◆ SECDEF Rumsfeld signature issue area (2001-6)
 - ◆ VADM (Ret) Cebrowski headed new OSD Office of Force Transformation (OFT) (2001-5)

2000s: US national security policies (VII)

CNA

- ◆ Initial DOD return to more global operations & planning
 - ◆ Introduction of generic capabilities-based vice threat-based planning
 - ◆ Flexible DOD force sizing across ever-changing spectrum of military operations
 - ◆ 2 MTWs still the main DOD force sizing construct

2000s: US national security policies (VIII)

CNA

- ◆ Post 9/11:
 - ◆ Pres Bush: North Korea, Iraq, Iran “Axis of Evil”
 - ◆ Continuous OEF (2001-) & OIF (2003-) coalition ops
 - ◆ Responses to Al Qaeda terror attacks on USS Cole, WTC, Pentagon; & to Saddam Hussein regime actions
 - ◆ NATO carrying part of OEF load
 - ◆ “Coalition of the willing” in Iraq
 - ◆ Increasing multilateralism
 - ◆ Other Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) ops
 - ◆ Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (from 2003)
 - ◆ Other anti-WMD efforts
 - ◆ Increased salience of homeland defense
 - ◆ Includes Maritime Domain Awareness, port security

2000s: US national security policies (IX)

- ◆ **Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (2001-)**
 - ◆ US Special Forces (incl/ USN SEALS) & intel operatives combine with regional Afghan warlords to topple Taliban & disrupt Al Qaeda network, supported by US & coalition air support (2001)
 - ◆ US forces remained in Afghanistan to attack Al Qaeda remnants on Pakistan border
 - ◆ NATO & others contributed to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help stabilize Afghanistan (2002-)
 - ◆ Pro-US Afghan gov't installed (2001); validated by election (2004)
 - ◆ Taliban insurgency continued, gained strength since 2006

2000s: US national security policies (X)

- ◆ **Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (2003-)**
 - ◆ SECDEF Rumsfeld policy of low US troop levels
 - ◆ Invasion, overthrow of Saddam regime, & occupation (2003)
 - ◆ **Increasing counter-insurgency (2003-6)**
 - ◆ US military Abu Ghraib prison abuses aroused world vs. US (2004)
 - ◆ Increased US, coalition, Iraqi protection of oil terminals following insurgent small boat attack (2004)
 - ◆ **Increasing sectarian strife & insurgencies. New Iraqi government elected & in power (2006-7)**
 - ◆ **US “surge” troop increases, tactics changes (2007)**
 - ◆ **Government control increased, violence fell off, US troops decreased (2007-9)**

2000s: US national security policies (XI)

CNA

As OEF & OIF unfolded . . .

- ◆ Refocus of defense planning & programming from “traditional” challenges to now include “Irregular”, “Catastrophic”, & Disruptive” challenges
 - ◆ *National Defense Strategy* (2005)
 - ◆ *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) (2006)
- ◆ Return to policy of international security cooperation

2000s: US national security policies (XII)

CNA

- ◆ OEF & OIF tempered “transformation” & global “capabilities-based” defense planning policies
 - ◆ OFT closed & responsibilities dispersed (2006)
 - ◆ Increased search for specific threat-based solutions, e.g.: specific anti-IED, cultural & linguistic capabilities
 - ◆ Need to increase “boots on the ground” troop strength for sustained land warfare & stabilization
 - ◆ Emphasis on uncertainties, complexities, fog of war
 - ◆ Pushed specially by USA & USMC
 - ◆ COMJFCOM Gen Mattis USMC abolished “effects-based operations” terminology (2008)
 - ◆ Col H.R. McMaster USA pushed abandonment of transformation
 - ◆ Push-back from Gens Deptula, Dunlap, other USAF thinkers

2000s: US national security policies (XIII)

CNA
The Center for National
Anchored by the U.S. Navy

- ◆ “Long war”, GWOT, SSTRO concepts emerged
 - ◆ SECDEF Gates (and others) vs. “Next war-it-is” (2008)
 - ◆ Call for “balance”
 - ◆ Less DOD focus on future possible scenarios; more focus on current conflicts & shaping of environment
 - ◆ Reflected in 2008 family of DOD capstone documents
- ◆ Continued plans & operations vs. state & non-state sponsors of terrorism, esp. in Middle East
 - ◆ State Dept designated Cuba, Iran, Sudan, Syria as state sponsors of terrorism
 - ◆ Also Iraq (to 2003); Libya (to 2006); DPRK (to 2008)
- ◆ Cyber attacks on DoD computers
 - ◆ US offensive & defensive cyberwar capabilities developed

2000s: US national security policies (XIV)

CNA
The Center for National
Anchored by the U.S. Navy

- ◆ Increased integration of US Diplomatic-Information-Military-Economic (DIME) policy, ops
- ◆ Increased concern over limitations of current US gov’t inter-agency mechanisms & ops
 - ◆ Executive, legislative & think tank concern
 - ◆ DOD concern re: Civilian agency current shortfalls
 - ◆ Civilian concerns re: Extent of current DOD influence
 - ◆ Concerns over efficacy of current coordinating mechanisms
- ◆ Project on National Security Reform (PSNR)
 - ◆ Congress mandated (2007)
 - ◆ *Preliminary Findings* (Jul 2008)
 - ◆ *The NSC* (Dec 2008)

2000s: US national security policies (XV)

CNA
Center for National Defense

- ◆ Nuclear policy issues no longer central in USG
- ◆ “Tailored deterrence” policy:
 - ◆ Credible capabilities to deter a range of threats:
Rogue states, terrorist groups, near-peer competitors
- ◆ Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) (2001)
 - ◆ Russia no longer seen as immediate threat
 - ◆ “New triad” for continued strategic deterrence
 - ◆ Not just nuclear & not just offensive systems
 - ◆ All 3 legs of “old triad” still retained
 - ◆ Continued reductions in US nuclear force levels
 - ◆ USN to retain 14 SSBNs w/ Trident II D-5 SLBMs
 - ◆ Extended SSBN, SLBM, warhead service life

2000s: US national security policies (XVI)

CNA
Center for National Defense

- ◆ SORT Treaty with Russia (2002)
- ◆ Retained SSN TLAM-N deployment capability
- ◆ US nuclear test moratorium (from 1992)
 - ◆ Stockpile Stewardship Program (since 1994)
 - ◆ Missile & warhead Life Extension Programs (LEPs)
- ◆ No new nuclear weapons capabilities developed

2000s: US national security policies (XVII) CNA

- ◆ **BMD policy (from 2002)**
 - ◆ To defend US homeland, deployed troops, friends
 - ◆ Merger of NMD & TMD
 - ◆ R&D & deployment vs. all BM types/ranges/phases
 - ◆ Sea-based systems essential
 - ◆ US abrogated 1972 ABM Treaty (2002)
 - ◆ Deployment to SOJ, then Poland & Czech Republic

2000s: US national security policies (XVIII) CNA

- ◆ DOD roles & missions governed by DOD Dir 5100.1 *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components* (Aug 2002 revision of 1987 ed.)
- ◆ PPBS became PPBE (2003)
 - ◆ “E” for “Execution”
 - ◆ Intent: Streamline duplicative processes
 - ◆ Concurrent program & budget reviews
 - ◆ Annual review process became biennial (2003)
 - ◆ “on year” and “off year” cycles
 - ◆ Alternating POM years and PR years
- ◆ Defense Planning Guidance split
 - ◆ Strategic Planning Guidance (GEF)
 - ◆ Joint Programming Guidance (JPG)

2000s: US national security policies (XIX)

CNA

- ◆ DOD *Global Defense Posture Review* (2002-4)
 - ◆ Mandated Pacific base increases, Europe draw-downs
 - ◆ Mandated shift from Main Operating bases (MOBs) to more adaptive global network of Forward Operating Sites (FOSS) & Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs)
 - ◆ US began to reduce, redeploy USA/USAF in ROK
 - ◆ US forces reduced by 1/3, begin shifting south
 - ◆ US began military buildup on Guam
- ◆ 5th BRAC round (2005)
 - ◆ Mandated base closures & creation of joint bases

2000s: US national security policies (XX)


CNA

- ◆ Critics:
 - ◆ Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) endured (from 1983)
 - ◆ Extensive focus on naval issues in 2000s
 - ◆ Andrew Krepinevich continued as Executive Director
 - ◆ Joined by Col Robert Work USMC (Ret) (2001) & CAPT Jan van Tol USN (Ret) (2008)
 - ◆ Center for Defense Information (CDI) endured
 - ◆ Joined by retired USMC generals Charles Wilhelm & Anthony Zinni
 - ◆ Joined by aging 1970s-era “military reformers” e.g.: Bill Lind

2000s: Combatant & component commands

CNA
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- ◆ USPACOM
 - ◆ PACFLT
- ◆ USSOUTHCOM
 - ◆ NAVSO (from 2000)
- ◆ USACOM (to 1999)
- ◆ USJFCOM (from 1999)
 - ◆ LANFLT (to 2001)
 - ◆ FFC (from 2001) USFF (from 2006)
- ◆ EUCOM
 - ◆ NAVEUR
- ◆ AFRICOM (from 2008)
 - ◆ NAVAFRICA (from 2008)
- ◆ USCENTCOM
 - ◆ NAVCENT
- ◆ USSPACECOM (to 2002)
- ◆ USNORTHCOM (from 2002)
 - ◆ FFC (USFF from 2006)
- ◆ USSOCOM
 - ◆ NAVSPECWARCOM
- ◆ USSTRATCOM
 - ◆ FFC (USFF from 2006)
- ◆ USTRANSCOM
 - ◆ MSC



2000s: Higher authorities & USN capstone documents

CNA
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Year	President	National Document	SECDEF	CJCS	Defense Document	CNO	USN CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
2001	GW Bush	NSPDs HSPDs NSS NSCWMO	Rumsfeld		JSPS Doc NPR, QOR SPG, OPG CPG, SCG NMSPWOT OO 5100.1 JOpsC CJCS JOCs TPG, GDPR,NMS	Clark	Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS, Naval Power 21 NOCJO Fleet Response Plan
2002		SORT Treaty NSCT PSI	Myers USAF			Mullen	
2003		HSPD 13 (MarSec)					
2004		NSMS					
2005		NSS	Pace USMC		SCA, NOS DOD3000.5 CCJD		
2006		NSCT MOTR NSHS Piracy Policy	Gates		QOR, NMSPWOT NMSCWMD NMSCO JT PUB 1	Mullen	Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 Naval Operations Concept Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10
2007					GOF, GEF NOS CCJD, QRN	Roughhead	A Cooperative Strategy, Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1),
2008							Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11, Naval Operations Concept, NDP 1 Naval Warfare, NSP ISO POM 12
2009	Obama						

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2000s: Bush Administration directives (I)

CNA

- ◆ *National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs) & Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs)*
- ◆ *National Security Strategy (2002 & 2006 rev)*
- ◆ *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (2002)*
- ◆ *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003 & 2006 rev)*
- ◆ *National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005)*
- ◆ *Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan (2006)*
- ◆ *National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007)*
- ◆ *Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy (2007)*
- ◆ *NSC, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan (Dec 2008)*
- ◆ *NSPD 66/ HSPD 25 Arctic Region Policy (Jan 2009)*

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2000s: Bush Administration directives (II)

CNA

- ◆ *2nd & 3rd (Bush) QDRs (2001 & 2006)*
- ◆ *Nuclear Posture Review (2001)*
 - ◆ *Strategic Capabilities Assessment (2005)*
- ◆ *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (CLAS, UNCLAS) (2002, 2006)*
- ◆ *SECDEF Transformation Planning Guidance (2003)*
- ◆ *DOD, Report to Congress: Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture (Sep 2004)*
- ◆ *SECDEF National Defense Strategy (2005, 2008)*
- ◆ *Strategy for Homeland Defense & Civil Support (2005)*
- ◆ *DODDIR 3000.5, Military Support to SSTRO (2005)*

2000s: Bush Administration directives (III)

CNA

- ◆ Recurring: *Strategic Planning Guidance, Joint Programming Guidance, Contingency Planning Guidance, Security Cooperation Guidance, JSCP*
- ◆ SECDEF Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) (2003)
- ◆ CJCS *Joint Operations Concepts* (2003)
- ◆ CJCS *National Military Strategy* (2004)
- ◆ CJCS *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (2005 & 2009)

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2000s: Bush Administration directives (IV)

CNA

- ◆ *National Military Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction* (2006)
- ◆ *National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations* (2006)
- ◆ *Joint Force Management (GFM) Allocation Plan* (2006)
- ◆ CJCS Joint Pub 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the U.S.* (2007 rev)

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2000s: Bush Administration directives (V)

CNA

- ◆ *SECDEF Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF) (May 2008)*
 - ◆ Replaced *Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG)*, *Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG)*, *Posture Guidance*, etc.
- ◆ *SECDEF Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) (May 2008)*
 - ◆ Replaced *Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)*, policy guidance for the employment of nuclear weapons, *Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG)*

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2000s: Bush Administration reports

CNA

- ◆ *DoD Military Power of the PRC*
 - ◆ Annual Reports to Congress
 - ◆ 1st edition: 2002

932

2000s: USN dollars, numbers, capabilities

YEAR	CNO	CAPSTONE DOCUMENT	DON TOA FY09\$	NEW SHIPS	BATTLE FORCE SHIPS	ACTIVE PERSONNEL	NEW CAPABILITIES INTRODUCED
2001	Clark		\$121B	6	317	378K	F/A-18E/F, operational chat, GCCS-M
2002		See Power 21 & Global CONOPS, Naval Power 21 NOCJO	\$125B	6	313	383K	CENTRIXS network, COWAN, MH-60S helo, CEC
2003			\$149B	5	297	382K	P-3C overland ops, MSGs, HSV Swift, ATFLIR
2004		Fleet Response Plan	\$141B	7	292	373K	FLTASWCOM, MARFPCOM, BMD tracking, Tomahawk Block IV TACTOM
2005	Mullen	NSP ISO POM 08 NOC	\$149B	8	282	362K	Virginia-class SSN, FAO, LSRS, ScanEagle
2006		NSP ISO POM 10	\$156B	4	281	350K	NECC, Riverine Group, AIS, CLREC, Lewis and Clark-class T-AKE
2007	Roughead	A Cooperative Strategy, NSP ISO POM 10 (Ch1), NSG ISO PR 11, NOC, NDP 1, NSP ISO POM 12	\$158B	5	276	338K	MCAG, MH-60R helo, RPB, DDG RMS, AESA radar
2008				4	283		Ohio-class SSGN, Seabasing INLS, BLU-126/B, Freedom-class LCS, Riverine Command Boat
2009				7			

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2000s: Capstone documents & force goals

YEAR	CNO	FORCE GOAL DOCUMENT	FORCE LEVEL GOAL	BATTLE FORCE SHIPS	CAPSTONE DOCUMENT
2001	Clark	QDR #2 (Navy View)	310	317	
2002		USN Global CONOPS	375	313	
2003			375	297	
2004			375	292	
2005	Mullen	USN Interim Long-Range Plan	325-260	282	
2006		DON Long-Range Plan	313	281	NSP ISO POM 08, NOC
2007	Roughead	DON Long-Range Plan	313	279	NSP ISO POM 10, A Cooperative Strategy, NSP
2008			313	283	NSG ISO PR 11, NOC, NDP 1, NSP ISO POM 12
2009					
2010					

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2000s: USN Force Structure Goals

CNA


Ship type	2000 Ship-building Report	2001 QDR (Navy View)	2002 USN Global CONOPS	2005 USN Interim Long-range Plan (range of numbers)	2006 DON plan
Total battle force ships	305-360	310	375	260-325	313
Attack submarines	50-66	55	55	37-41	48
Aircraft carriers	11-15	12	12	10-11	11
Surface combatants	116-133	116	160	130-174	143
Amphibious ships	36-42	36	37	17-24	31

935

2000s: USN deployment strategy

CNA

- ◆ 6 #d fleets: 1 forward-based, 3 forward deployed, 2 home
- ◆ 4th, 6th Flts fleets in name only. No big Med/LATAM "hubs"
- ◆ 2 home fleets, focused on homeland defense, trng, surge
- ◆ SSN & SSBN deployments; more SSBNs in PAC
- ◆ Deployments less routinized. More surge capability



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2000s: USN operations & exercises

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2000s: State of the Navy (I)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ USN the world's dominant sea power; PLAN a possible future challenger
- ◆ Continued extensive, varied, global ops & exercises
- ◆ Number of USN responses to situations dropped. Now a dozen long-running campaigns
- ◆ Continued decline in force levels; fluctuating budgets
 - ◆ All 31 Spruance-class DDs decommissioned (1998-2005)
- ◆ Significant shift in LANT/PAC fleet balance
 - ◆ 2001: 55/45 split (LANT 22% larger)
 - ◆ 2006: 53/47 split (LANT 13% larger)
 - ◆ 2007: 49/51 split (PAC 4% larger)

938

2000s: State of the Navy (II)

- ◆ Build-up in Pacific AOR
 - ◆ 1st CVN homeported in Japan (2008)
- ◆ LANT, MED no longer major USN operational theaters
- ◆ Med combat-credible forward deployed hub gone
- ◆ Increased focus on strategic planning, pol-mil affairs & international engagement ops
- ◆ Polled Americans rated USN *least important & prestigious* of 4 DOD armed services (2004-8)
 - ◆ But 2nd most desired to serve in (after USAF)

939

2000s: State of the Navy (III)

- ◆ Increased USN focus on surge readiness
 - ◆ Institution of new PERSTEMPO Program to limit excessive OPTEMPO (Jan 2007)
- ◆ Shift from CVBGs & ARG/MEU(SOC)s to CSGs & ESGs
- ◆ Commissioning of 4 SSGNs (converted SSBNs)
- ◆ SSN roles expanding: Strike, ISR, ASUW, ASW
- ◆ Continuation of active mid-frequency sonar solutions to quiet littoral anti-access submarine problem
 - ◆ Increased public outcries re: marine mammal safety
 - ◆ Litigation vs. mid-frequency sonar training (2005-8)

940

2000s: State of the Navy (IV)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Utility of powerful US sea-based TACAIR again demonstrated in early days of OEF & OIF
 - ◆ Limitations on land-based US TACAIR access
- ◆ USN strike power well-disbursed among platform types
- ◆ But declining relative salience of strike warfare among USN mission areas
- ◆ Carriers & air wings still optimized for strike operations
- ◆ Short combat radius of USN TACAIR
- ◆ Tomahawk: Longer range but less punch, more vulnerable

941

2000s: State of the Navy (V)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) (2001)
 - ◆ Retained 14 SSBNs w/ Trident II D-5 SLBMs
 - ◆ SSBN, SLBM, warhead Life Extension Programs (LEPs)
- ◆ Retained SSN TLAM-N deployment capability
 - ◆ TLAM-N missiles maintained at Trident bases
- ◆ US nuclear test moratorium (from 1992)
 - ◆ Stockpile Stewardship Program (since 1994)
- ◆ SSBN force optimized for counter-force targeting
 - ◆ All Trident C-4 missiles replaced by D-5s (by 2004)
 - ◆ SSBN 9-5 force level "tilt" toward Pacific (by 2005)
- ◆ Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) (research only) to replace Trident W76 warheads (from 2004)

942

2000s: State of the Navy (VI)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Follow-on SSBN studied at end of decade
- ◆ ELF system closed down (2004)
- ◆ USN developed, tested, deployed, operated, expanded BMD systems at sea
 - ◆ BM mid-course phase interceptions
 - ◆ Force expansion from 1 to 18 ships through decade
 - ◆ BMD surveillance & tracking patrols in Sea of Japan (from 2004)
 - ◆ Introduction of BMD capability to Middle East (2008)
 - ◆ USN Aegis BMD errant satellite shoot-down (2008)

943

2000s: State of the Navy (VII)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Fleet Forces Command created (2001)
 - ◆ NCC responsibilities under NORTHCOM, JFCOM, STRATCOM
 - ◆ NWDC placed under FFC; ADDU to NWC (2001)
 - ◆ Focus on CONOPS development
 - ◆ USN neglect of broad future concept development (till 2008)
 - ◆ CNO designated COMNWDC as Executive Agent for Concept Generation & Concept Development (2008)
- ◆ NAVNETWARCOM created (2002)
 - ◆ TYCOM for USN space, networks & IT
 - ◆ Functional Navy component command for USSTRATCOM

944

2000s: State of the Navy (VIII)

- ◆ Greatly increased USN focus on MSO, AT/FP, "Navy Expeditionary Warfare," Maritime Domain Awareness, TSC, HA/DR
- ◆ Drastic increases in security measures for USN PVSTs throughout the world (since 2000)
- ◆ New PSI (from 2003), GMP, GFS initiatives
- ◆ Stand-up & expansion of Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) (from 2006)
 - ◆ Revival of riverine warfare; expansion of coastal warfare & port security; creation of naval civil affairs
 - ◆ NECC integrated into fleet JTFEXs (2008)
- ◆ Continued focus on PLAN capabilities increase
- ◆ Russia again became a USN planning factor

945

2000s: State of the Navy (IX)

- ◆ New LCS classes developed, commissioned
- ◆ New Hybrid Sailor concept developed, implemented, to man LCSs
- ◆ Large # of USN "Individual Augmentees" (IAs) deployed
- ◆ Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program revitalized (from 2006)
- ◆ Navy Language, Regional Expertise & Culture (LREP) programs created &/or improved
- ◆ NPS Monterey Regional Security Education Program (RSEP) afloat training teams raise regional awareness of USN deployers

946

2000s: State of the Navy (X)



- ◆ Expansion of NCIS portfolio to include GWOT
 - ◆ Support for port security, maritime security ops, MDA, COIN, HUMINT, TSC, international engagement
- ◆ Increased cooperation with humanitarian & other NGOs
- ◆ Degradation of USN (& USMC) amphibious assault skills, due to OEF, OIF demands on USMC
- ◆ Mine Warfare Command moved, subsumed under new Fleet Anti-Submarine & Mine Warfare Command

947

2000s: State of the Navy (XI)



- ◆ Revitalization of US naval intelligence
 - ◆ Increased rank of flag officer leadership
 - ◆ Growth in budgets and personnel
 - ◆ New Navy & interagency intel organizations created
 - ◆ Interagency National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) (2009)
 - ◆ Focus on support for forward deployed naval forces; understanding Iran, PRC, Russia

948

2000s: State of the Navy (XII)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ OPNAV Director of Navy Staff now a VADM
- ◆ OPNAV refined campaign analysis POM efforts
- ◆ OPNAV “Deep Blue” cell (2001-2008)
 - ◆ At 1st to give intellectual support to USN GWOT role
 - ◆ Roles evolved over time
- ◆ OPNAV N00Z office established (2002)

949

2000s: State of the Navy (XIII)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ OPNAV program planning constructs continued to evolve
 - ◆ 5 “Integrated Warfare Architectures” (IWARS) (1998-2002)
 - ◆ Information superiority & sensors
 - ◆ Sea dominance
 - ◆ Power projection
 - ◆ Air dominance
 - ◆ Deterrence (became “homeland defense” in 1992)
 - ◆ 4 “Independent Capability Analysis & Assessment” (ICAA) “pillars” (2003 through 2009)
 - ◆ Sea Strike
 - ◆ Sea shield
 - ◆ Sea basing
 - ◆ FORCENet
 - ◆ Sea shaping (from 2005)

950

2000s: State of the Navy (XIV)



- ◆ **OPNAV N3/N5 reorganizations & redesignations**
 - ◆ N3/N5 VADM Morgan re-designated N51 as N5SP (2004)
 - ◆ N513 re-designated as N5SC
 - ◆ N3/N5 VADM Crowder re-designated N5SP as N51 (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ N5SC re-designated as N511
- ◆ **OPNAV Irregular Warfare Office established under N3/N5 (2008)**

951

2000s: State of the Navy (XV)



- ◆ **USN intellectual focus on present & near future; few long-term concepts examined**
- ◆ **N3/N5 (DCNO for Information, Plans & Strategy) influence within OPNAV peaked (2007)**
 - ◆ VADM John Morgan N3/N5 Aug 2004-Jun 2008
- ◆ **Unofficial “Navy Study Group”**
 - ◆ Disbanded (2003); reconvened (2008)
- ◆ **Global N5s conferences (N513/N5SP)**
- ◆ **OPNAV Strategic Concepts Group (N513) briefly decimated by 9/11 attack on Pentagon (2001-2)**

952

2000s: State of the Navy (XVI)

- ◆ NWC Pres VADM Cebrowski retired (2001)
- ◆ Hiatus in NWC “Title X” strategic-level war games (2001-8)
 - ◆ 1991-2001 national security focus on regional contingencies had rendered it obsolescent
 - ◆ By 2001 was: Very large, very expensive, focused on narrow networked C2 issues
 - ◆ Reborn to explore options to implement new global maritime strategy (2008)
- ◆ NAVWARCOL China Maritime Studies Institute created (2006)
- ◆ Continued NWC PME focus on joint strategy & ops, at the expense of maritime & naval subjects
- ◆ SSG mandate continued to be innovation & concept generation in the far future

953

2000s: State of the Navy (XVII)

- ◆ CNO ADM Mullen promulgated Navy Professional Reading Program (NPRP) to help develop Navy professionalism (2006)
 - ◆ Book collections distributed to all operational units
 - ◆ Several books on strategy listed (mostly business strategy)
 - ◆ No books listed on development of USN 1970-2008 capstone documents
- ◆ “Blogging” emerged as new medium of naval policy discourse
 - ◆ “Galrahn” (Raymond Pritchett) increasingly the most consistently sophisticated & relevant (from 2007)
 - ◆ Also “Steeljaw Scribe” (CAPT Will Dossel (Ret) (2006); USNI blog (2008); PACFLT Commander’s blog (2008); others

954

2000s: State of the Navy (XVIII)

- ◆ Weak community management of Navy's political-military/strategic planning sub-specialists
- ◆ Cancellation of national security affairs curriculum at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey
- ◆ Some continued utilization of leading civilian Poli Sci & IR graduate programs
- ◆ Top USN graduates continued to be detailed to Joint Staff vice OPNAV
 - ◆ Continued effect (intended) of Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986)
- ◆ Continued assignment of relatively junior, relatively inexperienced officers to OPNAV N3/N5

955

2000s: Naval policy literature of the period (I)

- ◆ Focus on technological innovation & COIN, but also on strategy, globalization & China
 - ◆ Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down* (1999)
 - ◆ Friedman, *Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (1999)
 - ◆ Alberts, Garstka & Stein, *Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority* (1999)
 - ◆ John Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered* (2000)
 - ◆ ADM William Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War* (2000)
 - ◆ Brig Gen David Deptula USAF, *Effects-Based Operations* (2001)

956

2000s: Naval policy literature of the period (II)

- ◆ Focus on technological innovation & COIN, but also on strategy, globalization & China
 - ◆ CAPT Bernard Cole (Ret), *The Great Wall at Sea* (2001)
 - ◆ CAPT Sam Tangredi (ed.) *Globalization and Maritime Power* (2002)
 - ◆ LTC John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (2002)
 - ◆ Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons," *International Security* (2003)
 - ◆ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace* (2003)
 - ◆ Owen Cote, *The Third Battle: Innovation in the Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines* (2003)
 - ◆ CAPT Terry Pierce, *Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies* (2004)

957

2000s: Naval policy literature of the period (III)

- ◆ Focus on technological innovation & COIN, but also on strategy, globalization & China
 - ◆ Col T.X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone* (2004)
 - ◆ Steven Budiansky, *Air Power* (2004)
 - ◆ Thomas P.M. Barnett, *Pentagon's New Map* (2004)
 - ◆ John Hattendorf, *Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986* (2004)
 - ◆ Thomas P.M. Barnett, *Blueprint for Action* (2005)
 - ◆ David A. Rosenberg & Christopher Ford, *The Admirals' Advantage: U.S. Navy Operational Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War* (2005)
 - ◆ ADM James L. Holloway III, *Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation* (2007)

958

2000s: State of the Navy (XIX)

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
- ◆ Systems in development &/or construction
 - ◆ Ships
 - ◆ Ford-class CVN
 - ◆ Had been CVN(X), CVN-21
 - ◆ LHA(R)
 - ◆ MPS(F)
 - ◆ CG(X)
 - ◆ Zumwalt-class DDG-1000
 - ◆ Had been DD-21, DD(X)
 - ◆ LCS & modules
 - ◆ Joint HSV
 - ◆ N/A vessel
 - ◆ N/MC connector
 - ◆ T-AGM
 - ◆ Remote Minehunting System (RMS)
 - ◆ ASW Distributed Netted Sensors (DNS)
- ◆ Aircraft
 - ◆ JSF (F-35C *Lightning II*)
(with USAF & USMC)
 - ◆ EA-18G *Growler*
 - ◆ E-2D *Advanced Hawkeye*
 - ◆ MQ-8B *Fire Scout*
 - ◆ P-8A *Poseidon MMA*
 - ◆ BAMS UAS
 - ◆ EP-X
 - ◆ X-47B N-UCAS
- ◆ CANES
- ◆ Terminal phase BMD
- ◆ UUV
- ◆ ERGM round (till 2008)
- ◆ MUOS
- ◆ Harpoon III & JSOW C1

959

2000s: Public ONI threat documents

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ *Worldwide Maritime Challenges* (2004)
- ◆ *China's Navy 2007* (2007)



960

2000s: State of the Navy: Sealift (I)

- ◆ Large US gov't RoRo fleet for surge
- ◆ Large available world containership fleet for sustainment
- ◆ Robust MSC nucleus fleet
 - ◆ Government-owned/chartered sealift ships, prepositioning ships, MARAD RRF
 - ◆ 28 sealift ships (2008)
 - ◆ 35 prepositioning ships (2008)
 - ◆ Afloat storage of USMC, US Army & USAF gear
 - ◆ MSC leasing of high speed vessels (HSVs)
 - ◆ Include 19 new /converted LMSRs (1997-2003)
 - ◆ Less planned use of foreign ships for sealift
- ◆ New USN, USMC, joint seabasing concepts
 - ◆ Plans & debates on MPF(F) family of ships

961

2000s: State of the Navy: Sealift (II)

- ◆ Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
 - ◆ MSC fleet provided bulk of sealift
 - ◆ USNS LMSRs: over 44%
 - ◆ Other MSC sealift ships: About 25%
 - ◆ MSC-chartered US flag merchant ships: 13%
 - ◆ MSC foreign charters: 13%
 - ◆ 40 RRF ships activated for OEF & OIF
 - ◆ Other activations, including Katrina HA/DR ops
 - ◆ RRF continues to depend on availability of American merchant mariners to crew ships

962

2000s: State of the Navy: Sealift (III)

CNA
Center for Naval Analyses

- ◆ Total MARAD NDRF ship #s dropped
 - ◆ 2000: 325 2005: 255 Apr 2008: 227
- ◆ NDRF RRF #s drop
 - ◆ 2000: 90 2004: 60 Apr 2008: 44
- ◆ 8 SL-7 Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) transferred from MSC to MARAD RRF (2007-8)
- ◆ MSC non-sealift gov't-owned/gov't-civilian-operated NFAF & Special Mission ships
 - ◆ Outnumber MSC sealift & prepositioning fleets
 - ◆ Placed under new Military Sealift Fleet Support Command (MSFSC) in Norfolk (2005)
 - ◆ COMSC reports as TYCOM to CFFC (vice CNO)

963

2000s: State of the Navy: Sealift (IV)

CNA
Center for Naval Analyses

- ◆ MARAD-USTRANSCOM agreement re: use of MARAD NDRF RRF ships (2008)
 - ◆ To respond to civil emergencies at home
 - ◆ To conduct defense sealift & humanitarian ops overseas

964

2000s: State of the Navy: Basing (I)

CNA

- ◆ **US Navy basing in 2008**
 - ◆ 13 regions
 - ◆ 79 installations
 - ◆ Over 109,000 facilities
 - ◆ Value: \$155 billion
 - ◆ 2,200 administrative buildings
 - ◆ 210 piers
 - ◆ 120 runways

965

2000s: State of the Navy: Basing (II)

CNA

- ◆ **DOD Global Defense Posture Review (2002-4)**
 - ◆ Mandated Pacific base increases, Europe drawdowns
 - ◆ Mandated shift from Main Operating bases (MOBs) to more adaptive global network of Forward Operating Sites (FOSS) & Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs)
- ◆ **5th BRAC round (2005)**
 - ◆ Mandated base closures & creation of joint bases
 - ◆ USN to manage in DC, Norfolk, Hawaii, Guam
 - ◆ 9 USN facilities began to close
- ◆ **Naval Installations Command created (2003)**
 - ◆ To consolidate functions & squeeze efficiencies out of the shore establishment

966

2000s: State of the Navy: Basing (III)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ More USN ships based in PAC than LANT (2007)
 - ◆ 1st time in 60 years
- ◆ NAVSTA Ingleside TX closed; Mine warfare bases, forces to SOCAL (2009)
- ◆ Expansion, modernization of USN Guam facilities
- ◆ Basing for new P-8 MMA announced (Jan 2009)
 - ◆ 6 squadrons to LANT (JAX)
 - ◆ 7 squadrons to PAC (Whidbey Island, Kaneohe)
- ◆ Mayport FL carrier homeporting issue
 - ◆ SECNAV decision to put CVN in Mayport vice NORVA (Jan 2009)

967

2000s: State of the Navy: Basing (IV)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ FOL Comalpa (El Salvador) established (2000)
- ◆ Roosevelt Roads NAS (PRico) closed (2004)
- ◆ JTF GTMO enemy combatant detainee camps established at NAVSTA Guantanamo Bay (2002)
 - ◆ USN manning (since 2005)
 - ◆ USN command (since 2006)
- ◆ Major Navy Europe changes
 - ◆ NAVEUR London HQ moved to Naples (2005)
 - ◆ NAS Keflavik closed (2006)
 - ◆ NSA La Maddalena (Sardinia) closed (2007)

968

2000s: State of the Navy: Basing (V)

CNA
The Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ USN VP forward based in Iraq & Qatar
- ◆ USN leased, deployed "Ocean 6" AFSB & command center off Iraqi oil terminal (2006)
- ◆ USN took over command of Camp Lemonier, Djibouti (& CJTF HOA) (2006)
- ◆ Singapore completed CVN-capable pier (2001)
- ◆ Subic Bay (RP) used for USN SSN tender support (2008)

969

2000s: State of the Navy: Basing (VI)


CNA

- ◆ Major strengthening of base & port security globally, in wake of USS Cole (DDG-67) & 9/11 attacks
 - ◆ Drastically increased physical security ashore & afloat
 - ◆ Vastly expanded naval security forces
 - ◆ MFPCOM established as FFC TYCOM (2004)
 - ◆ Increased anti-terrorism & counter-terrorism roles for Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS): Force Protection Detachments, vulnerability assessments

970

2000s: US Merchant Marine (I)

CNA



2000s: US Merchant Marine (II)

CNA

- ◆ US-flag commercial shipping generally not economically viable without significant US government assistance
- ◆ US-flag commercial Merchant Marine
 - ◆ Continued its decline
 - ◆ Ocean-going ships (1000 gross tons & over)
 - ◆ 2000: 461 2006: 344
 - ◆ Continued to carry only 2% of world tonnage
 - ◆ Carried less than 4% of US international trade
 - ◆ Many vessels not always suited for US military requirements
 - ◆ E.g.: Containerships; large bulk carriers
 - ◆ Small fleet by world standards

972

2000s: US Merchant Marine (III)

- ◆ 785 other US-owned merchant ships are registered in other countries
 - ◆ 68 listed by MARAD as EUSC (2006)
 - ◆ Large fleet by world standards
 - ◆ Part of global trend towards “flag of convenience” registrations
- ◆ Bush administration tax law change to incentivize US ownership of US-flag & EUSC ships (2004)
 - ◆ Restored tax deferral of shipping income
 - ◆ Had been ended by 1986 Reagan-era law
- ◆ 1920 Jones Act re-codified by Congress, President (2006)

973

2000s: US Merchant Marine (IV)

- ◆ Voluntary Inter-modal Sealift Agreement (VISA) & Maritime Security Program (MSP) continued
 - ◆ Assured DOD emergency access in exchange for subsidies & cargo preference
 - ◆ Maritime Security Act of 2003 expanded MSP from 47 ships to 60 (2004)
 - ◆ MSP subsidized US commercial fleet (2007):
 - ◆ 40 containerships; 14 RO/ROs; 2 heavy lift ships
 - ◆ 1 LASH vessel; 3 product tankers

974

2000s: US Merchant Marine (V)


CNA
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- ◆ **Maritime Domain Awareness**
 - ◆ New post-9/11 Merchant Marine non-sealift mission
 - ◆ Commercial fleets seen as additional global maritime eyes & ears
 - ◆ International Maritime Organization (IMO) mandated Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) on all merchant vessels over 300 gross tons (2002)
 - ◆ Commercial carriers integral to USN “1000 Ship Navy” & “Global Maritime Partnership” initiatives
 - ◆ Maersk-Lockheed Martin container ship “black box” data collection data experiment (2007-8)

975

2000s: US shipbuilding (I)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis



976

2000s: US shipbuilding (II)


CNA
Center for Naval Analyses

- ◆ Annual USN warship & US MM ocean-going shipbuilding each down to single digits
- ◆ Only NASSCO, Aker building US ocean-going MM ships
- ◆ # of US (gov't) naval shipyards stayed at 4
- ◆ USN issues with private US shipbuilders
 - ◆ Cost overruns (esp. initial LCSs)
 - ◆ Workmanship (esp. San Antonio-class LPDs)

977

2000s: TOA by US military department


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978

2000s: US service active duty personnel

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979

2000s: USN-USMC relations (I)

CNA
Center for Naval Analyses

- ◆ CMCs Jones, Hagee, Conway (1999-2008+)
- ◆ Relations improved over 1990s
 - ◆ Good personal CNO-CMC relations
 - ◆ USN accepted USMC commanders at sea
 - ◆ Brig Gen Mattis commanded NAVCENT TF 58 in OEF (2001)
 - ◆ Marines commanded some new ESGs
 - ◆ BrigGen Medina commanded ESG 3 (2004)
 - ◆ Marine colonel commanded TG 60.5 (USS *Emory S. Land* Gulf of Guinea deployment) (2005)
- ◆ Joint Pub 3-02 *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* signed (2001)
 - ◆ Superseded 1992 edition; updated cmnd relationships
- ◆ No new “DON Lift study” since 1990

980

2000s: USN-USMC relations (II)

CNA

- ◆ Continued internal USMC concept & doctrine development
 - ◆ MCDP-1 *Warfighting* (1997) still in force
 - ◆ CMC, *Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Concept* (2001)
 - ◆ *Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment* (2005 & 2007)
 - ◆ MCWP 3-31.7 *Seabasing* (2006)
 - ◆ CMC, *Send in the Marines: A Marine Corps Operations Concept to meet an Uncertain Security Environment* (2008)
 - ◆ USMC *Expeditionary Maneuver from the Sea* capstone operational concept (Jun 2008)

981

2000s: USN-USMC relations (III)

CNA

- ◆ USN-USMC concept collaboration
 - ◆ CGMCCDC & COMNWDC, *Enhanced Networked Seabasing Operational Concept* (2003)
 - ◆ CNO & CMC, *FORCEnet Concept* (Feb 2005)
 - ◆ Routine USN-USMC capstone document collaboration

982

2000s: USN-USMC relations (IV)



- ◆ Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) instituted (2000)
- ◆ USN subsumed ARGs under new ESGs (from 2002)
 - ◆ Include SCs & SSNs as well as amphibs
- ◆ USN-USMC Naval Logistics Integration (NLI) program (from 2003)

983

2000s: USN-USMC relations (V)



- ◆ Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration (TAI) plan (2002)
 - ◆ Reduced total numbers of DON F/A-18s & F-35s
 - ◆ Assigned USN squadrons to USMC units & USMC squadrons to Carrier air Wings
 - ◆ 1st Carrier Air Wing commanded by a Marine aviator (2006)
 - ◆ 1st Marine Aircraft Group commanded by USN aviator (2007)
 - ◆ Implementation stalled by OEF, OIF ops

984

2000s: USN-USMC relations (VI)

- ◆ **USMC focused on ground combat in OEF & OIF**
 - ◆ Reduced afloat MEU(SOC) presence
 - ◆ Increased USMC ground combat/ COIN experience
 - ◆ Degraded USMC amphibious assault competency
 - ◆ Minimal non-amphib afloat presence, but steps to reverse this
 - ◆ Emerging USMC SC MAGTF concept (2007 on)
 - ◆ Marines deployed on USS *Farragut* as trainers in SOUTHCOM (2008)
- ◆ **USMC Training & Advisor Group stood up (2007)**
- ◆ **Imaginative USN MSO/HCA use of “empty” amphibs**
- ◆ **Shoddy construction of San Antonio-class LPDs**

2000s: USN-USMC relations (VII)

- ◆ **USMC continued to acquire attributes of an autonomous & co-equal military service**
 - ◆ 1st USMC CJCS (2005-7)
 - ◆ 1st two USMC VCJs
 - ◆ USMC general officers rotated into new STRATCOM, EUCOM CCDR roles
 - ◆ USMC stood up MARSOC component within SOCOM (2006)
- ◆ **Bush Administration (2007) decision to increase active USMC end strength (by 27,000 Marines) to 202,000, by 2011.**
 - ◆ USN active end strength continues to drop

2000s: USN-USMC relations (VIII)



- ◆ **USN tactical support for USMC in OEF & OIF**
 - ◆ LHDs *Bataan* & *Bonhomme Richard* operate as “Harrier carriers” in OIF (2003)
- ◆ **USMC announced disestablishment of riverine-capable Small Craft Company (SCC) (2005)**
- ◆ **USMC passed USNA sentry duty to USN (2006)**
- ◆ **USMC passed OIF Iraq river ops to USN (2007)**
- ◆ **USN pilot “Global Fleet Stations” deployed w/ USMC dets**
 - ◆ HSV *Swift* in Caribbean (2007, 2009)
 - ◆ LSD USS *Fort McHenry* to Africa (2008)
- ◆ **MEU det in USN TF 151 anti-piracy ops (2009)**

987

2000s: USN-USMC relations (IX)



- ◆ **No USMC officer in N513/N5SC (1999-2008)**
- ◆ **Formal USN-USMC “Warfighter Talks” program**
- ◆ **Continued USMC commitment to LCAC, EFV (renamed from AAAV 2003), V-22**
- ◆ **USN-USMC-USAFAF co-development of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) variants**
- ◆ **Annual (unsuccessful) drive by Rep. Walter Jones (R-NC) to rename DON “Department of the Navy and Marine Corps” (since 2001)**

988

2000s: USN-USMC relations (X)

CNA
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- ◆ Continuing issues (I):
 - ◆ Co-equality of USN & USMC within DON
 - ◆ USMC pull on DON resources
 - ◆ Amphib #'s in Navy shipbuilding plan
 - ◆ Especially San Antonio-class LPDs (LPD-17s)
 - ◆ Amphib design
 - ◆ Especially follow-on LHA (w/ or w/o well-deck?)
 - ◆ USMC a/c force levels, carrier deployments
 - ◆ OEF & OIF ops cause major perturbations in TAI Plan
 - ◆ Navy surface fire support
 - ◆ USN canceled ERGM development (2008); DDG-1000 issues
 - ◆ Joint expeditionary fires Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) (2008)

Q&A

2000s: USN-USMC relations (XI)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Continuing issues (II):
 - ◆ MPF(F) Seabasing differences
 - ◆ USMC saw MPF(F) as added capability
 - ◆ USN saw as competing with amphibs
 - ◆ MPF(F) characteristics
 - ◆ Command of USMC afloat forces
 - ◆ CATF/CLF relationships vs. Supporting/supported relationships
 - ◆ Especially in large-scale MCOs
 - ◆ Continued simultaneous USMC development of single-service vision, concept, strategy & doctrine pubs, alongside USMC-influenced USN-USMC "naval" pubs

Q&A

2000s: USN-USCG relations (I)

- ◆ **US gov't responses to 9/11 attacks revolutionized USN-USCG relationships**
 - ◆ USCG budget ramped up as responsibilities grow
 - ◆ USCG manning grew post 9/11; USN declines
 - ◆ New homeland security & defense concepts
 - ◆ New agencies & inter-governmental organizations
- ◆ **MARDEZ concept ignored on 9/11/2001**
 - ◆ USN CNO offered support to USCG COMDT
 - ◆ MARDEZ concept still on the books but essentially defunct
- ◆ **USCG *Noble Eagle* ops after 9/11 attacks**
- ◆ **USCG moved into new Department of Homeland Security (since 2003)**

991

2000s: USN-USCG relations (II)

- ◆ **USN/SOCCOM PCs status changed**
 - ◆ All TACON to USCG off CONUS (2002-3)
 - ◆ USN crews; USCG LEDET
 - ◆ 5 leased to USCG (USN maintains) (2004)
- ◆ **USN-USCG created 4 JHOCs after 9/11 attacks**
 - ◆ NORVA pilot (Nov 2001)
 - ◆ Became SCC-Js (2006)
- ◆ **Maritime Force Protection Units (MFPUs) (2007)**
 - ◆ USCG manned; USN funded
 - ◆ For SSBN homeport ingress & egress security

992

2000s: USN-USCG relations (III)

- ◆ Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (2003-):
 - ◆ USCG cutters, WPBs, buoy tender, PSUs, LEDETs deployed forward in-theater under USN commands
 - ◆ USCG provided outload security in CONUS ports
 - ◆ USCG, USN personnel trained Iraqi Navy
- ◆ New US interagency MDA offices established
 - ◆ Global Maritime & Air Intelligence Integration (GMAII)
 - ◆ Established Jul 2006 in ODNI
 - ◆ Head: USCG FO; Location: McLean VA
 - ◆ Global Maritime Situational Awareness (GMSA)
 - ◆ Established Aug 2007 under DHS oversight
 - ◆ Head: USN FO; Deputy: USCG civ; Location: USCG HQ

993

2000s: USN-USCG relations (IV)

- ◆ Continued limited USCG cutter forward deployments ISO CCDRs & USN NCCs
 - ◆ USCG joined in new USN GFS, APS, POA deployments
 - ◆ USN bought USCG defense-specific gear, e.g.: radios
- ◆ Continued USCG cutter, WPB, PSU roles in joint war plans
- ◆ USN-USCG counter-drug ops continue
- ◆ USCG flag officer Directors of:
 - ◆ SOUTHCOM JIATF East (became JIATF South 2003)
 - ◆ PACOM JIATF West (moved to Hawaii 2004)
- ◆ USCG HITRON crews in USN helos (from 2005)
- ◆ USN-USCG Florida Strait blimp tests (2008)

994

2000s: USN-USCG relations (V)

- ◆ Major USCG “Deepwater” force modernization & replacement program
 - ◆ Issue: USN LCS & USCG NDC common hull
- ◆ Low USN funding of USCG defense hardware
 - ◆ USCG buys 1st 4 MK57mm guns for its new NSCs
- ◆ **USCGC Gentian Caribbean Support Tender (CST) (1999-2006)**
 - ◆ *Gentian* decommissioned when neither USCG nor USN would fund (2006)
 - ◆ Role picked up by USN LATAM Global Fleet Station deployments, w/ USCG participation
- ◆ **USCGC in USN Africa Partnership Station ops**
- ◆ **USCG LEDET in USN CTF 151 anti-piracy ops (from Jan 2009)**

995

2000s: USN-USCG relations (VI)

- ◆ 1st **National Strategy for Maritime Security** published (2005)
- ◆ **USN CNOs & COGARD COMDTs signed 2nd & 3rd updated *National Fleet* policy statements (2002, 2006)**
- ◆ **COMDT COGARD published**
 - ◆ *Coast Guard Pub 1* as 1st doctrinal handbook (2002)
 - ◆ *Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security* (2002)
 - ◆ *Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security & Stewardship* (2007)
 - ◆ DOD-like USCG “Posture Statement” (2008)

996

2000s: USN-USCG relations (VII)

CNA

- ◆ **Special Missions Training Center created (2003)**
 - ◆ Tri-service; run by USCG; at Camp Lejeune NC
 - ◆ USCG-USN-USMC small boat, port security courses
- ◆ **1st Coastguardsmen get SEAL training (2008)**
- ◆ **Formal Navy-Coast Guard “Leadership,” later “Warfighter,” Talks (replace NAVGARD Board)**
- ◆ **COMDT COGARD & staff participate in development of tri-service:**
 - ◆ *Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century (2007)*
 - ◆ *Coordinated HASC testimony (2007)*
 - ◆ *Naval Operations Concept (NOC) (2008)*

997

2000s: USN-USAFAF relations (I)

CNA

- ◆ **USAFAF capstone documents**
 - ◆ SECAF Peters & CSAF Ryan, *America’s Air Force: Global Vigilance, Reach & Power* (2000)
 - ◆ CSAF Gen Moseley, *U.S. Air Force Vision* (2006)
 - ◆ *Air Force Strategic Plan, 2006-2008* (2006)
 - ◆ CSAF Gen Moseley, *The Nation’s Guardians: America’s 21st Century Air Force* (Dec 2007)
 - ◆ USAFAF strategy for next 2 decades
 - ◆ Continues “global vigilance, reach & power” theme
 - ◆ Response (in part) to new maritime strategy (& to draft of this brief)
- ◆ **Also:**
 - ◆ AFDD 2-3, *Irregular Warfare*, 1 August 2007

998

2000s: USN-USAF relations (II)



- ◆ Few new USAF purchases (F-22s).
 - ◆ USAF fleet age greatly increased
- ◆ USAF continued to seek technological, airpower solutions to national defense problems
 - ◆ Push-back from Dunlap, Deptula, other USAF thinkers re: Army, USMC views of COIN
- ◆ USN-USMC TOA comparable to USAF
 - ◆ Relative status fluctuates slightly
- ◆ USN active end strength comparable to USAF
 - ◆ Relative status fluctuates slightly

999

2000s: USN-USAF relations (III)



- ◆ Continued integration of USN & USAF strike operations, utilizing JFACC & ATO concepts
 - ◆ Joint OEF & OIF ops achieved real USN-USAF synergies
 - ◆ USN full integration & participation in CAOC
- ◆ USN, USMC EA-6Bs continue as sole US national tactical electronic attack capability
 - ◆ Support AEFs as well as USN, USMC units
 - ◆ USAF ceases to provide crews (2005)
- ◆ USN temporarily assumed USAF OEF missions when USAF F-15s grounded (2007)

1000

2000s: USN-USAF relations (IV)

CNA

- ◆ Increased joint TACAIR exercises
- ◆ USN-USAF exercise “Resultant Fury” (2004)
 - ◆ USN, USAF B-52Hs destroy targets at sea
- ◆ USAF Operation “Rex Redux” (Aug 2007)
 - ◆ B-52 surveillance at sea
 - ◆ Big USAF publicity campaign
- ◆ USN, USAF, USMC continue co-development of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JFS) variants
- ◆ USN, USAF merge Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) acquisition programs

1001

2000s: USN-USAF relations (V)

CNA

- ◆ Increased USN dependence on USAF tankers
 - ◆ Short-legged F/A-18 force
 - ◆ Extended ranges of OEF & OIF targets
- ◆ Continued USN dependence on USAF for
 - ◆ Long-haul airlift support of critical parts, supplies, personnel
 - ◆ AWACs
- ◆ Formal USN-USAF Warfighter Talks program
- ◆ AFDD 2-1.4 *Countersea Operations* (2005)
- ◆ SECDEF accused USAF leadership of failing to focus on nuclear systems security (2008)
 - ◆ Resignations of SECAF & CSAF (2008)

1002

2000s: USN-USAF relations (VI)



- ◆ **USN Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aerial System program derived from USAF RQ-4 *Global Hawk***
- ◆ **Continued USN MSC afloat forward prepositioning of USAF munitions**
- ◆ **P-3C use of USAF-run FOL at Manta, Ecuador**
- ◆ **Continued joint USN-USAF education & training consolidation**
 - ◆ Eglin AFB ranges replace NAS Roosevelt Roads & Vieques for USN strike training

1003

2000s: USN-USAF relations (VII)



- ◆ **Continued high USN use of USAF space systems**
 - ◆ Continued modest USN funding of space systems
 - ◆ SECDEF Rumsfeld designates USAF as DOD executive agent for space issues (2001)
 - ◆ Space policy & acquisition authority to OSD (2007)
 - ◆ **USN is acquisition agent for narrowband satellites**
 - ◆ USN responsible for UHF/FO SATCOM system control & development of next-generation UHF Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) program
 - ◆ **On DOD direction, USN turned over operation of “space fence” ground-based surveillance system & Alternate Space Control Center (ASCC) to USAF (2004)**

1004

2000s: USN-USAF relations (VIII)



- ◆ USAF support for USN BMD system satellite shootdown (2008)
 - ◆ USAF provided satellite tracking data to USN shooters
 - ◆ SECDEF appointed USN ADM Donald to investigate USAF nuclear weps security lapses (2008)
- ◆ Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review (2008)
 - ◆ USN-USAF command, control & acquisition issues
 - ◆ Unmanned aircraft systems
 - ◆ Intratheater airlift (Operational Support Aircraft)
 - ◆ Cyber war responsibilities

1005

2000s: USN-USAF relations (IX)



- ◆ USN-USAF issues & disagreements
 - ◆ Stealth & SEAD
 - ◆ UAV responsibilities
 - ◆ Intra-theater lift responsibilities
 - ◆ Cyberwar responsibilities
 - ◆ BRAC-mandated joint bases to be managed by USN
 - ◆ NAVSTA Pearl & Hickham AFB
 - ◆ Naval base Guam & Anderson AFB
 - ◆ Naval Annex Anacostia & Bolling AFB
 - ◆ BRAC-mandated joint bases to be managed by USAF
 - ◆ NAF Washington & Andrews AFB
 - ◆ NAVWPNSTA CHASN & Charleston AFB
 - ◆ NAES Lakehurst & McGuire AFB

1006

2000s: USN-US Army relations (I)

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- ◆ Revised US Army doctrine
 - ◆ Entire Army consumed with COIN issues (USN had principally NECC)
 - ◆ US Army FM 3-0 *Operations* (2001, 2008)
 - ◆ 2008 edition gives equal weight to stability, civil support & shaping; and offensive & defensive ops & battles
 - ◆ FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 *Counterinsurgency* (2006)
 - ◆ Army converting from division-based to modular, brigade-based force

007

2000s: USN-US Army relations (II)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Big growth in Army TOA (OIF, OEF expenses)
- ◆ 2007 decision to increase active Army by 35,000 soldiers (to 547,000) by 2012.
 - ◆ USN active end strength continues to drop
- ◆ “Revolt of the Generals” (Public dissent) (2006)
- ◆ Army adjusted Korea force posture, deployment
 - ◆ Navy, other services adjust as well
- ◆ US Army Engineers riverine forces in Iraq (2003-)
- ◆ 101st Airborne Division stood up riverine force on Euphrates River in Iraq (2008)
- ◆ US Army, USCG manned experimental DOD counter-smuggler *Stiletto* craft in Caribbean (2008)

2000s: USN-US Army relations (III)

CNA

◆ Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (2001)

- ◆ US Army SOF troops, helos operated from USN carrier *Kitty Hawk* vs. Afghanistan targets

◆ Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (2003-)

- ◆ Puerto Rican ANG provided "Guardian Mariners" for USN sealift ships during OIF
 - ◆ Relieved by USN force protection forces (2003-4)
- ◆ USN support of Army
 - ◆ Sea-based close air support; Seabee construction
 - ◆ Individual Augmentees (IAs)
 - ◆ Army basic, specialized CONUS training of USN IAs
 - ◆ NECC port security & other unit deployments, etc.
 - ◆ Joint Army-Navy HSV & TSV ops, crewing
 - ◆ Patriot-Aegis early warning coordination

009

2000s: USN-US Army relations (IV)

CNA

◆ JTF Katrina (2005)

- ◆ Army helos operated off USN CVN USS *Harry S. Truman* in JTF Katrina (2005)

◆ USN adopted Army FAO concepts, practices

◆ Army interest in sea basing concepts, hardware

- ◆ Continued interest in USN sealift & prepo support

◆ Joint USN-Army HSV development & acquisition program

◆ Army C-RAM adapted Navy CIWS Phalanx

◆ USN SSN, SSGNs deployed Army *Buster* UAV

010

2000s: USN-US Army relations (V)

CNA
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- ◆ Continued USN MSC forward afloat prepositioning of US Army equipment
- ◆ US Army veterinarian support for USN humanitarian deployment ops
- ◆ Formal USN-USA “Warfighter Talks” program
- ◆ 1st USN commander of Joint Special Operations command (JSOC) (2008)
 - ◆ USA leadership since formation in 1980

011

2000s: USN-US Army relations (VI)

CNA
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- ◆ USN-US Army BMD interface cooperation
 - ◆ Aegis/Patriot BMD complementarity vs. DPRK BMs (from 2004)
 - ◆ Aegis data exchange w/ THAAD developmental program
 - ◆ 1st integrated Aegis-THAAD radar BM intercept (2008)
- ◆ Continued Army-Navy Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) exercises & symposia
- ◆ BRAC plans for USN NAB Little Creek administration of US Army Fort Story VA

012

2000s: USN-foreign navy relations (I)

- ◆ Multilateral operations the norm
- ◆ USN focus: Coordinating & *integrating* coalition capabilities in real world regional contingencies
- ◆ Solutions to coalition classified comms & data link interoperability issues
- ◆ 9/11 & GWOT sparked:
 - ◆ Push for wide exchange of UNCLAS data
 - ◆ Low-end navy MSO capacity-building; GFSs
- ◆ Exercises, education & training, tech transfer
- ◆ CJCS & COCOMs largely drove policy
- ◆ US Navy Global Maritime Partnerships initiatives sought to regain & expand service policy role

1013

2000s: USN-foreign navy relations (II)

- ◆ ISS on-going biennially at NWC Newport RI
- ◆ Routine integration of selected allied warships into USN CSG deployments & JTFX workups
 - ◆ Included 1st Brazilian frigate; Italian sub (2008)
- ◆ Multi-national Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) ops (2003-)
- ◆ NAVWARCOL curricula for foreign officers
 - ◆ Other foreign navy educations & training
- ◆ Bi-lateral Navy-to-Navy staff talks programs continue
- ◆ Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) restructured

1014

2000s: USN-foreign navy relations (III)

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- ◆ Arms & technology transfers (both ways)
 - ◆ US Aegis system enters Australian, Norwegian, Korean & Spanish navies
 - ◆ Naval arms transfers to Taiwan (esp. DDGs)
 - ◆ Naval arms offers to Taiwan (SSs, P-3Cs) (2001)
 - ◆ Selected Tomahawk, Standard block II transfers encouraged
- ◆ Intel & communications collaboration
 - ◆ CENTRIXS enables wide coalition interoperability
 - ◆ AUSCANZUKUS continues

1015

2000s: USN-foreign navy relations (IV)

CNA
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- ◆ Diesel Electric Submarine Initiative (DESI) for fleet ASW exercise support (since 2001)
- ◆ Annual Asia-Pacific Submarine Conference (APSC) (since 2001)
- ◆ USN students in RN “Perisher” sub command course (from 2002)
- ◆ ISMERLO activated in Norfolk (2004)

1016

2000s: USN-foreign navy relations (V)

CNA
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- ◆ Major coalition Red/Arabian Sea/Gulf naval ops
 - ◆ Maritime Security Operations (MSO)
 - ◆ Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) (post-9/11)
 - ◆ Multi-national task forces w/ rotating multinational leadership (CTF 150, CTF 152, CTF 158)
 - ◆ CMF commander was also CNC/C5F
 - ◆ USN Iraqi Navy advisory effort
 - ◆ Part of combined RN-USCG-other NaTT effort
 - ◆ International anti-piracy armada build-up off Somalia (2008)
 - ◆ Incl/ NATO force Oct-Dec 2008), relieved by
 - ◆ EU NAVFOR (Dec 2008-)
 - ◆ Russia, China, India, Japan, Malaysia, others
 - ◆ CNC/C5F/CMF constituted CTF 151 (Jan 2009)

1017

2000s: USN-foreign navy relations (VI)

CNA
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- ◆ Foreign military/ naval assistance to US at home
 - ◆ Post-9/11 (2001)
 - ◆ Post-Hurricane Katrina Gulf of Mexico disaster relief operations (2005)
- ◆ Israel-Lebanon War (2006)
 - ◆ Ad hoc multinational cooperative sea evacuation ops
 - ◆ UNIFIL multinational naval patrol off Lebanon (2006-)

1018

2000s: USN-foreign navy relations (VII)

CNA
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- ◆ CNO Clark “Maritime NORAD” concept floated (2001)
- ◆ CNO Mullen “1000-ship Navy” concept floated (2005)
 - ◆ Morphs into NSC- approved interagency Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP) policy (2008)
- ◆ CNO Mullen “Global Fleet Stations” (GFS) concept implemented
 - ◆ LATAM GFS & Africa Partnership Station (APS)
 - ◆ Engagement with European & local navies, coast guards, other local GOs & NGOs

1019

2000s: USN-foreign navy relations (VIII)

CNA
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- ◆ NATO relationships evolved (I)
 - ◆ Command structures, staffs, plans & exercises
 - ◆ SACLANT abolished. Ops & plans responsibilities passed to SACEUR (2003)
 - ◆ US command. Any service
 - ◆ New Allied Command Transformation (ACT) created in Norfolk
 - ◆ US command. Any service
 - ◆ USN command of new NATO JFC Naples & new NATO JC Lisbon
 - ◆ Standing Naval Forces (STANAVFORs) became Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs) (2005)
 - ◆ Occasionally now deployed out-of-area
 - ◆ Continued USN permanent contribution

1020

2000s: USN-foreign navy relations (IX)


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- ◆ NATO relationships evolved (II)
 - ◆ CONMAROPS superseded by *Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept – The Maritime Dimension*
 - ◆ Multinational Manuals (MMs), then Multinational Publications (MPs), superseded EXTACs
 - ◆ New MTP 1 superseded EXTAC 1000 *Maritime Maneuvering and Tactical Procedures* (2000)
 - ◆ AJP 3.1 *Allied Joint Maritime Operations* (Apr 2004)
 - ◆ Based in part on 1990s NAVDOCCOM MMOPs pub
 - ◆ Rationalization, standardization, interoperability

1021

AJP 3-1 Allied Joint Maritime Operations

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1022

2000s: USN-foreign navy relations (X)

CNA

- ◆ **NATO relationships evolved (III)**
 - ◆ Post-9/11 Operation *Active Endeavor* in Med (2001-)
 - ◆ NATO treaty area expanded in Baltic, Black Seas
 - ◆ Baltic republics, Romania, Bulgaria joined NATO (2004)
 - ◆ Combined Joint Operations From the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) opened in Norfolk (2006)
 - ◆ Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center (MIOTC) opened in Crete (2008)
- ◆ **CHENS & RSS continued**
- ◆ **Continued USN-RN collaboration on UK sea-based deterrent Trident life extension program**
 - ◆ POTUS-PM letters re: UK successor SSBN compatible missile compartment design (Dec 2006)
- ◆ **USN-FN CVN ops, training, cross-decking**

1023

2000s: USN-foreign navy relations (XI)

CNA

- ◆ **Annual USN-Russian Navy INCSEA meetings**
- ◆ **RUKUS expands to FRUKUS (2003)**
 - ◆ Exercise cancelled in wake of Russian attacks on Georgia (2008)
- ◆ **NORAD receives new North America maritime warning mission**
- ◆ **WPNS continues**
- ◆ **USN-PLAN relations fluctuate**
 - ◆ Contacts limited by 2000 Authorization Act
 - ◆ Flag contacts, PVSTs
 - ◆ USCG-PRC relationships ongoing, increasing
 - ◆ **US-PRC Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Plenary & working group discussions (since 1998)**

1024

2000s: USN-foreign navy relations (XII)



- ◆ RIMPAC, Cobra Gold exercises continue, expand
- ◆ JMSDF, ROKN, RAN, SN relationships expand
 - ◆ Major USN-JMSDF BMD cooperation
 - ◆ USN-ROKN relationships restructured
- ◆ CARAT continues
- ◆ SEACAT exercise program (from 2002)
- ◆ USN-Philippine Navy COIN cooperation
- ◆ USN, USCG anti-piracy assistance programs
 - ◆ Boats, radars, training
 - ◆ Especially to Indonesian Navy

1025

2000s: USN-foreign navy relations (XIII)



- ◆ Greatly increased naval relations w/ Indian Navy
 - ◆ Malabar exercises; visits; sale of *Trenton* (LPD) (2007)
 - ◆ Indo-US Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation (2006)
- ◆ Indian Ocean Naval Symposia (since 2008)
- ◆ LATAM navy relationships
 - ◆ PANAMAX exercises started, expanded (from 2003)
 - ◆ SIFOREXes with Peruvian Navy (from 2001)
 - ◆ UNITAS, IANC continue
 - ◆ Allied participation in JIATF South surveillance
- ◆ Significantly increased engagement with Gulf, African navies
- ◆ African Seapower Symposia (since 2005)

1026

2000s: USN-foreign navy relations (XIV)

CNA

- ◆ American Service-Members Protection Act (2002) prevents USN from providing certain forms of military assistance to countries not signing agreements
 - ◆ These “Article 98” Agreements pledge countries not to prosecute US citizens for genocide & other international crimes before International Criminal Court (ICC) IAW Rome Statute
 - ◆ Countries not signing include Barbados, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad, Uruguay, Venezuela, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya & others

1027

2000s: Text & context of each document

CNA

Hattendorf (ed.)
*U.S. Naval
Strategy in
the 2000s:
Selected
Documents*
(Forthcoming)

- ◆ Texts also available on the web, in journals, & as stand-alone documents

1028

ADM Vern Clark (CNO Jul 2000-Jul 2005)

CNA

- ◆ Oct 2002 *Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision*
- ◆ Nov 2002 *Sea Power 21*
 - ◆ A “vision”; Included “Global CONOPs”
- ◆ Apr 2003 *Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations*
- ◆ May 2003 *Fleet Response Plan*
 - ◆ From “concept” to “plan”



1029

ADM Vern Clark (CNO Jul 2000-Jul 2005) (I)

CNA

- ◆ Surface warfare officer
- ◆ Saw self as “the joint guy” & a business manager
 - ◆ Only CNO with an MBA
 - ◆ Had been DJS & DJ3 on Joint Staff
 - ◆ Candidate for CJCS
 - ◆ Sensitive to SECDEF, OSD concerns
 - ◆ E.g.: Transformation Roadmaps, Fleet Response Plan
- ◆ Saw POM as his strategy, as a service chief
 - ◆ Initial concern for current readiness, not the future
 - ◆ Initial disinterest in promulgating a “glossy pub”

1030

ADM Vern Clark (CNO Jul 2000-Jul 2005) (II)



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- ◆ Improved relations with USMC (e.g.: NOCJO)
- ◆ Signature program: LCS
- ◆ Advocated 375-ship Battle Force goal (2003)
 - ◆ Then advocated range of 260-325 ships (2005)
- ◆ In wake of 9/11 attacks, called repeatedly for "Maritime NORAD"
 - ◆ His concept was global, however, & multinational

10.31

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

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10.32

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA
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♦ Overview

- ♦ Signed by CNO ADM Clark & numerous other admirals
- ♦ NAVWARCOL speech & *Transformation Roadmap*
- ♦ UNCLAS *Proceedings* 9-article series; stand-alone 5-article pamphlet; posted on the web
- ♦ Billed as a “vision”
- ♦ Principle target: Many, esp. USN officer corps
- ♦ 8-concept framework: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, FORCENet, Sea Warrior, Sea Trial, Sea Enterprise, Global Concept of Operations
- ♦ Very influential within OPNAV, NWDC, ONR, etc. through 2008

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Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

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♦ Signed by:

- ♦ CNO ADM Vern Clark
 - ♦ During 2nd year in office
- ♦ Individual admirals & a general signed amplifying portions



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Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

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- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as a Navy “vision” document
 - ◆ Subtitle: “Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities”
 - ◆ Included a “Concept of Operations” (CONOPs)
 - ◆ NWC Current Strategy Forum speech (Jun 2002)
 - ◆ *Naval Transformation Roadmap* (Jun 2002)
 - ◆ UNCLAS 9-part *Proceedings* series (Oct 02-Jan 04)
 - ◆ 48 pages (incl. 10-page overview article; 4-page CONOPS)
 - ◆ Also stand-alone pamphlet (1st 5 parts only): 36 pages
 - ◆ Posted on web

1035

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

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- ◆ Why it was written (I)
 - ◆ To codify, rationalize & publicize CNO ADM Clark’s many key initiatives to grow & change the fleet
 - ◆ CNO thought timing was right
 - ◆ New administration elected and in place
 - ◆ 9/11 attacks had occurred
 - ◆ 2001 DOD QDR & Nuclear Posture Review completed
 - ◆ Initial CNO goals for “current readiness” being achieved
 - ◆ To link Navy programs & practices to Bush Administration policies & SECDEF Rumsfeld demands for “1-4-2-1” “Transformation” from all DOD components
 - ◆ To flesh out CNO ADM Clark’s 375-ship goal rationale

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Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

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♦ Why it was written (II)

- ♦ To push OPNAV cross-functional analyses for USN POM development; & fleet creation of new force packages
- ♦ To re-energize sea and area control
- ♦ To advertise the Navy as a joint player, and as more than just an enabling force
- ♦ To bring USN & USMC together by elevating Sea Basing status & visibility, expanding ARG to include organic fire support ships (& thus capable of CLF command)

1037

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

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♦ Context (I)

- ♦ 2nd year of Bush administration (2001-)
- ♦ Lackluster US economy pulling out of recession
- ♦ SECDEF Rumsfeld (2000-6)
- ♦ CNO ADM Clark (2000-05)
- ♦ Al Qaeda attack on USS *Cole* (DDG-67)(2000)
- ♦ 9-11 attacks on America & responses (2001)
- ♦ Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- ♦ Numerous post-9/11 US joint ops launched
 - ♦ Noble Eagle (homeland defense)
 - ♦ Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (Afghanistan)
- ♦ Customs & Border Patrol (CBP) Container Security Initiative (CSI) (from Jan 2002)

1038

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (II)

- ◆ NATO invoked Article 5 for 1st time, to assist US following Al Qaeda attack (2001)
- ◆ Taiwan elected 1st pro-independence president (2000)
 - ◆ Rising cross-Strait tensions
- ◆ USN EP-3 collision with PLAN interceptor (2001)
- ◆ *USS Greenville* collision with Japanese fishing vessel (2001)
- ◆ SORT Treaty (2002)
- ◆ US withdrawal from ABM Treaty (2002)
- ◆ SECDEF prohibited “glossy” publication of Navy & other service posture statements (2001)

1039

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ OSD “Transformation” focus
- ◆ Increased role of SECDEF & OSD
- ◆ Declining USN force levels; increasing budgets
- ◆ New USN 375-ship Battle Force goal
- ◆ USN in 2002: 313 Battle Force ships; 6 ships authorized
- ◆ CNO Clark satisfied with progress made in 1st 2 yrs in increasing *current* readiness. Turn to *future* readiness

1040

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPS (2002)



◆ Context (IV)

- ◆ Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) concept
 - ◆ Evolved from "Streetfighter" concept (1999)
 - ◆ Industry developing proposals (2002)
 - ◆ For operations *in* the littorals
 - ◆ Strong CNO ADM Clark support
- ◆ DOD canceled USN area-wide BMD program (2001)
- ◆ MDA created new Aegis BMD midcourse program (2002)
- ◆ CNA conference on Naval Forward Presence (2001)
- ◆ Continued USN-USMC differences on amphibious ops command & control, especially fire support

1041

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPS (2002)



◆ Context (V)

- ◆ Fleet Forces Command created (2001)
- ◆ NAVNETWARCOM created (May 2002)
- ◆ Atlantic & Med no longer US focal theaters of war (2002)
 - ◆ JFCOM lost geographic responsibilities,
 - ◆ Atlantic Ocean divided among NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, & EUCOM
 - ◆ Med combat-credible forward presence hub disappeared
- ◆ Unofficial DC-area Navy Study Group (1992-2005)
 - ◆ Convener: Dr. David Rosenberg
 - ◆ Participants included Sea Power 21 & CONOPS contributors
- ◆ OPNAV Dir. of Navy Staff elevated to 3 stars (Aug 2001)
- ◆ CNO Strategic Actions Group (OPNAV N00Z) created (2002)

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA

◆ Context (VI)

- ◆ OPNAV N513 (Strategic Concepts branch) temporarily short-manned following 9/11 Pentagon attack
 - ◆ Had successfully argued vs. transfer from Pentagon to Crystal City
 - ◆ Branch head CDR Bob Dolan & 4 action officers killed
- ◆ USN began JFMCC experiments & exercises
- ◆ USN began “Sea Swap” experiments, rotating crews to forward deployed destroyers (2002-6)
- ◆ CNO ADM Clark post-9/11 calls for a “Maritime NORAD”
- ◆ NWDC placed under new Fleet Forces Command (2001), vice Naval War College

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA

◆ Cited references

- ◆ *The Maritime Strategy* (1986)
- ◆ *...From the Sea* (1992)
- ◆ *Forward...From the Sea* (1994)
- ◆ Did not reference 2nd (1st Bush) QDR (2001)
 - ◆ But did reference QDR “1-4-2-1” force sizing construct
- ◆ Placed *Sea Power 21* in USN historical strategic conceptual context

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ 7th and last Clinton *National Security Strategy for a Global Age* (2000)
 - ◆ 2nd (1st Bush) *QDR* (2001)
 - ◆ *Nuclear Posture Review* (2001)
 - ◆ Added conventional weapons to strategic deterrent
 - ◆ "New Triad"
 - ◆ *DoD Global Force Posture Review* (underway)
 - ◆ CJCS GEN Shalikashvili *National Military Strategy* (1997)
 - ◆ CJCS *Joint Vision 2020* (2000)

1045

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ SPG, CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS
 - ◆ Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (2000)
 - ◆ *Naval Power 21* and *NOCJO* (being drafted)
 - ◆ Large family of USMC warfighting concepts (1996-8)
 - ◆ *MCDP 1 Warfighting* (1997)
 - ◆ *Marine Corps Strategy 21* (Nov 2000)
 - ◆ *CMC Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Concept* (2001)
 - ◆ *Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration Plan* (2002)

1046

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ NWDC, *Network Centric Operations: A Capstone Concept for Naval Operations* (2000 draft; never approved)
 - ◆ Revised (2nd) USN-USCG *National Fleet* policy statement (Jul 2002)
 - ◆ SECAF Peters & CSAF Ryan, *America's Air Force: Global Vigilance, Reach & Power* (1997)
 - ◆ Brig Gen David Deptula USAF, *Effects-Based Operations* (2001)
 - ◆ Rebuttals by LtGen Van Riper USMC (Ret) & others
 - ◆ Hart-Rudman Commission Reports (1999-2001)

1047

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
 - ◆ VADM Cebrowski & John Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," *Proceedings*, Jan 1998
 - ◆ Alberts, Garstka & Stein, *Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority* (1999)
 - ◆ BR 1806, *British Maritime Doctrine* (2nd ed.) (1999)
 - ◆ ADM William Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War* (2000)
 - ◆ CAPT Bernard Cole (Ret), *The Great Wall at Sea* (2001)

1048

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
 - ◆ Michelle Fluornoy, CAPT Sam Tangredi USN et al., *Report of the NDU QDR 2001 Working Group* (2000)
 - ◆ NIC, *Global Trends 2015* (Dec 2000)
 - ◆ Whiteneck & Weitz, *Naval Forward Presence and Regional Stability* (CNA) (Sep 2001)
 - ◆ Sherry Sontag & Chris Drew, *Blind Man's Bluff* (1998)
 - ◆ Friedman, *Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (1999)
 - ◆ Profs Looney, Schrady, Porch, *Economic Impact of Naval Forward Presence: Benefits, Linkage & Future Prospects* (NPS Monterey) (Dec 2001)

1049

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA

- ◆ How it was written (I)
 - ◆ Conceptual roots in
 - ◆ . . . *From the Sea, NSPG 2000*
 - ◆ CNO SSG products, 1996-2001
 - ◆ Especially FORCENet
 - ◆ CNO saw a need for a forward-looking vision for future readiness beyond his “Goals”
 - ◆ Current readiness goals well on the way to achievement

1050

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)



- ◆ How it was written (II)
 - ◆ Drafted in new CNO Strategic Actions Group (N-00Z) OPNAV office
 - ◆ Global CONOPS drafted in OPNAV N81
 - ◆ Personalities:
 - ◆ ADM Vern Clark, CNO
 - ◆ CAPT Frank Pandolfe, 1st N00Z Director
 - ◆ CDR Steve Richter, N81, (Global CONOPS)
 - ◆ RDML Stavridis, OPNAV Deep Blue (ESG concept)
 - ◆ Many others subsequently contributed

1051

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)



- ◆ How it was written (III)
 - ◆ Timing moved up to meet OSD *Naval Transformation Roadmap* Jun 2008 tasking deadline
 - ◆ CNO then decided to use in NAVWARCOL Current Strategy Forum speech (Jun 2002)
 - ◆ “Global CONOPS” sometimes a stand-alone & sometimes subsumed under general introduction or under “Sea Strike”

1052

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)



- ◆ How it was written (IV)
 - ◆ Series of 9 *Proceedings* articles
 - I. CNO ADM Vern Clark, "Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities" (Oct 02)
 - II. C3F VADM Mike Bucchi & OPNAV N8 VADM Mike Mullen, "Sea Shield: Projecting Global Defensive Assurance" (Nov 02)
 - III. C2F VADM Cutler Dawson & OPNAV N6/N7 VADM John Nathman, "Sea Strike: Projecting Persistent, Responsive, and Precise Power" (Dec 02)

1053

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)



- ◆ How it was written (V)
 - ◆ Series of 9 *Proceedings* articles
 - IV. OPNAV N4 VADM Charles W. Moore & CG MCCDC LtGen Edward Hanlon, Jr. USMC, "Sea Basing: Operational Independence for a New Century" (Jan 03)
 - V. COMNAVNETWARCOM VADM Richard W. Mayo & OPNAV N6/N7 VADM John Nathman, "ForceNet: Turning Information into Power," (Feb 03)
 - VI. OPNAV N8 VADM Mike Mullen, "Global Concept of Operations" (Apr 03)

1054

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA

- ◆ How it was written (VI)
 - ◆ Series of 9 *Proceedings* articles
 - VII. CNET VADM Alfred G. Harms, CHNAVPER VADM Gerald L. Hoewing, & COMNAVRESFOR VADM John B. Totushek, "Sea Warrior: Maximizing Human Capital" (Jun 03)
 - VIII. CFFC/CLF ADM Robert J. Natter, "Sea Trial: Enabler for a Transformed Fleet" (Nov 03)
 - IX. VCNO ADM Michael G. Mullen, "Sea Enterprise: Resourcing Tomorrow's Fleet" (Jan 04)

1055

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA

- ◆ Key ideas (I)
 - ◆ A "clear vision," not a strategy; with a "Global CONOPS"
 - ◆ "Unified battlespace"
 - ◆ Advantages of sea-based forces throughout integrated sea-land-air-space-cyberspace
 - ◆ Naval forces "fully integrated" in joint force
 - ◆ Navy more than an "enabler"
 - ◆ Growing importance of sea & area control
 - ◆ Transformation; new cross-cutting categories to transcend platform communities & demonstrate change
 - ◆ Re-label categories for USN force structure decisions

1056

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (II)

- ◆ Tight accordance with “national military strategy,” i.e.: SECDEF Rumsfeld 2001 QDR
- ◆ New emphasis on “global joint operations against regional and transnational dangers”
 - ◆ Return to focus on global threats
 - ◆ No longer just “regional challenges.” De-emphasis of MCOs
- ◆ “1-4-2-1” framework for concurrent US military ops
 - ◆ Defend the homeland
 - ◆ Deter adversaries in 4 critical forward regions
 - ◆ Swiftly defeat 2 enemies at the same time in 2 of those regions
 - ◆ Win one of those conflicts decisively

1057


Sea Power 21 (2002)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Key ideas (I)

- ◆ 3 “fundamental concepts”
 - ◆ Sea Strike
 - ◆ Sea Shield
 - ◆ Includes forward-deployed ops for Homeland Defense
 - ◆ Sea Basing
 - ◆ USN accepts USMC label
 - ◆ USN-USMC conceptual (& spelling) differences remain
- ◆ Enabler: FORCE Net
- ◆ Supporting organizational processes
 - ◆ Sea Trial
 - ◆ Sea Warrior
 - ◆ Especially reductions in crew size
 - ◆ Sea Enterprise
 - ◆ Call for shared technologies & systems with other services
- ◆ Global CONOPs
 - ◆ New distributed force packages

1058



Sea Power 21 (2002)

CNA

- ◆ Key ideas (II)
 - ◆ 4 “pillars” descend from 2 earlier frameworks
 - ◆ ... *From the Sea*
 - ◆ Command Control and Surveillance
 - ◆ Battlespace Dominance
 - ◆ Power Projection
 - ◆ Force Sustainment
 - ◆ NSPG 2000
 - ◆ Knowledge superiority
 - ◆ Battlespace control
 - ◆ Battlespace attack
 - ◆ Battlespace sustainment
 - ◆ *Sea Power 21*
 - ◆ FORCENet
 - ◆ Sea shield
 - ◆ Sea strike
 - ◆ Sea basing

1060

Sea Power 21 (2002)



- ◆ Key ideas (III)
 - ◆ Also mentioned
 - ◆ "the continuum of warfare from the maritime domain -- deterring forward in peacetime, responding to crises, and fighting and winning wars"
 - ◆ And a Turner variant: "enduring missions":
 - ◆ Sea control
 - ◆ Power projection
 - ◆ Strategic deterrence
 - ◆ Strategic sealift
 - ◆ Forward presence



1061

Global CONOPS (2002)



- ◆ Key ideas
 - ◆ Implement 2nd QDR (2001) "1-4-2-1" planning construct
 - ◆ Downgrade importance of forward "hubs"
 - ◆ Increase global presence
 - ◆ Widely disperse combat striking power
 - ◆ Simultaneous responses to crises around the world
 - ◆ New force packages
 - ◆ Integrate new SSGNs & BMD ships into force
 - ◆ USN accepted USMC-backed MPF(F) as important new capability
 - ◆ 375 ships; 37 tailored independent strike groups

1062



Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Not addressed (I)
 - ◆ Relationship to *Marine Corps Strategy 21*
 - ◆ Priorities among concepts, force packages presented
 - ◆ Globalization
 - ◆ Humanitarian assistance/disaster response ops
 - ◆ Maritime security operations
 - ◆ Coastal & riverine operations & capabilities

1065

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPs (2002)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Not addressed (II)
 - ◆ Piracy
 - ◆ counter-drug operations
 - ◆ U.S. Merchant Marine
 - ◆ Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
 - ◆ Post-hostilities ops
 - ◆ Surge capability & operations

1066

Sea Power 21 (2002)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Criticisms:
 - ◆ Should have been a “strategy”
 - ◆ Mere programmatic repackaging & re-labeling
 - ◆ Nothing new
 - ◆ Re-labeling a step backwards; “Sea-” prefixes not joint enough
 - ◆ Not visionary enough;
 - ◆ Not transformational enough
 - ◆ Just incremental modernization
 - ◆ Dividing “sea control” conceptually among Sea Strike/Shield/Basing blurred understanding of the core mission of the Navy (ADM Turner)
 - ◆ Making “Sea Basing” a pillar was an unwarranted concession to USMC
 - ◆ Litany of programs & programmatic packages overshadowed the vision

1067

Global CONOPS (2002)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Criticisms:
 - ◆ Merely a justification for 375 ships & the LCS
 - ◆ 375 ships an impossible goal
 - ◆ Too focused on forward presence vice surge posture
 - ◆ Constructed from flawed ship & force package counting schemes & comparisons
 - ◆ “CSGs” and “ESGs” merely moved a few surface combatants and an SSN from each CVBG to each ARG
 - ◆ “CSGs” and “ESGs” were constructs for training & workups only. Forward COCOMs typically dispersed their assets in theater

1068

Sea Power 21 (2002)

- ◆ **Sea Power 21 influence (I):**

- ◆ Wide within OPNAV & other USN headquarters
 - ◆ Reflected in changed organizations & processes
- ◆ Far more influence on internal OPNAV, FFC, NWDC and ONR frameworks than as a statement of Navy vision
- ◆ “Pillars” the organizing template (2003-2009) for:
 - ◆ OPNAV N81 POM development analysis
 - ◆ “Sea Shaping” pillar added in 2005
 - ◆ CFFC assignment of numbered fleet “operational agents” for Fleet CONOPS development
 - ◆ USN concept development organization within NWDC
 - ◆ ONR Future Naval Capability (FNC) technology development program (since 2005)

1069

Sea Power 21 (2002)

- ◆ **Sea Power 21 influence (II):**

- ◆ Resource for flag speeches, testimony
- ◆ Cited in new CNO-CMC naval concepts
 - ◆ *Enhanced Networked Seabasing* (2003)
 - ◆ *FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century* (2005)
- ◆ Still cited in DON FY 09 Budget Statement (Feb 2008), to frame discussion of surface combatant programs

1070

Sea Power 21 (2002)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Why did it have the influence it did?
 - ◆ Simple, catchy, easy-to-remember construct
 - ◆ Relentless repetition in speeches, testimony, articles
 - ◆ Interest, power & influence of CNO ADM Clark
 - ◆ Continued support by successor ADM Mullen
 - ◆ Cited as "The Navy's vision" in 2005 Newport ISS speech announcing development of a new maritime strategy
 - ◆ Institutionalization of categories into OPNAV organizations & analytic processes
 - ◆ As a single-service document, was of limited influence on subsequent bi-service & tri-service efforts

1071

Global CONOPS (2002)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ *Global CONOPS* influence
 - ◆ CSG and ESG force packages endured in the fleet through 2008
 - ◆ OPNAVINST 3501.316A codified policy for composition & capabilities of CSGs, ESGs, SSGs (Sep 2007)
 - ◆ Signed by CNO ADM Mullen
 - ◆ 375-ship, 37-group navy force goals lasted only a few years

1072

Global CONOPs (2002)



- ◆ Why did it have what influence it did? (I)
 - ◆ Advocacy & repetition by CNO
 - ◆ Published as a detailed *Proceedings* article, but omitted from stand-alone pamphlet
 - ◆ Discussed, however, in basic *Sea Power 21* text
 - ◆ Article author was upwardly-mobile flag officer VADM Mullen
 - ◆ Repeated & expanded upon in NOCJO
 - ◆ Fleet became comfortable working up CSGs & ESGs

1073

Global CONOPs (2002)



- ◆ Why did it have what influence it did? (II)
 - ◆ Forward deployment emphasis moderated by *Fleet Response Plan* focus on surge (2003)
 - ◆ 375-ship force level goal superseded by 260-325-range goal (2005) & 313-ship goal (2006)

1074

Sea Power 21 w/ Global CONOPS (2002)


CNA

- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Spurred SECNAV drafting of *Naval Power 21*
 - ◆ Reflected heavily and expanded upon in *NOCJO*
 - ◆ Cited in *NOCJO*, *NSP ISO POM 08*, & *Naval Operations Concept* (2006)
 - ◆ “Pillars” used in:
 - ◆ *NOCJO*
 - ◆ *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08*
 - ◆ *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10*
 - ◆ *Global CONOPS* reflected and fleshed out in *NOCJO*

1075

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

CNA



1076

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Overview

- ◆ Signed by SECNAV England, CNO ADM Clark, CMC Gen Jones
- ◆ Billed as a “vision”
- ◆ Principle target: USN & USMC leadership
- ◆ UNCLAS. Published on the web
- ◆ Central theme: Navy-Marine team
 - ◆ USN-USMC TACAIR integration
- ◆ Brought together *Sea Power 21*, *Global CONOPS*, (& *Marine Corps 21*) concepts & initiatives
 - ◆ Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, FORCENet, Sea Warrior, Sea Trial, Sea Enterprise; 25% increase in size of the fleet
- ◆ Little influence

1077

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Signed by:

- ◆ SECNAV Gordon R. England
- ◆ CNO ADM Vern Clark
 - ◆ During 3rd year in office
- ◆ CMC Gen James L. Jones



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Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as a “Vision”
 - ◆ Short (6 pages).
 - ◆ UNCLAS.
 - ◆ Published on the web (Oct 2002)

1079

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

CNA

- ◆ Why it was written
 - ◆ To assert visibility of new SECNAV England & his agenda of bringing USN & USMC closer together
 - ◆ To bring USN *Sea Power 21* & USMC *Strategy 21* visions and concepts together in one overarching document, endorsed by SECNAV
 - ◆ To provide a conceptual basis for USN-USMC TACAIR integration – essentially a cost-saving measure
 - ◆ Tie DON to Bush Administration & SECDEF Rumsfeld “transformation” agenda
 - ◆ To call for increasing fleet size by 25%
 - ◆ In wake of 9/11 attacks, to assert USN role in homeland security is primarily far forward, but also at home
 - ◆ Principle target: USN & USMC leadership

1080

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)



♦ Context (I)

- ♦ Late in 2nd year of Bush (R) administration (2001-)
- ♦ Lackluster US economy pulling out of recession
- ♦ SECDEF Rumsfeld (2001-6)
 - ♦ SECNAV England (2001-06)
 - ♦ CNO Clark (2000-05)
- ♦ Al Qaeda terrorist attack on USS Cole (DDG-67) (2000)
- ♦ 9-11 attacks on America (2001)
 - ♦ USN strategy office briefly decimated
- ♦ Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- ♦ PLAN-USN aircraft collision (2001)

1081

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)



♦ Context (II)

- ♦ SECDEF Rumsfeld push for “transformation”
- ♦ 2nd (1st Bush) QDR (2001)
 - ♦ 310-ship Battle Force goal
 - ♦ “1-4-2-1” force sizing construct
 - ♦ Demise of “2 MTW” construct
 - ♦ “Capabilities-based planning”
- ♦ USN in 2002: 313 Battle Force ships; 6 ships authorized
- ♦ USN began JFMCC experiments (1999)

1082

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Context (III)
 - ◆ NOCJO being drafted
 - ◆ OEF: Marine general commands USN-USMC TF
 - ◆ SECDEF-directed integration of OPNAV & Secretariat
 - ◆ Fleet Forces Command created (2001)
 - ◆ OPNAV Deep Blue created (2001)
 - ◆ For innovative concepts ISO current GWOT combat ops
 - ◆ NAVNETWARCOM created (May 2002)

1083

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

CNA

- ◆ Cited references
 - ◆ 2nd (1st Bush administration) DOD Quadrennial Defense Review (2001)
 - ◆ *Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare* USMC capstone concept (2001)
 - ◆ *Marine Corps Strategy 21* (2002)
 - ◆ *Sea Power 21* (2002)

1084

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ MCDP 1 *Warfighting* (Jun 1997)
 - ◆ MCDP 1-0 *Marine Corps Operations* (Sep 2001)
 - ◆ CJCS GEN Shelton *Joint Vision 2020* (2000)
 - ◆ Revised Joint Pub 1: *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (2000)
 - ◆ Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration Plan (2002)

1085

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ ADM Bill Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War* (2000)
 - ◆ SECAF Peters & CSAF Gen Ryan, *America's Air Force: Global Vigilance, Reach & Power* (1997)
 - ◆ Brig Gen Deptula USAF, *Effects-Based Operations* (2001)
 - ◆ Rebuttals by LtGen Van Riper USMC (Ret)
 - ◆ Profs Looney, Schrady, Porch, *Economic Impact of Naval Forward Presence: Benefits, Linkage & Future Prospects* (NPS Monterey) (Dec 2001)
 - ◆ Whiteneck & Weitz, *Naval Forward Presence and Regional Stability* (CNA) (Sep 2001)

1086

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)



- ◆ How it was written
 - ◆ Drafted in new OPNAV N3/N5 Deep Blue shop
 - ◆ Contributions by OPNAV N513
 - ◆ Personalities: SECNAV England, RDML Jim Stavridis (Deep Blue), CAPT Will Dossel (N513)

1087

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

- ◆ Key ideas (I)
 - ◆ “3/4/8” framework
 - ◆ 3 “fundamental pillars”
 - ◆ We assure access; We fight and win; We are continually transforming to improve
 - ◆ 4 “fundamental qualities of naval forces”
 - ◆ Decisiveness; Sustainability; Responsiveness; Agility
 - ◆ 7 Seapower 21 “concepts”
 - ◆ Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, enabled by ForceNET
 - ◆ Sea Warrior, Sea Trial, Sea Enterprise

1088

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)



◆ Key ideas (II)

- ◆ Concept of “continually transforming”
- ◆ Focus on Navy-Marine team
 - ◆ Call for Navy-Marine strike fighter integration
- ◆ Described *Marine Corps Strategy 21*
- ◆ “Homeland Security: We will engage potential adversaries and address threats to our security as far from the United States and our interests as possible . . . Additionally, in partnership with the U.S. Coast Guard and other federal agencies the Navy-Marine Corps team will continue defense at home”

1089

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)



◆ What was new?

- ◆ 1st joint USN-USMC capstone document in 8 years
- ◆ SECNAV endorsement of *Sea Power 21* framework
- ◆ Call for doubling number of strike groups & increasing fleet size by 25%
- ◆ Navy role in homeland security seen as primarily far forward but also at home

1090

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

CNA

- ◆ Not addressed (I)
 - ◆ "Global CONOPs" portion of *Sea Power 21*
 - ◆ Priorities among concepts discussed
 - ◆ World trade issues
 - ◆ Maritime security operations
 - ◆ Anti-terrorism operations
 - ◆ Counter-drug operations
 - ◆ Anti-piracy operations

1091

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

CNA

- ◆ Not addressed (II)
 - ◆ Sealift
 - ◆ U.S. Merchant Marine
 - ◆ Coastal & riverine capabilities and operations
 - ◆ U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
 - ◆ Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
 - ◆ Surge

1092

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

CNA
INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED STRATEGY

- ◆ Criticisms

- ◆ “Never heard of it”
- ◆ Neither publicized nor used

1093

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

CNA
INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED STRATEGY

- ◆ Influence:

- ◆ Little
- ◆ But provided “Ref A” for NOCJO
- ◆ Also cited in *FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century* (2005)

- ◆ Why?

- ◆ Overwhelmed by *Sea Power 21 & Marine Corps 21*
- ◆ No strong SECNAV public push or follow-up
- ◆ 25% increase in fleet size not achieved

1094

Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)


CNA
The CNA Corporation

- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Minimal
 - ◆ Recorded SECNAV push for more USN-USMC integration. Set stage for NOCJO & NOC
 - ◆ Cited in NOCJO as "our transformational vision"

1095

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

CNA
The CNA Corporation



1096

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

◆ Overview

- ◆ Signed by CNO ADM Clark & CMC Gen Hagee
- ◆ Billed as an “Operating Concept”
- ◆ Principal target: USN, USMC officer corps
- ◆ UNCLAS. Published on web
- ◆ Amplified *Sea Power 21* & *Global CONOPS* concepts
- ◆ Elevated *ready-force surge* alongside *forward presence*
- ◆ Near-term, mid-term & long-term (to 2020) visions
- ◆ Capabilities-based approach vs. generic threats
- ◆ Explicit relationships to joint & sister service concepts
- ◆ Tentative USN-USMC Sea Basing consensus
- ◆ Little influence in Navy. More in Marine Corps

1097

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

◆ Signed by:

- ◆ CNO ADM Vern Clark
 - ◆ 3rd year in office
- ◆ CMC Gen Michael W. Hagee



1098

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

◆ What it was

- ◆ Billed as an “operating concept” & a “capstone concept”
- ◆ Tasked in *Naval Power 21* (October 2002)
- ◆ Signed April 2003
- ◆ UNCLAS. Published on web
- ◆ 23 pages
- ◆ Explicitly superseded by *Naval Operations Concept (NOC)* (2006)

1099

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

◆ Why it was written

- ◆ To lay out vision for near-term and far-term naval capabilities and operations
- ◆ To lay out USN-USMC contributions to the joint force (including SOF), implementing “1-4-2-1” defense strategy & *Joint Vision 2020*
- ◆ As USN-USMC input to proposed *Joint Operations Concept*
- ◆ To achieve USN-USMC consensus on Sea Basing & other naval concepts
- ◆ To expand upon & implement vision of *Seapower 21*
- ◆ Principal target: USN, USMC officer corps

1100

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

◆ Context (I)

- ◆ 3rd year of Bush administration (2001-)
- ◆ Modest US economic growth
- ◆ SECDEF Rumsfeld (2001-6)
- ◆ SECNAV England (2001-2006)
- ◆ CNO ADM Clark (2000-05)
- ◆ Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on USS *Cole* (2000) & MV *Limburg* (2002)
- ◆ 9-11 Al Qaeda attack on America
- ◆ Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- ◆ SECDEF policy of spurring defense “transformation”
- ◆ OEF operational experience & lessons learned
- ◆ More post-9/11 joint ops launched
- ◆ Planning for, conducting Iraq invasion, occupation
 - ◆ Invasion (Mar 20, 2003); Iraq occupied (April 2003)
 - ◆ President Bush “mission accomplished” speech (May 2003)

1101

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

◆ Context (II)

- ◆ USJFCOM *Millenium Challenge 2002* war game
 - ◆ Crystalized US military conceptual debates
 - ◆ LtGen USMC (Ret) Van Riper critique
- ◆ Container Security Initiative (from Jan 2002)
- ◆ Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (2003)
- ◆ Declining USN force levels; increasing budgets
- ◆ 375-ship Battle Force USN force goal
- ◆ USN in 2003: 297 Battle Force ships; 5 ships authorized
- ◆ New LCS classes under development
- ◆ New Hybrid Sailor concept under development, to man LCSs

1102

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ Heavy USN, coalition MSO ops in Arabian Sea
- ◆ Desert Shield/Desert Storm strike & MPS experience assimilated
- ◆ CVNs as AFSBs routinized
- ◆ USN began "Sea Swap" experiments, rotating crews to forward deployed destroyers (2002-6)
- ◆ Fleet Forces Command created (2001)
- ◆ CNO Clark post-9/11 calls for a "Maritime NORAD"
- ◆ Unofficial DC-area Navy Study Group (1992-2005)
 - ◆ Convener: Dr. David Rosenberg
 - ◆ Participants included NOCJO contributors

1103

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

◆ Cited references (I)

- ◆ 1st Bush *National Security Strategy* (2002)
 - ◆ Unilateral, pre-emptive strike; maintenance of US military superiority
- ◆ CJCS Shelton *Joint Vision 2020* (2000)
- ◆ *Naval Power 21* (2002)
- ◆ *Sea Power 21* (2002-3)
- ◆ *Marine Corps Strategy 21* (2002)

1104

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

- ◆ Cited references (II)
 - ◆ *Naval Transformation Roadmap* (2002)
 - ◆ Family of USMC concepts
 - ◆ *Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare* (EMW) (2001)
 - ◆ *Operational Maneuver From the Sea* (OMFTS) (1996)
 - ◆ *Ship-to-Objective Maneuver* (STOM) (1997)
 - ◆ *USN-USMC Enhanced Networked Sea Basing concept draft*

1105

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ *NATO Strategic Concept of the Alliance* (1999)
 - ◆ Emphasis on crisis management
 - ◆ *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (2002)
 - ◆ 2nd (1st Bush) QDR (2001)
 - ◆ 310-ship BF goal; "1-4-2-1" force sizing construct
 - ◆ SPG, CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS
 - ◆ NIC, *Global Trends 2015* (Dec 2000)

1106

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (2000)
 - ◆ Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (2001)
 - ◆ Outlined 4 phases of joint operations
 - ◆ Large family of USMC warfighting concepts (from 1996)
 - ◆ MCDP 1 *Warfighting* (Jun 1997)
 - ◆ MCDP 1-0 *Marine Corps Operations* (Sep 2001)
 - ◆ Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration Plan (2002)
 - ◆ Revised USN-USCG *National Fleet* policy statement (2002)

1107

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ US Army FM 3-0 *Operations* (2001)
 - ◆ BR 1806, *British Maritime Doctrine* (2nd ed.) (1999)
 - ◆ Kugler & Frost (eds.) *The Global Century* (2001)
 - ◆ CDR Steve Benson chapter on USN & Globalization
 - ◆ CAPT Sam Tangredi (ed.) *Globalization and Maritime Power* (2002)
 - ◆ Col Bob Work USMC (Ret) *Challenge of Maritime Transformation: Is Bigger Better?* (2002)

1108

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
 - ◆ DoD *Military Power of the PRC* (2002)
 - ◆ First Annual Report to Congress
 - ◆ CAPT Bernard Cole (Ret), *The Great Wall at Sea* (2001)
 - ◆ Friedman, *Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (1999)
 - ◆ CAPT Wayne Hughes(Ret) *Fleet Tactics & Coastal Combat* (1999)
 - ◆ Sherry Sontag & Chris Drew, *Blind Man's Bluff* (1998)

1109

- ◆ How it was written (I)
 - ◆ SECNAV tasked in *Naval Power 21* (Oct 2001)
 - ◆ Initial draft by OPNAV N513 & MCCDC (2002)
 - ◆ CAPT Will Dossel, CAPT Tommy Klepper, CDR Tim Groelinger, CDR Paul Nagy (OPNAV N513)
 - ◆ Col Art Corbett & staff (MCCDC)
 - ◆ N5/N51 oversight: VADM Green/ RDML Wachendorf
 - ◆ Contentious USN-USMC issues, esp. seabasing specificity
 - ◆ Never got beyond 3-star level

1110

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

♦ How it was written (II)

- ♦ Effort resurrected by NWDC, MCCDC (2003)
 - ♦ NWDC: CAPT Brian Barrington
 - ♦ MCCDC: LtCol Mike Raimondo
 - ♦ OPNAV N513 & HQMC PP&O contributed to end-game
 - ♦ OPNAV oversight: VADM Kevin Green (N3/N5) & RDML Eric Olson (N51) (SEAL officer)
 - ♦ SOF role highlighted

1111

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

♦ Key ideas (I)

- ♦ NOCJO meets US “1-4-2-1” national defense strategy requirements
- ♦ Navy-Marine Team seeks to do it all
 - ♦ Elevated *ready-force surge* alongside *forward presence*
 - ♦ Near-term, mid-term & long-term (to 2020) visions
 - ♦ Meet conventional and unconventional threats
 - ♦ Meet nation-state and non-state adversaries
 - ♦ Priorities not discussed

1112

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

◆ Key ideas (II)

- ◆ Amplified *Sea Power 21* & *Global CONOPS* concepts
 - ◆ Expanded discussion of *Sea Strike*, *Sea Shield*, *Sea Basing*, *FORCENet*
 - ◆ Full discussion of *Global CONOPS*
 - ◆ Endorsed new *Global CONOPS* force packages
 - ◆ Did not refer to *Global CONOPS* by name, however
 - ◆ Limited discussion of *Sea Warrior* & *Sea Trial*
 - ◆ No discussion of *Sea Enterprise*
- ◆ Integrated USMC concepts of *Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW)*, *Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)*, *Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM)* throughout



1113

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

◆ Key ideas (III)

- ◆ Tentative USN-USMC Sea Basing consensus
- ◆ Capabilities-based approach, vs. generic threats
 - ◆ State & non-state actors
 - ◆ Conventional & unconventional threats
- ◆ Call for new, revised version of NDP 1, *Naval Warfare* (1994)
- ◆ Call for more integrated USN-USMC education, training, doctrine, experimentation, R & D
- ◆ Explicit relationships to joint & sister service concepts & operations, including SOF

1114



Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

- ◆ Not addressed
 - ◆ Priorities among the concepts presented
 - ◆ Maritime Security Operations
 - ◆ Coastal & riverine capabilities & operations
 - ◆ Anti-piracy operations
 - ◆ U.S. Merchant Marine
 - ◆ U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
 - ◆ Non-governmental organizations
 - ◆ Link to force level planning, programming, budgeting

1117

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

- ◆ Criticisms
 - ◆ Unnecessary & unused
 - ◆ Overwhelming USMC influence
 - ◆ USN-USMC Sea Basing consensus soon unraveled

1118

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

◆ Influence

- ◆ Little in Navy, except (small) concept development community
- ◆ More in USMC
- ◆ Helped spawn 2 CNO-CMC-signed concepts
 - ◆ *Enhanced Networked Seabasing operational concept (2003)*
 - ◆ *FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century (2005)*

1119

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

◆ Why this influence?

- ◆ Little USN interest in formal long-range concept development in general, & in conformance to joint concept development processes & definitions in particular
- ◆ Useful to small USN/USMC concept development groups, however
- ◆ Little CNO ADM Clark involvement or follow-through
- ◆ No USN fanfare. USMC cited sometimes
- ◆ Eclipsed in Navy by wide *Sea Power 21* internal & external publicity, and use in USN POM development
- ◆ Published only on the web

1120

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)



- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Minimal
 - ◆ 2003 NOCJO tasking to update 1994 *NDP 1* largely ignored as of 2008
 - ◆ Futurist orientation & conformance to joint practices of NOCJO (2003) not continued in NOC (2006)

1121

Fleet Response Plan (2003)



1122

Fleet Response Plan (2003)

CNA
CNA Foundation

◆ Overview

- ◆ Promulgated by CNO ADM Clark & CFFC ADM Natter
- ◆ First a “concept”; then a “plan”
- ◆ Actions to increase & maintain USN surge capability
- ◆ Enable “presence with a purpose”
- ◆ Advertised as tested in *Summer Pulse 04*
- ◆ Internal USN directives; external flag interviews, speeches, articles; web
- ◆ Great internal USN influence, especially on waterfront & at sea; OSD impressed
- ◆ Principal targets: DOD civilian leadership, USN officers. Later, USN enlisted & families

1123

Fleet Response Plan (2003)

CNA
CNA Foundation

◆ Promulgated by:

- ◆ CNO ADM Vern Clark
 - ◆ 3rd year in office
- ◆ CFFC ADM Robert Natter



1124

Fleet Response Plan (2003)



- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed first as a “concept”; then as a “plan”
 - ◆ Published in internal USN directives & external flag officer interviews, speeches & articles & on web
 - ◆ CNO concept Mar 2003
 - ◆ Definitive CFFC ADM Robert Natter msg: May 2003
 - ◆ Short: 3 pages
 - ◆ CFFC ADM Robert Natter, “Creating a Surge Ready Force,”
Proceedings (Sep 2003)
 - ◆ Short: 3 pages
 - ◆ Major CHINFO effort ISO *Summer Pulse 04*

1125

Fleet Response Plan (2003)



- ◆ Why it was written (I)
 - ◆ To change Navy culture & practices to better link Navy to Bush Administration policies & priorities
 - ◆ To demonstrate to SECDEF & OSD that more Navy force structure was usable to the nation--through surging on demand -- beyond the fraction that was forward deployed
 - ◆ “To give the President more options”

1126

Fleet Response Plan (2003)



- ◆ Why it was written (II)
 - ◆ To change a host of Navy policies, practices & procedures in order to ensure surge forces were ready
 - ◆ To sustain these changes by changing Navy culture from “deployment-centric to “readiness-centric”
 - ◆ To satisfy CCDR plans force requirements
 - ◆ Principal targets: DOD civilian & joint leadership, USN officers. Later, USN enlisted & families

1127

Fleet Response Plan (2003)



- ◆ Context (I)
 - ◆ 3rd year of Bush administration (2001-)
 - ◆ SECDEF Rumsfeld (2001-6)
 - ◆ CNO ADM Clark (2000-5)
 - ◆ Priority: Improved readiness
 - ◆ 9-11 Al Qaeda attacks on America
 - ◆ *OEF, OIF, Noble Eagle, Active Endeavor, JTF GITMO, OEF Philippines, CJTF HOA* all ongoing
 - ◆ USN surges
 - ◆ OIF appeared to have secured “defeat of Iraq”
 - ◆ Continuing counter-insurgency & stabilization ops unforeseen
 - ◆ Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on USS *Cole* (2000) & MV *Limburg* (2002)

1128

Fleet Response Plan (2003)

CNA

◆ Context (II)

- ◆ Turkey refused US military access to ports, air space, en route to OIF (Mar 2003)
- ◆ Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (2003)
- ◆ Declining USN force levels; increasing budgets
- ◆ 375-ship Battle Force USN force goal
- ◆ USN in 2003: 297 Battle Force ships; 5 ships authorized
- ◆ USN begins "Sea Swap" experiments, rotating crews to forward deployed destroyers (2002-6)
- ◆ RADM John Morgan (senior SECNAV MA) initiative to re-examine "Principles of War" (2003)

1129

Fleet Response Plan (2003)

CNA

◆ Cited references

- ◆ *Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP)*
- ◆ CNO 2003 "Culture of Readiness" message
- ◆ Other previous CNO messages

1130

Fleet Response Plan (2003)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications
 - ◆ Dan Goure, "The Tyranny of Forward Presence," *Naval War College Review* (Summer 2001)
 - ◆ *Sea Power 21* (2002)
 - ◆ No mention of surge
 - ◆ 3rd (2nd Bush) QDR (2005, later 2006) impending
 - ◆ DoD *Global Defense Posture Review* underway
 - ◆ Post-OIF "Navy Reconstitution Plan" briefings
 - ◆ Joint Staff *Operational Availability* (OA) 2003 report
 - ◆ CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS

1131

Fleet Response Plan (2003)

CNA

- ◆ How it was written (I)
 - ◆ SECDEF & OSD demand for more, faster surge capability from all DOD components, post-9/11
 - ◆ Joint Staff "Operational Availability (OA)" 2003 report
 - ◆ Focus on service support for COCOM needs
 - ◆ "10-30-30" planning goal
 - ◆ Adopted by OSD in DPG
 - ◆ USD (P&R) Dr. David Chu remark

"There is in the Navy and Marine Corps a substantial portion of the structure that is unavailable to the President on short notice, short of heroic measures"

1132

Fleet Response Plan (2003)



- ◆ How it was written (II)
 - ◆ Development methodology
 - ◆ Concept incubated in OPNAV (Deep Blue)
 - ◆ Later passed to CFFC for plan development & implementation
 - ◆ Early OPNAV role
 - ◆ VADM Willy Moore (OPNAV N4) originated concept
 - ◆ Initial concept paper drafted in OPNAV N3/N5 Deep Blue (RDML Doug Crowder, CAPT Joe Bouchard)
 - ◆ CNO tasked Commander, Fleet Forces Command (ADM Robert Natter) to develop concept (Mar 2003)
 - ◆ ADM Natter published FRP implementation plan (May 2003)

1133

Fleet Response Plan (2003)



- ◆ Key ideas (I)
 - ◆ Focus on output (support to CCDR plans)
 - ◆ Elevate priority of USN surge capability
 - ◆ Permanent combat-credible USN forward presence no longer the main peacetime goal
 - ◆ Increase USN capability to surge combat-ready CSGs & -- later --other fleet elements
 - ◆ Enable more “presence with a purpose”
 - ◆ Create USN “culture of readiness” to supplant “culture of deployment”

1134

Fleet Response Plan (2003)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Key ideas (II)

- ◆ Capitalize on recently improved fleet readiness
- ◆ Change current USN training, maintenance manning policies & practices
- ◆ Redesign and lengthen fleet Inter-Deployment Cycle to increase ship, aircraft & personnel surge availability
 - ◆ New phases, timelines, vocabulary, goals
- ◆ More options for the President

1135

Fleet Response Plan (2003)


CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ The evolving metric for the goal

- ◆ 2003-5: "6 & 2"
 - ◆ 6 CSGs deployable within 30 days; 2 within 90 days
- ◆ 2005-7: "6 & 1"
 - ◆ 6 CSGs deployable within 30 days; 1 within 60 days
- ◆ 2007: "3+3+1"
 - ◆ 3 CSGs deployed; 3 deployable within 30 days; 1 in 90 days

- ◆ Carrier numbers declined from 12 to 11 to 10
- ◆ No explicit goals yet for other force packages

1136



Fleet Response Plan (2003)

- ◆ What was new?
 - ◆ Emphasis on satisfying CCDR plans demand
 - ◆ Emphasize surge
 - ◆ “6 & 2” goal metric & “progressive readiness” concept
 - ◆ Attempt to change USN culture: “R+” vice “D-” thinking
 - ◆ Formalized training milestones
 - ◆ Major OPNAV Deep Blue-orchestrated CHINFO campaign (*Summer Pulse 04*)
 - ◆ Implications for changing USN deployment to a “Flexible Deployment Concept” (FDC)

Fleet Response Plan (2003)

CNA

- ◆ Not addressed
 - ◆ Most elements not directly related to deployment policy & increased surge capability
- ◆ Document focused on cultural & administrative changes necessary to improve USN readiness to surge
- ◆ Only threat & policy driver mentioned was war on *terrorism*

1139

Fleet Response Plan (2003)

CNA

- ◆ Critical literature & subsequent analyses
 - ◆ K. Smith et al., *Explorations of the Fleet Response Plan* (CNA 2005)

1140

Fleet Response Plan (2003)



♦ Criticisms

- ♦ Based on questionable baseline data
- ♦ Destabilized Sailor home life & therefore reduced retention
- ♦ Not really transformational
 - ♦ Merely tweaked the carrier schedule
 - ♦ Centrality of the two forward deployment hubs remained
- ♦ Not applicable beyond CSGs
- ♦ National (GNFPP) requirements prevent true implementation
- ♦ Focus on surge meant neglect of extended "Phase IV" operations
- ♦ Increased Navy costs in several areas

1141

Fleet Response Plan (2003)



♦ Influence:

- ♦ An on-going, expanding program as of 2008
- ♦ OSD was impressed
- ♦ Great influence within USN
 - ♦ In schoolhouses, on the waterfront, & at sea
 - ♦ Fleet schedules altered
- ♦ *Summer Pulse 04* influenced PRC and Taiwan
- ♦ Continued through CNO(s) ADM Mullen & ADM Roughead terms (but with changed metrics)
 - ♦ FRP extended to ESGs in 2007
- ♦ Influenced 2007 USN PERSTEMPO rules changes
- ♦ Cited in DON FY 09 Budget Statement (Feb 2008)
- ♦ *Flexible Deployment Concept* yet to be endorsed, implemented as national policy

1142

Fleet Response Plan (2003)



- ◆ Why did it have the influence it did?
 - ◆ Assumption over next few years that there might be more “short-notice Iraqs”
 - ◆ FRP fit DoD 10-30-30 *Operational Availability* (OA) deployment strategy and world situation
 - ◆ Heavy CNO ADM Clark endorsement & follow-through
 - ◆ Deployment *readiness* lies within CNO purview
 - ◆ Deployment *strategy* driven by SECDEF, CCDRs, not Navy, however

1143

Fleet Response Plan (2003)



- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ “Surge” concept discussed in *Navy Strategic Plan in support of POM 08* (May 2006)
 - ◆ *Fleet Response Plan* itself not mentioned
 - ◆ Cited in Dec 2007 CNO ADM Roughead testimony on *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
 - ◆ “Surge” mentioned only in passing in *A Cooperative Strategy* text itself

1144

ADM Michael Mullen (CNO Jul 2005-Sep 2007)

CNA

- ◆ Apr 2006 *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08* (S) & (U)
- ◆ Sept 2006 *Naval Operations Concept* (U)
- ◆ Sept 2007 *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10* (S)



1145

ADM Michael Mullen (CNO Jul 2005-Sep 2007) (I)

CNA



- ◆ Surface warfare officer
- ◆ Became CNO following tours as OPNAV N8 (charged with implementing *Sea Power 21*); then NATO Commander, Joint Force Naples & Commander, US Naval Forces Europe
 - ◆ Showed professional growth following each tour
- ◆ Signature initiatives:
 - ◆ New maritime strategy
 - ◆ “1000-Ship Navy”
 - ◆ “Global Fleet Stations”
- ◆ New USN BF force goal: 313 ships

1146

ADM Michael Mullen (CNO Jul 2005-Sep 2007)(II)

- ◆ Embraced & expanded on VADM John Morgan (OPNAV N3/N5) strategic planning vision for the Navy
- ◆ After a year in office, signed out
 - ◆ *NSP ISO POM 08*
 - ◆ *Naval Operations Concept (NOC)* (with CMC)
- ◆ Signed out *NSP ISO POM 10* in last week as CNO
- ◆ Actively started & presided over development of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
 - ◆ Unexpectedly became CJCS before drafting completed
 - ◆ Pushed for USMC & USCG participation & signatures

1147

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

1148

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Overview

- ◆ Signed by CNO ADM Mullen
- ◆ A “strategic plan”
- ◆ Principle target: USN planners & programmers
- ◆ SECRET & UNCLAS stand-alone pubs; on web
- ◆ Effects-based & capabilities-based planning
- ◆ Used modified *Sea Power 21* “pillars”
- ◆ Non-traditional missions not solely sub-sets of MRCs
- ◆ Emphasis throughout on programming for GWOT
- ◆ Risk is inherent
- ◆ Influence: Too late to affect POM 08 directly, but set stage for *A Cooperative Strategy & NSP ISO POM 10*

1149

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Signed by:

- ◆ CNO ADM Michael Mullen
- ◆ During 1st year in office



1150

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA
Center for Naval Analyses

- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as a “Strategic plan”
 - ◆ Subtitle: “in support of Program Objective Memorandum 08”
 - ◆ Although Navy POM 08 already submitted
 - ◆ CNO Mullen tasked 29 July 2005
 - ◆ SECRET version April 2006
 - ◆ 42 pages
 - ◆ UNCLAS version May 2006
 - ◆ 23 pages
 - ◆ Announced intent: Publish every 2 years

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Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA
Center for Naval Analyses

- ◆ Why it was written
 - ◆ To socialize emerging new national security & naval concepts within the Navy, especially:
 - ◆ Need for naval capabilities beyond conventional conflict
 - ◆ Primarily for the GWOT but also for Homeland Defense – especially Maritime Domain Awareness -- & “1000-Ship Navy”
 - ◆ Provide strategic & policy guidance – including priorities -- to USN staff elements responsible for building USN POM 08 submission (& PR-09, POM 10 submissions)
 - ◆ Link higher-level guidance to Navy PPBE process
 - ◆ Serve as capstone document for a new family of subordinate Navy strategic plans
 - ◆ Start a repeatable OPNAV staff process linking strategy to programs more tightly
 - ◆ Principle target: USN leaders, planners, programmers & budgeters

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Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

◆ Context (I)

- ◆ 2nd term of G.W. Bush administration (2001-9)
- ◆ US economic growth slowing
- ◆ SECDEF Rumsfeld (2001-6)
- ◆ US voters re-endorsed Bush administration (2004)
- ◆ New CNO ADM Mullen (2005-7)
- ◆ New SECNAV Winter (2006-9)
- ◆ DPRK withdrew from NPT, restarted nuclear weapons program (2003)
- ◆ Iranian nuclear enrichment program discovered
- ◆ President announced global partnership w/ India (2005)
- ◆ US-Libya rapprochement
 - ◆ Gaddafi renounces terror, WMD (2003)

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

◆ Context (II)

- ◆ New DOD PPBE system introduced (2004)
- ◆ *Global Defense Posture Review* (2004)
 - ◆ USN Europe base drawdown & Guam increase
 - ◆ NAS Roosevelt Roads PR closed (2004)
- ◆ 3rd (2nd Bush) QDR (2006)
 - ◆ QDR 2001 “1-4-2-1” Force Planning Construct became 3-part separate but overlapping mission set (“Michelin Man Strategy”)
 - ◆ Homeland Defense
 - ◆ War on Terror/Irregular Warfare
 - ◆ Conventional Campaigns
 - ◆ Pacific Ocean concerns, shifts
 - ◆ Directed USN to increase Pacific force posture
 - ◆ Goal of 11 CVNs: 6 in Pacific
 - ◆ “Tailored deterrence” strategy

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ OEF, OIF, other operations ongoing
 - ◆ Rising levels of insurgency, sectarian violence in Iraq (2003-6)
 - ◆ Abu Ghraib Iraqi prison abuses aroused world vs. US (2004)
 - ◆ Increased US, coalition, Iraqi protection of oil terminals following insurgent small boat attack (2004)
 - ◆ Declining US force levels in Iraq (since Nov 2005)
- ◆ Turkish refusal of US military access to ports, air space, en route to OIF (Mar 2003)
- ◆ ASG Islamic separatist terrorist attack on Philippine ferry (2004)
- ◆ Terrorist attack on USN Iraq oil terminal security force (2004)
- ◆ Rise in pirate attacks worldwide
 - ◆ Malacca Strait ISR measures instituted
 - ◆ PACOM RMSI (aborted) (2003), MALSINDO (2004), Eyes-in-the-Sky (2005)
 - ◆ Somali pirate Seabourn Spirit cruise ship attack (2005)

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (IV)

- ◆ Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- ◆ Increased USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore in Iraq & Afghanistan, to relieve stress on ground forces
 - ◆ Exponential rise in USN IA assignments, ISO OIF & OEF
- ◆ Heavy USN, coalition MSO ops in Arabian Sea, Caribbean, etc.
- ◆ Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) ops ongoing
- ◆ Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005)
- ◆ USN DDG BMD surveillance & tracking patrols in Sea of Japan (from 2004)

1156

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

◆ Context (V)

- ◆ 2004-5 7th Fleet IO tsunami disaster relief ops yield favorable US policy outcomes & publicity
- ◆ USN-led Pakistan earthquake disaster relief ops (2005)
- ◆ Russians deliver 8 more *Kilo* SSs & 2 more *Sovremenny* DDGs to PRC (2005-7)
- ◆ Unprecedented large Russian-PRC land-sea-air East Asian exercise: *Peace Mission 2005*
- ◆ Continued USN mid-frequency active sonar ASW training vs. quiet diesel submarines
 - ◆ Concerns raised globally over effect on marine mammals
 - ◆ USN committed to environmental research (Aug 2005)
 - ◆ Environmental groups sued to stop training (Oct 2005)
 - ◆ Litigation ongoing in US courts; widespread publicity

1157

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

◆ Context (VI)

- ◆ Fluctuating Navy budgets; declining force levels
- ◆ USN Battle Force goal of 313 ships (Feb 2006)
- ◆ USN in 2006: 281 Battle Force ships; 4 ships authorized
- ◆ USN concluding "Sea Swap" experiments, rotating crews to forward deployed destroyers (2002-6)
- ◆ Fleet ASW Command established in Pacific (San Diego) (2004)
- ◆ ISMERLO activated in Norfolk (2004)
- ◆ NECC standup (including Riverine Group) (2005)

1158

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA

◆ Context (VII)

- ◆ 4 Kidd-class DDGs transferred to Taiwan (2005-6)
- ◆ Mine Warfare Command moved, subsumed under new Fleet Anti-Submarine & Mine Warfare Command (2006)
- ◆ New LCS classes under construction
- ◆ New Hybrid Sailor concept under development to man LCSs

1159

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA

◆ Context (VIII)

- ◆ New USN ASW CONOPS approved (Dec 2004)
- ◆ CNO Mullen "1000-ship Navy" concept floated (2005)
- ◆ USN FAO program revitalized, strengthened (Nov 2005)
- ◆ USN Center for Language, Regional Expertise & Culture (CLREC) created (Feb 2006)
- ◆ Increased focus on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
- ◆ VADM John Morgan, DCNO for Information, Plans & Strategy (OPNAV N3/N5) (2004-8)
 - ◆ Plans to overhaul USN strategy
 - ◆ Had stimulated "Principles of war" debates (w/ Anthony McIvor)
 - ◆ All N3/N5 offices re-designated (2004)
 - ◆ N51 became N5SP; N513 became N5SC


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Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

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◆ Context (IX)

- ◆ VADM Morgan “3/1 Strategy” construct floated (2005)
 - ◆ Under CNO ADM Clark
 - ◆ Thesis: HA/DR, C-T etc. NOT lesser included cases any more
 - ◆ RDML Charles Martoglio (N5SP) “Bear Paw” graphic
 - ◆ Progenitor of *NSP, NOC, A Cooperative Strategy*
 - ◆ Spawned new N81 “sea shaping” analytical pillar for POM development (alongside Sea Power 21 pillars) (2005)
 - ◆ Never officially promulgated or endorsed



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Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (X)

- ◆ Demise of unofficial Rosenberg-convened “Navy Study Group” (2003)
- ◆ Navy Global N5s/N39s Conferences began (2005)
 - ◆ Driver: RADM Charles Martoglio (N5SP)
- ◆ JHU/APL, Lockheed Martin & CNA workshops on USN strategy (2005-8)
 - ◆ JHU/APL drivers: Duncan Brown, CAPT (Ret) Steve Richter
 - ◆ Lockheed Martin driver: CAPT (Ret) Robby Harris
 - ◆ CNA drivers: RADM (Ret) Michael McDevitt, CAPT (Ret) Peter Swartz
- ◆ CNO ADM Mullen announced development of a new maritime strategy
- ◆ CNO ADM Mullen tasked drafting of “Naval Operating Concept” (6 Jan 06)

1162

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA

◆ Cited references (I)

- ◆ 2nd Bush *National Security Strategy* (2006)
- ◆ *National Strategy for Maritime Security* (2005)
- ◆ SECDEF Rumsfeld *National Defense Strategy* (2005)
 - ◆ New focus on need for capabilities vs *Traditional* but also *Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive* challenges
- ◆ 3rd (2nd Bush) QDR (2006)

1163

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA

◆ Cited references (II)

- ◆ CJCS Myers *National Military Strategy* (2004)
- ◆ *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (2006)
- ◆ *Strategic Planning Guidance* (Mar 2006), *Joint Programming Guidance*, *Contingency Planning Guidance*, *Transformation Planning Guidance*, *JSCP*
- ◆ “CNO Guidance for 2006”
- ◆ *Sea Power 21* (2002)

1164

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2006)
 - ◆ *DoD Nuclear Posture Review* (2001)
 - ◆ DODDIR 3000.5: *Military Support for SSTR Ops* (Nov 2005)
 - ◆ *National Military Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* (2005)
 - ◆ *Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan (MOTR)* (2006)
 - ◆ *Security Cooperation Guidance, OPLANS, CONPLANS, CCDR TSC Plans*
 - ◆ *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Version 2.0* (Aug 2005) and *Joint Operating Concepts*
 - ◆ *Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept* (2005)

1165

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ DOD, *Report to Congress: Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture* (Sep 2004)
 - ◆ Joint Global Force Management (GFM) Allocation Plan (superseded GNFPP) (2006)
 - ◆ DOD annual reports *Military Power of the PRC* (2002+)
 - ◆ DOD OFT, *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach* (2003)
 - ◆ NIC, *Mapping the Global Future: Global Trends 2020* (2004)
 - ◆ CGMCCDC & COMNWDC, *Enhanced Networked Seabasing Operational Concept* (2003)
 - ◆ ONI, *Worldwide Maritime Challenges* (2004)
 - ◆ CNO & CMC, *FORCEnet Concept* (Feb 2005)
 - ◆ 3rd USN-USCG *National Fleet* policy statement (2006)

1166

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ Former UNDERSECNAV Jerry Hultin-sponsored globalization studies
 - ◆ CDR Steve Benson on "USN and Globalization", in Kugler & Frost (eds.) *The Global Century* (2001)
 - ◆ CAPT Sam Tangredi (ed.) *Globalization and Maritime Power* (2002)
 - ◆ RADM Morgan, D. McIvor, & SECNAV's "Action Team," "Rethinking the Principles of War" *Proceedings* (Oct 2003)
 - ◆ VADM Morgan & RDML Martoglio "1000-Ship Navy" *Proceedings* (2005)
 - ◆ Anthony McIvor (ed.), *Rethinking the Principles of War* (2005)

1167

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
 - ◆ Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons," *International Security* (2003)
 - ◆ Blake Dunnivant, *Brown Water Warfare* (2003)
 - ◆ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace* (2003)
 - ◆ *The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004)
 - ◆ Col T.X. Hammes, *Sling and the Stone* (2004)
 - ◆ Steven Budiansky, *Air Power* (2004)
 - ◆ Argues for air support of ground forces
 - ◆ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (2004)
 - ◆ Thomas P.M. Barnett, *Pentagon's New Map* (2004)
 - ◆ Thomas P.M. Barnett, *Blueprint for Action* (2005)

1168

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
 - ◆ CAPT Ed Smith (Ret) *Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War* (2002)
 - ◆ CNA, *Report to Congress Regarding Naval Force Architecture* (Jan 2005)
 - ◆ Congressionally mandated (2003)
 - ◆ DOD OFT, *Alternative Fleet Architecture Design* (2005)
 - ◆ Congressionally mandated (2003)
 - ◆ CSBA reports on naval transformation, fleet architecture & seabasing (2002-2006)
 - ◆ CNA studies on PRC military
 - ◆ Earlier drafts of this briefing (April 2005-2006)

1169

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA

- ◆ How it was written
 - ◆ Personalities: VADM John Morgan (N3/N5) & RDML Charles Martoglio (N5SP) conceived & drafted
 - ◆ LCDR Joe Carrigan & LT Mark Lawrence supported
 - ◆ Intellectual foundation was earlier 2005 Morgan-Martoglio "Navy 3/1 Strategy" construct
 - ◆ RDML Martoglio had vetted portions at Newport International Seapower Symposium (Sept. 2005)

1170

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA
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- ◆ Key ideas (I)
 - ◆ Strategy should inform USN investments
 - ◆ USN plays key roles in GWOT, SSO, & HD
 - ◆ NSP links higher-level guidance to Navy program planning
 - ◆ SECDEF has identified GWOT as “the Department’s highest priority”
 - ◆ Support for the Joint Force, Joint Force commanders, and Joint Force component commanders
 - ◆ Details on US Coast Guard ops & relationships
 - ◆ Continued to promote *Sea Power 21* principles
 - ◆ Laid out *Sea Power 21* “pillars” (less “FORCEnet”)
 - ◆ Included new “Sea Shaping” pillar (N5SP lead) (2005)
 - ◆ Effects-based & capabilities-based planning

1171

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Key ideas (II)
 - ◆ American vision of peaceful, productive movement of international commerce
 - ◆ Deepened USN “cooperation with maritime forces of our strategic partners as well as emerging partner nations”
 - ◆ Global Network of Maritime Nations/ 1000 Ship Navy
 - ◆ There will be a forthcoming *Navy Operating Concept*
 - ◆ Directed drafting of comprehensive family of USN strategic plans
 - ◆ 1st of a repeatable series of NSPs

1172

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA

- ◆ Key ideas (III)
 - ◆ 3 CNO focus areas, with desired effects
 - ◆ Keyed to 3 QDR 2006 mission sets
 - 1. Global War on Terror/Irregular Warfare
 - ◆ Global Maritime Domain Awareness
 - ◆ Theater Security Cooperation
 - ◆ Maritime portion of GWOT & additional capabilities to joint GWOT force
 - ◆ Navy deterrence of transnational threats
 - 2. Homeland Security/Homeland Defense
 - ◆ Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR)
 - ◆ WMD interdiction
 - ◆ Navy deterrence of future competitors
 - 3. Conventional Campaigns
 - ◆ Project defense from Joint Seabase to support Joint Force
 - ◆ Rapidly mass effects
 - ◆ Surge capacity for 2 campaigns; sustain 1 to win decisively
 - ◆ Deter regional threats through steady-state forward presence

1173

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA

- ◆ Key ideas (IV)
 - ◆ 3 “maritime focus areas” for USN
 - ◆ Text related almost exclusively to GWOT
 - 1. Western Pacific
 - ◆ Particularly Southeast Asia
 - 2. Middle East and Southwest Asia
 - 3. Mediterranean
 - ◆ NATO ability allows USN ops elsewhere
 - ◆ Also briefly mentioned: South America, Gulf of Guinea, Swahili coast, Black Sea region
 - ◆ NATO lead in western Africa

1174

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Key ideas (V)
 - ◆ 4 SECDEF-identified challenges:
 - ◆ Traditional – Irregular – Catastrophic – Disruptive
 - ◆ *National Defense Strategy (2005)*
 - ◆ “There are unique capabilities that the Joint Force must develop that fall outside of the rubric of conventional warfighting capabilities”
 - ◆ Joint interdependence & joint dependence
 - ◆ 313-ship Navy force goal
 - ◆ Call for new small force packages
 - ◆ Single amphibious ships acting as joint/coalition seabases
 - ◆ SEAL teams, USMC, USCG, USN expeditionary security forces on independently operating surface combatants, SSNs, SSGNs


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Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)


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- ◆ Key ideas (VI)
 - ◆ “Global Navy Concept: Distributed, Networked Ops”
 - ◆ Risk Guidance
 - ◆ Risk is inherent (details in SECRET version)
 - ◆ Navy Enterprise Model

1176



1177



Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

- ◆ Not addressed (in UNCLAS version)
 - ◆ Mine warfare
 - ◆ Maritime Security Operations
 - ◆ Sealift
 - ◆ Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
 - ◆ Global Fleet Stations
 - ◆ Preventing wars
 - ◆ Arctic Ocean; Atlantic Ocean; North, Mid-, Eastern Pacific Ocean; US offshore waters
- ◆ Little discussion of conventional campaigns, compared to discussion of GWOT

1179

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

- ◆ Criticisms (I)
 - ◆ Reflected rather than drove Navy program planning
 - ◆ Came out too late to meaningfully affect POM 08
 - ◆ Disagreements over Risk Guidance specifics
 - ◆ Relationship to forthcoming “new maritime strategy” unclear
 - ◆ Process seemed backwards
 - ◆ Not officially circulated widely
 - ◆ Looked too much like 2005 “3/1” Strategy construct
 - ◆ Too focused on GWOT; not enough focus on conventional campaigns

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Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA

♦ Criticisms (II)

- ♦ Did not encompass important emerging USN concepts (e.g., Global Fleet Stations)
- ♦ Directed family of strategic plans never drafted
- ♦ Cited forthcoming *Navy Operating Concept* never written
- ♦ Needed more on assurance, dissuasion, deterrence objectives
- ♦ CCDR priorities not well reflected

1181

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

CNA

♦ Influence

- ♦ Modest for POM-08
- ♦ Some influence on PR-09
- ♦ Effort considered valuable precedent
- ♦ Cited in USN FY 08 budget highlights document
- ♦ Cited & used in *OPNAV N6/Deputy DON CIO (Navy) Strategy* document (Feb 2007)

♦ Why?

- ♦ Issued 6 months too late to influence POM meaningfully
 - ♦ (But earlier drafts did have some influence)
- ♦ OPNAV consensus to continue effort & do better next time
- ♦ Buy-in by other OPNAV flag officers beyond N3/N5


1182

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Example proved useful
 - ◆ CNO directed drafting of *NSP /ISO POM 10*
 - ◆ Re-socialized expanded “3-1 Strategy” construct ideas among Navy flag officers and staffs, to be revisited in
 - ◆ *Naval Operations Concept* (Sep 2006)
 - ◆ *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (Oct 2007)
 - ◆ Same themes will be re-visited in *Naval Operations Concept 2006*
 - ◆ Same maritime “focus areas”
 - ◆ Same message of importance of ability to conduct non-traditional missions

1183

Naval Operations Concept (2006)



1184

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Overview

- ◆ Signed by CNO ADM Mullen & CMC Gen Hagee
- ◆ A "naval operations concept" & "unified vision for the future"
- ◆ Principle targets: USN & USMC officers & enlisted
- ◆ UNCLAS booklet
- ◆ 13 Mission areas, 9 guiding principles
- ◆ 9 Methods, 5 strategic objectives
- ◆ More influence at HQs than in the fleet
 - ◆ Precedent seen as useful
 - ◆ Some influence on *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (2007)

1185

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

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◆ Signed by:

- ◆ CNO ADM Michael Mullen
 - ◆ During 2nd year in office
- ◆ CMC Gen Michael W. Hagee



1186

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

CNA

- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as a “Naval Operations Concept” and a “unified vision for the future”
 - ◆ Navy & Marine Corps
 - ◆ UNCLAS, pocket-sized booklet for portability
 - ◆ 36 pages
 - ◆ Signed Sep 2006
 - ◆ Superseded 2002 NOCJO

1187

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

CNA

- ◆ Why it was written
 - ◆ To continue socialization within USN & USMC of new emerging national security & naval strategic concepts
 - ◆ To provide internal USN & USMC intellectual stimulus for evolving a new maritime strategy
 - ◆ To strengthen USN-USMC operational relations
 - ◆ To replace NOCJO (2003)
 - ◆ To elevate visibility of naval missions for the Long War/GWOT & homeland defense
 - ◆ E.g.: maritime security operations, security cooperation, counterinsurgency, ballistic missile defense, information ops
 - ◆ To promote new Global Fleet Stations deployment concept
 - ◆ “Written for a wide audience”
 - ◆ Principally “to guide . . . Sailors & Marines”
 - ◆ Also to promote public, joint, interagency & multinational understanding of Navy & Marine Corps operations & capabilities

1188

Naval Operations Concept (2006)



◆ Context: (I)

- ◆ 2nd term of G.W. Bush (R) administration (2001-)
- ◆ US economic growth slowing
- ◆ SECDEF Rumsfeld (2001-6)
- ◆ OIF & OEF continuing
 - ◆ USMC & US Army heavily engaged ashore
 - ◆ High levels of insurgency, sectarian violence in Iraq (2003-6)
 - ◆ Increased US, coalition, Iraqi protection of oil terminals following insurgent small boat attack (2004)
 - ◆ US military Abu Ghraib prisoner mistreatment publicized (2004)
 - ◆ Decreasing US force levels in Iraq (from Nov 2005)
 - ◆ "Revolt of the Generals" (2006)
- ◆ Also Noble Eagle, Active Endeavor, JTF GITMO, CJTF HOA, OEF Philippines, PSI ongoing

1189

Naval Operations Concept (2006)



◆ Context: (II)

- ◆ Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- ◆ Iranian nuclear enrichment program discovered (2003)
- ◆ DPRK developing nuclear weapons
- ◆ DPRK unsuccessful but highly publicized Taepo-dong 2 missile test (July 2006)
- ◆ Russians deliver 8 more Kilo SSs & 2 more Sovremenny DDGs to PRC (2005-7)
- ◆ Unprecedented large Russian-PRC land-sea-air East Asian exercise: *Peace Mission 2005*

1190

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

CNA
The CNA Corporation

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ 3rd (2nd Bush) QDR (2006)
 - ◆ QDR 2001 "1-4-2-1" Force Planning Construct became 3-part separate but overlapping mission set ("Michelin Man Strategy")
 - ◆ Homeland Defense
 - ◆ War on Terror/Irregular Warfare
 - ◆ Conventional Campaigns
 - ◆ Pacific Ocean concerns, shifts
 - ◆ Directed USN to increase Pacific force posture
 - ◆ Goal of 11 CVNs: 6 in Pacific
 - ◆ "Tailored deterrence" strategy

1191

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

CNA
The CNA Corporation

◆ Context (IV)

- ◆ Increased DoD attention to integration within US Diplomatic-Information-Military-Economic (DIME) policy, capabilities, ops
- ◆ DoD "long war", Global War on Terror, partnership, MDA & SSTRO concepts predominate & in vogue

1192

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

◆ Context (V)

- ◆ Demands of OEF, OIF tempered “transformation” & global “capabilities-based” defense planning policies
 - ◆ Especially by USA & USMC
 - ◆ Very high levels of sectarian violence in Iraq
 - ◆ Increased search for specific threat-based solutions, e.g.: specific anti-IED, cultural & linguistic capabilities
 - ◆ Need to increase “boots on the ground” troop strength, as well as all services’ precision strike & information capabilities
 - ◆ Push-back from Gens Dunlap, Deptula, other USAF thinkers

1193

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

◆ Context: (VI)

- ◆ Turkish refusal of US military access to ports, air space, en route to OIF (Mar 2003)
- ◆ Terrorists launched 2 missiles at USN amphibs visiting Aqaba, Jordan (2005)
- ◆ USN BMD surveillance & tracking patrols in Sea of Japan (from 2004)
- ◆ Stepped-up USN & coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia
 - ◆ Somali pirate *Seabourn Spirit* cruise ship attack (2005)
- ◆ MALSINDO Malacca Strait anti-piracy ops (from 2004)
 - ◆ Negative reaction to possible USN anti-piracy initiatives in Strait
- ◆ Heavy USN, coalition MSO ops in Arabian Sea, Caribbean, etc.
- ◆ 7th Fleet IO tsunami disaster relief ops yield favorable US policy outcomes & publicity (2004-05)
- ◆ USN-led Pakistan earthquake disaster relief ops (2005)

1194

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

◆ Context: (VII)

- ◆ New DOD Global Force Management (GFM) system for allocating & assigning forces supersedes GNFPP (2006)
 - ◆ UCP assigned JFCOM as Single Joint Force Provider (SJFP)
- ◆ Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005)
- ◆ Continued USN mid-frequency active sonar ASW training vs. quiet diesel submarines
 - ◆ Concerns raised globally over effect on marine mammals
 - ◆ USN committed to environmental research (Aug 2005)
 - ◆ Environmental groups sued to stop training (Oct 2005)
 - ◆ Litigation ongoing in US courts; widespread publicity

1195

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

◆ Context: (VIII)

- ◆ 313-ship Battle Force USN force level goal (Feb 2006)
- ◆ USN in 2006: 281 Battle Force ships; 4 ships authorized
- ◆ New USN ASW CONOPS approved (Dec 2004)
- ◆ USN FAO program revitalized, strengthened (Nov 2005)
- ◆ CNET created USN Center for Language, Regional Expertise & Culture (CLREC) at Pensacola (Feb 2006)
- ◆ Robust USN Individual Augmentee (IA) program
- ◆ Cyber attacks on Naval War College computer systems
- ◆ Fleet Force Command (FFC) restyled USFF (2006)
- ◆ New LCS classes under construction
- ◆ Hybrid Sailor program developed to man LCSs

1196

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

CNA

◆ Context (IX)

- ◆ VADM John Morgan, DCNO for Information, Plans & Strategy (OPNAV N3/N5) (2004- 8)
 - ◆ Plans to overhaul USN strategy
- ◆ VADM Morgan "3/1 Strategy" draft construct (2005)
 - ◆ MSO & HA/DR NOT lesser included cases any more
 - ◆ Progenitor of NSP, OC, new maritime strategy
 - ◆ Spawned new N81 "sea shaping" analytical pillar for POM development (alongside Sea Power 21 pillars) (2005)
 - ◆ Never officially promulgated or endorsed
- ◆ Navy Global N5s/N39s Conferences continue
- ◆ NAVWARCOL, JHU/APL, Lockheed Martin & CNA workshops on USN strategy continue

1197

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

CNA

◆ Cited references

- ◆ ...*From the Sea* (1992)
- ◆ *Forward...From the Sea* (1994)
- ◆ *Sea Power 21* (2002)
- ◆ *The 21st Century Marine Corps*
- ◆ *NOCJO* (2002)
- ◆ *National Defense Strategy* (2005)
 - ◆ Focus on need for capabilities vs *Traditional* but also *Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive* challenges
- ◆ *National Strategy for Maritime Security* (2005)
- ◆ *Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (MOC)* (Mar 2006)
- ◆ *2nd Bush National Security Strategy* (2006)
- ◆ *Navy Operating Concept* (anticipated)

1198

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ 3rd (2nd Bush) QDR (2006)
 - ◆ CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS
 - ◆ DOD OFT, *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach* (2003)
 - ◆ *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2006)
 - ◆ DODDIR 3000.5: *Military Support for SSTR Ops* (Nov 2005)
 - ◆ DOD, *Report to Congress: Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture* (Sep 2004)
 - ◆ CJCS Myers *National Military Strategy* (2004)
 - ◆ *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (2006)

1199

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ MCDP 1 *Warfighting* (1997)
 - ◆ CJCS Myers *Joint Operations Concepts* (2003)
 - ◆ Ignored
 - ◆ CJCS Myers *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (2005)
 - ◆ Ignored
 - ◆ Joint Pub 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Sep 2006)
 - ◆ Deleted term "MOOTW;" introduced 6 phases of jt ops
 - ◆ *Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept* (2005)
 - ◆ CNO & CMC, *FORCEnet Concept* (Feb 2005)
 - ◆ CGMCCDC & COMNWDC, *Enhanced Networked Seabasing Operational Concept* (2003)

1200

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ NIC, *Mapping the Global Future: Global Trends 2020* (2004)
 - ◆ MCWP 3-31.7 *Seabasing* (Aug 2006)
 - ◆ 3rd USN-USCG *National Fleet* policy statement (2006)
 - ◆ *Strategic Planning Guidance (Mar 2006), Contingency Planning Guidance, Security Cooperation Guidance*
 - ◆ Joint Global Force Management (GFM) Allocation Plan (2006) (superseded GNFPP)
 - ◆ CSBA reports on naval transformation, fleet architecture & seabasing (2002-6)
 - ◆ Earlier drafts of this briefing (2005-6)

1201

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
 - ◆ US Army FM 3-0 *Operations* (2001)
 - ◆ SECAF Peters & CSAF Ryan, *America's Air Force Vision: Global Vigilance, Reach & Power* (1997)
 - ◆ CAPT Ed Smith (Ret) *Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War* (2002)
 - ◆ *The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004)
 - ◆ VADM Morgan & RDML Martoglio "1000-Ship Navy," *Proceedings* (2005)
 - ◆ NATO AJP 3.1 *Allied Joint Maritime Operations* (2004)
 - ◆ BR 1806, *British Maritime Doctrine* (3rd ed.) (2004)

1202

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
 - ◆ LTC John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (2002)
 - ◆ Col T.X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone* (2004)
 - ◆ Barry Posen "Command of the Commons," *International Security* (2003)
 - ◆ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace* (2003)
 - ◆ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (2004)
 - ◆ DoD annual reports *Military Power of the PRC* (2002+)

1203

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- ◆ How it was written (I)
 - ◆ USN-USMC Warfighter Talks identified need for "first principles" (VADM Morgan; LtGen Huly) (2005)
 - ◆ VADM Morgan had been stimulating "Principles of War" debate
 - ◆ New CNO ADM Mullen tasked drafting of "Naval Operating Concept" (6 Jan 06)
 - ◆ USMC published its own *Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (MOC)* (Mar 2006)
 - ◆ USN starting point: Chart of naval principles, missions, etc.

1204

Naval Operations Concept (2006)



- ◆ How it was written (II)
 - ◆ VADM Morgan (OPNAV N3/N5) & LtGen Mattis (CG, MCCDC) oversaw
 - ◆ OPNAV Deep Blue - MCCDC/SIG core team formed
 - ◆ USFF participation
 - ◆ Initial USFF concerns that NOC properly its purview
 - ◆ Personalities: RDML-SEL Phil Cullom, CDR Tom Disy, LtCol (Ret) John Berry (MCCDC)
 - ◆ Original OPNAV N3/N5 Deep Blue cog
 - ◆ People & cog later moved to OPNAV N5SP
 - ◆ Endorsement by new incoming CMC Gen Conway in his initial planning guidance

1205

Naval Operations Concept (2006)



- ◆ Key ideas (I)
 - ◆ Call for “more widely distributed forces” for “increased forward presence”: disaggregated but aggregatable
 - ◆ Not the message of the *Fleet Response Plan* (2003)
 - ◆ Call for “tailored” and “adaptive force packages” & “alternative non-standard options”
 - ◆ International security cooperation
 - ◆ “Pre-emption” of non-traditional threats
 - ◆ Global response to crises where access is difficult

1206

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Key ideas (II)

- ◆ Focus areas

- ◆ 3 "longstanding" focus areas of naval operations
 - ◆ Mediterranean, Arabian Sea, Western Pacific to Bay of Bengal
 - ◆ 3 "emerging" focus areas of naval operations
 - ◆ Gulf of Guinea, East African littoral, Latin American waters
 - ◆ (does not include Arctic, North Atlantic, North Pacific, or US offshore waters)
 - ◆ Same areas as in *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)*

1207

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Key ideas (III)

- ◆ Cited 4 challenges from SECDEF *National Military Strategy* (2005)
 - ◆ Traditional – Irregular – Catastrophic -- Disruptive
 - ◆ Need for Diplomatic – Informational – Military -- Economic (DIME) elements of US power
 - ◆ Cited 3 guiding principles from *National Strategy for Maritime Security* (2005)
 - ◆ Preserve freedom of the seas
 - ◆ Facilitate & defend commerce
 - ◆ Facilitate movement across US borders, screening out dangers
 - ◆ Discussed & illustrated 2005 QDR mission set construct
 - ◆ Homeland defense
 - ◆ War on Terror/Irregular Warfare
 - ◆ Conventional Campaign(s)

1208

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

CNA

◆ Key ideas (IV)

◆ 13 naval missions

- ◆ Forward Naval Presence*
- ◆ Crisis Response
- ◆ Expeditionary Power Projection*
- ◆ Maritime Security Operations
- ◆ Sea Control*
- ◆ Deterrence*
- ◆ Security Cooperation
- ◆ Civil-Military Operations
- ◆ Counterinsurgency
- ◆ Counterterrorism
- ◆ Counterproliferation
- ◆ Air & Missile Defense
- ◆ Information Operations

- VADM Turner's 4 missions

◆ Added 9 to Turner list

- ◆ But not "sealift"

1209

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

CNA

◆ Key ideas (V)

◆ 9 "guiding" and "enduring" naval principles

- ◆ Agility
- ◆ Coordinated global influence
- ◆ Deployability & employability
- ◆ Interoperability
- ◆ Persistent presence
- ◆ Adaptive force packaging
- ◆ Precision
- ◆ Speed
- ◆ Unpredictability for our adversaries & reliability for our friends

1210

Naval Operations Concept (2006)



- ◆ Key ideas (VI)
 - ◆ Also 4 “foundations,” 9 “Methods” & “5 “strategic outcomes”
 - ◆ “Foundations” include *Global Awareness*
 - ◆ “Methods” include *networked, distributed ops, & sea basing*
 - ◆ “The challenge for the Navy and Marine Corps today is to remain capable of traditional naval missions while simultaneously enhancing our ability to conduct non-traditional missions”
 - ◆ Same message as in *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08* (2006)
 - ◆ Detailed coverage of US Coast Guard ops, relationships
 - ◆ Written in a mix of present and future tense
 - ◆ Assumed USN would write its own *Navy Operating Concepts* document as well

1211

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

- ◆ Key ideas (VII)
 - ◆ Very extensive discussion of HA/DR ops, with vignettes, throughout

1212



Naval Operations Concept (2006)

CNA

- ◆ Not addressed
 - ◆ "Transformation"
 - ◆ Surge capabilities & operations, or *Fleet Response Plan*
 - ◆ *Seapower 21* & OPNAV program planning "Independent Capability Analysis & Assessment" (ICAA) framework and vocabulary
 - ◆ Mine warfare
 - ◆ "Sealift" "not listed as a naval mission or capability set, only in passing as a beneficiary of sea control
 - ◆ U.S. Merchant Marine
 - ◆ U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
 - ◆ Requirement for USN & USMC to size its forces IAW naval missions mentioned only in passing

1215

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

CNA

- ◆ Criticisms (I)
 - ◆ Relationship to new maritime strategy unclear
 - ◆ Process seemed backwards
 - ◆ Relationship to *NDP 1* (1994) unclear
 - ◆ Based on an existing USMC operations concept, but USN concept not yet drafted
 - ◆ Too many lists: Hard to remember, assimilate & use

1216

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

♦ Criticisms (II)

- ♦ Not a long-range “concept” in the joint meaning of the term. Too focused on the present and near-term, despite use of future tense throughout
 - ♦ Abandoned 2002 “near-term, mid-term, long-term” NOCJO framework
 - ♦ The future as described is just an extension of the present
- ♦ Assumed a *Navy Operating Concepts* document that never happened

1217

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

♦ Influence

- ♦ Some in OPNAV; NAVWARCOL seminars & games
- ♦ Modest influence at USFF & in fleet
 - ♦ CNO-CMC tasking to USFF & CMFC to develop NOC implementation plan ignored
 - ♦ But “13 missions” construct repeated in *USFF 2008 Annual Plan*
- ♦ Direction for USN to develop service “NOC-‘y” ignored
- ♦ Marines used it to update their documents, develop new concepts (e.g.: SC MAGTF)

1218

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Why did it have such influence as it had?
 - ◆ Ostensibly for the fleet, but little USFF/ fleet buy-in during development
 - ◆ Linkages between NOC lists and fleet documents not obvious to fleet
 - ◆ No visible major CNO involvement or follow-through
 - ◆ Complexity of format hindered utility

T219

Naval Operations Concept (2006)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ NOC Mission Areas adopted in *NSP ISO POM 10* (2007)
 - ◆ Used by drafters of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (2007)
 - ◆ Influenced NWC contributions
 - ◆ Precedent seen as useful by OPNAV, HQMC, MCCDC
 - ◆ Revised in 2007-8 as *Naval Operations Concept* (2008).
 - ◆ Generated June 2007 USMC revision of its *Marine Corps Operating Concept*
 - ◆ Cited in CMC operational employment concept *The Long War* (Jan 2008) & in USMC *Vision & Strategy 2025* (Jun 2008)

T220


Naval Operations Concept (2006)



- ◆ Influence on other subsequent documents
 - ◆ Generated June 2007 USMC revision of its *Marine Corps Operating Concept*
 - ◆ Referenced in OPNAVINST 3501.316A *Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements* (Sep 2007)
 - ◆ Referenced incorrectly as *Naval Operating Concept 2006*
 - ◆ Cited in CMC operational employment concept *The Long War* (Jan 2008) & in USMC *Vision & Strategy 2025* (Jun 2008)

1221

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)



1222

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

CNA

◆ Overview

- ◆ Signed by outgoing CNO ADM Mullen
- ◆ A “Navy strategic plan”
- ◆ SECRET stand-alone pub. No UNCLAS version
- ◆ Developed in tandem with *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
- ◆ Designed to translate strategy into programmatic guidance
- ◆ Extensive strategic context analysis & risk guidance
- ◆ Revised by incoming CNO ADM Roughead within 2 months
- ◆ Principal target: DON programmers & budgeters

1223

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

CNA

◆ Signed by:

- ◆ CNO ADM Michael Mullen
- ◆ Signed his last week on the job, after 27 months in office



1224

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

CNA

- ◆ What it was
 - ◆ Billed as a “Strategic plan”
 - ◆ 2nd edition
 - ◆ NSP ISO POM 08 considered useful precedent
 - ◆ SECRET stand-alone pub (26 Sept 2007)
 - ◆ No UNCLAS version
 - ◆ Long: 76 pages
 - ◆ Navy (vice “sea services”) focus
 - ◆ Continued 2-year series initiated with *NSP ISO POM 08*

1225

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

CNA

- ◆ Why it was written
 - ◆ Provide strategic guidance to USN staff elements responsible for development of USN POM 2010, including
 - ◆ Extensive strategic context (including classified intelligence); force planning & extensive risk & analytic guidance; CNO ADM Mullen mission areas; & strategic initiatives
 - ◆ Translate national strategic guidance into USN guidance
 - ◆ Translate new concurrently drafted maritime strategy into a plan to inform Navy investments
 - ◆ Continue, routinize & improve process begun with *NSP ISO POM 08*
 - ◆ NSP the new “1st P” in USN PPBE process
 - ◆ Principal target: DON leaders, programmers & budgeteers

1226

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ Context (I)

- ♦ Late in 2nd term of Bush administration (2001-)
- ♦ Democrats control both houses of Congress (2007)
- ♦ SECDEF Gates (2006-)
- ♦ Outgoing CNO ADM Mullen (2005-7)
- ♦ New CNO ADM Roughead announced
- ♦ SECNAV Winter (2006-)
- ♦ OEF, OIF, PSI, other operations ongoing
 - ♦ OIF US forces "surge" underway (since Jan 2007)
 - ♦ US troop increase & changes in ops & tactics (from Feb 2007)
 - ♦ Less Iraqi internal violence, coalition casualties (from May 2007)
- ♦ Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- ♦ Weakening U.S. economy
- ♦ Northwest Passage north of Canada & Alaska opening

1227

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ Context (II)

- ♦ International concerns: Terrorism, China, North Korean & Iran nukes & missiles, Venezuela, Russia
 - ♦ Russians delivered 8 more Kilo SSs & 2 more Sovremenny DDGs to PRC (2005-7)
 - ♦ PLAN introduced new SSN & SSBN classes (2006-7)
 - ♦ PLAN sub penetrated *Kitty Hawk* screen (2006)
 - ♦ DPRK tested nuclear weapon (2006)
 - ♦ Hezbollah land-based missile hit Israeli warship (2006)
 - ♦ Iran suspected of developing nuclear weapons
 - ♦ PRC tested ASAT weapon (2007)
 - ♦ Russia suspended participation in CFE (2007)
 - ♦ Russian Navy claimed Arctic seabed resources (Aug 2007)
 - ♦ Russian aircraft approached USN exercises off Guam (2007)
 - ♦ Worldwide pirate attacks fell off from 2003 peak
 - ♦ Russian cyber attack on Estonia (2007)

1228

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ SFRC recommended Senate ratify LOS Treaty (Sep 2007)
 - ◆ Strongly endorsed by administration, JCS, USN
- ◆ India, US agreed on civil nuclear cooperation (Jul 2007)
- ◆ Panama began widening Panama Canal (Sept 2007)
- ◆ Stepped up USN, coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia, including USN use of naval gunfire (since 2006)
- ◆ 313-ship Battle Force USN force level goal (2006)
- ◆ USN in 2007: 279 Battle Force ships; 5 ships authorized
- ◆ USN BMD surveillance & tracking patrols in Sea of Japan (from 2004)
- ◆ Heavy USN, coalition MSO ops in Arabian Sea, Caribbean, etc.

1229

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (IV)

- ◆ New USN PERSTEMPO program (Jan 2007)
- ◆ High levels of sectarian violence in Iraq being countered by US “surge” & counterinsurgency policies
- ◆ Maturing USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, to relieve stress on ground forces
- ◆ MHQ with MOC concept under development
 - ◆ To standardize C2 practices among fleets, globally
- ◆ CNO “Global Maritime Partnerships” (was “1000-Ship Navy”); “GFS;” and T-AH ops initiatives (2007)
- ◆ VADM Morgan is OPNAV N3/N5 (since 2004)
- ◆ USN redeploys Med sub tender to Pacific (2007)

1230

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ Context (V)

- ♦ Robust USN “Individual Augmentee” (IA) program continues, becomes more formalized
- ♦ NECC stood up. Riverine Squadron in Iraq
 - ♦ USN conducts 1st riverine combat ops in 34 years (2007)
- ♦ Interagency Global Maritime Situational Awareness (GMSA) office established (1 Aug 2007)
- ♦ Navy Adaptive Planning Process (NAPP/later NSPP) pilot program under way. (Slight influence on NSP)
- ♦ Well-publicized USN LCS construction overruns & delays
- ♦ Hybrid Sailor program implemented to man LCSSs
- ♦ Congress refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007)
- ♦ USAF Operation “Rex Redux” (Aug 2007)

1231

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ Context (VI)

- ♦ Continued USN mid-frequency active sonar ASW training vs. quiet diesel submarines
- ♦ Environmental group litigation ongoing in US courts to stop training; widespread publicity

1232

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

CNA

◆ Cited references (I)

- ◆ *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (2007)
- ◆ *Naval Operations Concept* (2006)
- ◆ *Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2008*
- ◆ *2nd Bush National Security Strategy* (2006)
- ◆ *National Strategy for Maritime Security* (2005)

1233

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

CNA

◆ Cited references (II)

- ◆ *National Defense Strategy* (2005)
 - ◆ Focus on need for capabilities vs *Traditional* but also *Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive* challenges
- ◆ *CJCS Myers National Military Strategy* (2004)
- ◆ *3rd (2nd Bush) QDR Report* (2006)
 - ◆ Directed USN to increase force posture in Pacific
- ◆ *CNO Guidance for 2006*
- ◆ *CNO Guidance for 2007*
- ◆ *NIC, Mapping the Global Future: Global Trends 2020* (2004)
- ◆ Intelligence reports
- ◆ CNA & RAND studies

1234

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2006)
 - ◆ DODDIR 3000.5: *Military Support for SSTR Ops* (Nov 2005)
 - ◆ CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS
 - ◆ SCG, CCDR TSC Plans
 - ◆ CNA study "*National Security and the Threat of Climate Change*" (2007)
 - ◆ MOTR Plan (2006)
 - ◆ JT Pub 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* revision (2007)

1235

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ VADM Morgan, RDML Martoglio "1000-Ship Navy" (2005)
 - ◆ CAPT E.A. Smith USN (Ret), *Complexity, Networking and Effects-Based Approaches to Operations* (2006)
 - ◆ *National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations* (2006)
 - ◆ *National Military Strategy to Combat WMD* (2006)
 - ◆ *DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense & Civil Support* (2005)
 - ◆ CNO SSG XXVI Report on Cyber Warfare (2007)
 - ◆ *Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy* (2007)
 - ◆ OPNAV N8 analyses
 - ◆ *Air Force Strategic Plan, 2006-2008* (2006)

1236

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ CNO *Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept* (May 2007)
 - ◆ OPNAVINST 3501.316A *Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements* (Sep 2007)
 - ◆ CSBA Reports: On naval transformation, fleet architecture, & seabasing (2002-7)
 - ◆ Schultz, Perry, Kissinger, Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," *WSJ* (Jan 2007)
 - ◆ Earlier drafts of this briefing (2005-7)

1237

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

- ◆ How it was written
 - ◆ Jan 2005 tasker for *NSP ISO POM 08* had directed that process be repeated "at least biennially"
 - ◆ Personalities: VADM Morgan (N3/N5), RADM Cullom & RDML-SEL Donegan (N5SP) oversaw
 - ◆ CDR Nagy (N5SC) led OPNAV-wide development team. LCDR Stewart primary N5SC AO (LT Kawamura & Mr. Ballard supporting).
 - ◆ Heavy OPNAV N81 input (CAPT John Yurchak; CDR Bryan Clark)
 - ◆ To ensure "fit" with follow-on OPNAV POM processes
 - ◆ New pilot OPNAV "Navy Adaptive Planning Process" ongoing
 - ◆ "New Maritime Strategy" development process ongoing

1238

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

- ◆ Key ideas

- ◆ NSP translates new strategy into programmatic guidance for POM development
- ◆ Provide extensive strategic context
- ◆ Provide force planning & extensive risk & analytic guidance
- ◆ CNO mission areas
- ◆ Take strategic initiatives

1239

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

- ◆ What was new?

- ◆ First use of new Navy Adaptive Planning Process (NAPP)
- ◆ Tie-in to *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (2007) and *Naval Operations Concept* (2006)
- ◆ Extensive classified assessment of strategic context confronting the Navy

1240

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-10 (2007)

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◆ Criticisms

- ◆ Reflected rather than drove Navy program planning
- ◆ Classification of document precluded wide distribution & understanding of its role in implementing *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
- ◆ No real mechanism established to ensure OPNAV compliance

1241

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Written to influence

- ◆ Navy POM 10
- ◆ *Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2008*
- ◆ *Draft SECDEF Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF) for 2010-2015*
- ◆ *Draft SECDEF Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) for 2010-2015*
- ◆ 4th Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2009-2010
 - ◆ New incoming administration

1242

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)



♦ Influence

- ♦ Iterative development process influenced ongoing OPNAV POM 10 processes
- ♦ But CNO ADM Mullen-signed document immediately superseded by new CNO ADM Roughead-signed document

123

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)



- ♦ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ♦ Provided core of *NSP ISO POM 10 (Change 1)*
 - ♦ Intended to set strategic context for *Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2008*

1234

ADM Gary Roughead (CNO Sept 2007-)

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- ◆ 2007 *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
- ◆ 2007 *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1)*
- ◆ 2008 *Naval Operations Concept* (in draft)



1245

ADM Gary Roughead (CNO Sept 2007-)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis


- ◆ Surface warfare officer
 - ◆ 3rd SWO CNO in a row
- ◆ Appointed CNO when ADM Mullen unexpectedly named CJCS
- ◆ Previously COMPACFLT & COMUSFLTFORCOM
 - ◆ Active in drafting of *NOC*, *Navy Strategic Plans*, & *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
- ◆ Embraced new maritime strategy & CNO Mullen 313-ship BF goal
 - ◆ But saw 313 ships as a “floor”, not a ceiling
- ◆ Signature program: CG (X)?

1246

The 2006-7 sequence

- ◆ “We knew we were doing the process in a backwards way.”
- ◆ “Now . . . We want the strategy to lead”

VADM John Morgan, 15 Nov 2007





1247

The 2007-9 correction: The “Trifecta”

- ◆ “The following three documents provide the basis of my overarching guidance to guarantee our continued dominance as the preeminent maritime power”

G. Roughead, Admiral , U.S. Navy, 25 October 2007



“CNO Guidance for 2007-2008: Executing our Maritime Strategy”



1248

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis



1249

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Overview

- ◆ Signed by CNO ADM Roughead, CMC Gen Conway, COMDT COGARD ADM Allen
- ◆ Principal stated target: American people & US Congress
- ◆ UNCLAS
- ◆ Complex, lengthy, open development process
- ◆ Promulgated at Oct 2007 International Seapower Symposium
- ◆ Major USN publicity & implementation campaigns
- ◆ Key ideas: Globalization; cooperation; trust; war prevention as important as war winning; 6 strategic imperatives, 6 core capabilities, 3 implementation priorities

1250

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ Signed by:

- ♦ CNO ADM Gary Roughead
 - ♦ During 1st month in office
- ♦ CMC Gen James T. Conway
- ♦ COMDT COGARD ADM Thad Allen



1251

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ What it was

- ♦ Billed as a “strategy”
- ♦ UNCLAS
- ♦ “Sea Services” (vice USN) focus
- ♦ Multi-media promulgation
 - ♦ Booklet (16 pages)
 - ♦ *Proceedings* article (Nov 2007)
 - ♦ *Marine Corps Gazette* article (Nov 2007)
 - ♦ *Naval War College Review* article (Winter 2008)
 - ♦ CNO testimony (Dec 2007, Feb 2008)
 - ♦ DVD, CD-ROM, web
 - ♦ Conferences, meetings, speeches, seminars, press releases
 - ♦ “Conversations with the Country” & “Executive Seminars”
 - ♦ Blogs

1252

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)



◆ Why it was written (I)

- ◆ To change the Navy
- ◆ To tie the US Navy into a perceived new national security – & American public opinion -- environment & policy era, reaching beyond conventional warfighting & current GWOT operations to encompass “soft power”
- ◆ To elevate visibility of – and resources devoted to – preventing wars, maintaining the global system, USN humanitarian assistance/disaster response & maritime security operations, & international cooperation
- ◆ To elevate visibility of Global Fleet Stations and other new distributed fleet deployment options
- ◆ To demonstrate US Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard solidarity, and highlight their participation in US government inter-agency processes & operations

1253

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)



◆ Why it was written (II)

- ◆ To demonstrate to both current & *future* Administration national security leadership – & US public & Congress -- that Navy was in vanguard of needed national security concept changes
- ◆ To influence subsequent Navy, joint, defense & national security policies, concepts, strategies, doctrines & documents, in both the current administration & *the next*
- ◆ To influence many targets, “especially the American people & US Congress”

1254

♦ Context (I)

- ♦ Last part of 2nd G.W. Bush administration term (2001-)
- ♦ Democrats control both houses of Congress (2007)
- ♦ New SECDEF Gates (2006-)
- ♦ Terrorist & insurgent groups worldwide
- ♦ Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- ♦ Continued PRC military growth
 - ♦ PLAN introduced new SSN & SSBN classes (2006-7)
- ♦ OIF & OEF ongoing
 - ♦ "Revolt of the Generals" (2006)
 - ♦ OIF US forces "surge" underway (from Feb 2007)
 - ♦ US troop increase & changes in ops & tactics
 - ♦ Sectarian violence & casualties in Iraq decreasing (from May 2007)
- ♦ Weakening U.S. economy
- ♦ impending U.S. 2008 presidential election
- ♦ Climate change, including the Arctic

1255

♦ Context (II)

- ♦ Increased DoD attention to integration within US Diplomatic-Information-Military-Economic (DIME) policy, capabilities, ops
- ♦ DoD "long war", Global War on Terror, partnerships, MDA, & SSTRO concepts predominate & in vogue.
- ♦ OEF, OIF cause tempering of "transformation" & global "capabilities-based" defense planning policies
 - ♦ Especially by USA & USMC
 - ♦ Increased search for specific threat-based solutions, e.g.: specific anti-IED, cultural & linguistic capabilities
 - ♦ Need to increase "boots on the ground" troop strength, as well as all services' precision strike & information capabilities
 - ♦ Push-back from Dunlap, Deptula, other USAF thinkers

1256

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ Turkish refusal of US military access to ports, air space, en route to OIF (Mar 2003)
- ◆ New joint Africa Command announced
- ◆ Russia suspended participation in CFE (2007)
- ◆ Russian Navy claimed Arctic seabed resources (Aug 2007)
- ◆ US-ROK agreement to shift command relationships (2007)
- ◆ Panama began widening Panama Canal (Sept 2007)
- ◆ India, US agree on civil nuclear cooperation (Jul 2007)
- ◆ Northwest Passage north of Canada & Alaska opening
- ◆ SFRC hearings on LOS ratification (Sept 2007)
 - ◆ Strongly endorsed by administration, JCS, USN

1257

◆ Context (IV)

- ◆ Cyber attacks on Estonian gov't computer systems (2007)
- ◆ Regional powers gaining nuclear weapons
 - ◆ DPRK nuclear tests (2006)
 - ◆ Iran suspected of developing nuclear weapons
- ◆ Worldwide pirate attacks fell from 2003 peak
 - ◆ Attacks off Somalia continue rise, however
 - ◆ US-supported Ethiopians supporting Transitional Federal Government routed Islamist militias in Somalia. Islamist insurgency & regional warlordism continued, however
 - ◆ Rise in attacks near Nigerian oil resources
- ◆ PLAN submarine penetrated *Kitty Hawk* screen (2006)
- ◆ PRC successfully tested ASAT weapon (2007)
- ◆ Russians deliver 8 more *Kilo* SSs & 2 more *Sovremenny* DDGs to PRC (2005-7)
- ◆ Russian aircraft approach USN exercise off Guam (2007)

1258

◆ Context (V)

- ◆ CNOs ADMs Mullen (2005-7), Roughead (2007-)
- ◆ USN in 2007: 279 Battle Force ships; 5 ships authorized
- ◆ USN 313-ship Battle Force force level goal (Feb 2006)
- ◆ Number of USN carriers fell from 12 to 11
- ◆ New USN PERSTEMPO Program (Jan 2007)
- ◆ Fleet homeport balance shifted toward Pacific (2007)
- ◆ Robust USN “Individual Augmentee” (IA) program continued, became more formalized
- ◆ “MHQ with MOC” concept under development
 - ◆ To standardize fleet command and control practices
 - ◆ To better integrate naval fleet command into joint command

1259

◆ Context (VI)

- ◆ USN conducted 1st riverine combat ops in 34 years
- ◆ Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) ops on-going
- ◆ Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005)
- ◆ USN BMD surveillance & tracking patrols in Sea of Japan (from 2004)
- ◆ Heavy USN, coalition Maritime Security Ops ongoing in Arabian Sea, Caribbean, Mediterranean, SE Asia, etc.
 - ◆ Iran seized, detained RN/RM boat team in Gulf
- ◆ Continued US, coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia, including occasional USN use of naval gunfire
- ◆ USN redeployed Med sub tender to Pacific (2007)

1260

♦ Context (VII)

- ♦ 7th Fleet reactive IO tsunami disaster relief ops success (2004-5) led to proactive USN HA deployments:
 - ♦ T-AH & LHD HA ops ongoing in Pacific, LATAM
- ♦ USN-led Pakistan earthquake disaster relief ops (2005)
- ♦ CNO “Global Maritime Partnerships” (was “1000-Ship Navy”) initiative formalized through State Dept. cable
 - ♦ *Pacific Partnership & Partnership of the Americas* ops ongoing
- ♦ USN “Global Fleet Stations” concept floated (2006)
 - ♦ 2 pilot programs ongoing (*Caribbean & Africa Partnership Station*) (2007)
- ♦ Congress refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007)
- ♦ Hybrid Sailor program developed to man LCSs

1261

♦ Context (VIII)

- ♦ USN admirals picked for high joint command
 - ♦ CJCS, CDR CENTCOM, CDR PACOM, CDR SOCOM, CDR SOUTHCOM. Retired USN admiral is DNI
- ♦ USN FAO program revitalized, strengthened (Nov 2005)
- ♦ CNET created USN Center for Language, Regional Expertise & Culture (CLREC) at Pensacola (Feb 2006)
- ♦ FLTASWCOM & COMINEWARCOM merged to become Naval Mine & ASW Command (2006)
- ♦ But . . .
 - ♦ Polled Americans rated USN as least important & least prestigious of 4 DOD services (2004)
 - ♦ Increasing public outcries re: USN sonar effects on marine mammal safety
 - ♦ Well-publicized USN LCS construction overruns & delays

1262

♦ Context (IX)

- ♦ Continued USN mid-frequency active sonar ASW training vs. quiet diesel submarines
- ♦ Environmental group litigation ongoing in US courts to stop training; widespread publicity
- ♦ USCG moved from DOT to new DHS (2003)
- ♦ Increasingly complex & important USN-USCG relationships, especially re: MDA
 - ♦ Interagency Global Maritime Situational Awareness (GMSA) office established (1 Aug 2007)
- ♦ USAF Operation "Rex Redux" (Aug 2007)
- ♦ Close USN-French Navy carrier & aircraft training cooperation

1263

♦ Context (X)

- ♦ VADM John Morgan, DCNO for Information, Plans & Strategy (OPNAV N3/N5) (2004- 8)
- ♦ VADM Morgan "3/1 Strategy" draft construct (2005)
 - ♦ MSO & HA/DR NOT lesser included cases any more
 - ♦ RDML Charles Martoglio (N5SP) "Bear Paw" graphic
 - ♦ Spawns new N81 "sea shaping" analytical pillar for POM development (alongside Sea Power 21 pillars) (2005)
 - ♦ Never officially promulgated or endorsed
- ♦ Navy Global N5s/N39s Conferences continued

1264

- ◆ Context (XI): USN-USMC issues
 - ◆ USMC & USCG growing; USN shedding end strength
 - ◆ Amphibious ship numbers & characteristics
 - ◆ MPF(F) numbers & characteristics
 - ◆ JSF variants & numbers
 - ◆ Sea basing
 - ◆ Marines on non-amphibious ships
 - ◆ Reduced USMC amphibious competency during OIF era
 - ◆ Increased USN use of amphibious shipping in non-amphibious roles

1265

- ◆ Cited references
 - ◆ 2nd Bush *National Security Strategy* (2006)
 - ◆ SECDEF Rumsfeld *National Defense Strategy* (2005)
 - ◆ Focus on need for capabilities vs. *Traditional* but also *Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive* challenges
 - ◆ CJCS Gen Myers *National Military Strategy* (2004)
 - ◆ *National Strategy for Maritime Security* (2005)
 - ◆ *Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan (MOTR)* (2006)
 - ◆ 3rd USN-USCG *National Fleet* policy statement (2006)

1266

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2006)
 - ◆ *Global Defense Posture Review* (2004)
 - ◆ 3rd (2nd Bush) QDR Report (2006)
 - ◆ Directed USN to increase force posture in Pacific
 - ◆ *Strategic Planning Guidance* (SPG)
 - ◆ JSCP
 - ◆ CNO Guidance for 2007
 - ◆ Joint Pub 3-0 *Joint Operations* (2006)
 - ◆ Joint Pub 1 *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (2007)

1267

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ *National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations* (2006)
 - ◆ *National Military Strategy to Combat WMD* (2006)
 - ◆ *DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense & Civil Support* (2005)
 - ◆ DODDIR 3000.5: *Military Support for SSTR Ops* (Nov 2005)
 - ◆ *Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy* (2007)

1268

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ VADM Morgan & RDML Martoglio "1000-Ship Navy"
US Naval Institute *Proceedings* article (2005)
 - ◆ *Naval Operations Concept* (2006)
 - ◆ C2F Report: *Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers: Concept of Operations (CONOPS)* (Mar 2007)
 - ◆ CFFC Report: *Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers: An Enabling Concept for maritime Command and Control* (Sep 2007)
 - ◆ OPNAVINST 3501.316A *Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements* (Sep 2007)

1269

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
 - ◆ *Coast Guard Pub 1* (2002)
 - ◆ *U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security & Stewardship* (2007)
 - ◆ MCDP 1 *Warfighting* (1997)
 - ◆ MCWP 3-31.7 *Seabasing* (2006)
 - ◆ *Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (MOC)* (2nd Ed) (June 2007)
 - ◆ FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 *Counterinsurgency* (2006)
 - ◆ Written using similar techniques as A Cooperative Strategy
 - ◆ CSAF Gen Moseley, *U.S. Air Force Vision* (2006)
 - ◆ *Air Force Strategic Plan, 2006-2008* (2006)

1270

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
 - ◆ NATO AJP 3.1 *Allied Joint Maritime Operations* (2004)
 - ◆ BR 1806, *British Maritime Doctrine* (3rd ed.) (2004)
 - ◆ *Indo-US Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation* (2006)
 - ◆ Friedman, *Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (1999)
 - ◆ Former Under SECNAV Jerry Hultin-sponsored globalization studies
 - ◆ CDR Steve Benson on "USN and Globalization", in Kugler & Frost (eds.) *The Global Century* (2001)
 - ◆ CAPT Sam Tangredi (ed.) *Globalization and Maritime Power* (2002)
 - ◆ Iraq Study Group report (2006)

1271

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (VI)
 - ◆ Peter Schwartz, *Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World* (1991)
 - ◆ NIC, *Mapping the Global Future: Global Trends 2020* (2004)
 - ◆ USJFCOM *Joint Operational Environment* (JOE)
 - ◆ CSIS "Seven Futures" Project
 - ◆ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (2004)
 - ◆ CAPT E.A. Smith USN (Ret), *Complexity, Networking and Effects-Based Approaches to Operations* (2006)
 - ◆ CSIS Commission on Smart Power report: *A Smarter, More Secure America* (2007)

1272

- ◆ Context: Other contemporary publications (VII)
 - ◆ Schultz, Perry, Kissinger, Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," *WSJ* (Jan 2007)
 - ◆ CSBA reports on naval transformation, fleet architecture, & seabasing (2002-7)
 - ◆ CNA studies
 - ◆ Responding to complex humanitarian disasters (several)
 - ◆ *Global Navy Effects* study (2007)
 - ◆ *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change* (2007)
 - ◆ National Academy of Sciences, Naval Studies Board, *The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror* (2007)
 - ◆ CNO Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept (May 2007)
 - ◆ Earlier drafts of this briefing (2005-7)

1273

- ◆ How it was written (I)
 - ◆ VADM Morgan (N3/N5) conceived & directed
 - ◆ Had already formulated several key concepts (2004-6)
 - ◆ CNO ADM Mullen actively fostered & championed
 - ◆ Unprecedented well-funded massive, lengthy, orchestrated, complex, open, inclusive development effort
 - ◆ Widespread, intensive publicity about the process
 - ◆ "Competition of ideas"
 - ◆ Coordinated by N3/5 SAG (CDR Bryan McGrath, CAPT Foggo (briefly), & staff)
 - ◆ CDR McGrath principal USN drafter throughout
 - ◆ Col Doug King (USMC) & CAPT Sam Neill (USCG)
 - ◆ CNO announced effort at CSF in Newport (Jun 2006)

1274

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)



◆ How it was written (II)

- ◆ CNO Mullen formally tasked OPNAV N3/N5 July 2006
- ◆ 3 phases of development (Aug 06 - Oct 07)
- ◆ Phase I (Aug 06-Jan 07): Major NAVWARCOL effort & input
 - ◆ Deliberate involvement of NAVWARCOL & publicizing of same
 - ◆ RADM Jacob Shuford championed
 - ◆ CAPT "Barney" Rubel (Ret) managed & coordinated
 - ◆ Workshops, symposia, "Strategic Foundations game"
 - ◆ 5 grand strategy options identified, developed & debated
 - ◆ Initial "Conversations with the Country"
- ◆ Oct 2006 tri-service 3-star TOR
 - ◆ Established 3-star tri-service EXCOM: VADM Morgan, LtGen Amos, RDML Nimmich
- ◆ MSTF established (O5/O6-level)

1275

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)



◆ How it was written (III)

- ◆ Phase II (Mar-Jun 07):
 - ◆ Vetting & winnowing of grand strategy options by drafters, MSTF, EXCOM, 3/4-stars
 - ◆ 1 strategy option chosen (in reaction to NWC-developed options)
- ◆ Phase III (Jun-Oct 07)
 - ◆ Tri-service drafting
 - ◆ Vetting among 4-stars; re-drafting
- ◆ Conversations with the country continuing
- ◆ Drafting team anticipated & prepared for counter-arguments

1276

- ◆ How it was written (IV)
 - ◆ End-game (Oct 2008)
 - ◆ Change in CNO leadership
 - ◆ ADM Roughead for ADM Mullen as CNO
 - ◆ CNO Roughead end-game initiatives
 - ◆ Strengthened "hard power," major combat operations
 - ◆ Strengthened missile defense, MDA, sealift wording
 - ◆ CNA analyses; Re-drafting
 - ◆ 4-star agreement on ordering of capabilities & imperatives
 - ◆ SECNAV Winter briefed
 - ◆ Thought "soft power" was over-emphasized
 - ◆ Simultaneous "Great White Fleet" anniversary focus
 - ◆ CNO-CMC-COMDT COGARD signatures (Oct 2007)

1277

- ◆ How it was written (V)
 - ◆ Other simultaneous activities
 - ◆ New "Navy Adaptive Planning Process" (later "Navy Strategic Planning Process") ISO POM 12 getting underway
 - ◆ *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-10* development ongoing
 - ◆ Foreign defense industry, academic, interagency inputs sought
 - ◆ Foreign navy inputs sought
 - ◆ ISS 2005, Naval Institute *Proceedings* solicitation, Navy staff talks, academic engagements abroad
 - ◆ JHU/APL conferences (2005-7)
 - ◆ Lockheed Martin conferences (2005-8)
 - ◆ Origins of this publication

1278

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007) CNA

- ◆ How it was written (VI): Semi-official documents
 - ◆ NAVWARCOL President RADM Jacob Shuford "President's Forum" articles, *Naval War College Review* (Autumn 2006, Summer 2007, Winter 2008)
 - ◆ CAPT James Foggo, "Mahan Lives! Developing A New Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century," *Submarine Review* (Jan 2007)
 - ◆ CDR Bryan McGrath, "1,000-Ship Navy and Maritime Strategy," *Naval Institute Proceedings* (Jan 2007)



1279

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007) CNA


- ◆ How it was written (VII): NWC conference output
 - ◆ NAVWARCOL/ Enterra Solutions *Maritime Strategy Geo-strategic Environment Workshop* report (Aug 2006)
 - ◆ NAVWARCOL *Legal Experts Workshop on the Future Global Legal Order* report (Oct-Nov 2006)
 - ◆ NAVWARCOL Ruger Workshop, *Economics and Maritime Strategy: Implications for the 21st Century* (Nov 2006)
 - ◆ NAVWARCOL Ruger Workshop, *Defense Strategy and Forces: Setting Future Directions* (Nov 2007)



1280

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

- ◆ How it was written (VIII): CNA conferences
 - ◆ "US Naval Strategy & Concepts" (Jun 2006)
 - ◆ "The Future of Maritime Strategy" (Oct 2006)
 - ◆ "Winning Big Wars vs. Shaping & Influence" (Jan 2007)
 - ◆ "Implementing the New Maritime Strategy (Jan 2008)



1281

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)


- ◆ How it was written (IX): Feeder articles
 - ◆ Dr./CAPT Roger W. Barnett, "Strategic Culture and its Relationship to Naval Strategy," *NWCR* (Winter 2007)
 - ◆ Dr. George Baer, "Notes toward New Maritime Strategy," *NWCR* (Spring 2007)
 - ◆ CAPT Wayne Hughes, "A Bimodal Force for the National Maritime Strategy," *NWCR* (Spring 2007)
 - ◆ Dr. Geoffrey Till, "New Directions in Maritime Strategy?" *NWCR* (Autumn 2007)



1282

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007) CNA


- ◆ How it was written (X): Semi-official documents
 - ◆ IFPA, *A New Maritime Strategy for Twenty-First Century National Security* (Sep 2007)
 - ◆ *Orbis* special issue “Global Security and Maritime Strategy” (Fall 2007)



1283


A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007) CNA

- ◆ How it was written (XI): Official testimony
 - ◆ Statements by ADM Roughead, Gen Conway, & ADM Allen before the House Armed Services Committee (13 December 2007)
 - ◆ Posture Statements by ADM Roughead, Gen Conway, & ADM Allen (Spring 2008)



1284

- ◆ How it was written (XII): Official foreign inputs
 - ◆ "The Commanders Respond," US Naval Institute Proceedings (March 2007)
 - ◆ NAVWARCOL, *Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of Proceedings*, Oct 2007 (forthcoming)



1285

- ◆ How it was written (XIII)
 - ◆ Formal CHINFO dissemination plan, products & dissemination
 - ◆ CHINFO RDML Frank Thorp active oversight
 - ◆ Assigned PAO: CDR "Cappy" Surette
 - ◆ Targets:
 - ◆ Congress/ interagency
 - ◆ "Thought leaders"
 - ◆ Media
 - ◆ Internal DOD, DON
 - ◆ Direct-to-public (US, International)

1286

♦ How it was written (XIV)

- ♦ “This tension between warfighting and everything else was the main feature of the internal debates surrounding the development of the Maritime Strategy”

CDR Bryan McGrath USN (Ret)

Oct 2008

1287

♦ Key ideas (I)

- ♦ *Global system & globalization* a vital influence
- ♦ USN-USMC-USCG cooperation
- ♦ Formal & informal sea service, joint, interagency, & international *cooperation* & building of *trust*
- ♦ War prevention as important as warfighting
 - ♦ “Maritime forces must contribute to winning wars decisively while enhancing our ability to prevent war, win the long struggle against terrorist networks, positively influence events, and ease the impact of disasters”
- ♦ “6-6-3” construct
 - ♦ 6 key tasks or strategic imperatives
 - ♦ 6 expanded core capabilities
 - ♦ 3 implementation priorities

1288

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007) CNA

◆ Key ideas (II)

- ◆ 6 key tasks/ strategic imperatives
 - ◆ *Regionally Concentrated, Credible Combat Power*
(Western Pacific, Arabian Gulf /Indian Ocean)
 - ◆ Deter major power war
 - ◆ Win our nation's wars
 - ◆ Limit regional conflict
 - ◆ *Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces*
(especially Africa, Western Hemisphere)
 - ◆ Contribute to homeland defense in depth
 - ◆ Foster & sustain cooperative relationships
 - ◆ Prevent or contain local disruptions

(Tracked with NSP /SO POM 08 & NOC 2006, except Med omitted)

1289

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007) CNA

◆ Key ideas (III)

- ◆ 6 expanded core capabilities
 - ◆ *Forward Presence*
 - ◆ *Deterrence*
 - ◆ *Sea Control*
 - ◆ *Power projection*
 - ◆ *Maritime security*
 - ◆ *Humanitarian assistance & disaster response*
- ◆ Added 2 to Zumwalt/Turner “missions of the Navy” canon
 - ◆ Re-ordered Turner’s listing
- ◆ Subtracted 7 from NOC 2006 list of missions
- ◆ No inclusion of *strategic sealift* as core capability
 - ◆ Often previously added to “missions” list

1290

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

◆ Key ideas (IV)

- ◆ 3 implementation priorities
 - ◆ Improve integration and interoperability
 - ◆ Marines to be employed as detachments aboard a wider variety of ships and cutters for maritime security missions
 - ◆ No geographic boundaries between USN & USCG homeland defense responsibilities
 - ◆ *Global Maritime Partnerships* initiative
 - ◆ Enhance awareness
 - ◆ Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
 - ◆ Expanded Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability
 - ◆ Prepare our people
 - ◆ "Maritime forces will normally operate in a less concentrated manner than they do today"
 - ◆ New responsibilities & expertise for junior officers & commanders

1291

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

◆ Key ideas (V)

- ◆ Call for "mission-tailored" & "adaptive force packages"
- ◆ "We will provide our people . . . With the training, education, and tools necessary to promote peace . . ."
- ◆ "As a declaratory strategy, this document challenges the sea services to evolve an expanded range of integrated capabilities to achieve enduring national strategic objectives"
- ◆ In accompanying explanatory texts:
 - ◆ Deliberate invocation of (& comparison to) *The Maritime Strategy* of 1980s
 - ◆ Deliberate slighting of all other USN capstone documents since 1980s.

1292

◆ Key ideas (VI)

- ◆ To “complement Sea Power 21” & influence next:
 - ◆ Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) (drafting ongoing in 2007)
 - ◆ Naval Operations Concept (NOC) (2008)
 - ◆ SECDEF Gates National Defense Strategy (NDS) (2008)
 - ◆ CJCS Mullen National Military Strategy (NMS) (2008)
 - ◆ Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review (QRM) (2008)
 - ◆ 4th Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (2009-2010)
 - ◆ New incoming administration

1293

Maritime Strategic Imperatives



1294

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ What was new (I)

- ♦ 1st ever capstone document signed by 3 service chiefs
 - ♦ 1st USN-USMC-USCG unified maritime strategy since 1980s
 - ♦ One of only 4 capstone documents to comprehensively integrate USCG
 - ♦ 1st capstone document to cite USN-USCG *National Fleet* policy
- ♦ Complex, open, lengthy development process
 - ♦ Included "competition of ideas" phase
 - ♦ Extensive, structured flag officer involvement
 - ♦ "Conversations with the country" & "executive seminars"
 - ♦ Public solicitation of foreign input
 - ♦ Unprecedented allocation of Navy \$ & manpower for development
 - ♦ Widespread & intensive publicity about the process

1295

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

♦ What was new? (II)

- ♦ Emphasis on the *global system* & *globalization*
 - ♦ 1st use of term *global system* in a USN capstone document
- ♦ Asserted that *preventing war* as important as winning
- ♦ Elevation of *Maritime Security* & *Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response* to core capabilities
- ♦ Emphasis on interagency action & DIME construct
- ♦ Navy as enabling force for humanitarian ops too
- ♦ Public DOD announcement & endorsement
- ♦ Massive & sustained CHINFO-led multi-media internal & external publicity campaign
- ♦ Use of blogs for dissemination

1296

◆ What was new? (III)

- ◆ Serious & massive attempt to rigorously measure effects
 - ◆ ADM Roughead CNO Guidance 2008: "Develop comprehensive plan that accomplishes each implied task and tracks progress with measures of effectiveness"
 - ◆ CNO approved two methodologies to be applied to each of the 6 "strategic imperatives" (Jun 2008)
 - ◆ VTC Conversation tool (initiated Sep 2008)
 - ◆ Monthly CNO-NCC dialogues on opportunities & impediments
 - ◆ Systems Thinking Model
 - ◆ Industry-proven methodology adapted by Naval War College (Prof. Downes-Martin)

1297

◆ Not addressed

- ◆ Many (but not all) naval warfare tasks
 - ◆ Strike, amphibious, anti-air, anti-surface, electronic, mine warfare, underway replenishment not mentioned
 - ◆ TBMD, ISR, MDA, TSC, sealift mentioned. ASW, IO implied.
- ◆ Cooperation with US Army & US Air Force by name
- ◆ U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
- ◆ Arctic Ocean; Atlantic Ocean; North, Mid-, Eastern Pacific Ocean; Mediterranean Sea
- ◆ Riverine operations & capabilities
- ◆ China, Iraq, Afghanistan, "The Long War," Europe
- ◆ "Transformation"
- ◆ Seapower 21 framework or vocabulary
 - ◆ Even though Seapower 21 remained central to OPNAV Independent Capability Analysis and Assessment (ICAA) program planning process & NWDC concept development

1298

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Scant mention
 - ◆ No mention of *Fleet Response Plan* or of importance of *surge*, except in passing
 - ◆ *Strategic sealift* not included as a “core capability”
 - ◆ Coast Guard constabulary & law enforcement roles received slight treatment
 - ◆ No substantive discussion of seabasing
 - ◆ Little on naval coastal warfare
 - ◆ Only one very general reference to links to force level planning, programming & budgeting

1299

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ 1970-74 & 2007
 - ◆ *A Cooperative Strategy* built on Zumwalt – Turner’s “4 missions”
 - ◆ Thrust of *A Cooperative Strategy* echoes Zumwalt-Turner views 35 years before
 - ◆ Zumwalt-Turner: Discussion of sea control & presence in reaction to VN War power projection focus
 - ◆ *A Cooperative Strategy*: Discussion of sea control & presence in reaction to 1990s power projection focus
 - ◆ Turner’s “deterrence” and “warfighting” missions echoed in *A Cooperative Strategy*’s “war prevention” and “war winning” discussion

1300

♦ Critical literature & subsequent analyses (I)

- ♦ Christopher Castelli, "Navy Weighs Three Maritime Strategy Options, but Others May Emerge," *Inside the Navy* (Apr 2007)
- ♦ "Strategy 1," (CDR Bryan McGrath USN), "Maritime Strategy 2007," *Steeljaw Scribe* blog, <http://steeljawscribe.com>, Oct 2007
- ♦ Hon. John Lehman, "A Bravura Performance," US Naval Institute *Proceedings* (Nov 2007)
- ♦ Hon. Seth Cropsey, "Don't Give Up the Ships: The Navy's Flawed New Strategy," *The Weekly Standard* (Nov 2008)

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♦ Critical literature & subsequent analyses (II)

- ♦ CAPT Robert Rubel USN (Ret), "The New Maritime Strategy: The Rest of the Story," *Naval War College Review* (Spring 2008)
- ♦ Jan van Tol & Robert Work, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: An Assessment* (CSBA, Mar 2008)
- ♦ Geoffrey Till, Steve Carmel, CAPT (Ret) Wayne Hughes, RADM (Ret) Bill Pendley articles, *Naval War College Review*, Spring 2008)
- ♦ Serge Bertrand, "A Canadian Perspective on the Cooperative Strategy," *Canadian Naval Review* (Summer 2008)

1302

♦ Criticisms (I)

- ♦ Not really a “strategy.” More a “strategic concept.”
 - ♦ Not equivalent to 1980s’ “Maritime Strategy”
- ♦ Accompanying explanatory narrative inaccurately slighted all USN strategic conceptual efforts since 1980s
 - ♦ Especially . . . *From the Sea*
- ♦ Not useful as “The Navy Story:”
 - ♦ Advertised target audiences (US public, Congress) uninterested in strategy, and especially in peacetime ops
 - ♦ Strategy too nuanced for Congress & US public
 - ♦ Globalization & international trade do not resonate as themes with the American people, whose traditional comparatively low support for international trade was actually declining

1303

♦ Criticisms (II)

- ♦ Not specific enough. Not enough detail. Not focused.
- ♦ Emphasis on global system, world trade & the global commons as “context” not accompanied by robust enough explanation as to what seriously threatens them
 - ♦ Little current & foreseeable threat to global seaborne trade
- ♦ Failure to prioritize strategic imperatives, core capabilities, potential threats, US operations
- ♦ Not enough discussion as to exactly *how* maritime forces *prevent* wars
- ♦ Unadvisedly favored “soft” over “hard” maritime power
 - ♦ Elevation of MSO & HA/DR operations as “core capabilities” unwarranted
 - ♦ No mention of *strike* or *amphibious assault* or ASW ops
 - ♦ No concomitant elevation of *sealift*, as often in the past

1304

◆ Criticisms (III)

- ◆ Not joint enough
 - ◆ Not explicit on links to Army, Air Force strategies & operations
 - ◆ Ignored USN-USAF strike integration achievements & potential
- ◆ Linkage to force levels, programs, budgets not explicit
 - ◆ USN 313-ship force level goal developed prior to strategy
 - ◆ Current USN building program does not reflect the strategy
- ◆ Little on USN role in meeting traditional, disruptive, irregular, catastrophic challenges
- ◆ Not enough on Navy roles in winning at counter-insurgency & the war on terror
- ◆ Advocacy of global maritime partnerships rang hollow beside US refusal to ratify UN Law of the Sea treaty
- ◆ Not enough on naval control & protection of shipping
- ◆ Not enough on protection of oceanic natural resources

1305

◆ Criticisms (IV)

- ◆ Development too lengthy, complex, & wasteful of \$
- ◆ Many of its tenets actually predated the so-called “development” process
 - ◆ “Development” process an elaborate sham; VADM Morgan already knew what he wanted to say (cf: “3-1 Strategy” draft)
- ◆ Too many other competing USN capstone documents
- ◆ Timing of publication was poor; Pres. election impending
- ◆ Backwards process. Relationship to NSP, NOC, & new OPNAV “Navy Adaptive Planning Process” unclear

1306

◆ Criticisms (V)

- ◆ “Conversations with the Country” flawed
 - ◆ Many audiences from Navy-oriented groups
 - ◆ Many “conversations” actually “performances”
 - ◆ Not enough audience was reached for effort made
 - ◆ Blogging would have been more useful
- ◆ Strategy programmatic *implementation* little in evidence
 - ◆ USN force goal remained 313 battle force ships 13 months after *A Cooperative Strategy* was published
 - ◆ USN Jul 2008 public arguments for truncating DDG-1000 program had no roots in the strategy
- ◆ PRC not identified as a challenge in strategy; but PRC capabilities implicitly figure in separate USN program justifications
 - ◆ & PRC routinely mentioned in SECDEF, CJCS documents

1307

◆ Influence (I)

- ◆ Immediate & strong within the US Navy
- ◆ Informed subordinate USN command concepts, strategies, plans, briefings, operations, public affairs releases
- ◆ Cited in:
 - ◆ CJCS *Risk Assessment* to Congress (2008)
 - ◆ CNO & other flag officer speeches and testimony
 - ◆ CMC operational employment concept *The Long War* (2008)
 - ◆ DON FY 09 Budget Statement (Feb 2008) (selected excerpts)
 - ◆ SECDEF *Foreign Affairs* article (Jan-Feb 2009)
- ◆ Ideas & vocabulary informed USN preparations for 2008-9 QRM review & 4th QDR

1308

♦ Influence (II)

- ♦ “Implementing the strategy” a major USN theme
 - ♦ Strategy implementation the theme of *CNO Guidance (CNOG) for 2007-2008* and *CNOG for 2009*
 - ♦ Subtitle: “Executing our Maritime Strategy”
 - ♦ CNOGs dominated by strategy implementation issues
 - ♦ Efforts to measure effects of the strategy
 - ♦ NAVWARCOL *Title X Global War Game '08* (July 2008) to provide strategy implementation insights
 - ♦ Sparked revival of old informal “Navy Study Group”
 - ♦ Spearheaded by CAPT (Ret) Robby Harris (Lockheed Martin)
 - ♦ Included many authors & contributors to past & current Navy capstone strategy documents

1309

♦ Influence (III)

- ♦ CJCS ADM Mullen public citation & endorsement (2008)
- ♦ Influence on:
 - ♦ Joint Staff 2008 *National Military Strategy* authors
 - ♦ CSAF Gen Moseley
 - ♦ *The Nation's Guardians: America's 21st Century Air Force* (Dec 2007)
 - ♦ Air Staff (“Checkmate”)-drafted strategy/vision
- ♦ Much positive feedback from foreign navies
 - ♦ Salience of cooperation theme noticed & appreciated
 - ♦ German, Canadian other navies sought to emulate USN “Conversations with the Country”
- ♦ But little cited in public debates on DDG-1000 numbers
- ♦ Not much resonance on Capitol Hill or among the American people

1310

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)



◆ Why did it have such influence? (I)

- ◆ Visible & repeated CNO ADM Mullen endorsement during development
- ◆ Visible & repeated CNO ADM Roughead endorsement following publication
- ◆ Well-publicized personal involvement by CNOs & senior flag officers
- ◆ Well-constructed & well-written
- ◆ Widespread publicity before & after publication
- ◆ Massive CHINFO multi-media distribution campaign
- ◆ Concepts tracked with current USN ops & DOD initiatives as well as outside defense expert opinion

1311

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)



◆ Why did it have such influence? (II)

- ◆ Involvement of many actors in its creation
 - ◆ But disappointment among some at lack of real influence
- ◆ Complex, multi-actor development process well-orchestrated by VADM Morgan
 - ◆ But also tainted by close association with VADM Morgan's reputation & views
- ◆ Calculated tie-in to successful USN *Maritime Strategy* effort of 1980s
- ◆ Calculated tie-in to Naval War College reputation as strategy font
- ◆ Capitol Hill is typically not interested in nuances of military strategy, nor in peacetime operations. Their focus is usually on requirements for warfighting.


1312

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

- ◆ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
 - ◆ Informed revisions to:
 - ◆ Navy Strategic Plan (Sept & November 2007)
 - ◆ Naval Operations Concept (2009)
 - ◆ NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2009)
 - ◆ Informed Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)
- ◆ Influence on other Navy documents
 - ◆ Cited in Jan 2008 VCNO POM-10 PLANORD as providing context & priorities to guide POM 10 investment decisions
 - ◆ (But not mentioned in Jan 2009 PLANORD for PR 11)
 - ◆ Cited often in USFF 2008 Annual Plan
 - ◆ FY-09 Navy Budget Book (2008) incl/ 4-page synopsis
- ◆ 6 strategic imperatives used in USMC Vision & Strategy 2025 (Jun 2008)

1313

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) (2007)



1314

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Overview

- ◆ Signed by CNO ADM Roughead
- ◆ A “Navy strategic plan”
- ◆ Principal target: DON programmers & budgeters
- ◆ SECRET stand-alone pub
- ◆ Modest changes to CNO ADM Mullen NSP ISO POM 10, signed just weeks before
- ◆ Emphasis on NSP as the strategic source document for USN POM development

1315

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Signed by:

- ◆ CNO ADM Gary Roughead
 - ◆ Signed within his first two months on the job



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Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analyses

◆ What it was

- ◆ Billed as a “strategic plan”
- ◆ Revision of 2nd (26 Sep 2007) edition
- ◆ SECRET stand-alone pub (5 Nov 2007)
- ◆ Long: 76 pages
 - ◆ Same length as 26 Sep edition
- ◆ Navy (vice “sea services”) focus
- ◆ Continued (but revised) 2-year series initiated with *NSP ISO POM 08*

1317

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) (2007)

CNA
Center for Naval Analyses

◆ Why it was written

- ◆ New CNO ADM Roughead desire to “make it his”
- ◆ To lay out relationship to *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (published October 2007)
- ◆ Provide CNO ADM Roughead’s specific guidance for POM 10 development
- ◆ Principal target: DON leaders, programmers & budgeters

1318

◆ Context (I)

- ◆ Last years of G.W. Bush administration 2nd term (2001-)
- ◆ US economy continuing to weaken
- ◆ SECDEF Gates (2006-)
- ◆ SECNAV Winter (2006-)
- ◆ New CNO ADM Roughead (Sept 2007-)
- ◆ OEF, OIF, PSI, other operations ongoing
 - ◆ OIF US forces "surge" underway
 - ◆ Violence continues to fall off
- ◆ Maturing USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, to relieve stress on ground forces
- ◆ Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland

1319

◆ Context (II)

◆ International concerns:

- ◆ Terrorism, China, North Korea & Iran nukes & missiles, Pakistan, Venezuela, Russia
- ◆ North Korea agreed to disable nuclear facilities
- ◆ Pakistani political turmoil
 - ◆ President Musharaf re-elected; former PM Bhutto returned; state of emergency declared
- ◆ Cyber attacks on Estonian government computer systems (2007)

1320

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) (2007)

CNA

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended ratification of Law of the Sea Treaty (31 Oct 2007)
- ◆ Weakening U.S. economy
- ◆ Stepped-up USN & coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia
- ◆ Continuing USN LCS construction overruns & delays
- ◆ QRM Review & 4th QDR impending
- ◆ New CNO ADM Roughead declared USN 313-ship Battle Force goal to be a “floor”
- ◆ USN in 2007: 279 Battle Force ships; 5 ships authorized

1321

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) (2007)

CNA

◆ Cited references

- ◆ Same as *NSP ISO POM 10*
- ◆ Added ADM Roughead *CNO Guidance for 2007-2008* (CNOG)

1322

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) (2007)



◆ How it was written

- ◆ Personalities: CNO ADM Roughead, VADM Morgan (N3/N5), RDML-SEL Donegan (N5SP) oversaw
- ◆ LCDR Stewart (N5SC) (had been primary AO for CNO ADM Mullen *NSP ISO POM 10*)
 - ◆ N5SC assists: CDR Paul Nagy, LT Brian Kawamura, Mr. Philip Ballard
- ◆ N81 input to ensure “fit” with follow-on OPNAV POM processes
- ◆ New OPNAV “Navy Adaptive Planning Process” (NAPP) getting underway
- ◆ *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* development process completed & document published

1323

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) (2007)



◆ Key ideas

- ◆ Same as *NSP ISO POM 10* (2007)
- ◆ But...
 - ◆ New execution guidance
 - ◆ More explicit tie-ins to *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
 - ◆ Aligned objectives with CNO Roughead CNOG for 2007-2008
 - ◆ New CNO ADM Roughead specific risk guidance direction

1324

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) (2007)



- ◆ What was new?
 - ◆ Modest changes to risk guidance
 - ◆ New CNO ADM Roughead execution guidance

1325

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) (2007)



- ◆ Criticisms
 - ◆ Classification of document precluded wide distribution & understanding of its role in implementing *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
 - ◆ Largely reflected, rather than drove, Navy program planning
 - ◆ No real way of tracking OPNAV compliance
 - ◆ No follow-through to ensure tasked studies ever initiated, completed

1326

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) (2007)

CNA
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◆ Influence:

- ◆ “The NSP is the authoritative Navy reference for conduct and development of POM-10”

VCNO Jan 2008 POM-10 PLANORD

- ◆ Cited in *USFF 2008 Annual Plan*
- ◆ Used by OPNAV N81 & ONR in POM 10 development


◆ Why?

- ◆ Strong & visible new CNO ADM Roughead personal involvement & endorsement

1327

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR-11 (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis



1328

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR-11 (2009)

◆ Overview

- ◆ To be signed by CNO ADM Roughead
- ◆ “Navy strategic guidance”
- ◆ Principle targets:
 - ◆ DON officers & civilians charged with developing PR 11
- ◆ SECRET

1329

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)

◆ To be signed by:

- ◆ CNO ADM Gary Roughead
 - ◆ During 2nd year of his term



1330

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)



◆ What it is

- ◆ Billed as “strategic guidance”
- ◆ Continued (but revised) 2-year series initiated with *NSP ISO POM 08*
- ◆ Update of 2nd (26 Sep 2007) edition of *NSP ISO POM 10*
- ◆ SECRET stand-alone pub
- ◆ Navy (vice “sea services”) focus

1331

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)



◆ Why it is being written

- ◆ NSPs originally planned for 2-year cycles
- ◆ But PR 11 was special
 - ◆ Administration change. QRM review & 4th QDR prep on-going. NPR anticipated
 - ◆ Accordingly, *NSG ISO PR 11* tasked
 - ◆ To compare *NSP ISO POM 08* to actual POM 08 BES results
 - ◆ Tasker: Feb 2008 VCNO memo on CY 08/09 Navy strategic planning

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Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (I)

- ◆ Drafted during presidential election campaign & last months of G.W. Bush (R) administration 2nd term (2001-2009)
- ◆ Drafting completed, document signed early in new Obama (D) Administration
- ◆ Democrat control of both houses of Congress (2007)
- ◆ SECDEF Gates (2006-)
- ◆ SECNAV Winter (2006-9)
- ◆ CNO ADM Roughead (Sept 2007-)
- ◆ U.S. & world economies in deep financial crisis
 - ◆ Price of oil plummeting
- ◆ Unprecedented immediate aggressive large-scale US gov't policy response to economic crisis
- ◆ Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review (QRM) & 4th Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) underway during drafting

1333

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (II)

- ◆ Issues: Terrorism, China, North Korea & Iran nukes & missiles, Pakistan, Venezuela, Russia
- ◆ Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- ◆ Interminable international roller-coaster negotiations to disable DPRK nuclear facilities
- ◆ Iran threatening stability of Gulf region
 - ◆ Iran put 1st domestically-made satellite into orbit (Feb 2009)
- ◆ Pakistani political turmoil stabilized
 - ◆ Newly elected civilian president (Sep 08)
 - ◆ India-Pak trade route reopened thru Kashmir (Oct 08)
- ◆ Russian military & cyber attacks on Georgia; navy squadron deployments to Pac, Med & Caribbean (2008)
- ◆ Russia, Iran, Qatar in gas cartel discussions (2007-8)

1334

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)

CNA

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ PRC increasing military posture opposite Taiwan
- ◆ Continued PRC anti-ship ballistic missile R & D
- ◆ New PLAN amphibious ship class introduced (2008)
 - ◆ PRC launched 1st Venezuelan satellite (Oct 2008)
- ◆ US announced arms sales to Taiwan, incl/ Harpoon (Oct 2008)
- ◆ PRC suspended PVSTs, other US military ties in protest (Oct 2008)
- ◆ Unprecedented high-level Taipei talks & agreements on increased PRC-Taiwan transport links (Nov 2008)
- ◆ Independence-leaning former Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian (2000-8) indicted for corruption (Dec 2008)
- ◆ PLAN counter-piracy squadron to Arabian Sea (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ 1st PLAN operational deployment outside Asia
 - ◆ 1st Chinese long-range naval expedition since 1433

1335

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)

CNA

◆ Context (IV)

- ◆ India successfully tested SLBMs in Bay of Bengal (2008)
- ◆ India-US signed 2007 "123 Agreement" facilitating India's access to civilian nuclear fuel & technology (Oct 2008)
- ◆ India launched satellite in moon orbit (Oct 2008)
- ◆ USN-Indian Navy *Malabar* exercise (Oct 2008)
- ◆ Major seaborne Pakistani-based Islamist terrorist assault on Mumbai, India (Nov 2008)
- ◆ India agreed to buy 8 US P8I multi-mission maritime aircraft (Dec 2008)

1336

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009) CNA

◆ Context (V)

- ◆ OEF, OIF, PSI, Continuing Promise, other operations ongoing
 - ◆ OIF US "post-surge" force levels declining (from Oct 2008)
 - ◆ Iraqi sectarian violence, insurgency continued to fall off
 - ◆ Rising Taliban insurgency, US & coalition force levels in Afghanistan
 - ◆ US-Iraq Security Agreement signed (Nov 2008)
- ◆ Continuing & mature USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, relieving stress on ground forces
- ◆ Continued highly-publicized surge in Somali pirate attacks in Gulf of Aden
 - ◆ Stepped-up international USN, coalition, NATO, EU anti-piracy deployments off Somalia (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ Kenya agreement to try Somali pirates captured by US naval forces (Jan 2009)

1337

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009) CNA

◆ Context (VI)

- ◆ USN fleet balance in favor of Pacific (since 2007)
 - ◆ 1st CVN home-ported in Japan (2008)
- ◆ PACFLT Mid-Pacific Surface Combatant Operational Deployment Program (since 2008)
- ◆ USN in 2008: 282 Battle Force ships; 6 ships authorized
- ◆ CNO ADM Roughead declared USN 313-ship Battle Force goal to be a "floor"
- ◆ Continuing USN LCS construction overruns & delays
 - ◆ 1st LCS commissioned (Nov 2008)
- ◆ Hybrid Sailor program implemented to man LCSs
- ◆ Congress again refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007 & 2008)
- ◆ Follow-on SSBN being studied
- ◆ Northrop-Grumman X-47B N-UCAS unveiled (Dec 2008)

1338

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (VII)

- ◆ Continuing USMC fire support issues
 - ◆ USN canceled ERGM development (May 2008); DDG-1000 program (Jul 2008); Joint expeditionary fires Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) (Oct 2008)
 - ◆ US Supreme Court lifted lower court restrictions on USN active mid-frequency sonar training (Nov 2008)
 - ◆ USN settled worldwide environmental lawsuits (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ New OPNAV N3/N5 organization (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ Strategy & Concepts branch split (new N511 & N513)
 - ◆ Unofficial *Navy Study Group* ongoing

1339

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)

CNA

◆ Context: Contemporary publications (I)

- ◆ *A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century* (2007)
- ◆ *Naval Operations Concept* 2009 in 5th draft. Awaiting CNO/Commandants approval
- ◆ National Academy of Sciences National Research Council, *U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for 2008* (Aug 2008)
 - ◆ Recommended deployment of conventional Trident II SLBMs
- ◆ SECDEF TF on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, *Review of the DOD Nuclear Mission* (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ USN commended re: nuclear mission commitment
 - ◆ USN chided for neglect of TLAM-N funding

1340

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)

- ◆ Context: Contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ LtCol (Ret) Frank Hoffman , *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Dec 2007)
 - ◆ CDI, *Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for the New President and Congress* (Oct 2008)
 - ◆ Included Bill Lind recommendations on USN (w/ roots in 1970s)
 - ◆ National Academy of Sciences, Naval Studies Board, *The "1,000-Ship Navy" --- Maritime Security Partnerships* (Nov 2008)
 - ◆ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025* (Nov 2008)
 - ◆ CDRJFCOM *Joint Operating Environment* (JOE) (Nov 2008)

1341

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)

- ◆ Context: Contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ *Unified Command Plan* revision (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ NSC, *Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan* (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ NSPD-66/HSPD-25, *Arctic Region Policy* (Jan 2009)
 - ◆ SECDEF Gates *Foreign Affairs* article (Jan-Feb 2009)
 - ◆ CJCS ADM Mullen *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) (Jan 2009)
 - ◆ SECDEF Gates *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report* (Jan 2009)
 - ◆ Earlier drafts of this briefing (2008-9)

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Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ How it is being written
 - ◆ Personalities: CNO ADM Roughead, VADM Crowder (N3/N5), RDML Robert Thomas (N5SP) oversaw
 - ◆ Drafted in N5SC (CAPT Vic Addison)
 - ◆ N81 input to ensure “fit” with follow-on OPNAV POM processes
 - ◆ OPNAV “Navy Strategic Planning Process” (NSPP) to inform *NSP ISO POM 12* ongoing simultaneously
 - ◆ Endgame of *Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2008* ongoing simultaneously
 - ◆ Tri-service revision of *NDP 1 Naval Warfare* begun (from Oct 2008)

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Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)


CNA
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- ◆ Criticisms
 - ◆ Classification of document precludes wide distribution & understanding of its role in implementing *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*

1344

Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis



NOC
2009

1345

Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ Overview
 - ◆ To be signed by CNO ADM Roughead, CMC Gen Conway, COMDT COGARD ADM Allen
 - ◆ USN-USMC-USCG staff drafting participation
 - ◆ A “naval operations concept”
 - ◆ Principle targets:
 - ◆ USN & USMC officers & enlisted (initially)
 - ◆ Joint concept development participants (later)
 - ◆ Congress (later still)
 - ◆ UNCLAS booklet

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ To be signed by:
 - ◆ CNO ADM Gary Roughead
 - ◆ During 2nd year of his term
 - ◆ CMC Gen James Conway
 - ◆ CMDT COGARD ADM Thad Allen



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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA

- ◆ What it is
 - ◆ Billed as a “Naval Operations Concept”
 - ◆ Navy, Marine Corps & Coast Guard
 - ◆ UNCLAS, pocket-sized booklet for portability
 - ◆ Supersedes 2006 NOC

1348

Naval Operations Concept (2009)



- ◆ Why it is being written (I)
 - ◆ At least three major sets of disparate, contending, successive & cumulative pressures on drafters:
 1. Define and articulate "How we fight," for Sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen
 2. Address void in USN future concept development, for joint & Navy concept & doctrine development community
 3. Explain linkages between *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* & the Navy's force goal, for Congress & defense policy analysts

1349

Naval Operations Concept (2009)



- ◆ Why it is being written (II)
 - ◆ Also:
 - ◆ Replace NOC (2006)
 - ◆ Inform Navy positions for ongoing QRM review (2008-9); upcoming 4th QDR (2009-10); anticipated NPR (2009-10)
 - ◆ Align with new National Defense/upcoming Military Strategies
 - ◆ Set scene for a revision of *Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare*
 - ◆ Continue close cooperation among the 3 sea services
 - ◆ 1st time USCG included in a NOC
 - ◆ Promote mutual understanding between Sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen & joint, interagency & international partners
 - ◆ Bring naval operations concepts in line with *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (2007) and *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10* (2007)

1350

Naval Operations Concept (2009)

◆ Context: (I)

- ◆ Drafted during presidential election campaign & last year of G.W. Bush (R) administration 2nd term (2001-2009)
- ◆ Drafting completed during 1st months of new Obama (D) Administration
- ◆ Democrat control of both houses of Congress (2007)
- ◆ US & world financial crises; economic crashes & recession (Sep 2008-)
- ◆ World food crises & energy crises unfolding
 - ◆ Oil prices soar, then plummet after Sep 2008 crash
- ◆ Unprecedented immediate aggressive large-scale US gov't policy response to economic crisis
- ◆ Russia, Iran, Qatar in gas cartel discussions (2007-8)
- ◆ Senate put off voting on Law of the Sea ratification, despite SFRC Oct 07 vote to ratify

1351

Naval Operations Concept (2009)

◆ Context: (II)

- ◆ SECDEF Gates (2006-): Focus on current ops support
- ◆ OIF & OEF continuing
 - ◆ USMC, US Army heavily engaged on the ground
 - ◆ OIF US "surge" appeared to turn war around (2007-8)
 - ◆ Increased US troop strength; changes in US ops & tactics (Feb 2007-Oct 2008)
 - ◆ Decreased US force levels in Iraq (from Oct 2008)
 - ◆ Decreased Iraqi sectarian violence & insurgency
 - ◆ Rising Taliban insurgency & increased US & coalition force levels in Afghanistan
 - ◆ US-Iraq Security Agreement signed (Nov 2008)
- ◆ Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA

◆ Context: (III)

- ◆ Northwest Passage north of Canada & Alaska opening
- ◆ Resurgent Russian defense budgets, military deployments, exercises, overflights of USN (2007-8) (largest in 15 yrs)
 - ◆ Russian Navy Arctic seabed resources claim (Aug 2007)
 - ◆ Russian Navy squadron Pac, Med, Caribbean cruises (2008)
- ◆ Kosovo declared independence from Serbia (Feb 2008)MSOffice
- ◆ Russian ground, air, naval, cyber forces attack in Georgia (Aug 2008)
- ◆ FRUKUS exercise cancelled (Aug 2008)

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA

◆ Context: (IV)

- ◆ Panama widening Panama Canal (from Sep 2007)
- ◆ US NIE assessed Iran halted nuclear weapons design program in 2003 (Nov 2007)
- ◆ COMUSNAVCENT public vow to keep open Strait of Hormuz (Jul 2008)
- ◆ Iranian ground & naval missile tests & publicity campaign (Jul 2008)
 - ◆ Iran put 1st domestically-made satellite into orbit (Feb 2009)
- ◆ Pakistani political turmoil
 - ◆ Former PM Bhutto assassinated (Dec 07); President General Musharaf not re-elected (Mar 08); resigned (Aug 08); Bhutto widower Zardari elected President (Sep 08).
- ◆ DPRK declared its nuclear activities (June 2008); then agreed to halt them (Oct 2008)
 - ◆ US dropped DPRK from list of state sponsors of terrorism
- ◆ Well-publicized Israeli Med military exercises (Jul 2008)

Slide 1353

 **MSOffice2** , 2/29/2008

Slide 1354

 **MSOffice16** , 2/29/2008

Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context: (V)

- ◆ Independence Party defeated in Taiwan election (Mar 08)
- ◆ Violent political unrest in Tibet region of PRC (Mar 2008)
- ◆ 1st use of US-PRC military telephone hotline (Apr 2008)
- ◆ 1st PRC civilian flights to Taiwan in 60 years (Jul 2008)
- ◆ US arms sales to Taiwan announced, incl/ Harpoon (Oct 2008)
- ◆ PRC suspended PVSTs & other US military ties in protest (Oct 2008)
- ◆ Unprecedented high-level Taipei talks & agreements on increased PRC-Taiwan transport links (Nov 2008)
- ◆ Independence-leaning former Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian (2000-8) indicted for corruption (Dec 2008)

1355

Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context: (VI)

- ◆ Russian delivery of 8 more Kilo SSs & 2 more Sovremenny DDGs to PRC (2005-7)
- ◆ PLAN introduced new SSN, SSBN & amphibious ship classes (2006-8)
- ◆ Continued PLAN anti-ship ballistic missile R & D
- ◆ PRC launch of 1st lunar orbiter (Oct 2007)
- ◆ PRC launch of 1st Venezuelan satellite (Oct 2008)
- ◆ PRC temporarily denied USN HK port calls (Nov 2007)
- ◆ USN CV transited Taiwan Strait (Dec 2007) (1st since 2002)
- ◆ PLAN deployed counter-piracy squadron to Arabian Sea (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ 1st PLAN operational deployment outside Asia
 - ◆ 1st Chinese long-range naval expedition since 1433

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MSOffice17 , 2/29/2008

Slide 1356

MSOffice1 , 2/29/2008

Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context: (VII)

- ◆ India successfully tested SLBMs in Bay of Bengal (2008)
- ◆ India launched satellite in moon orbit (Oct 2008)
- ◆ USN-Indian Navy *Malabar* exercise (Oct 2008)
- ◆ India-US signed 2007 "123 Agreement" facilitating India's access to civilian nuclear fuel & technology (Oct 2008)
- ◆ Major seaborne terrorist assault on Mumbai, India (Nov 2008)
- ◆ India agreed to buy 8 US P8I multi-mission maritime aircraft (Dec 2008)
- ◆ New ROK gov't cooler towards DPRK (2008)
- ◆ DPRK renounced 1992 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (Jan 2009)
- ◆ Incl/renouncing respect for Yellow Sea Northern Limit Line

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CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

Naval Operations Concept (2009)

◆ Context: (VIII)

- ◆ DoD "Long War", Global War on Terror, partnership, MDA & SSTRO concepts predominate & in vogue.
- ◆ Increased DOD attention to integration within US Diplomatic-Information-Military-Economic (DIME) policy, capabilities, ops
- ◆ Heavy USN, coalition MSO & HA/DR ops in Arabian Sea, Caribbean, SE Asia, African littoral, etc.
- ◆ Also Noble Eagle, Active Endeavor, JTF GITMO, CJTF HOA, OEF Philippines, PSI
- ◆ Unfulfilled USN DR Bay of Bengal operation *Caring Response* in wake of Myanmar cyclone (Jun 2008)
- ◆ Communist Cuba turned down unprecedented US humanitarian assistance offer in wake of two hurricanes (Sep 2008)

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA

♦ Context: (IX)

- ♦ OEF, OIF demands temper “transformation” & global “capabilities-based” defense planning policies
 - ♦ Especially by USA & USMC
 - ♦ Increased search for specific threat-based solutions, e.g.: specific anti-IED, cultural & linguistic capabilities
 - ♦ Need to increase “boots on the ground” troop strength, as well as all services’ precision strike & information capabilities
 - ♦ US “Surge” & new tactics reduce level of sectarian violence in Iraq
- ♦ Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (“Strategic Posture Review Commission” (SPRC)) begins work (July 2008)
 - ♦ Directed by National Defense Authorization Act of 2008
 - ♦ Report due to Congress (Spring 2009)

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA

♦ Context: (X)

- ♦ USN fleet balance in favor of Pacific (since 2007)
 - ♦ 1st CVN home-ported in Japan (2008)
- ♦ PACFLT Mid-Pacific Surface Combatant Operational Deployment Program (since 2008)
- ♦ Africa Partnership Station (APS) ongoing. Included overt SSN ops. Planning for future GFS deployments
- ♦ SSN counter-terrorist TLAM strikes on Somalia (Feb 08)MSORC

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

◆ Context: (XI)

- ◆ Intensified USN & coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia
 - ◆ Somali civil war, insurgencies, Ethiopian occupation, warlordism continued
 - ◆ Huge surge in number of pirate attacks in Gulf of Aden (2008)
 - ◆ UN Security Council authorized foreign navy entry into Somali waters to repress piracy & armed robbery at sea (June 2008)
 - ◆ COMUSNAVCENT declared Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) off Somalia (Aug 2008)
 - ◆ NATO SNMG deployed to Somali, Gulf waters (Oct 08)
 - ◆ International anti-pirate armada buildup off Somalia (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ COMUSNACENT created anti-Somali piracy CTF 151 (Jan 2009)
 - ◆ Kenya agreement to try Somali pirates captured by US naval forces (Jan 2009)

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

◆ Context: (XII)

- ◆ USN redeployed Med sub tender to Pacific (2007)
- ◆ 5 USN CSGs deployed forward simultaneously (Spring 2008)
- ◆ 4th Fleet re-established (Apr 2008)
- ◆ AFRICOM & NAVFORAFRICA established (Oct 2008)
- ◆ *Mercy, Peleliu* humanitarian civil assistance (HCA) deployments; Operation Sea Angel II (2007)
- ◆ USN BMD development & deployment focus: NE Asia
- ◆ Close USN-French Navy carrier & aircraft training cooperation
- ◆ Fleet-wide MHQ with MOC implementation beginning
- ◆ New USN PERSTEMPO Program (Jan 2007)

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 **MSOffice22** , 2/29/2008

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 **MSOffice7** , 2/29/2008

Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA
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◆ Context: (XIII)

- ◆ USN BMD surveillance & tracking patrols in Sea of Japan (from 2004)
- ◆ USN SM-3 shoot-down of errant satellite (Feb 08)
- ◆ USN two-theater Med-Gulf BMD exercise (Jun 2008)
- ◆ Agreement on US BMD radar facility in Czech Rep. (Jun 2008)
 - ◆ SECSTATE Rice cited potential linkage to USN BMD systems
- ◆ Follow-on SSBN being studied (end of decade)
- ◆ Northrop-Grumman X-47B N-UCAS unveiled (Dec 2008)

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context: (XIV)

- ◆ USN Georgia Black Sea HA ops (from Aug 2008)
- ◆ USN-USMC differences re: Command of Marines afloat
- ◆ USN canceled ERGM development (May 2008); DDG-1000 program (Jul 2008); Joint expeditionary fires Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) (Oct 2008)
- ◆ USCG MFPU escorts USN SSBN port transits (from 2007)
- ◆ USAF Operation "Rex Redux" (Aug 2007)
- ◆ NECC integrated into fleet JTFEXs (2008)

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 **MSOffice11** , 2/29/2008

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 **MSOffice21** , 2/29/2008

Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context: (XV)

- ◆ NSC Deputies Committee approved interagency Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP) program, under OSD(P) oversight with USN core support (2008)
- ◆ 1st USN Global Maritime Engagement Synchronization Conference (Feb 2008)
 - ◆ Deployment scheduling for FY 2010
 - ◆ Proactive vice reactive MSO/HCA ops
- ◆ Robust USN “Individual Augmentee” (IA) program continued, became more formalized
- ◆ Continued USN presence at highest command levels
 - ◆ VADM McRaven to COMJSOC
 - ◆ But ADM Fallon resigned as CDRUSCENTCOM (Mar 2008)

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context: (XVI)

- ◆ VADM John Morgan relieved by VADM Doug Crowder as OPNAV N3/N5 (Aug 2008)
 - ◆ Morgan retired; had held position since 2004
 - ◆ During 2008, focused on “Conversations with the Country” (& overseas) & impending retirement (Jun 2008)
 - ◆ RADM Pete Daly acting N3/N5 for much of 2008 (thru Aug)
- ◆ New OPNAV N3/N5 organization (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ Strategy & Concepts branch split (new N511 & N513)
- ◆ Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review (QRM) & 4th Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) under way
 - ◆ New DNS VADM Harvey formed QDR Integration Group (QIG) under RDML Burke (Apr 2008)
 - ◆ Demise of OPNAV N3/N5 “Deep Blue” (Mar 2008)

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MSOffice6 , 2/29/2008

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MSOffice8 , 2/29/2008

Naval Operations Concept (2009)

- ◆ Context: (XVII)

- ◆ USN concept generation & development changes
 - ◆ Updated mandates to OPNAV/FFC/NWDC/NWC (Jun 2008)
 - ◆ New CJCS *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) under development
 - ◆ New CDRJFCOM *Joint Operations Environment* (JOE) under development
- ◆ CDRJFCOM Gen Mattis USMC decreed “Effects-Based Operations” and “Operational Net Assessment” concepts no longer to be used in JFCOM operations & products (Aug 2008)
- ◆ 1st LCS commissioned (Nov 2008)
- ◆ Hybrid Sailor program implemented to man LCSs
- ◆ Congress again refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007 & 2008)

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

- ◆ Context: (XVIII)

- ◆ USN Battle Force goal: 313-ship “floor”
- ◆ USN in 2008: 283 Battle Force ships; 4 ships authorized
- ◆ OPNAV NSPP under way, to influence NSP ISO POM 12
- ◆ Unofficial “Navy Study Group” reconvened (May 2008)
- ◆ OPNAV Irregular Warfare Office established (July 2008)
- ◆ Naval War College UNCLAS multinational Title X “Global” War Game (Aug 2008)
 - ◆ Explored possible alternative futures & executions of A MSOffic
Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century
 - ◆ Players included NOC 2008 drafters
- ◆ US Supreme Court lifted lower court restrictions on USN active mid-frequency sonar training (Nov 2008)
- ◆ USN settled worldwide environmental lawsuits (Dec 2008)

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 **MSOffice14** , 2/29/2008

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 **MSOffice9** , 2/29/2008

Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context: (XIX)

- ◆ Polled Americans rated USN as least important & least prestigious of 4 DoD services (2004-8)
- ◆ Some bad publicity
 - ◆ Public, Congressional, Pentagon angst re: USN surface combatant shipbuilding requirements, oversight
 - ◆ LCS construction overruns & delays (from April 2007)
 - ◆ Zumwalt-class DDG-1000 program truncated (from Jul 2008)
 - ◆ Perceived confusion regarding CG(X) program (from Jul 2008)
 - ◆ USS *George Washington* (CVN-73) fire (May 2008)
 - ◆ USS *Houston* (SSN-713) radiation leak (through Jul 2008)
 - ◆ Popular concerns re: USN sonar & marine mammals
 - ◆ LATAM leftist leaders seized on 4th Fleet creation to whip up domestic fears of American imperialism & aggression (2008)
 - ◆ Somalia piracy issues made USN appear toothless to some

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA

◆ Context: Contemporary publications (I)

- ◆ 2nd Bush National Security Strategy (2006)
- ◆ National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005)
- ◆ National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006)
- ◆ National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (2006)
- ◆ Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy (2007)
- ◆ National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) (Dec 2007)
 - ◆ Declares Iran not designing nuclear weapons
- ◆ NSC, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan (Dec 2008)
- ◆ NSPD-66/HSPD-25, Arctic Region Policy (Jan 2009)

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

- ◆ Context: Contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ UN Security Council resolutions on Somali piracy (2008)
 - ◆ National Intelligence Council (NIC), *Global Trends 2025* (Nov 2008)
 - ◆ National Security Council & State Department Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP) documents (2008)
 - ◆ 3rd (2nd Bush) *QDR* (2006)
 - ◆ "Michelin Man": Homeland Defense & GWOT & Conventional
 - ◆ Directed USN to increase forces in Pacific
 - ◆ SECDEF *Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF)* (2008)
 - ◆ SECDEF *Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF)* (2008)

1371

Naval Operations Concept (2009)

- ◆ Context: Contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ SECDEF Gates *National Defense Strategy* (Jul 2008)
 - ◆ SECDEF *Global Force Management Guidance* (GFM) (superseded GNFPP)
 - ◆ DODDIR 3000.5: *Military Support for SSTR Ops* (Nov 2005) *Unified Command Plan* revision (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ JSCP, COCOM plans, NCC plans (as of 2008)
 - ◆ DoD annual report *Military Power of the PRC* (2008)
 - ◆ CJCS *Risk Assessment* to Congress (Feb 2008)
 - ◆ SECDEF TF on DOD Nuclear Weapons Mgmt, *Review of the DOD Nuclear Mission* (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ USN commended re: nuclear mission commitment
 - ◆ USN chided for neglect of TLAM-N funding

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

- ◆ Context: Contemporary publications (IV)
 - ◆ SECDEF Gates *Foreign Affairs* article (Jan-Feb 2009)
 - ◆ CJCS Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) (Jan 2009)
 - ◆ CJCS Joint Operations Concepts
 - ◆ SECDEF Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review Report (Jan 2009)

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

- ◆ Context: Contemporary publications (V)
 - ◆ 3rd USN-USCG *National Fleet* policy statement (2006)
 - ◆ CDRUSJFCOM *Joint Operating Environment* (JOE) (Nov 2008)
 - ◆ CNO *U.S. Navy Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness (LREC) Strategy* (Jan 2008)
 - ◆ CNO Guidance for 2007-2008 (October 2007)
 - ◆ OPNAVINST 3000.15, *Fleet Response Plan* (Aug 2007)
 - ◆ OPNAVINST 3000.13C, *Personnel Tempo of Operations Program* (Jan 2007)

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Contemporary publications (VI)
 - ◆ CNO Navy *Maritime Domain Awareness Concept* (May 2007)
 - ◆ C2F Report: *Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers: Concept of Operations (CONOPS)* (Mar 2007)
 - ◆ CFFC Report: *Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers: An Enabling Concept for Maritime Command and Control* (Sep 2007)
 - ◆ OPNAVINST 3501.316A *Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements* (Sep 2007)

1375

Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Contemporary publications (VII)
 - ◆ MCDP 1 *Warfighting* (1997)
 - ◆ Marine Corps *Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (MOC)* (2nd Ed) (June 2007)
 - ◆ USMC operational employment concept *The Long War: Send in the Marines* (Jan 2008)
 - ◆ USMC *Vision & Strategy 2025* (Jun 2008)
 - ◆ USMC *Expeditionary Maneuver from the Sea* capstone operational concept (Jun 2008)

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

- ◆ Context: Contemporary publications (VIII)
 - ◆ DHS *Small Vessel Security Strategy* (April 2008)
 - ◆ U.S. Coast Guard *Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security & Stewardship* (2007)
 - ◆ Army FM 3-0 *Operations* (Feb 2008)
 - ◆ NATO AJP 3.1 *Allied Joint Maritime Operations* (2004)

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

- ◆ Context: Contemporary publications (IX)
 - ◆ CSIS Commission on Smart Power, *A Smarter, More Secure America* (2007)
 - ◆ National Academy of Sciences, Naval Studies Board, *The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror* (2007)
 - ◆ LtCol (Ret) Frank Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Dec 2007)
 - ◆ National Academy of Sciences, Naval Studies Board, *The "1,000-Ship Navy" --- Maritime Security Partnerships* (2008)
 - ◆ HASC Panel on Roles and Missions *Initial Perspectives* report (Jan 2008)
 - ◆ CDI, *Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for the New President and Congress* (2008)
 - ◆ Included Bill Lind recommendations on USN (w/ roots in 1970s)

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Contemporary publications (X)
 - ◆ National Academy of Sciences National Research Council, *U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for 2008* (Aug 2008)
 - ◆ Recommended deployment of conventional Trident II SLBMs
 - ◆ CSBA reports on *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* & on carrier-based unmanned combat air systems (2008)
 - ◆ CNA report: *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change* (2007)
 - ◆ CNA study on NWDC & USN concept development (2007)
 - ◆ CNA studies on effects of USN humanitarian civic assistance & engagement operations (2008)
 - ◆ Earlier drafts of this briefing (2007-9)

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA

- ◆ How it is being written (I)
 - ◆ New CNO Roughead tasked in CNO Guidance (CNOG), October 2007
 - ◆ Drafting began Dec 2007
 - ◆ VADM Morgan (OPNAV N3/N5) & LtGen Amos (DC, CD&I/ CG, MCCDC) initially conceived & oversaw
 - ◆ Complex development process
 - ◆ Writing Team, Core Working Group, Extended Working Group; routine OPNAV SITREPs to GO/FOs, Flag VTCs, etc.
 - ◆ Flag Maritime Security Conference (MSC) precept developed & adopted
 - ◆ Discussion series; USMC War Game "Expeditionary Warrior 2008: Seabasing;" Flag venue discussions; CNO-CMC-COMDT CG discussions
 - ◆ Wide circulation of 5 formal drafts for comment

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)



◆ How it is being written (II)

◆ Personalities:

◆ Oversight:

- ◆ RADM Daly (OPNAV N3B/N5B) replaced VADM Morgan (Jan 2008) overseeing NOC development
- ◆ VADM Crowder (OPNAV N3/N5) replaced RADM Daly (Aug 2008)
- ◆ RDML Thomas replaced RDML Donegan as N5SP

◆ Drafters:

- ◆ USN: RDML-SEL Doug Venlet (N5SC) (later CAPT Randy Wood), LCDR Mike Mosbruger, Mr. Philip Ballard,
- ◆ USMC: Maj Hollis, Col King, LtCol (Ret) Berry, Col (Ret) Dobson
- ◆ USCG rep

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)



◆ How it is being written (III)

◆ Successive & additive drafting guidance over time

- ◆ For Sailors, Marines & Coastguardsmen: "How to fight"
- ◆ For joint & Navy concept development community: How naval long-range concepts were generated & developed
- ◆ For Congress: Why USN needed numbers/types of ships

◆ Long gestation period due to:

- ◆ Difficulties in coordinating agreed positions among three services at many levels
- ◆ Changing Navy target audiences, approaches & agendas
- ◆ Backdrop of presidential primary elections, general election, & administration transition

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ How it is being written (IV)
 - ◆ Continued CNO ADM Roughead interest, focus, involvement throughout
 - ◆ “Conversations with the Country” ISO A *Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century* ongoing (through 2008)
 - ◆ Coordinator: RDML-SEL Dan Cloyd (relieved CDR Bryan McGrath as head of N5 SAG)
 - ◆ *Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11* drafting begun during NOC endgame (from Sept 2008)
 - ◆ *NDP 1 Naval Warfare* revision drafting begun during NOC endgame (from Oct 2008)

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Naval Operations Concept (2009)

CNA
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- ◆ Criticisms
 - ◆ Took too long to publish following Oct 2007 A *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
 - ◆ Superfluous, given pending NWDC revision of NDP-1
 - ◆ Not “Navy” enough.
 - ◆ Reflected heavy USMC (& USCG) influence on USN thinking, alongside USMC 2007-8 publication of its own single-service family of concept documents
 - ◆ No Navy-only NOC.
 - ◆ Did not use *Seapower 21* constructs or vocabulary
 - ◆ Not targeted sufficiently at the Fleet

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NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)



NDP 1
revision
(2009)

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NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)



- ◆ Overview
 - ◆ To be signed by CNO ADM Roughead, CMC Gen Conway, COMDT COGARD ADM Allen
 - ◆ “Doctrine”
 - ◆ Principle targets:
 - ◆ Sailors, Marines, Coastguardsmen
 - ◆ UNCLAS

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NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ To be signed by:
 - ◆ CNO ADM Gary Roughead
 - ◆ During 2nd year of his term
 - ◆ CMC Gen James Conway
 - ◆ CMDT COGARD ADM Thad Allen



1387

NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ What it is
 - ◆ Billed as “doctrine”
 - ◆ Update of 1st (1994) edition of *NDP 1 Naval Warfare*
 - ◆ UNCLAS stand-alone pub
 - ◆ “Sea services” focus

1388

NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analyses

◆ Why it is being written

- ◆ Other services, allies requests for USN doctrine update
- ◆ Meet need for “how we fight” document aimed at Sailors, Marines, Coastguardsmen
 - ◆ NOC draft had changed its own focus from this (mid-2008)
- ◆ Bring naval doctrine & TTP in line with *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (2007) & agreed joint campaign phases doctrine
 - ◆ Parts of *NDP 1* (1994) out of date
- ◆ Continue close cooperation among the 3 sea services
 - ◆ 1st time USCG included in an NDP
- ◆ Promote mutual understanding between Sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen & joint, interagency & international partners
- ◆ CNO & CFFC desire to enhance role of NWDC

1389

NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analyses

◆ Context (I)

- ◆ Drafted during presidential election campaign & last year of G.W. Bush (R) administration 2nd term (2001-2009)
- ◆ Drafting to be completed, document signed during 1st months of new Obama (D) Administration
- ◆ Democrat control of both houses of Congress (2007)
- ◆ SECDEF Gates (2006-)
- ◆ SECNAVs Winter (2006-9); and TBD (2009-)
- ◆ CNO ADM Roughead (Sept 2007-)
- ◆ U.S. & world economies in deep financial crisis
 - ◆ Price of oil plummeting
- ◆ Unprecedented immediate aggressive large-scale US gov’t policy response to economic crisis
- ◆ Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review (QRM) & 4th Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) under way

1390

NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)

◆ Context (II)

- ◆ Issues: Terrorism, China, North Korea & Iran nukes & missiles, Pakistan, Venezuela, Russia
- ◆ Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- ◆ Interminable international roller-coaster negotiations to disable DPRK nuclear facilities
- ◆ Iran threatening stability of Gulf region
 - ◆ Iran put 1st domestically-made satellite into orbit (Feb 2009)
- ◆ Pakistani political turmoil stabilized
 - ◆ Newly elected civilian president (Sep 08)
 - ◆ India-Pak trade route reopened thru Kashmir (Oct 08)
- ◆ Russian military & cyber attacks on Georgia; Navy squadron deployments to Pac, Med, Caribbean (2008)
- ◆ Russia, Iran, Qatar in gas cartel discussions (2007-8)

1391

NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ PRC increasing military posture opposite Taiwan
- ◆ Continued PRC anti-ship ballistic missile R & D
- ◆ New PLAN amphibious ship class introduced (2008)
 - ◆ PRC launched 1st Venezuelan satellite (Oct 2008)
- ◆ US arms sales to Taiwan announced (Oct 2008)
 - ◆ Incl/ Harpoon missiles
- ◆ PRC suspended PVSTs & other US military ties in protest (Oct 2008)
- ◆ Unprecedented high-level Taipei talks & agreements on increased PRC-Taiwan transport links (Nov 2008)
- ◆ Independence-leaning former Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian (2000-8) indicted for corruption (Dec 2008)
- ◆ PLAN deployed counter-piracy squadron to Arabian Sea (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ 1st PLAN operational deployment outside Asia
 - ◆ 1st Chinese long-range naval expedition since 1433

1392

NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (IV)

- ◆ India successfully tested SLBMs in Bay of Bengal (2008)
- ◆ India, US signed 2007 “123 Agreement” facilitating Indian access to civilian nuclear fuel & technology (Oct 2008)
- ◆ India launched satellite in moon orbit (Oct 2008)
- ◆ USN-Indian Navy *Malabar* exercise (Oct 2008)
- ◆ Major seaborne Pakistani-based Islamist terrorist assault on Mumbai, India (Nov 2008)
- ◆ India agreed to buy 8 US P8I multi-mission maritime aircraft (Dec 2008)
- ◆ DPRK renounced 1992 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (Jan 2009)
 - ◆ Incl/ renouncing respect for Yellow Sea Northern Limit Line

1393

NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)

CNA
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◆ Context (V)

- ◆ OEF, OIF, PSI, Continuing Promise, other operations ongoing
 - ◆ OIF US “post-surge” force levels declining (from Oct 2008)
 - ◆ Iraqi sectarian violence, insurgency continued to fall off
 - ◆ Rising Taliban insurgency, US & coalition force levels in Afghanistan
 - ◆ US-Iraq Security Agreement signed (Nov 2008)
- ◆ Continuing & mature USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, relieving stress on ground forces
- ◆ Continued highly-publicized surge in Somali pirate attacks in Gulf of Aden
 - ◆ Stepped-up international USN, coalition, NATO, EU anti-piracy deployments off Somalia
 - ◆ COMUSNAVCENT created CTF 151 (Jan 2009)
 - ◆ Kenya agreement to try Somali pirates captured by US naval forces (Jan 2009)

1394

NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)

◆ Context (VI)

- ◆ USN fleet balance in favor of Pacific (since 2007)
 - ◆ 1st USN CVN home-ported in Japan (2008)
- ◆ PACFLT Mid-Pacific Surface Combatant Operational Deployment Program (since 2008)
- ◆ USN in 2008: 282 Battle Force ships; 6 ships authorized
- ◆ CNO ADM Roughead declared USN 313-ship Battle Force goal to be a “floor”
- ◆ Continuing USN LCS construction overruns & delays
 - ◆ 1st LCS commissioned (Nov 2008)
- ◆ Hybrid Sailor program implemented to man LCSs
- ◆ Congress again refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007 & 2008)
- ◆ Follow-on SSBN being studied (end of decade)
- ◆ Northrop-Grumman X-47B N-UCAS unveiled (Dec 2008)

1395

NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)

◆ Context (VII)

- ◆ Continuing USMC fire support issues
 - ◆ USN canceled ERGM development (May 2008); DDG-1000 program (Jul 2008); Joint expeditionary fires Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) (Oct 2008)
- ◆ US Supreme Court lifted lower court restrictions on USN active mid-frequency sonar training (Nov 2008)
- ◆ USN settled worldwide environmental lawsuits (Dec 2008)
- ◆ New OPNAV N3/N5 organization (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ Strategy & Concepts branch split (new N511 & N513)
- ◆ Unofficial Navy Study Group ongoing

1396

NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Contemporary publications (I)
 - ◆ *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (2007)
 - ◆ *Naval Operations Concept* 2009 in 5th draft. Awaiting CNO/Commandants approval
 - ◆ *Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11* in draft
 - ◆ LtCol (Ret) Frank Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Dec 2007)
 - ◆ CDI, *Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for the New President and Congress* (Oct 2008)
 - ◆ Incl/ Bill Lind recommendations on USN (w/ roots in 1970s)
 - ◆ National Academy of Sciences, Naval Studies Board, *The "1,000-Ship Navy" --- Maritime Security Partnerships* (Nov 2008)

1397

NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ NIC, *Global Trends 2025* (Nov 2008)
 - ◆ CDRJFCOM *Joint Operating Environment* (JOE) (Nov 2008)
 - ◆ *Unified Command Plan* revision (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ SECDEF TF on DOD Nuclear Weapons Mgmt, *Review of the DOD Nuclear Mission* (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ USN commended re: nuclear mission commitment
 - ◆ USN chided for neglect of TLAM-N funding
 - ◆ NSC, *Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan* (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ NSPD-66/HSPD-25, *Arctic Region Policy* (Jan 2009)

1398

NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Contemporary publications (III)
 - ◆ SECDEF Gates *Foreign Affairs* article (Jan-Feb 2009)
 - ◆ CJCS ADM Mullen *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) (Jan 2009)
 - ◆ SECDEF *Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review Report* (Jan 2009)
 - ◆ Earlier drafts of this briefing (2005-9)

1399

NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)

CNA

- ◆ How it is being written (I)
 - ◆ 1994 edition seriously outdated
 - ◆ But revision delayed due to:
 - ◆ USMC-USN differences
 - ◆ Low perceived priority by USN leadership
 - ◆ NWDC vice OPNAV responsibility
 - ◆ Various aborted draft revisions (e.g.: 2000, 2005)
 - ◆ Revision tasked in *Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations* (NOCJO) (2003)
 - ◆ Little movement beyond NWDC efforts

1400

NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision (2009)


CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ How it is being written (II)
 - ◆ USMC balked at revision; happy with 1994 edition
 - ◆ USN pushed for agreed TOR (2008)
 - ◆ USN-USMC-USCG TOR finally signed (Oct 2008)
 - ◆ Initial drafters' conference convened at NWDC (Dec 2008)
- ◆ Personalities:
 - ◆ COMNWDC RADM Carpenter; CGMCCDC LtGen Flynn; Asst COMDT COGARD for Plans & Policy RADM Salerno
 - ◆ CAPT Edward Long III USN (Ret)
 - ◆ Northrop Grumman Defense Mission Systems contractor
- ◆ Drafting endgame of *Naval Operations Concept* ongoing simultaneously
- ◆ Drafting of *Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11* ongoing simultaneously
- ◆ OPNAV "Navy Strategic Planning Process" (NSPP) to inform *NSP ISO POM 12* ongoing simultaneously

1401

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis



1402

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

CNA

- ◆ Overview

- ◆ To be signed by CNO ADM Roughead
- ◆ “Navy strategic plan”
- ◆ Principle targets:
 - ◆ DON officers & civilians charged with developing POM-12
- ◆ SECRET

1403

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

CNA

- ◆ To be signed by:

- ◆ CNO ADM Gary Roughead
 - ◆ During 2nd year of his term



1404

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)



♦ What it is

- ♦ Billed as a “strategic plan”
- ♦ Continued series initiated with *NSP ISO POM 08*
- ♦ SECRET stand-alone pub
- ♦ Navy (vice “sea services”) focus

1405

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)



♦ Why it is being written

- ♦ To continue by-now routinized series of *Navy Strategic Plans* to guide Navy POM development
- ♦ Tasker: Jan 2008 VCNO PLANORD for POM-12

1406

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

◆ Context (I)

- ◆ Drafted during 1st 9 months of new Obama (D) Administration
- ◆ Democrat control of both houses of Congress (2007)
- ◆ SECDEF Gates (2006-)
- ◆ SECNAVs Winter (2006-9); and TBD (2009-)
- ◆ CNO ADM Roughead (Sept 2007-)
- ◆ U.S. & world economies in deep financial crisis
 - ◆ Price of oil plummeting
- ◆ Unprecedented immediate aggressive large-scale US gov't policy response to economic crisis
- ◆ Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review (QRM) & 4th Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) under way

1407

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

◆ Context (II)

- ◆ Issues: Terrorism, China, North Korea & Iran nukes & missiles, Pakistan, Venezuela, Russia
- ◆ Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
- ◆ Interminable international roller-coaster negotiations to disable DPRK nuclear facilities
- ◆ Iran threatening stability of Gulf region
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- ◆ Pakistani political turmoil stabilized
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- ◆ Russian military & cyber attacks on Georgia; navy squadron deployments to Pac, Med & Caribbean (2008)
- ◆ Russia, Iran, Qatar in gas cartel discussions (2007-8)

1408

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

CNA

◆ Context (III)

- ◆ PRC increasing military posture opposite Taiwan
- ◆ Continued PRC anti-ship ballistic missile R & D
- ◆ New PLAN amphibious ship class introduced (2008)
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1409

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

CNA

◆ Context (IV)

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 - ◆ Incl/ renouncing respect for Yellow Sea Northern Limit Line

1410

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (V)

- ◆ OEF, OIF, PSI, Continuing Promise, other operations ongoing
 - ◆ OIF US "post-surge" force levels declining (from Oct 2008)
 - ◆ Iraqi sectarian violence, insurgency continued to fall off
 - ◆ Rising Taliban insurgency, US & coalition force levels in Afghanistan
 - ◆ US-Iraq Security Agreement signed (Nov 2008)
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- ◆ Continued highly-publicized surge in Somali pirate attacks in Gulf of Aden
 - ◆ Stepped-up international USN, coalition, NATO, EU anti-piracy deployments off Somalia (Dec 2008)

1411

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (VI)

- ◆ USN fleet balance in favor of Pacific (since 2007)
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- ◆ Congress again refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007 & 2008)
- ◆ Follow-on SSBN being studied
- ◆ Northrop-Grumman X-47B N-UCAS unveiled (Dec 2008)

1412

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

◆ Context (VII)

- ◆ Continuing USMC fire support issues
 - ◆ USN canceled ERGM development (May 2008); DDG-1000 program (Jul 2008); Joint expeditionary fires Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) (Oct 2008)
- ◆ US Supreme Court lifted lower court restrictions on USN active mid-frequency sonar training (Nov 2008)
- ◆ USN settled worldwide environmental lawsuits (Dec 2008)
- ◆ New OPNAV N3/N5 organization (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ Strategy & Concepts branch split (new N511 & N513)
- ◆ Unofficial Navy Study Group ongoing

1413

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

CNA

◆ Context: Contemporary publications (I)

- ◆ *A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century* (2007)
- ◆ *Naval Operations Concept 2009*
- ◆ *NDP 1 Naval Warfare* being drafted at NWDC
CDRJFCOM Joint Operating Environment (JOE) (Nov 2008)
- ◆ *Unified Command Plan* revision (Dec 2008)

1414

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

CNA

- ◆ Context: Contemporary publications (II)
 - ◆ SECDEF TF on DOD Nuclear Weapons Mgmt, *Review of the DOD Nuclear Mission* (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ USN commended re: nuclear mission commitment
 - ◆ USN chided for neglect of TLAM-N funding
 - ◆ NSC, *Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan* (Dec 2008)
 - ◆ SECDEF Gates *Foreign Affairs* article (Jan-Feb 2009)
 - ◆ CJCS ADM Mullen *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) (Jan 2009)
 - ◆ SECDEF *Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review Report* (Jan 2009)
 - ◆ Earlier drafts of this briefing (2009)

1415

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

CNA

- ◆ How it is being written
 - ◆ Personalities: CNO ADM Roughead, VADM Crowder (N3/N5), RDML Robert Thomas (N5SP) oversaw
 - ◆ Drafted in N51 (CDR Steve Kelley)
 - ◆ N81 input to ensure "fit" with follow-on OPNAV POM processes
 - ◆ OPNAV "Navy Strategic Planning Process" (NSPP) to inform *NSP ISO POM 12* ongoing simultaneously
 - ◆ Endgame of *Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2008* ongoing simultaneously
 - ◆ Tri-service revision of *NDP 1 Naval Warfare* begun (from Oct 2008)

1416

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)



- ◆ Criticisms

- ◆ Classification of document precluded wide distribution & understanding of its role in implementing *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*

1417

Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP)



- ◆ OPNAV implementing NSPP (2006-2009)
 - ◆ Originally “Navy Adaptive Planning Process (NAPP)”
- ◆ Designed to drive USN NSP & POM development
 - ◆ Initial advocates: N8B (Jo Decker), N3/N5 (VADM Morgan), RDML Metcalf, RDML Donegan, CAPT Lockwood, LCDR Kelley
 - ◆ NSPs /SO POM 08 & POM 10 developed by N5SC AOs, with low -- but increasing -- NAPP/NSPP influence
 - ◆ NSP /SO POM 12 planned to be 1st true NSPP-driven NSP (drafting to start in Mar 2009)
 - ◆ But drafting of NSG /SO PR 11 ongoing simultaneously
 - ◆ Will lay out alternative futures & strategic options
- ◆ VCNO memo gave tasks for CY 08/09 (Feb 2008)

1418

Context: The world of 2009

CNA

- ◆ High globalization & world trade levels; but global economic crises
- ◆ Great economic growth in big "BRIC" states (Brazil/Russia/India/China)
- ◆ U.S. still sole superpower; expanded NATO; other major allies
- ◆ Alienation, ferment, crises in parts of non-Western world ("the Gap") 🚨
- ◆ U.S. prosecuting Global War on Terrorism; opposing "rogues"
- ◆ 4 new nuclear states since 1970; but few interstate wars foreseen 🎈



The 2000s vs. the 1990s (I)

CNA

- ◆ A few long-running combat operations vice series of many short wars & incidents
 - ◆ Predominance of ground vs. air ops
- ◆ Focus on SW Asia vice disparate global crises
 - ◆ Iraq & Afghanistan seen as arenas, vice threats
- ◆ Greatly increased saliency of initiatives to counter terrorism & to defend US homeland
- ◆ Emergence of "BRIC" & other potential mid-term challengers to USN maritime supremacy vs. uncontested USN supremacy for foreseeable future
- ◆ Continued PRC economic, military, naval growth

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The 2000s vs the 1990s (II)

- ◆ 2000s
 - ◆ Navy budgets increasing, then turning down somewhat
 - ◆ Navy force levels increasing somewhat at end
 - ◆ Navy force level goals *higher* than current fleet force levels
- ◆ 1990s:
 - ◆ Navy budgets decreasing, then turning around at end
 - ◆ Navy force levels decreasing throughout the decade
 - ◆ Navy force level goals decreasing also, but *lower* than current force levels

1421

The 2000s vs. the 1990s (III)

- ◆ Continued shift in USN forward basing from Europe, Atlantic & Caribbean to SW Asia, Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf & mid- & western Pacific
- ◆ Continued publication of mostly UNCLAS USN capstone documents
- ◆ About same number & frequency
- ◆ Emergence of a “family” of related documents vs. one master document
- ◆ Inclusion of the USCG as a signatory & co-developer of maritime capstone documents

1422

Outline



- I. Introduction
- II. How each document was written
- III. Comparisons, constants, changes** 
- IV. Analyzing capstone documents
- V. How to write the next one

1423

Comparisons, constants, changes



- ◆ Ad hocery rules
- ◆ Comparing *form*
- ◆ Comparing *substance*

1424

Ad hoc-ery rules

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- ◆ No two documents were alike
- ◆ Even *NWP 1* & *NDP 1* were one-off documents, never routinely & systematically updated

1425

"History is not reliably linear"

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Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ "History is not a steady, or even an unsteady and irregular, march toward a brighter tomorrow.
- ◆ Instead, the course of history is an occasionally non-linear journey to nowhere in particular."
- ◆ "We cope as best we can with the perils of the era."

Colin Gray,
"Coping with Uncertainty: Dilemmas of Defense Planning"
Comparative Strategy (Jul-Sep 2008)

1426

Comparing the documents: Form (I)



- ◆ Who tasked them
- ◆ Principal target audiences
- ◆ What they said they were
- ◆ Where they were drafted
- ◆ Some special features
- ◆ Who signed them
- ◆ When in tours CNOs published them

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Comparing the documents: Form (II)



- ◆ How they were published
- ◆ How they were socialized
- ◆ How long they were influential
- ◆ Approaches, styles & formats
- ◆ The Navy & other maritime services
- ◆ Costs of developing documents
- ◆ USN officers as naval strategists/visionaries

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Who tasked them (I)

◆ Project SIXTY	CNO
◆ Missions of the U.S. Navy	PNWC
◆ NWP 1 (Rev. A): Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy	CNO
◆ Sea Plan 2000	SECNAV, SECDEF
◆ CNO Strategic Concepts, Future of U.S. Sea Power	CNO
◆ The Maritime Strategy	VCNO, CNO
◆ The Way Ahead	SECNAV
◆ The Navy Policy Book	CNO
◆ ... From the Sea	SECNAV
◆ Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare	CNO, CMC
◆ Forward ... From the Sea	SECNAV
◆ Navy Operational Concept (NOC)	CNO, CMC
◆ Anytime, Anywhere	CNO
◆ Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) I & II	CNO
◆ Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS	CNO
◆ Naval Power 21 ... A Naval Vision	SECNAV
◆ Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO)	CNO, CMC
◆ Fleet Response Plan (FRP)	CNO
◆ Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 08	CNO
◆ Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2006	CNO, CMC
◆ Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10	CNO
◆ A Cooperative Strategy for 21 st Century Seapower	CNO
◆ Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 (Change 1)	VCNO
◆ Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11	CNO
◆ Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2009	CNO, CMC
◆ Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare	COMNWDC, CGMCCDC
◆ Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12	VCNO 1429

Who tasked them (II)

- ◆ The Navy
 - ◆ Usually CNO & his staff
 - ◆ USN capstone documents are almost always self-generated
 - ◆ Little or no demand signal from outside the Navy
 - ◆ To meet internally-felt Navy requirements, not externally-driven demands
 - ◆ CMC & USMC staffs often push for joint operations concepts

Principle target audiences (I)



♦ <i>Project SIXTY</i>	SECDEF, OSD, DON, OPNAV
♦ <i>Missions of the U.S. Navy</i>	USN officer corps
♦ <i>NWP 1 (Rev. A): Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy</i>	USN officer corps, Congress
♦ <i>Sea Plan 2000</i>	SECDEF, OSD, DON, OPNAV, Congress
♦ <i>CNO Strategic Concepts & Future of U.S. See Power</i>	USN officer corps, Congress
♦ <i>The Maritime Strategy</i>	Many, esp. USN officer corps, Soviets
♦ <i>The Way Ahead</i>	Many, esp. USN officer corps
♦ <i>The Navy Policy Book</i>	USN officers & enlisted
♦ <i>... From the Sea</i>	Many, esp. USN & USMC officer corps
♦ <i>Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare</i>	All services' officer corps
♦ <i>Forward . . . From the See</i>	Many, esp. USN officer corps
♦ <i>Navy Operational Concept</i>	USN officer corps
♦ <i>Anytime, Anywhere</i>	Many, esp. USN officer corps
♦ <i>Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) I & II</i>	DON planners, programmers, budgeters
♦ <i>See Power 21 & Global CONOPs</i>	Many, esp. USN programmers
♦ <i>Nevel Power 21: A Nevel Vision</i>	USN & USMC leadership
♦ <i>Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO)</i>	USN & USMC officers & enlisted
♦ <i>Fleet Response Plan</i>	SECDEF, OSD, USN officers; later USN enlisted & families
♦ <i>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08</i>	DON planners, programmers, budgeters
♦ <i>Naval Operations Concept 2006</i>	USN & USMC officers & enlisted
♦ <i>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10</i>	DON planners, programmers, budgeters
♦ <i>A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower</i>	American people, Congress
♦ <i>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Change 1)</i>	DON programmers, budgeters
♦ <i>Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11</i>	DON programmers, budgeters
♦ <i>Naval Operations Concept 2009</i>	Congress
♦ <i>NDP 1 (Rev) Naval Warfare</i>	Sailors, Marines, Coastguardsmen
♦ <i>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12</i>	DON programmers, budgeters

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Principle target audiences (II)



- ♦ Mostly: The Navy itself
 - ♦ Self-advertised exceptions:
 - ♦ *A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century*
 - ♦ *Naval Operations Concept 2009*
- ♦ Often: The Congress, SECDEF, OSD
- ♦ Seldom:
 - ♦ The American People
 - ♦ Exception: *A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century*
 - ♦ The adversary
 - ♦ Exception: *The Maritime Strategy* (1980s)

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What they said they were (I)



• Project SIXTY	Assessment & direction
• Missions of the U.S. Navy	Missions
• NWP 1 (Rev. A): Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy	Strategic concepts
♦ Sea Plan 2000	Force planning study
♦ CNO Strategic Concepts & Future of U.S. Sea Power	Strategic concepts & Fundamental principles
♦ The Maritime Strategy	Strategy
♦ The Way Ahead	Way ahead
♦ The Navy Policy Book	Policy
♦ ... From the Sea	White paper, combined vision
♦ Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare	Doctrine
♦ Forward... From the Sea	Strategic concept
♦ Navy Operational Concept	Operational concept
♦ Anytime, Anywhere	Vision
♦ Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) I & II	Strategic planning guidance
♦ Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS	Vision, CONOPS
♦ Naval Power 21: A Naval Vision	Vision
♦ Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO)	Operating concept
♦ Fleet Response Plan	Concept, then plan
♦ Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08	Strategic plan
♦ Naval Operations Concept 2006	Operations concept
♦ Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10	Strategic plan
♦ A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seepower	Strategy
♦ Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Change 1)	Strategic plan
♦ Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11	Strategic guidance
♦ Naval Operations Concept 2009	Operations concept
♦ NDP 1 (Rev) Naval Warfare	Doctrine
♦ Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12	Strategic plan

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What they said they were (II)



♦ Assessment	♦ White paper
♦ Direction	♦ Doctrine
♦ Missions	♦ Operational/operations/ operating concept
♦ Strategic concepts	♦ Vision
♦ Fundamental principles	♦ Strategic planning guidance
♦ Strategy	♦ CONOPS
♦ Way ahead	♦ Strategic plan
♦ Policy	
♦ Force planning study	

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Where they were drafted in USN (I)

◆ <i>Project SIXTY</i>	CNO Flag SAs
◆ <i>Missions of the U.S. Navy</i>	NWC
◆ <i>NWP 1 (Rev. A): Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy</i>	CNO, OP-60N
◆ <i>Sea Plan 2000</i>	Committee
◆ <i>CNO Strategic Concepts, Future of U.S. Sea Power</i>	CNO EA
◆ <i>The Maritime Strategy</i>	OP-603, N00K
◆ <i>The Way Ahead</i>	OP-07
◆ <i>The Navy Policy Book</i>	OP-00K
◆ <i>... From the See</i>	Committee
◆ <i>NDP 1: Naval Warfare</i>	NDC
◆ <i>Forward . . . From the See</i>	N513
◆ <i>Navy Operational Concept (NOC)</i>	N513
◆ <i>Anytime, Anywhere</i>	N00K
◆ <i>Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) I & II</i>	N513
◆ <i>See Power 21 & Global CONOPS</i>	N00Z, N81
◆ <i>Naval Power 21 . . . A Naval Vision</i>	Deep Blue
◆ <i>Nevel Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO)</i>	NWDC, N513
◆ <i>Fleet Response Plan (FRP)</i>	Deep Blue
◆ <i>Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 08</i>	N5SC
◆ <i>Neval Operations Concept (NOC) 2006</i>	Deep Blue, N5SC
◆ <i>Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10</i>	N5SC
◆ <i>A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seepower</i>	N5SAG
◆ <i>Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 (Change 1)</i>	N5SC
◆ <i>Navy Strategic Guidence ISO PR 11</i>	N513
◆ <i>Neval Operations Concept (NOC) 2008</i>	N513
◆ <i>NDP 1 (Rev) Naval Warfare</i>	NWDC
◆ <i>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12</i>	N513

Note: Red = OPNAV N511 + lineal ancestors

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Where they were drafted in USN (II)

- ◆ OPNAV
 - ◆ CNO (1)
 - ◆ OP-60N/OP-603/N513/N5SC (13)
 - ◆ N5SAG (1)
 - ◆ CNO special assistants, EA (6)
 - ◆ Deep Blue (3)
 - ◆ OP-07 (1)
 - ◆ N81 (1)
- ◆ But also
 - ◆ Committee (2)
 - ◆ Naval War College (1)
 - ◆ Naval Doctrine Command/NWDC (3)

Some special features (I)

- ◆ PPBS process (*NWP 1*)
- ◆ Series of maps (*Maritime Strategy*)
- ◆ Annotated bibliography (*Maritime Strategy*)
- ◆ Multi-media (*Maritime Strategy, Cooperative Strategy*)
- ◆ Multiple articles & authors (*Maritime Strategy, Sea Power 21*)
- ◆ Published in academic journal (*Maritime Strategy*)
- ◆ Reading list (*Navy Policy Book, NDP 1*)
- ◆ Naval history (*Missions of the Navy, Navy Policy Book, NDP 1*)

Some special features (II)

- ◆ Risk guidance (*NSPG, Navy Strategic Plans*)
- ◆ Illustrative fictional vignettes (*NOC 2006*)
- ◆ Development history commissioned while process ongoing/ at end
 - ◆ *The Maritime Strategy, NDP 1, NOC 1997*
- ◆ Tasked actions
 - ◆ ...*From the Sea; Navy Strategic Plans*
- ◆ Principles of War (*NDP 1*)
- ◆ Directed further studies
 - ◆ *Navy Strategic Planning Guidance; Navy Strategic Plans*

Some special features (III)

- ◆ References to earlier documents
 - ◆ *Way Ahead, ...From the Sea, NDP 1, Forward...From the Sea, NOCJO, Anytime, Anywhere, NOC, Cooperative Strategy*
- ◆ **SECRET, then UNCLAS versions**
 - ◆ *Project SIXTY & Missions of the U.S. Navy, Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, Sea Plan 2000, Future of U.S. Sea Power, Maritime Strategy, NSPG, NSP*
- ◆ Pocket-sized for portability
 - ◆ Holloway “Strategic Concepts” Posture Statements; 2006 NOC

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Some special features (IV)

- ◆ “Conversations with the Country”
 - ◆ *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*
- ◆ Major expenditure of resources to create
 - ◆ *Sea Plan 2000, . . . From the Sea, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*

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Who signed them



Publication	SECNAV	CNO	CMC	CCG	CFFC	PNWC
1970 Project SIXTY		Zumwalt				
1974 Missions of the U.S. Navy						Turner
Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy						
1978 NWP 1 (Rev. A):		Holloway				
1978 Sea Plan 2000	Claytor					
1979 Future of U.S. Sea Power		Hayward				
1982- The Maritime Strategy	Lehman	Watkins	Kelley			
1990		Trost				
1991 The Way Ahead	Garrett	Kelso	Gray			
1992 The Navy Policy Book		Kelso				
1992 ... From the See	O'Keefe	Kelso	Mundy			
1994 NDP 1: Naval Warfare		Kelso	Mundy			
1994 Forward... From the See	Dalton	Boorda	Mundy			
1997 Navy Operational Concept (NOC)		Johnson				
1997 Anytime, Anywhere		Johnson				
1999-0 NSPG I & II		Johnson				
2002 Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS		Clark				
2002 Naval Power 21: A Naval Vision	England	Clark	Jones			
2003 NOCOJO		Clark	Hagee			
2003 Fleet Response Plan (FRP)		Clark		Natter		
2006 Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 08		Mullen				
2006 Naval Operations Concept (NOC)		Mullen	Hagee			
2007 Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10		Mullen				
2007 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower		Roughead	Conway	Allen		
2007 Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 (Change 1)		Roughead				
2009 Naval Strategic Guidance (NSG) ISO PR 11		Roughead				
2009 Navy Operations Concept (NOC)		Roughead	Conway	Allen		
2009 NDP 1 (Rev) Naval Warfare		Roughead	Conway	Allen		
2009 Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 12		Roughead				

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When in their tours CNOs published them

◆ Zumwalt	2 mos	◆ Boorda	6 mos
◆ Holloway	18 mos	◆ Johnson	12 mos
◆ Hayward	6 mos	◆ Clark	23 mos
◆ Watkins	23 mos	◆ Mullen	9 mos
◆ Trost	6 mos	◆ Roughead	1 mo
◆ Kelso	10 mos		

Average: 11 mos

Range: 1-23 mos

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How many pages they took

CNA

◆ Project SIXTY	30 (plus 44 slides)
◆ Missions of the U.S. Navy	16
◆ NWP 1 (Rev. A): Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy	37
◆ Sea Plan 2000	(U) 23/ (S) 889
◆ CNO Strategic Concepts, Future of U.S. Sea Power	6
◆ The Maritime Strategy	(S) 70, 87, 47(AW), 70, 51/ (U) 40, 4, 9
◆ The Way Ahead	12
◆ The Navy Policy Book	40
◆ . . . From the Sea	4
◆ Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare	76
◆ Forward . . . From the Sea	4
◆ Navy Operational Concept (NOC)	8
◆ Anytime, Anywhere	3
◆ Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) I & II	55 & 90
◆ Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS	48
◆ Naval Power 21 . . . A Naval Vision	6
◆ Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO)	23
◆ Fleet Response Plan (FRP)	3
◆ Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 08	(U) 23/ (S) 42
◆ Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2006	36
◆ Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10	76
◆ A Cooperative Strategy for 21 st Century Seapower	16
◆ Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 (Change 1)	76
◆ Navy Strategic Guidance (NSG) ISO PR 11	??
◆ Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2009	??
◆ NDP 1 (Rev) Naval Warfare	??
◆ Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 12	??

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How they were published (I)

CNA

◆ Project SIXTY	Briefings, Ltr to Flags
◆ Missions of the U.S. Navy	NWCR, NIP
◆ NWP 1 (Rev. A): Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy	NWP, NIP, Posture statements
◆ Sea Plan 2000	Study document, IS
◆ CNO Strategic Concepts, Future of U.S. Sea Power	Ltr to Flags, Briefings, NIP, Posture Statement Document, NIP, IS; booklet, video, hearings, books
◆ The Maritime Strategy	NIP; MCG; booklet
◆ The Way Ahead	Booklet
◆ The Navy Policy Book	NIP, MCG; booklet, web
◆ . . . From the Sea	booklet, web
◆ Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare	NIP, MCG; booklet, web
◆ Forward . . . From the Sea	Sea Power, Web
◆ Navy Operational Concept (NOC)	NIP
◆ Anytime, Anywhere	Booklets, web, SIPRNET
◆ Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) I & II	Speech, NIPs; booklets, web
◆ Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS	Web
◆ Naval Power 21 . . . A Naval Vision	Web
◆ Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO)	Naval messages, NIP, web
◆ Fleet Response Plan (FRP)	web, SIPRNET
◆ Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 08	Booklet, web, ITN
◆ Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2006	SIPRNET
◆ Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10	Booklet, web, DVD, CD, NIP, MCG, NWCR, blog
◆ A Cooperative Strategy for 21 st Century Seapower	SIPRNET
◆ Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 (Change 1)	SIPRNET
◆ Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11	Booklet, Web
◆ Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2009	Booklet, web
◆ NDP 1 (Rev) Naval Warfare	SIPRNET
◆ Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 12	1444

How they were published (II)

- ◆ Briefings (*lingua franca* of the Pentagon) (all)
- ◆ Letter to Flag officers (2)
- ◆ Booklet (9)
- ◆ Naval Institute *Proceedings* article (14)
- ◆ Posture statements (3)
- ◆ Naval Doctrine/Warfare pub (2)
- ◆ *Naval War College Review* article (2)
- ◆ Conferences
- ◆ *Sea Power* article (1)
- ◆ *Inside the Navy* article (1)
- ◆ *Marine Corps Gazette* article (4)
- ◆ Study document (1)
- ◆ Video, DVD, CD-ROM (2)
- ◆ Hearings (1)
- ◆ Naval messages
- ◆ Web (all since 1992)
- ◆ Books (1)
- ◆ Blogs (1)

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How they were “socialized” in USN (I)

- ◆ Official in-house fora
 - ◆ Dates? Current Strategy Forum (NWC)
 - ◆ Dates? International Seapower Symposia (NWC)
 - ◆ 1985-9 Navy Long-Range Planners Conferences
 - ◆ OPNAV OP-00X, OP-00K lead
 - ◆ 1990-95 “Cooke Conferences”
 - ◆ NAVPGSCOL (CDR Mitch Brown) & NAVWARCOL (Dr. Don Daniel) lead
 - ◆ Late 1990s “Sestak Conferences”
 - ◆ RDML Sestak (OPNAV N51) lead
 - ◆ 2005- Global N5s/N39s Conferences
 - ◆ OPNAV N5SP lead

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How they were “socialized” in USN (II)

- ◆ Unofficial DC-area officer discussion fora
 - ◆ Late 1970s “Commanders Cabal”
(Convener: CDR Norm Mosher)
 - ◆ Early 1980s “Young Turks” lunches w/ SECNAV
(Convener: SECNAV John Lehman)
 - ◆ Mid-1980s & early 1990s Navy Discussion Groups
 (“Ancient Mariners”)
(Convener: CDR, later CAPT Jim Stark)
 - ◆ Mid-1980s US Naval Institute symposia
(Coordinator: Editor Fred Rainbow)
 - ◆ 1992-2005 Navy Study Group
(Convener: Dr. David Rosenberg)
 - ◆ 2008- Navy Study Group
(Convener: CAPT (Ret) Robby Harris)

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
How they were “socialized” in USN (III)

- ◆ War college & NPS curricula
 - ◆ CDR Tritton to NPS (1987)
 - ◆ CAPT Byron to NATWARCOL (1988)

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How long they were influential

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Approaches, styles & formats

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- ◆ Wide variety, e.g. :
 - ◆ *NWP 1*: Rigorous force planning and operational typologies
 - ◆ *Maritime Strategy*: Told a story
 - ◆ *NDP 1*: Abstract principles
 - ◆ *Sea Power 21*: Re-packaged Navy programs

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Capstone doctrine pubs: The record

- ◆ Long shelf life
- ◆ But decreasing relevance over time within USN
- ◆ *NWP 10 & revisions (1954, 1961, 1970)*
 - ◆ Revised and still in force in 1970
 - ◆ Ignored by authors of *Project 60 & Missions of the Navy*
- ◆ *NWP 1 (1978)*
 - ◆ Still in force in 1980s
 - ◆ Little used, never updated by *Maritime Strategy* authors
- ◆ *NDP 1 (1994)*
 - ◆ Still in force as of 2009
 - ◆ Ignored inside the Navy

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USN & the other maritime services

- ◆ Significant USMC influence on documents dates from *Sea Plan 2000* (1978)
- ◆ CMC co-signature dates from *The Amphibious Warfare Strategy* (1985) & *The Way Ahead* (1991)
- ◆ Significant USCG influence dates from *The Maritime Strategy* (1984)
- ◆ COMDT COGARD co-signature dates from *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (2007)

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Costs of developing documents



- ◆ Expenditure of
 - ◆ Talent
 - ◆ Time
 - ◆ Money
 - ◆ Education & experience
- ◆ Opportunity costs
 - ◆ Alternative employment of these officers

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USN officers as naval strategists



- ◆ USN strategic planning subspecialty has been famously broken
- ◆ Yet...the system works
 - ◆ Periodic flag officer efforts to create a “cadre of USN strategists”
 - ◆ Flag officer selection
 - ◆ Officer self-selection

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Efforts to create USN strategy cadres

- ◆ 1970s
 - ◆ Fletcher School program (1960s-1980s)
 - ◆ Patton, Wylie, Stark, Johnson, Stavridis, Strasser, Ullman, Wylie, Pandolfe, Marfiaik, etc.
 - ◆ VADM Turner at Newport
 - ◆ Curriculum & faculty changes
 - ◆ OP-60N
 - ◆ RADMs Hilton, Moreau: OP-603 (late 1970s; early 1980s)
- ◆ 1980s
 - ◆ Strategic Studies Group
 - ◆ NAVPGSCOL programs
- ◆ 2000s
 - ◆ VADM Morgan (N3/N5) & the SAG

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USN officers as USN strategists

Q: Who developed the concepts and drafted the strategies?

A: Often Strategic Planning sub-specialists
Some examples (just the PhDs):

◆ CAPT Roger Barnett, PhD	◆ RDML Jim Stavridis, PhD
◆ CAPT Joe Bouchard, PhD	◆ RADM Joe Strasser, PhD
◆ RADM Phil Dur, PhD	◆ CAPT Sam Tangredi, PhD
◆ CAPT Frank Pandolfe, PhD	◆ CDR Harlan Ullman, PhD
◆ CAPT Jim Patton, PhD	◆ LCDR Stan Weeks, PhD
◆ CAPT Joe Sestak, PhD	◆ CAPT Jim Stark, PhD
◆ CAPT Ed Smith, PhD	

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Experienced drafters (I)

- ◆ Examples
 - ◆ William Cockell
 - ◆ *Project SIXTY*
 - ◆ *Future of US Sea Power*
 - ◆ James Stark
 - ◆ *Sea Plan 2000*
 - ◆ *The Maritime Strategy*
 - ◆ *Navy Policy Book*
 - ◆ Kenneth McGruther
 - ◆ *Sea Plan 2000*
 - ◆ *The Maritime Strategy*

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Experienced drafters (II)

- ◆ R. Robinson Harris
 - ◆ *The Maritime Strategy*
 - ◆ *Anytime, Anywhere*
- ◆ James Stavridis
 - ◆ ...From the Sea
 - ◆ Naval Power 21
 - ◆ *Sea Power 21 Global CONOPS*
- ◆ Ed Smith
 - ◆ . . . From the Sea
 - ◆ *Anytime, Anywhere*
- ◆ Joseph Sestak
 - ◆ *Forward...From the Sea*
 - ◆ *Navy Strategic Planning Guidance*

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Experienced drafters (III)



- ◆ Joseph Bouchard
 - ◆ *Navy Operating Concept*
 - ◆ *Fleet Response Plan*
- ◆ Paul Nagy
 - ◆ NOCJO
 - ◆ *NSP ISO POM 08*
 - ◆ *NSP ISO POM 10*
- ◆ Bryan McGrath
 - ◆ CNO Johnson “Steer by the Stars” speech
 - ◆ *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*

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Experienced drafters as future major critics



- ◆ Examples
 - ◆ ADM Turner & CDR Thibault
 - ◆ Drafted *Project SIXTY* & “Missions of the Navy”
 - ◆ Public critics of *The Maritime Strategy*

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Comparing the documents: Substance



- ◆ Relating to the administration
- ◆ What constructs they used
- ◆ Things that did not change
- ◆ Other rationales: why were they written
- ◆ Constant (or almost constant) themes
- ◆ New elements introduced & maintained
- ◆ Things that waxed & waned
- ◆ Things that have changed
- ◆ Things seldom if ever mentioned

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Relating to the administration (I)



- ◆ Four kinds of relationships
 - I. Efforts to anticipate & guide the new Administration
 - II. Efforts to follow the new Administration's lead
 - III. Efforts to change Administration policies
 - IV. Efforts not focused on Administration policies

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Relating to the administration (II)



I. Efforts to anticipate & guide a new Administration

- ◆ *Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-6)*
 - ◆ Prep for possible new Democrat (or same Republican) Administration
- ◆ *Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)*
 - ◆ Prep for possible new Republican (or same Democrat) Administration
- ◆ *... From the Sea (1992)*
 - ◆ Prep for possible new Democrat (or same Republican) Administration
- ◆ *Navy Strategic planning Guidance (NSPG) (2000)*
 - ◆ Prep for new Republican or Democrat administration
- ◆ *A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century (2008)*
 - ◆ Prep for new Republican or new Democrat Administration

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Relating to the administration (III)



II. Efforts to follow a new Administration's lead

- ◆ *The Maritime Strategy (1982+)*
 - ◆ In synch with Reagan (R) Administration
- ◆ *The Way Ahead (1991)*
 - ◆ In synch with G. H. W. Bush (R) Administration
- ◆ *... from the Sea (1992)*
 - ◆ In synch with G. H. W. Bush (R) Administration
- ◆ *Forward . . . From the Sea (1994)*
 - ◆ In synch with Clinton (D) Administration
- ◆ *Naval Power 21 (2002) & Sea Power 21 (2002)*
 - ◆ In synch with G. W. Bush (R) Administration
- ◆ *Fleet Response Plan (2003)*
 - ◆ In synch with G. W. Bush (R) Administration

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Relating to the administration (IV)

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III. Efforts to change current Administration policies

- ◆ *Project SIXTY* (1970)
 - ◆ CNO ADM Zumwalt → Nixon Administration (R)
- ◆ *Strategic Concepts of the US Navy* (1977-8)
 - ◆ CNO ADM Holloway → Carter Administration (D)
- ◆ *Sea Plan 2000* (1978)
 - ◆ SECNAV Claytor → Carter Administration (D)
- ◆ *Future of US Sea Power* (1979)
 - ◆ CNO ADM Hayward → Carter Administration (D)

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Relating to the administration (V)

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IV. Efforts not focused on Administration policies

- ◆ *Missions of the U.S. Navy* (1974)
- ◆ *Navy Policy Book* (1992)
- ◆ *NDP 1 Naval Warfare* (1994)
- ◆ *Navy Operational Concept* (1997)
- ◆ *Anytime, Anywhere* (1997)
- ◆ *Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations* (2003)
- ◆ *Naval Operations Concept* (2006)
- ◆ *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08* (2006)
- ◆ *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10* (2007)
- ◆ *Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (CH 1)* (2007)
- ◆ *NSG ISO PR 11 & NSP ISO POM 12* (2009)
- ◆ *Naval Operations Concept* (2009)
- ◆ *NDP 1 Naval Warfare* (2009)

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How they were organized & constructed (I)

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- ◆ 3 main constructs
 - ◆ “Navy capabilities”
 - ◆ E.g.: ADM Turner’s “Four missions of the Navy”
 - ◆ “Spectrum of conflict”
 - ◆ E.g.: *The Maritime Strategy*’s “Peacetime crises, war”
 - ◆ “Pillars”
 - ◆ E.g.: *Sea Power 21*’s “Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing”
- ◆ Other constructs
 - ◆ E.g.: A Cooperative Strategy’s “6 Strategic Imperatives”
 - ◆ E.g.: NOC 2006’s “9 principles, 9 methods, 4 foundations,” etc.

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How they were organized & constructed (II)

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Year	Documents	Navy capabilities	Spectrum of conflict	Pillars	Other
1970	Project SIXTY	●			Tactics
1974	Missions of the Navy	●			12 warfare tasks
1978	NWP 1 (Rev A)	●			Capabilities
1978	Sea Plan 2000		●		Principles, conclusions
1979	Future of US Sea Power				Warfare tasks
1980s	The Maritime Strategy	●	●		
1991	The Way Ahead				20 characteristics
1992	Navy Policy Book	●			
1992	...From the Sea	●			Characteristics, principles
1994	NDP 1: Naval Warfare				
1994	Forward...From the Sea	●	●		
1997	NOC				
1997	Anytime, Anywhere	●	●		
2000	NSPG				
2002	Sea Power 21	●	●		10-part model
2002	Naval Power 21				
2003	NOCJO				
2003	Fleet Response Plan				USMC concepts
2006	NSP ISO POM 08				
2006	NOC	●			4 challenges
2007	NSP ISO POM 10				Multiple constructs
2007	Cooperative Strategy	●			
2009	NSG ISO PR 11				Strategic imperatives
2009	NOC				
2009	NDP 1: Naval Warfare				
2009	NSP ISO POM 12				

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Construct #1: “Navy capabilities”

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<i>Project SIXTY</i>	4 categories of USN capabilities (“classic 4”)
<i>Missions of the USN</i>	4 missions (“classic 4”)
<i>NWP 1 (Rev. A)</i>	2 functions (SC, PP); 3 roles (incl/ strat nuclear deterrence); presence a side benefit
<i>See Plan 2000</i>	
<i>Future of U.S. Sea Power</i>	
<i>The Maritime Strategy (1986)</i>	3 primary missions (sea control, power projection, sealift)
<i>The Way Ahead</i>	
<i>The Navy Policy Book</i>	20 characteristics of naval operations, incl/ “classic 4”, sealift
<i>... From the Sea</i>	6 capabilities, incl/ “classic 4”, crises, sealift
<i>NDP 1: Naval Warfare</i>	10 characteristics of “what we do”, incl/ “classic 4”
<i>Forward ... From the Sea</i>	5 fundamental and enduring roles (“classic 4” + sealift)
<i>Navy Operational Concept</i>	
<i>Anytime, Anywhere</i>	4 broad missions (see control the prerequisite)
<i>NSPG II</i>	10-part multi-level model, incl/ “classic 4” missions
<i>SP 21 & Global CONOPS</i>	5 enduring missions (“classic 4” + strategic sealift)
<i>Navel Power 21</i>	
<i>NOCJO</i>	
<i>Fleet Response Plan</i>	
<i>NSP ISO POM 08</i>	13 naval missions, incl/ “classic 4”. No sealift.
<i>NOC 2006</i>	
<i>NSP ISO POM 10</i>	6 expanded core capabilities (“classic 4” + MSO, HA/DR). No sealift.
<i>Cooperative Strategy</i>	
<i>NSP ISO POM 10 (Ch 1)</i>	
<i>NSG ISO PR 11</i>	
<i>NOC 2009</i>	
<i>NDP 1: Naval Warfare</i>	
<i>NSP ISO POM 12</i>	

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Evolution of “navy capabilities” construct

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<i>Project SIXTY (1970)</i>	<i>Missions of the US Navy (1974)</i>	<i>NWP 1 (Rev A) (1978)</i>	<i>The Maritime Strategy (1986)</i>
<i>4 capabilities</i>	<i>4 missions/mission areas</i>	<i>2 functions</i>	<i>3 primary missions</i>
Assured second strike	Strategic deterrence	Sea control	Sea control
Control of sea lines & areas/Sea control	Projection of power/forward presence	Power projection	Power projection
Projection of power ashore	Naval presence		Sealift
Overseas presence in peacetime			
<i>...From the Sea (1992)</i>	<i>Forward...From the Sea (1994)</i>	<i>Anytime, Anywhere (1997)</i>	
<i>6 capabilities</i>	<i>5 fundamental & enduring roles</i>	<i>4 broad missions</i>	
Forward deployment/presence	Projection of power from sea to land	Sea & area control	
Strategic deterrence	Sea control & maritime supremacy	Power projection	
Control of the seas	Strategic deterrence	Presence	
Crisis response	Strategic sealift	Deterrence	
Forward projection of power	Forward naval presence		
Sealift			
<i>Seapower 21 (2002)</i>	<i>Naval Operations Concept (2006)</i>	<i>Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)</i>	
<i>5 enduring missions</i>	<i>13 naval missions</i>	<i>6 expanded core capabilities</i>	
<i>Sea control</i>	Forward naval presence	Forward presence	
Power projection	Crisis response	Deterrence	
Strategic deterrence	Expeditionary power projection	Sea control	
Strategic sealift	Maritime security operations	Power projection	
Forward presence	<i>Sea control</i>	Maritime security	
	Deterrence	Humanitarian assistance & disaster relief	
	Security cooperation		
	Civil-military operations		
	Counterinsurgency		
	Counterterrorism		
	Counter-proliferation		
	Air & missile defense		
	Information operations		

Construct #2: “Spectrum of conflict”

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<i>Project SIXTY</i>	
<i>Missions of the USN</i>	
<i>NWP 1 (Rev. A)</i>	Maintain stability, contain crises, deter worldwide war
<i>Sea Plan 2000</i>	
<i>Future of U.S. Sea Power</i>	
The Maritime Strategy	Peacetime presence, crisis response, global conventional war
<i>The Way Ahead</i>	
<i>The Navy Policy Book</i>	
<i>... From the Sea</i>	
<i>NDP 1: Naval Warfare</i>	
<i>Forward... From the Sea</i>	Peacetime forward presence operations, crisis response, regional conflict
<i>Navy Operational Concept</i>	Peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, fight end win
<i>Anytime, Anywhere</i>	
<i>NSPG II</i>	Regional stability, deterrence, timely crisis response, warfighting and winning
<i>SP 21 & Global CONOPs</i>	Deterring forward in peacetime, responding to crises, fighting end winning wars
<i>Naval Power 21</i>	
<i>NOCJO</i>	Secure homeland, global stability, deterrence, crisis response,
<i>Fleet Response Plan</i>	Force build-up in theater, conflict resolution, war
<i>NSP ISO POM 08</i>	
<i>NOC 2006</i>	
<i>NSP ISO POM 10</i>	
<i>Cooperative Strategy</i>	
<i>NSP ISO POM 10 (Ch 1)</i>	
<i>NSG ISO PR 11</i>	
<i>NOC 2009</i>	
<i>NDP 1: Naval Warfare</i>	
<i>NSP ISO POM 12</i>	

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Evolution of “spectrum of conflict” construct CNA

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)	The Maritime Strategy (1980s)	Forward...from the Sea (1994)
<i>3 primary national security objectives</i>	<i>Range of conflict possibilities</i>	<i>A continuum of forward operations</i>
Maintain stability	Peacetime presence	Peacetime presence operations
Contain crises	Crisis response	Crisis response
Deter worldwide war	Global conventional war	Regional conflict
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transition to war • Seize the initiative • Carry the fight to the enemy • War termination on favorable terms 	
Navy Operational Concept (1997)	Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (2000)	
<i>3 components of the National Military Strategy</i>	<i>Ends</i>	
Peacetime engagement	Regional stability	
Deterrence & conflict prevention	Deterrence	
Fight & win	Timely crisis response	
	War fighting & winning	
Sea Power 21 (2002)	Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)	
<i>Continuum of warfare</i>	<i>Flexible response</i>	
Deterring forward in peacetime	Secure homeland	
Responding to crises	Global stability	
Fighting & winning wars	Deterrence	
	Crisis response	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Force build-up in theater • Conflict resolution • War 	

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Construct #3: "Pillars"

CNA

<i>Project SIXTY</i>	
<i>Missions of the USN</i>	
<i>NWP 1 (Rev. A)</i>	
<i>Sea Plan 2000</i>	
<i>Future of U.S. Sea Power</i>	
The Maritime Strategy	
<i>The Way Ahead</i>	
<i>The Navy Policy Book</i>	
... <i>From the Sea</i>	C2 & surveillance, battlespace dominance, power projection, force sustainment
<i>NDP 1: Naval Warfare</i>	C2 & surveillance, battlespace dominance, power projection, force sustainment
<i>Forward... From the Sea</i>	
<i>Navy Operational Concept</i>	
<i>Anytime, Anywhere</i>	Battlespace control, battlespace attack, b-space sustainment, knowledge superiority
<i>NSPG II</i>	Sea strike, sea shield, sea basing, FORCENet, sea trial, sea warrior, sea enterprise
<i>SP 21 & Global CONOPS</i>	Sea strike, sea shield, sea basing, FORCENet, sea trial, sea warrior, sea enterprise
<i>Naval Power 21</i>	Sea strike, sea shield, sea basing, FORCENet, sea trial, sea warrior, sea enterprise
<i>NOCJO</i>	Sea strike, sea shield, sea basing, FORCENet, sea trial, sea warrior, sea enterprise
<i>Fleet Response Plan</i>	
<i>NSP ISO POM 08</i>	Sea strike, sea shield, sea base, sea shaping, sea enterprise, sea trial, sea warrior
<i>NOC 2006</i>	
<i>NSP ISO POM 10</i>	
<i>Cooperative Strategy</i>	
<i>NSP ISO POM 10 (Ch 1)</i>	
<i>NSG ISO PR 11</i>	
<i>NOC 2009</i>	
<i>NDP 1: Naval Warfare</i>	
<i>NSP ISO POM 12</i>	

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Evolution of "pillars" construct

CNA

...From the Sea (1992)	NDP 1 Naval Warfare (1992)	Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (2000)
<i>4 key operational capabilities</i>	<i>4 critical operational capabilities</i>	
Command, control & surveillance	Command, control & surveillance	
Battlespace dominance	Battlespace dominance	
Power projection	Power projection	
Force sustainment	Force sustainment	
		Ways
		Battlespace control
		Battlespace attack
		Battlespace sustainment
		Means
		Forward presence
		Knowledge superiority
Sea Power 21 + Naval Power 21 (2002)	Navy Operations Concept for Joint Operations (2003)	
<i>3 fundamental concepts</i>	<i>Integrated & complementary concepts</i>	
Sea Strike	Sea Strike	
Sea Shield	Sea Shield	
Sea Basing	Sea Basing	
<i>Enabled by</i>		
FORCEnet		
<i>Supporting triad of organizational processes*</i>	Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare	
Sea Trial	Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS)	
Sea Warrior	Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM)	
Sea Enterprise	Sea Trial	
		* Labeled "supporting triad of initiatives" in Naval Power 21
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)		
Sea Power 21 Pillars		
Sea Strike		
Sea Shield		
Sea Basing		
Sea Shaping		
Sea Enterprise		
Sea Trial		
Sea Warrior		

1474

Alternative & supplemental constructs



Project SIXTY

Missions of the USN

4 missions each broken down into tactics

NWP 1 (Rev. A)

6 fundamental warfare tasks; 6 supporting warfare tasks

Sea Plan 2000

8 measures of naval capabilities, keyed to spectrum of war

Future of U.S. Sea Power

8 basic principles to guide structuring, employment of naval forces; 6 conclusions

The Maritime Strategy

The Way Ahead

6-8 warfare tasks in global conventional war with Soviets; 2-12 uncertainties

The Navy Policy Book

Bush Aspen speech: Deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, reconstitution

... From the Sea

Bush Aspen speech: Deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, reconstitution

NDP 1: Naval Warfare

4 tradit/ capab's: Forward deployment, crisis response, strategic deterrence, sealift

Forward ... From the Sea

9 Principles of War

Navy Operational Concept

Anytime, Anywhere

NSPG II

10-part model: Means, ways, ends

SP 21 & Global CONOPS

Naval Power 21

3 fundamental pillars: Assure access, fight and win, continually transform to improve

NOCJO

Incl USMC concepts: Expeditionary warfare maneuver, OMFTS, STOM

Fleet Response Plan

Contrasts old Inter-Deployment Cycle phases w/ new FRP readiness phases

NSP ISO POM 08

4 DOD challenges: Traditional, irregular, catastrophic, disruptive

NOC 2006

3-5 strategic missions, 9 principles, 9 methods, 5 strategic objectives, 4 foundations

NSP ISO POM 10

Cooperative Strategy

NSP ISO POM 10 (Ch 1)

6 strategic imperatives; 3 implementation priorities

NSG ISO PR 11

NOC 2009

NDP 1: Naval Warfare

NSP ISO POM 12

1475

Organizing & constructing documents



"All of which points to the ultimate futility of trying to describe warfare in terms of definitive categories"

ADM Michael Mullen USN

Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

15 January 2009

Things that have not changed

CNA

- ◆ Rationales for writing a capstone document
- ◆ Three overarching rationales
 - ◆ Explain need for the Navy
 - ◆ Explain how the Navy meets that need
 - ◆ Explain where Navy is heading

1477

Other rationales (I): Why were they written?

CNA

- ◆ Address changing world, country, USN
- ◆ Implement specific ideas of USN leaders (& drafters)
- ◆ Advocate CNO priorities
- ◆ Codify current thinking
 - ◆ Advocate new directions
 - ◆ Influence and respond to higher authority
 - ◆ Strengthen budget arguments

1478

Other rationales (II): Why were they written?

- ◆ Unify Navy elements in a common conceptual framework
- ◆ Break down internal Navy community & platform parochialism
- ◆ Maintain common ground with USMC and USCG
- ◆ Try to influence internal Navy force structure decisions

1479

Other rationales (III): Why were they written?

- ◆ Try to influence U.S. government policy debates & academia (sometimes)
- ◆ Demonstrate USN intellectual capability and/or positive responses to change
 - ◆ Avoid externally imposed changes
- ◆ Try to influence adversaries (sometimes)
- ◆ Respond to and/or gain advantage over concepts of other services (sometimes)

1480

Constant (or almost constant) ideas (I)

- ◆ National strategy drives USN strategy
- ◆ There are major distant & global threats to US
- ◆ USN is mobile, agile, combat-ready & persistent, & operates (& should operate) powerfully, globally, forward, offensively, & flexibly
 - ◆ Encompasses both forward presence & CONUS surge
 - ◆ USN sea control as vital sea line protector for other services, allied forward overseas ops (during Cold War)
 - ◆ USN power projection as enabling force for other services forward ops (Sea Power 21 an exception) (since 1991)
- ◆ USN & USMC operate closely together
- ◆ USN operates with joint & international partners

1481

Constant (or almost constant) ideas (II)

- ◆ USN contributes to strategic nuclear deterrence
- ◆ USN (and USMC) deploy and operate in mission-tailored and scalable task forces
- ◆ USN must have a balanced fleet, for variety of missions
- ◆ Sea control is the enabler for power projection
- ◆ Uncertainty, risk, & changes in tasking are inherent & inevitable. Naval forces should be – and are -- adaptable

1482

Constant (or almost constant) ideas (III)

- ◆ USN *defends exposed forward US forces, allies and their SLOCs from attack*
- ◆ USN *vital for peacetime, crisis response, war*
- ◆ USN *is a tool of US perception management*
- ◆ *Sea basing confers advantages to US policy*
 - ◆ US Army & Air Force forward overseas *land bases* are useful – even vital
 - ◆ But they are often *insufficient, in jeopardy, vulnerable, dwindling, constrained, entangling, expensive, unavailable*

1483

Constant (or almost constant) ideas (IV)

- ◆ USN operations must *transcend individual warfare specialties & platform communities*
- ◆ USN has *overarching policy concepts* that drive it; not just sum of internal community desires for budget share & new equipment
- ◆ USN wants to be– & can be– entrusted with *defining what it does & managing its own destiny*
- ◆ USN concepts, strategies and visions *inform USN program & budget decisions*

1484

New ideas introduced & maintained (I)

- ◆ US naval operations can be *decisive* (1978)
- ◆ *Terrorism* recognized as a threat (1984)
- ◆ USN provides homeland *coastal defense* (1984)
- ◆ *Drug traffickers* recognized as threats (1989)
- ◆ USN conducts *humanitarian assistance ops* (1989)
- ◆ USN as *enabling force* for other services (1991)
- ◆ USN conducts *interdiction/interception ops* (1992)

1485

New ideas introduced & maintained (II)

- ◆ USN conducts *ballistic missile defense ops* (1992)
- ◆ *Maneuver warfare style* characterizes USN ops (1992)
- ◆ Forward presence must be *combat credible* (1997)
- ◆ USN contributes to *homeland defenses* (2000)
- ◆ USN conducts *maritime security operations* (2006)
- ◆ *Riverine & coastal* operations & capabilities (2006)

1486

Ideas that have waxed & waned (I)



- ◆ Priorities
 - ◆ Some are clear; some implicit; some not addressed
- ◆ Role of *forward presence*
 - ◆ Relative to *surge*
 - ◆ Relative to *sea control, power projection*
 - ◆ Relative to *manpower, personnel & retention* considerations

1487

Ideas that have waxed & waned (II)



- ◆ Priority of *strike warfare*
- ◆ Priority of *anti-submarine warfare*
- ◆ Mention of *mine warfare*
- ◆ Attention paid to *sealift* as a Navy function
- ◆ Call for new (e.g.: “adaptive”) naval force packages
- ◆ Call for less concentrated, more distributed forward presence
- ◆ Attention to joint command of naval forces

1488

Ideas that have waxed & waned (III)

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- ◆ Specific mention of USAF & USA as partners
- ◆ Recognition of USCG as a maritime partner
 - ◆ USCG actually discussed less than USAF
- ◆ Discussion of effects of globalization
- ◆ Citation of global economy & trade
- ◆ Recognition of *piracy* as a threat
- ◆ Need for USN "*transformation*"

1489

Ideas that have changed (I)

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- ◆ Adversaries
 - ◆ *Certainty* to *uncertainty*
 - ◆ *Single overarching threat* to *multiplicity of threats*
- ◆ Jointness
 - ◆ From *cooperation* to *integration*
 - ◆ Especially with *US Air Force*
- ◆ Battlespace expansion
 - ◆ From sea focus to integrated *sea-air-land-space-cyberspace continuum*
- ◆ Navy–Marine Corps relationships
 - ◆ From *hierarchical* to *equal*

1490

Ideas that have changed (II)



- ◆ Navy-Coast Guard relationships
 - ◆ From USN *disregard* to *recognition* of USCG roles
- ◆ Elevation of *Maritime Security Operations & Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response ops*
- ◆ *Networks and netting*
- ◆ *Fleet capabilities up; fleet size down*
- ◆ De-emphasis of *nuclear deterrence*
- ◆ Increased attention to *inter-agency relations*

1491

Ideas seldom if ever mentioned (I)



- ◆ Irregular warfare/GWOT/MSO (I)
 - ◆ Little or no strategic direction or vision re:
 - ◆ Coastal warfare
 - ◆ Riverine warfare
 - ◆ Boats, aviation, sustainment
 - ◆ Force protection
 - ◆ Civil affairs
 - ◆ Land-based helo ops
 - ◆ Foreign Area Officers (FAOs)
 - ◆ Expeditionary sailor ops
 - ◆ MIO/VBSS
 - ◆ Anti-piracy and anti-smuggling

1492

Ideas seldom if ever mentioned (II)



- ◆ Irregular warfare/GWOT/MSO (II)
 - ◆ All present during Vietnam War, though
 - ◆ *The Way Ahead* an exception
 - ◆ Sea change since 2006, however
- ◆ “Blockade” as a discrete naval operation (since 1970s)
- ◆ Naval arms control (except 1989-90)

1493

Ideas seldom if ever mentioned (III)



- ◆ Post-war stability ops (“Phase IV” ops)
 - ◆ ...and yet:
 - ◆ *Operation Frequent Wind*, etc. (1975)
 - ◆ *Operation Southern Watch*, etc. (1990s)
 - ◆ *Operations Enduring Freedom & Iraqi Freedom* (2001-)
- ◆ US maritime industries
 - ◆ Private industrial base
 - ◆ Commercial shipbuilding
 - ◆ Merchant marine
- ◆ Non-governmental organizations

1494

Outline



- I. Introduction
- II. How each document was written
- III. Comparisons, constants & changes
- IV. Analyzing capstone documents** ←
- V. How to write the next one

1495

Analyzing capstone strategies



- ◆ Overall judgments
- ◆ Why weren't they similar?
- ◆ What can they influence?
- ◆ Have they been "successful"?
- ◆ How to measure "success"?
 - ◆ Measuring inputs & outputs
- ◆ Factors contributing to success
- ◆ Secondary consequences
- ◆ Reciprocal causality
- ◆ CNOs matter
- ◆ Impediments to overcome
- ◆ Links to fleet operations
- ◆ Links to USN budget requests
- ◆ The future
- ◆ CNO goals
- ◆ Capstone document checklist
- ◆ Satisfying all critics is impossible
- ◆ Bottom line recommendations
- ◆ Questions for 2009

1496

Overall judgments

- ◆ USN has not lacked for capstone documents
 - ◆ At least 25 over the full careers of current USN leadership
- ◆ They often matter
- ◆ They usually spawn further debate
- ◆ “Success” is hard to measure
- ◆ No consistent, agreed system, formula, format, or process for producing these documents, or the ideas in them.

1497

Why weren't they all similar?

Question:

- ◆ Why strategies, vision, policies, doctrines, etc.?

Answer:

- ◆ Different eras & different problems require different kinds of documents
- ◆ CNOs feel different needs
- ◆ US Navy generally indifferent to nomenclature issues

1498

What can they potentially influence?

	Inside U.S. Navy	Inside U.S. government	Adversaries	Allies
Policy & Grand Strategy	X	X	X	X
Employment Strategy (OPS & Training)	X	X	X	X
Acquisition Strategy	X	X	X	X
Morale, confidence, unity of effort	X	X	X	X

1499

What can they potentially influence? DOTMLPF

DoctrineOrganizationTrainingMaterialLeadership & educationPersonnelFacilities

- ◆ Developed for analyzing operational deficiencies
- ◆ Acronym gained currency within DoD in 2000s
- ◆ Capstone documents can help ensure consistency

1500

What can capstone documents do?


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- ◆ If “successful”, they can:
 - ◆ Create or contribute to a “general climate of opinion” re: present & future purposes, uses, & forces of the Navy
 - ◆ Borrows from Dr. Warner R. Schilling’s analysis of the role of Congressional oversight
 - ◆ Avoid (to paraphrase Dr. Samuel Huntington):
 - ◆ Confusion by the American public and its political leaders as to the Navy’s role
 - ◆ Uncertainty as to the necessity of the Navy’s existence
 - ◆ Apathy or hostility to the Navy’s claims upon the resources of society

1501

Have the documents been “successful”?

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1502

Have the documents been “Successful?”

- ◆ How to measure?
- ◆ What factors made for success?
- ◆ Issues:
 - ◆ Measuring outputs: Very difficult
 - ◆ Measuring inputs: Easier
 - ◆ Secondary effects of documents
 - ◆ The problem of reciprocal causality

1503

Measuring outputs

- ◆ What is “success”?
- ◆ How do you measure it?

1504

Outputs: How measure “Success?” (I)



- ◆ Effect on joint, DOD, national security, & allied policy & strategy
- ◆ Retain/regain/enhance USN freedom to shape its own destiny
- ◆ Have desired effect on the adversary/adversaries
- ◆ Become central message & *lingua franca* of USN policy- and decision-makers & their staffs
 - ◆ Resource for OPNAV documents, flag officer speeches & testimony
 - ◆ Real influence or “lip service”?

1505

Outputs: How measure “Success?” (II)



- ◆ Influence USN programmatic decisions
 - ◆ Usually stated as a goal; rarely achieved
 - ◆ Legacy programs, OSD guidance, technology push are primary program drivers
 - ◆ Hard for Navy strategy/concepts/policy/doctrine to compete as influence
 - ◆ Hard to discern cause and effect due to complexity of intervening layers of processes
 - ◆ But, NSPGs & *Navy Strategic Plan* attempt(ed) to measure

1506

Outputs: How measure “Success?” (III)



- ◆ Increase integration of USN platforms, systems & communities
- ◆ Influence fleet operations, exercises, war games, training & analyses
- ◆ Stimulate internal USN conceptual & strategic thinking & debate
- ◆ Better USN reputation for intellectual thought
 - ◆ Within DOD & externally

1507

Outputs: How measure “Success?” (IV)



- ◆ Effect on subsequent documents
 - ◆ Mostly positive in the past
 - ◆ But some negative reactions
 - ◆ *Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy vs Project SIXTY*

1508

Measuring inputs



- ◆ Three naval experts re: Alignment
- ◆ Government Accountability Office (GAO)
 - ◆ Identified 6 major characteristics of a strategy
 - ◆ Identified 27 element of those characteristics
- ◆ Library of Congress Congressional Research Service (CRS)
 - ◆ Identified 9 considerations in evaluating strategies
- ◆ CNA research, workshops, interviews, & other solicited expert inputs
 - ◆ Factors contributing to “success”
 - ◆ Checklist

1509

4 experts re: Alignment as “success”



- ◆ Contrasting views
 - ◆ George Baer & Joe Bouchard: Alignment with national policy
 - ◆ Roger Barnett also: Alignment with Navy strategic culture & Sam Bateman
 - ◆ Sam Bateman also: Convincing to politician appropriators also: Persuasive to friends & allies & credibly threatening to potential adversaries
- ◆ Is such “success” a sufficient criterion?
- ◆ Should USN have **not** written documents in 1970s?
- ◆ How can documents shape the future if they are tied to current culture?
- ◆ How can this “success” be measured?

GAO: 6 desirable characteristics of a strategy



- I. Purpose, scope & methodology
- II. Problems, risks & threats
- III. Goals, objectives, activities & performance measures
- IV. Resources, investments & risk management
- V. Organizational roles, responsibilities, & coordination mechanism
- VI. Integration among & with other entities

1511

GAO: 6 desirable characteristics of a strategy



In other words...

- I. Why was it produced? What's the scope of its coverage? What's the process by which it was developed?
- II. What problems & threats is it directed toward?
- III. What's it trying to achieve? What steps will achieve those results? What priorities, milestones, and performance measures gauge results?

1512

GAO: 6 desirable characteristics of a strategy

CNA

- IV. What'll it cost? What are the sources & types of resources & investments needed? Where should resources & investments be targeted by balancing risk reductions & costs?
- V. Who will be implementing the strategy? What'll their roles be compared to others? What mechanisms coordinate their efforts?
- VI. How does the strategy relate to other strategies' goals, objectives & activities? To subordinate levels and their plans to implement the strategy?

1513

GAO: The 27 elements of a strategy (I)

CNA

- I. Purpose, scope & methodology
 - 1. Identify the impetus that led to the strategy being written
 - 2. Discuss the strategy's purpose
 - 3. Define or discuss key terms, major functions, mission areas or activities
 - 4. Discuss the process that produced the strategy
 - 5. Discuss the assumptions or principles & theories that guided the strategy's development

1514

GAO: The 27 elements of a strategy (II)



II. Problems, risks & threats

6. Discuss or define the problems the strategy intends to address
7. Discuss the causes of the problems
8. Discuss the operating environment
9. Discuss the threats at which the strategy is directed
10. Discuss quality of data available, e.g.: constraints, deficiencies, unknowns

1515

GAO: The 27 elements of a strategy (III)



III. Goals, objectives, activities, & performance measures

11. Address overall results desired, "end state"
12. Identify strategic goals & subordinate objectives
13. Identify specific activities to achieve results
14. Address priorities, milestones, & outcome-related performance measures
15. Identify process to monitor & report on progress
16. Identify limitations on progress indicators

1516

GAO: The 27 elements of a strategy (IV)



IV. Resources, investments & risk management

17. Identify what the strategy will cost
18. Identify the sources & types of resources or investments needed
19. Address where resources or investments should be targeted to balance risks & costs
20. Address resource allocation mechanisms
21. Identify risk management principles and how they help implementers prioritize & allocate resources

1517

GAO: The 27 elements of a strategy (V)



V. Organization roles, responsibilities, & coordination mechanism

22. Address who will implement the strategy
23. Address lead, support and partner roles & responsibilities of specific organizations
24. Address mechanisms and/or processes for parties to coordinate efforts
25. Identify processes for resolving conflicts

1518

GAO: The 27 elements of a strategy (VI)



VI. Integration among & with other entities

26. Address how the strategy relates to strategies of other organizations, *horizontally*
27. Address integration with relevant documents from higher authority & subordinate organizations, *vertically*

1519

CRS: 9 considerations for evaluating strategies



1. Frequency
2. Synchronization of timelines
3. Clear relationships among strategic documents
4. Prioritization
5. Roles & responsibilities
6. Fiscal constraints
7. Competition of ideas
8. Intended audience
9. Timeframe

1520

CRS: 9 considerations for evaluating strategies

CNA

1. Frequency

- ◆ How often should strategies be changed and updated?

2. Synchronization of timelines

- ◆ Are superior & subordinate strategies issued in a logical sequence?

3. Clear relationships among strategic documents

- ◆ Are types of strategy documents sufficiently different from each other to warrant separate publication?

1521

1

CRS: Considerations for evaluating strategies: 4-6

CNA

4. Prioritization

- ◆ Are objectives and missions prioritized?

5. Roles & responsibilities

- ◆ Do strategy documents assign responsibilities for carrying out missions?

6. Fiscal constraints

- ◆ Has the strategy been fiscally constrained?

1522

CRS: Considerations for evaluating strategies: 7-9



7. Competition of ideas

- ◆ Was the strategy created through a competition of ideas?
- ◆ Is an alternative document also being published to provide a competitive mechanism, once the strategy is published?

8. Intended audience

- ◆ Who is the intended audience?
- ◆ Has the strategy been classified appropriately for its audience?

9. Timeframe

- ◆ Does the strategy address the current situation or the future?

1523

What factors contribute to “Success”? (I)



- ◆ From CNA research, workshops, interviews:
 - ◆ No competing USN “capstone documents”
 - ◆ One capstone document at a time
 - ◆ CLAS & UNCLAS versions
 - ◆ Satisfy a real need by OPNAV, fleet & nation
 - ◆ Show how all NCCs & fleet commanders fit
 - ◆ Time release of the document for maximum impact
 - ◆ Tie to national policy & joint & coalition strategy, explicitly & implicitly

1524

What factors contribute to “Success”? (II)



- ◆ From CNA research, workshops, interviews:
 - ◆ Acknowledge joint, sister service & allied relationships
 - ◆ Push or real buy-in by the CNO. CNO signs
 - ◆ Continuity across CNO terms
 - ◆ Real buy-in by cross-section of senior OPNAV & Fleet flags
 - ◆ One or two champions not enough
 - ◆ USMC buy-in
 - ◆ Simplicity & power of title, core elements, structure
 - ◆ Reduce central message to a few simple concepts

What factors contribute to “Success”? (III)



- ◆ From CNA research, workshops, interviews:
 - ◆ Plan dissemination; seize all distro opportunities
 - ◆ Start with a briefing, then wide multi-media distro
 - ◆ Relate to Navy as a whole, not just a collection of individual communities, but ensure all important communities are addressed to ensure buy-in
 - ◆ Ensure threat characterizations are supported by Intel community & administration
 - ◆ Build on what came before OR lead/reflect changes

1526

What factors contribute to “Success”? (IV)



- ◆ From CNA research, workshops, interviews:
 - ◆ Use plain English
 - ◆ What the Fleet, the Congress, the public, allies, & adversaries understand
 - ◆ Involve all USN intellectual institutions in some fashion:
 - ◆ OPNAV, CEP, ONI, SSG, NWC academics & War Gaming Center, NPS, NWDC, Naval Institute, CNA, etc.,
 - ◆ Especially Naval War College:
 - ◆ For substance & for cachet
 - ◆ Choose specialists as drafters
 - ◆ Allocate sufficient manpower & dollar resources

1527

What factors contribute to “Success”? (V)



- ◆ From CNA research, workshops, interviews:
 - ◆ Tough internal criticism, discussion, debate, at AO & flag levels
 - ◆ Know how to handle attacks
 - ◆ Incorporate valid ideas
 - ◆ Stick to your guns
 - ◆ Consider effects on adversaries

1528

Secondary Consequences (I)

- ◆ Influence on other services
 - ◆ USN routinely briefs to other service colleges
- ◆ Often strong influence on allied & coalition naval thinking
 - ◆ Affects their support for USN
 - ◆ Affects how they present themselves to their own parliaments, MODs
 - ◆ USN routinely briefs strategies & concepts at ISS, Navy talks, etc.


1529

Secondary Consequences (II)

- ◆ Influence on civilian national security specialists & academia
 - ◆ Reflected in education of next generation of policy wonks (including USN officers in graduate education)
- ◆ Influence on adversaries
- ◆ Influence on contractors
- ◆ Open debate on US naval policy and strategy

1530

Problem: Disentangling “reciprocal causality”



1531

Reciprocal causality: Strategies & force goals (I)

- ◆ Do capstone documents **drive** or **justify** force goals?
 - ◆ Classic “chicken and-egg” issue
- ◆ On surface, they seem to **justify** them, *ex post facto*
 - ◆ Force goal announcements often **precede** publication of capstone documents
 - ◆ “600-ship Navy” goal preceded *Maritime Strategy* publication
 - ◆ 450-ship DOD Base Force goal preceded *The Way Ahead* & ... *From the Sea*
 - ◆ 346-ship “Bottom-Up Review” goal preceded *Forward... From the Sea*
 - ◆ 313-ship CNO goal preceded *A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century*

1532

Reciprocal causality: Strategies & force goals (II)

- ◆ Truth is more complicated
 - ◆ Same ideas & concepts often drive both force level goal decisions & capstone document contents
 - ◆ Force levels & capstone documents are developed at different paces
 - ◆ Force level goal decisions are often driven by tight deadlines mandated by external authorities
 - ◆ Capstone documents normally originate from internal USN tasking.
 - ◆ Deadlines can & do slip
 - ◆ Need for internal USN inclusiveness lengthens capstone document development processes
 - ◆ Some capstone documents try to drive the **next round** of force level goal development
 - ◆ . . . *From the Sea* preceded "Bottom Up Review" (BUR) (1993)
 - ◆ *A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century* preceded "QDR 2009"

1533

CNOs usually matter . . . A lot

- ◆ CNO has 2 main roles
 - ◆ Provide professional naval advice to President, SECDEF, CJCS, SECNAV, other chiefs
 - ◆ Craft Navy program & budget recommendations
- ◆ Timing & nature of CNO capstone document involvement is a vital contributor to success
- ◆ Each CNO has taken a different approach

1534

SECNAVs sometimes matter



◆ Examples

- ◆ Claytor & *Sea Plan 2000*
- ◆ Lehman & *The Maritime Strategy*
- ◆ O'Keefe & ...*From the Sea*
- ◆ Dalton & *Forward...From the Sea*
- ◆ Danzig abortive initiatives
- ◆ England & *Naval Power 21*
- ◆ Winter speech at ISS 2007

1535

Goals of a CNO capstone document (I)



◆ Internal to the Navy

- ◆ Show linkages among current initiatives
- ◆ Lend coherence to USN force structure
- ◆ Build internal USN cohesion & esprit
- ◆ Integrate internal USN communities
- ◆ Focus exercise, war gaming, experimental, education, training efforts

1536

Goals of a CNO capstone document (II)

CNA

- ◆ External to the Navy
 - ◆ Demonstrate that USN leadership is:
 - ◆ Thoughtful
 - ◆ Consistent with national & joint policy
 - ◆ In step with or ahead of the times
 - ◆ Highly trustworthy tool of national policy
 - ◆ Has a compelling rationale for its desired new acquisitions
 - ◆ Give sister & allied services a sense of how best to partner with USN
 - ◆ Contribute to deterrence and perception management of potential adversaries
 - ◆ Shape and leverage national security policy documents

1537

Impediments to overcome (I)

CNA

- ◆ Opposition on substantive grounds: “Wrong strategy” or “Wrong vision”
- ◆ Other influences drive force structure decisions beside USN strategies or visions
- ◆ Warfare/platform communities retain power
- ◆ Administration changes
- ◆ Next USN strategy/concept follows too soon
- ◆ Low relevance to actual fleet ops
- ◆ Navy leadership changes

1538

Impediments to overcome (II)

- ◆ Joint system opposed to “service strategies”
- ◆ Lack of USN appreciation of influence of these documents
- ◆ USN officer focus often tactical vice strategic
- ◆ USN “wariness of doctrine”
- ◆ Internal USN “turf” issues
- ◆ Fear of debate and discussion
- ◆ Navy-Marine Corps issues

1539

Impediment to overcome (III)

- ◆ “Practically the entire OPNAV organization is tuned, like a tuning fork, to the vibrations of the budgetary process... {T}here is a vast preoccupation with budgetary matters at the expense of considering planning, or readiness or requirements, or operational characteristics or any of the other elements contributing to the ability of the Fleets to fight.”

—OP-03G (Fleet Ops) memo
To OP-090 (Program Planning)
(Sept 1970)

1540

Little fleet demand for/ influence on documents

- ◆ Some exceptions:
 - ◆ Hayward's *Future of U.S. Seapower*
 - ◆ Elements of *The Maritime Strategy*
 - ◆ "Desert Storm" influences on ...*From the Sea*
 - ◆ OEF and OIF influences on *Fleet Response Plan*
 - ◆ Others?
- ◆ But...all "Washington" documents have been initiated & drafted by recent (& future) fleet sailors

1541

Links to fleet operations

- ◆ *Future of U.S. Seapower* (1979) had been conceived and exercised in the Pacific Fleet
- ◆ *The Maritime Strategy* (1980s) was reflected in and based on real-world ops and exercises
- ◆ ...*From the Sea* (1992) & *Forward...From the Sea* (1994) reflected real-world operations and deployments
- ◆ *Fleet Response Plan* (2003) altered fleet schedules, was demonstrated in *Summer Pulse '04*
- ◆ A *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* was reflected in post-9/11 real-world HCA and maritime security operations

1542

Why so few links to the fleet?

- ◆ Fleet operations are directed by SECDEF, CJCS, CINCs/CCDRs & their staffs
- ◆ Not directed by SECNAV or CNO or OPNAV
- ◆ SECNAV, CNO & OPNAV are focused on Navy programs, budgets, acquisition, relations with USMC, & fostering Navy institutional unity
 - ◆ Documents usually reflect this focus

1543

Links to USN budget requests

- ◆ Issues:
 - ◆ To link explicitly or not
 - ◆ One document or a family documents
 - ◆ Presentations to Capital Hill
 - ◆ The SECNAV Lehman “tripartite” message
 - ◆ Stand-alone strategy presentations

1544

Who should do what re: USN strategy?


CNA
Center for Naval Analysis

- ◆ CNO?
- ◆ OPNAV N3/N5?
- ◆ CNO special assistants?
- ◆ USFF?
- ◆ Navy component commanders (NCCs)?
- ◆ Naval War College?
- ◆ Navy Warfare Development Command?
- ◆ Contractors?
- ◆ U.S. Naval Institute?

1545

Why so many documents?

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DILBERT: (c) Scott Adams/Dist. by United Feature Syndicate, Inc.

Why so many documents? (I)

- ◆ Conditions change
- ◆ National policies & strategies change
- ◆ Personalities change
- ◆ It was ever thus:
 - ◆ *War Plan Orange*
 - ◆ 27 versions in 36 years

1547

Why so many documents? (II)

- ◆ Conditions change
 - ◆ Ending of the Vietnam War
 - ◆ Iran Revolution & Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
 - ◆ Gorbachev regime in USSR
 - ◆ End of the Cold War
 - ◆ Tiananmen Square incident
 - ◆ Desert Storm victory
 - ◆ Taiwan Straits crisis
 - ◆ USS Cole (DDG-67) terrorist attack
 - ◆ Al Qaeda attacks on America
 - ◆ Extension of the wars in Afghanistan & Iraq
 - ◆ Economic conditions change

1548

Why so many documents? (III)

- ◆ National policies & strategies change
 - ◆ 8 Presidential administrations
 - ◆ 14 National Security Strategies (since 1987)
 - ◆ 2 National Defense Strategies (since 2005)
 - ◆ 5 National Military Strategies (since 1992)
 - ◆ 3 Quadrennial Defense Reviews (since 1997)
 - ◆ Numerous Presidential directives & strategies
 - ◆ Treaties & changes in US public law
 - ◆ Numerous PPBS guidance & other DOD directives
 - ◆ Numerous JSPS documents & joint doctrine pubs
 - ◆ Other defense reviews

1549

Why so many documents? (IV)

- ◆ Personalities change
 - ◆ 8 Presidents
 - ◆ 13 Secretaries of Defense
 - ◆ 11 Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 - ◆ 15 Secretaries of the Navy
 - ◆ 11 Chiefs of Naval Operations
 - ◆ 21 DCNOs for Plans, Policy & Operations (OP-06/N3/N5)
 - ◆ 100+ Other thoughtful, activist OPNAV VCNOs, Special Assistants, DCOSs, ACOSs, Division Directors, Branch Heads, Deputies, Action Officers, Contractors
 - ◆ Naval War College Presidents & professors
 - ◆ NAVDOCCOM & NWDC commanders

1550

Better analysis needed: I. Assessment

- ◆ This was a brief initial assessment
- ◆ More rigorous analyses could prove helpful
- ◆ E.g., assess influence & impact of each on:
 - ◆ USN ops, plans, training recommendations & decisions
 - ◆ By the President, SECDEF, CJCS, CCDRs
 - ◆ By USN commanders
 - ◆ USN force structure recommendations & decisions
 - ◆ By the Congress, President, SECDEF, OSD
 - ◆ By OPNAV
- ◆ One updated document ('80s) vs. several ('90s)
 - ◆ Which is more effective approach?
 - ◆ Don't the times drive this?

1551

Better analysis needed: II. MOEs

- ◆ How to measure success?
 - ◆ Budget share?
 - ◆ Operational effectiveness?
 - ◆ Acquisition-operations alignment?
 - ◆ Favorable press reports?
 - ◆ Preservation of autonomy?
 - ◆ Richness of the debate?
 - ◆ Other?

1552

Better analysis needed: III. Processes

CNA

- ◆ Need to flesh out each case study
- ◆ Discuss strategic planning processes
- ◆ Disentangle causes and effects

1553

Better analysis needed: IV. Expansion

CNA

- ◆ Go farther back in time
- ◆ Trace USMC experience
- ◆ Trace USA, USAF, USCG, joint experiences
- ◆ Trace foreign experiences

1554

Outline



- I. Introduction
- II. How each document was written
- III. Comparisons, constants & changes
- IV. Analyzing capstone documents
- V. How to write the next one** 

1555

How to write the next one



- ◆ Checklist of questions for discussion & debate
- ◆ Recommendations & best practices

1556

Our approach



Providing contemporary strategists with a general understanding of how the strategic policymaking process has worked in the past may help that process to work better in the present and future.

Nothing can provide policy-makers with the right answers to the challenges that confront them. But history suggests the questions they should ask

While variables have different effects . . . from one era to another, some of them recur with impressive regularity.

Williamson Murray & Mark Grimsby
"Introduction: On Strategy"
The Making of Strategy (1994)

1557

Checklist: 7 phases of document creation*



1. **Conceiving** (Why?)
2. **Crafting** (How?)
3. **Coordinating** (Who?)
4. **Producing** (What?)
5. **Presenting** (When?)
6. **Distributing** (Where?)
7. **Measuring** (How well?)

*Maj Barbara J. Faulkenberry USAF

Global Reach– Global Power: *Air Force Strategic Vision, Past and Future* (1996)

1558

8. Implementing (so what?)

*Not identified by Maj Faulkenberry

1559

1. Conceiving (“why?”)

- ◆ Why do you want to write this?
 - ◆ What message are you trying to send?
 - ◆ What effects are you trying to achieve?
- ◆ If you change your purpose while the document is still being developed, how will you ensure your course correction is reflected for the remainder of the process?
- ◆ What *kind of* message are you trying to send?
 - ◆ “Strategy”? “Policy”? “Concept”? “Vision”? “Doctrine”?
 - ◆ Other?
 - ◆ Why?

1560

USN capstone document checklist (II)



Conceiving (continued)

- ◆ Why do you want to write this *now*?
 - ◆ Why shouldn't you wait? Are there documents from higher authority that need to be in place first?
- ◆ Are you trying to *lead* new national policy, *follow* current national policy, or *change* current national policy? Why? How will your new document do this?
- ◆ Or is this a primarily internal document, accepting national policy as a given?

1561

USN capstone document checklist (III)



Conceiving (continued)

- ◆ Why does your agenda merit a *new*, separate document?
 - ◆ Have you found out what all the existing current US Navy capstone documents are?
 - ◆ Why not just update an already existing document?
- ◆ Who is your intended *audience*? Why?
 - ◆ How will you ensure that the document is appropriate for that audience?
 - ◆ Is the audience supposed to use the document in its own existing processes? How?
 - ◆ What else do you want your audience to do with this document? Why?

1562

USN capstone document checklist (IV)



2. Crafting ("how")?

- ◆ Who will be the document's "champion(s)" in the Navy?
Why? How senior will he/they be? How much time will they be able to devote to developing the document?
- ◆ How committed is the CNO to this effort? If "not very", then why are you doing it & why will it matter?
- ◆ Who will do the actual drafting and vetting? Why?
- ◆ What will they do/read to prepare themselves for this task? Why?
- ◆ Who will be their immediate supervisors? Why?
- ◆ How often, intensively, and directly will the actual authors of the strategy interface with its senior champions? The CNO?

1563

USN capstone document checklist (V)



Crafting (continued)

- ◆ What steps will the document development process take?
- ◆ What else will you do to validate your ideas besides seniors correcting the writing of juniors? Why?
 - ◆ How? Conferences? VTCs? War games? Exercises? Analyses? Journal articles? Solicitation of outside opinions? Murder boards by potential critics? Other?
- ◆ Will there be a "competition of ideas" in developing your document? Why?
 - ◆ If so, who will the competitors be, how will they compete, and how will the winners be decided?

1564

USN capstone document checklist (VI)

CNA

Crafting (continued)

- ◆ How big an investment will you make in personnel & dollars in this effort? Where will the personnel & dollars come from?
- ◆ Will the development process spawn spin-off documents? Why? How?

1565

USN capstone document checklist (VII)

CNA

3. Coordinating (“who”?)

- ◆ What USN intellectual, staff, fleet elements will contribute? Why? How? When?
 - ◆ What roles for OPNAV? CEP? NAVWARCOL? NPS? NWDC? FFC? Fleet staffs? CNA? Why? How?
- ◆ What roles for HQMC? MCCDC? USCG HQ? Others?
- ◆ Will the SECNAV be involved? How? Why? When?
 - ◆ What role for the Secretariat? Which offices?
- ◆ Will you solicit inputs from other services? Other navies? Why? How? When?
- ◆ How open & public will the development process be? Why?
- ◆ Will you solicit inputs from academia? Other outside experts? Capitol Hill? The press? Defense industry? Interested citizens? Why? How? When?

1566

USN capstone document checklist (VIII)



4. Producing (“what?”)

- ◆ What will it say that does what you want?
- ◆ Will it be classified, unclassified, or both? Why?
- ◆ How explicitly will it be tied to current administration policies? Which ones? Why?
- ◆ How internally inclusive will it be? Why?
 - ◆ Reference to which USN communities, roles, missions, capabilities, commands?
- ◆ If the audience is supposed to use the document in its own existing processes, how will you organize the document so that those processes can be fit into it?

1567

USN capstone document checklist (IX)



Producing (continued)

- ◆ Will you use agreed DoD joint definitions, recent & current Navy usage, or invent a new vocabulary? Why?
- ◆ How “maritime” will it be? Why?
 - ◆ Reference to USMC? USCG? Sealift? Merchant marine? Shipbuilding? Industrial base? Bases?
 - ◆ Passing reference or in-depth treatment? Why?
- ◆ How joint will it be? Why?
 - ◆ How explicit re: JCS? COCOMs? USAF? US Army?
 - ◆ To what extent will it be nested within current joint strategy/concepts/vision? Why? (or why not?)
- ◆ How “interagency” will it be? Why?

1568

USN capstone document checklist (X)



Producing (continued)

- ◆ How allied will it be? Why?
- ◆ How explicitly will threats be treated? Why?
- ◆ What intel sources will you use? Why?
- ◆ How will you guard against mirror-imaging? Against attributing preferred strategies to threats? Against assuming current & future threats will necessarily be similar to most recent past threats?
- ◆ Have you thought through how exactly to deal with each postulated threat, and its estimated strategy?
- ◆ How much of this will you discuss in this document? Why?
- ◆ If not in this document, then where? Why? How?

1569

USN capstone document checklist (XI)



Producing (continued)

- ◆ Which other current, on-going USN policy initiatives will be included? Which excluded? Why?
- ◆ Will it deal with the present, the future or both? Why?
- ◆ If it deals with the future, how far out will it look? Why?
- ◆ How abstract will it be? Why? How concrete & descriptive of reality? Why? What will be the balance? Why?
- ◆ How many lists of what kinds of elements will the document contain? Why?

1570

USN capstone document checklist (XII)

CNA

Producing (continued)

- ◆ When you list your document's elements, will you *prioritize* those lists? If not, why not?
- ◆ Will responsibilities be identified for each element? If not, why not?
- ◆ Will you build on, refute, or ignore the immediately preceding USN capstone documents? Why?
- ◆ What will be your central organizing framework? A variant of Turner's "Missions of the Navy"? Of the peace-crisis-war spectrum? Of the Sea Power 21 pillars? Something else? More than one framework? Why?
- ◆ Will you address current & impending operations, priorities & concerns in the fleet? Why? (or why not?) And if so, how?

1571

USN capstone document checklist (XIII)

CNA

Producing (continued)

- ◆ Will the various elements of your document be fiscally constrained? Why? How?
- ◆ Will you address current & impending OPNAV programming, budgeting and acquisition priorities & concerns? Why? (or why not?) And if so, how?
- ◆ What is the relationship between the document and a particular Navy force level goal, if any? Why? How will the document treat this relationship? Why?

1572

USN capstone document checklist (XIV)



Producing (continued)

- ◆ What title will you give your document? Why?
- ◆ What past or current official & public documents will you research and/or cite, if any? Why?
- ◆ Will your document include action items? Why?
 - ◆ Will it assign responsibilities for those action items? If not, why not?
 - ◆ What processes will be in place to monitor achievement of these items?
- ◆ How long will it be? Does it matter? Why?
- ◆ How much time will you take to develop it? Why? Is it sufficient?

1573

USN capstone document checklist (XV)



Producing (continued)

- ◆ What criticisms do you anticipate? How will you answer them?
- ◆ Who will put it into clear professionally-edited English?
- ◆ Will it include a reading list? Why?
- ◆ Will it include uncertainties, unknowns, and/or alternatives? Why (or why not)?
- ◆ As producing the document proceeds, has the original purpose of the document been altered? If so, has the drafting kept up with the changes? What have you done to ensure the document remains coherent & focused, despite the changes? What have you had to discard/ put in a separate document? Why?

1574

USN capstone document checklist (XVI)



5. Presenting (“when”?)

- ◆ Is the Navy ready to defend it in public? How?
- ◆ Exactly when will it be published? Why?
 - ◆ Have all relevant factors been considered regarding timing of publication?
- ◆ Who will sign it? Why?
- ◆ What will it look like physically? Why?
- ◆ What will the cover design look like? Why?
- ◆ Will you use maps? Diagrams? Pictures? How many? How few? Of what? Why?

1575

USN capstone document checklist (XVII)



5. Presenting (“when”?)

- ◆ Who will do the presenting? To which audiences? Why?
 - ◆ What – if any -- will be the roles of the CNO? The SECNAV? The OPSDEP? Other senior Navy flag officers? CHINFO? OLA? The Naval War College? The drafters? Others? Other naval service chiefs & staffs?
 - ◆ Why?
- ◆ What will you do, if anything, to ensure internal Navy buy-in by officers? By enlisted? By DON civilians? Why?

1576

USN capstone document checklist (XVIII)

CNA

Presenting (continued)

- ◆ How will you ensure that there are few if any *competing* Navy messages being presented at the same time?
- ◆ How will the document be sustained when its present champions & authors go on to other assignments?
- ◆ Will you chronicle your document's goals & your development efforts for posterity? Why?
 - ◆ If so, what have you done to ensure this?
- ◆ After publication, will you foster further "competition of ideas" (e.g.: A Team B)? Why (or why not)?
 - ◆ If so, how will you do this?

1577

USN capstone document checklist (XIX)

CNA

6. Distributing ("where")?

- ◆ Is there a media campaign plan for distribution of the document's message? If not, why not?
- ◆ Who is responsible to carry it out? To monitor & change it as necessary? Why?
- ◆ What audiences should receive the most attention? Why?
- ◆ How wide & in what depth will you target each audience? Why?
- ◆ If there are multiple intended audiences, do you have multiple methods of reaching them?
- ◆ What media will you use to publish it? Why?
 - ◆ What new emerging media should be examined?

1578

USN capstone document checklist (XX)

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Distributing (continued)

- ◆ Exactly how and when will it be disseminated to each desired audience? Why?
 - ◆ The U.S. public at large?
 - ◆ Congress?
 - ◆ US government national security leadership?
 - ◆ US government national security departments, sister services, joint commands & staffs, agencies?
 - ◆ Uniformed Navy and Navy civilians?
 - ◆ US national security & naval affairs specialists?
 - ◆ Other US opinion leaders?
 - ◆ Defense industry?
 - ◆ Foreign navies?
 - ◆ Actual & potential foreign allies & friends?
 - ◆ Actual & potential foreign competitors or adversaries?

1579

USN capstone document checklist (XXI)

CNA
Center for National Defense

7. Measuring (“how well?”)

- ◆ Is it accomplishing what you wanted? Did it achieve its desired effects?
- ◆ How do you know?
- ◆ What methods will you use to measure the effects of your document? Why?
- ◆ Once published & disseminated, what, if any, have been its unintended consequences?
- ◆ How will you document & disseminate lessons learned, for future efforts

1580

USN capstone document checklist (XXII)



♦ 8. Implementing (So what?)*

- ♦ When will you start planning for implementation? Why?
- ♦ What will you do to ensure the document is affecting:
 - ♦ Navy operations?
 - ♦ Navy billet selection & personnel promotion practices?
 - ♦ Navy programs, budgets & acquisition?
 - ♦ Navy exercises
 - ♦ Navy education, training and war gaming?
 - ♦ Navy doctrine, tactics, techniques & procedures?
 - ♦ Navy inputs to national, inter-agency, defense and joint policies, concepts & strategy?
 - ♦ Allied, coalition, partner and other friendly forces?

*Not part of the original USAF list re: Document creation

1581

USN capstone document checklist (XXIII)



♦ Implementing (continued)

- ♦ Who will direct implementation? Why? How?
- ♦ Who will keep track of implementation? Why? How?
- ♦ If your document identified alternatives, uncertainties, unknowns, risks, etc., how will the Navy try to resolve them after publication?
- ♦ When will you start writing the *next* document? Why?

1582

USN can/will never satisfy all critics

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- ◆ The same documents have been criticized for being:
 - ◆ Too long; too short
 - ◆ Too general & vague; too specific & detailed
 - ◆ Too highly classified; not classified highly enough
 - ◆ Not constrained enough by existing program realities; too constrained by existing program realities
 - ◆ Too narrowly naval; too joint & inclusive
 - ◆ Too tied to past & present experience; not anchored enough in past & present experience
 - ◆ Not novel and “out of the box” enough; too unrealistic
 - ◆ Too plainly presented; too slick and glossy

1583

Best practices/recommendations (I)

CNA
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- ◆ Ensure the Navy’s highest leadership – primarily the CNO -- really wants to do this & has an agenda
- ◆ Ensure the document’s drafters have direct, frequent & intensive access to its flag-level champions & the CNO
- ◆ Obtain & publicize new CNO endorsement quickly
- ◆ Keep core messages few & simple
- ◆ Choose a simple, basic, memorable construct
- ◆ Avoid excessive length & -- more important -- complexity
- ◆ Keep the number of lists of elements to a minimum

1584

Best practices/recommendations (II)

- ◆ Spend time on it
 - ◆ A smart, respected officer can dash off a paper & get it signed by the CNO quickly. But this will reduce staff & fleet buy-in, ignore potentially vital inputs from others, & prevent polishing & refining
- ◆ Spend money on it
 - ◆ Travel, workshops, conferences & media cost money. Scrimping, however, will result in a document nobody has heard of ; knows how/why to use; or wants to use
- ◆ Link ideas in document to broader national & world political, economic, military & social factors

1585

Best practices/recommendations (III)

- ◆ Strategy is not a game of solitaire. Understand the strategies & concepts of potential adversaries
 - ◆ Use agreed national intelligence
 - ◆ Avoid mirror-imaging, attributing a USN-preferred strategy to adversaries, &/or extrapolating uncritically from past threats
 - ◆ If classified & unclassified intel estimates diverge greatly in substance and/or tone, consider publication of classified & unclassified document versions
 - ◆ Consider effect of the document on adversary perceptions, intentions & capabilities
 - ◆ Consider role of document in adversary perception management

1586

Best practices/recommendations (IV)

- ◆ If this is a statement of Navy strategy, it should think through & lay out how to deal with the maritime components of all estimated strategies of all important estimated threats
- ◆ If it is not a statement of strategy, it should provide the latest concepts, vision, doctrine etc. on which the USN will build & implement the range of its potential strategies
- ◆ Keep the document focused. If the focus must change due to changed CNO or other high-level guidance, ruthlessly cull material no longer relevant to the new purpose, perhaps putting it in a separate document.

1587

Best practices/recommendations (V)

- ◆ Explain how/why the Navy is vital to the country. Key off approved national security & defense strategy to maximum extent possible, esp. President-approved elements
- ◆ Show relationship of USN to other joint & allied actors
- ◆ Avoid overstating USN capabilities, uniqueness & self-sufficiency, and understating USN dependence on capabilities of others
- ◆ Wherever possible, set priorities & make choices among elements
- ◆ Give it a good name. Do it quickly and stick with it

1588

Best practices/recommendations (VI)

- ◆ If primary audiences are defense policy makers & naval officers, consider SECRET Briefing as primary document medium (Pentagon “lingua franca”)
- ◆ Seek to build linkages & get inputs across a wide spectrum of other entities while document is being drafted. Focus on those who will potentially use the document the most, and those whose opposition to it would hurt it the most
- ◆ Especially manage collegial development effort across OPNAV & fleet staffs: Leadership and action officers

1589

Best practices/recommendations (VII)

- ◆ Ensure document is in harmony with USN operational culture, to ensure acceptance. If document seeks to change that culture, lay rationale for the change out clearly, in fleet language
- ◆ Ensure strategy tracks with fleet ops & plans, or with fleet understanding of changes to ops & plans
- ◆ Ensure document is in a format that is *usable* by:
 - ◆ The fleet
 - ◆ OPNAV programmers
 - ◆ Navy concepts and doctrine drafters
 - ◆ Capitol Hill

1590

Best practices/ recommendations (VIII)



- ◆ Murder board. Murder board. Murder board.
 - ◆ Expose to relentless internal criticism while developing
 - ◆ Learn what external criticisms to expect, how to counter
- ◆ Publish in plain but polished, professionally-edited English
 - ◆ For internally-oriented documents, use DOD & Navy acronyms & jargon, to enhance credibility
 - ◆ For externally-oriented documents, avoid DOD & Navy acronyms & jargon, to enhance comprehension
 - ◆ For multi-target documents, strive to achieve a considered, judicious balance, to ensure both internal credibility as well as external comprehension

1591

Best practices/ recommendations (IX)



- ◆ Plan a multimedia approach to distribution
 - ◆ CNO media events, briefings, *Proceedings* article, brochure, book, journal articles, flag officer testimony & speeches, video, web, blogs, NDP/NWP, CLAS, UNCLAS
- ◆ Dissemination: Repeat. Repeat. Repeat
- ◆ Don't overload the document with slick but random photos & graphics. They can obscure your message. Every graphic should have a clear purpose.

1592

Best practices/ recommendations (X)

- ◆ Be careful how you present it on Capitol Hill. Emphasize warfighting aspects & linkages to required force levels and systems, and to affordability
- ◆ Don't ignore development & content of Navy doctrine pubs. Others won't
- ◆ Don't levy taskings in document and then not follow through to ensure implementation
- ◆ Maintain consistency or at least complementarity with other contemporary Navy documents. If consistency not possible, cancel those documents

1593

Best practices/ recommendations (XI)

- ◆ Consider just updating an earlier document. There is virtue- and strength – in continuity. Plus it enables development downstream of implementing DOTMLPF
- ◆ Plan early how actually to implement the document's ideas through new DOTMLPF, while it is being written. This involves more than just planning how to get the word out.
- ◆ Once the document is out, actually implement it through DOTMLPF. This will take time & effort.

1594

Best practices/ recommendations (XII)

- ◆ Plan to measure the effects of the strategy while it is being written, then carry out the measurement
 - ◆ If you don't care what effect it has, why did you write it?
- ◆ Be mindful of – and use as appropriate – the Navy's past experience
 - ◆ Hence this study
- ◆ But avoid appearance of backward-looking, reactionary traditionalism & blind adherence to the past
 - ◆ A particular US Navy cliché & vulnerability
 - ◆ Navy routinely – and unjustly – criticized for this

1595

Best practices/ recommendations (XIII)

- ◆ Follow through on pursuing any alternatives, options, uncertainties , unknowns, etc. identified in your document, after it is published. They were identified to be resolved, not forgotten.

1596

Other useful recommendations to consider

- ◆ Track the debate
 - ◆ E.g.: annotated bibliography
 - ◆ To know some of its effects; to help inform & shape further promulgation & dissemination
- ◆ Have a historian(s) chronicle -- and publish & distribute -- what was done & why
 - ◆ Incl/ lessons learned for the future
 - ◆ Some options:
 - ◆ Embedded Naval Heritage & History Command historian
 - ◆ Naval War College historian
 - ◆ Naval History Reserve Unit, Naval Historical Foundation, US Naval Institute oral history interviews

1597

Macro recommendations (I)

- ◆ Foster knowledge of strategy development & of strategic-level issues among USN uniformed & civilian leaders
 - ◆ Consider adding appropriate books on capstone Navy document efforts to Navy Professional Reading Program (NPRP)
 - ◆ For "Senior Leaders" &/or "Department/Command Leaders"
 - ◆ Examples:
 - ◆ Dr. John B. Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986* (2004)
 - ◆ ADM James L. Holloway III, *Aircraft Carriers at War* (2007)
 - ◆ Edward S. Miller, *War Plan Orange* (1991)
 - ◆ ADM William A. Owens, *High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World* (1995)
 - ◆ ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. *On Watch* (1976)

1598

Macro recommendations (II)



- ◆ Foster specialized education & training of cadre of US Navy officers capable of orchestrating the next generation of Navy strategies, concepts, & capstone documents
 - ◆ Aggressive OPNAV N3/N5 Pol-Mil, Strategic Planning subspecialty community management critical
 - ◆ Optimize Naval Postgraduate School use
 - ◆ Optimize civilian graduate school use
 - ◆ In-house OPNAV education programs

1599

Macro recommendations (III)



- ◆ Foster interactions among strategy & policy specialists in OPNAV, ONI, NAVWARCOL, NPS, USNA, NWDC, CNA, other war colleges, allied navies, etc.
- ◆ Foster debate & discussion of Navy strategies, concepts, visions, etc.
 - ◆ Formal conferences & workshops
 - ◆ Teleconferences
 - ◆ Informal officer after-hours discussion groups
 - ◆ Blogs
 - ◆ Articles & retorts in *Proceedings, Naval War College Review, Submarine Review, Marine Corps Gazette, JFQ, Armed Forces Journal*, etc.

1600

Macro recommendations (IV)

- ◆ Foster validation, testing of strategies, concepts, visions etc. through:
 - ◆ Gaming
 - ◆ Quantitative & qualitative analysis
 - ◆ Historical analyses & analogies
 - ◆ At-sea exercises
 - ◆ Examination of real-world operations
 - ◆ Interaction with outside-the-Navy expertise
- ◆ Consider reviving exchange program to place USN strategists on USAF & Army Pentagon staffs & vice versa

1601

Macro recommendations (V)

- ◆ NB: Macro recommendations, like micro recommendations, require expenditure of
 - ◆ Money
 - ◆ Time
 - ◆ Leadership

1602

Macro recommendations (VI)

- ◆ Lessons from history
 - ◆ Clearly see yourself and potential adversaries
 - ◆ Weigh imponderables through structured debates
 - ◆ Squarely address issues that are bureaucratic orphans
 - ◆ Unerringly discern and prepare to strike the enemy's jugular
 - ◆ Cheerfully face the uncertainties of decision and the dangers of action

MacGregor Knox, "Conclusion"

The Making of Strategy (1994)

1603

Some questions for 2010

- ◆ What has been utility of
 - ◆ USN-USMC-USCG A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower? Why?
 - ◆ USN NSG ISO PR 11? NSP ISO POM-12? Why?
 - ◆ USN-USMC-USCG NOC 2009? Why?
 - ◆ USN-USMC-USCG NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2009)? Why?
- ◆ Should USN write its own *single-service NOC*, as tasked in NOC 2006? Why?
- ◆ Should USN write its own *single-service NDP 1*? Why?
- ◆ Should USN/USMC/USCG rewrite all documents in 2010 if new Obama Administration NSS, NDS & NMS appear in 2009? Why?

1604

Outline

CNA
The Center for Naval Analyses

- I. Introduction
- II. How each document was written
- III. Comparisons, constants & changes
- IV. Analyzing capstone documents
- V. How to write the next one

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